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Abstract
For thousands of years, people have been creating maps of the world around 
them as a means of understanding, navigating and controlling space. Cyberspace is the 
pre-eminent terra incognita of the twenty-first century and a wide range of maps and 
map-like visualisations have been produced to comprehend it. Many different aspects 
of cyberspace have been mapped, from the physical infrastructure, the data flows and 
customer statistics, to the emergent patterns of Web hyperlinks and the social 
structures of online forums. This thesis provides a discussion of the nature of these 
maps and visualisations, recognising them as complex socio-technical visual images 
open to multiple connotative interpretation, and imbued with political power and 
embedded in a wider socio-cultural milieu. The work is situated theoretically within 
contemporary cultural analyses of cartography, employing a hermeneutic epistemology 
and a non-progressive categorisation of cyberspace mapmaking practices into distinct, 
but overlapping and contested modes. The research questions tackled by the thesis are 
threefold, involving auditing how Internet infrastructures have been mapped, how 
these maps work semiotically and what is the nature of power they have to do work in 
the world.
The thesis is an empirically-focused interpretative approach applied to an 
important mode of cyberspace cartographies: those that map Internet infrastructures. 
These maps give a fascinating picture of what the Internet looks like, and, 
significantly, they also provide rich insights into how different interest groups want the 
Internet to look. The goal of the analysis is to understand both the design connotations 
of the cartographic signs and the political imaginings of maps of the Internet 
infrastructure and this proceeds via two detailed case studies. The first case study 
focuses on the connotative meaning and power of statistical mapping to represent the 
nature of the globalisation of Internet connectivity. The second case study critiques 
marketing maps that sell infrastructure access and are intimately bound up in 
promoting the notion of global network reach.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Now when I w as a little chap I had a passion for maps. I would look for hours at South 
America, or Africa, or Australia, and lose myself in all the glories of exploration. At that time 
there were many blank sp aces on the earth and when I found one that looked particularly 
inviting on a map (but they all look that) I would put my finger on it and say, ‘When I grow up 
I will go there’.
-  Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 1902.
I want to investigate in what ways this cartographic imaginary proliferates sp aces and the 
ways in which w e can live in them.
-  John Pickles, A History of Spaces, 2004.
1.1 Aims
This thesis is one of the outcomes of an ongoing, ten-year long, cybergeography 
research project focused on describing the various socio-spatial forms of 
cyberspace, analysing their supporting material infrastructures and understanding 
their implications for the geographical organisation of everyday living. The 
epistemological and philosophical approach I have taken is centred around the 
map as a process of knowledge construction and as social-material site for 
critique. The goal of the thesis is to provide an analysis of the semiotic meanings 
and political “imaginings’ of cyberspace cartographies through a critical reading 
of maps of Internet network infrastructures.
To understand the power of maps, particularly in contemporary Western 
capitalist contexts, one must grasp how they stir both the imagination and work 
instrumentally in the exploration and exploitation of new spaces. As Joseph 
Conrad’s narrator Marlow makes clear in the Heart o f Darkness, mapped 
representations open up space to the imagination. This cartographic imaginary, 
according to theorist John Pickles, is more than looking, it inspires action, it
11
Chapter One: Introduction
beckons space into being and needs to be understood in relationship to living 
within and through cyberspace \
Cyberspace is often portrayed as the pre-eminent ‘blank’ space of the twenty- 
first century, an alluring virtual terra incognita. The fact that its digitally- 
mediated territories are composed of software code rather than vast deserts or 
impenetrable jungle does not weaken the desire for exploration or the potency of 
the cartographic imaginary in representing it in particular ways for competing 
interests. Cyberspace cartographies are opening up unique ways to visually 
understand the complex, multivalent and intangible nature of virtual spaces. Yet, 
just like in the Heart o f  Darkness, the opening up of cyberspace through 
particular cartographic gazes also closes down some avenues of development and 
some of the latent potential of virtual space at the same time. A mapped space 
becomes a known place, a controllable territory that can be more effectively used 
by certain interests and groups over and above others.
Many different aspects of cyberspace have been mapped, ranging from the 
physical infi-astructure, the logical layers of data links, the routing details held in 
software code, traffic flows, customer statistics, hyperlink structures of the Web, 
the emergent patterns of social interaction, along with new interactive 
spatialisations^ to navigate in the myriad of online forums and information 
resources (see Dodge 2005 for examples). The maps cover a range of different 
scales from individual local area networks and single websites up to global scale 
visualisation of vast topological grids and the graphical exploration of the online 
social networks of millions of people. Some of the maps and spatialisations 
adhere to established conventions of cartographic design, but many more use 
different visual vocabularies. A few are beautiful and many more are really
' As pointed out by C. Board (viva, October 2006) Pickles’ notion is in many ways a subset o f a 
more general 'geographical imaginary’, that is particular historically continent ways o f seeing 
and thinking about places and social groups that, while they are subjective and stereotypical, 
actually affect how decisions are made. (cf. Gregory 1994). Maps are potent means for creating 
such imagined and preconceived notions o f place and people (cf. Schulten 2001).
■ Spatialisations are a form o f visualisation where a spatial structure and map-like interface is 
applied to data where no inherent or obvious geographical one exists. They are used to provide an 
interpretable, navigable structure to various types o f non-geographic datasets, particularly large 
text corpuses (cf. Couclelis 1998; Dodge and Kitchin 2000a; Skupin and Fabrikant 2003).
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rather unappealing in terms of quality of design and aesthetics. A few are quite 
useful as practical cartographic tools for navigating new virtual space, but many 
more are not effective at all for route following or finding particular sites. 
However, all the maps provide a fascinatingly diverse picture of what cyberspace 
looks like, and they can also be read connotatively and interpreted politically to 
provide valuable insights into how people imagine the virtual territory to look in 
service to their interests and desires. Understanding the connotative meanings 
and political contexts of cartographies of cyberspace is, therefore, important 
because they not only reflect the nature of the virtual world according to the 
interests of map-makers and mapping institutions, but also because they play a 
fundamental role in shaping the ongoing social-material (re)production of those 
virtual spaces. They are active in the producing a cartographic imaginary of 
cyberspace but also in producing cyberspace itself.
This new and diverse emerging domain of cyberspace mapping activities can be 
usefully conceptualised, following Edney (1993), into three distinct cartographic 
modes. The first mode, what I term, 'maps of cyberspace’ is mapping which 
describes the material information and communications technology (ICT) 
infrastructures and documents the operations of cyberspace itself, as viewed from 
an external position. (This thesis is focused on this mode through the analysis of 
Internet infrastructure maps.) In some senses they can be thought of as the 
thematic maps of cyberspace and are distinct from the other two modes. 'Maps 
for cyberspace’, the second mode, are maps and spatialisations created for 
navigating within cyberspace; they are expressly designed to be used to 
'interface’ virtual spaces themselves. The final mode, 'maps in cyberspace’ 
involves putting existing forms of terrestrial mapping online to widen access and 
add user interactivity. This mode is far and away the most evident in terms of the 
many millions of people using online services like MapQuest and Google Earth. 
(These three mode conceptualisation is discussed further in chapter three.)
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1.2 Research questions
The major research questions tackled by the thesis are threefold:
1. What are the main ways that Internet infrastructures have been mapped?
2. How do the elements of cartographic design in terms denotative signs on these 
maps work in creating particular kinds of connotative meanings about the 
Internet infrastructures?
3. Within what kind of culture milieus and political contexts are these maps of 
Internet infrastructures embedded and how does this effect the power they exert 
in advancing particular interests and agendas?
A range of relevant empirical evidence to answer these questions has been 
gathered, primary from texts published online and from corporate reports and 
government documents. The primary cartographic evidence is analysed utilising 
three methodological approaches: (1) processes of audit and classification, (2) 
semiotic interpretation of connotative meanings of representations and (3) a 
deconstructive reading of the maps.
1.2 Defining themes
Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, 
in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts...A  graphical representation 
of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system . Unthinkable 
complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of 
data. Like city lights, receding... (Gibson 1984, 67.)
1.2.1 Cyberspace
Historically considered, cyberspace emerged from the convergence of two sets of 
technologies: those for the transmission of information and those for the 
automation of computation. (This convergence is itself premised on the 
fundamental digitisation of the operations and products of both of these sets of 
technologies.) Since the second world war the technologies of computing and 
telecommunication have grown dramatically in capacity and fallen in per unit 
cost. As is well noted, they have diffused throughout society and have had a 
significant transformative agency in the nature of everyday living (Castells
14
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1996), including radically altering space-time relations in complex ways through 
processes of space-time convergence, time-space compression, and distanciation 
of service provision (Janelle 1969; Harvey 1989; Giddens 1990). They also give 
rise to cyberspaces, the conceptual spaces of information flows and social 
interactions that are continually created within the infrastructural ensemble of 
digital computing hardware, software code and high-speed telecommunications 
networks.
Cyberspace is not the technology or infrastructure itself (although it cannot exist 
independently of these), but the experience of virtual spaces that these engender. 
The word literally means ‘navigable space’ and is derived from the Greek word 
kyber (to navigate). As a description of virtual space it was conceived by William 
Gibson, in his novel Neuromancer (1984, 51), as a three-dimensional ‘data- 
scape’ inside the global matrix of computer networks where disembodied users 
interact with “clusters and constellations of data”. As an everyday human 
phenomena, cyberspace is much more mundane than Gibson’s science-fiction 
imaginary, but is fast becoming as powerful in mediating social relationships and 
re-shaping the material world. For example, cyberspace “is the ‘place’ where a 
telephone conversation appears to occur. Not inside your actual phone, the 
plastic device on your desk. Not inside the other person's phone, in some other 
city. The place between the phones. The indefinite place out there, where the two 
of you, two human beings, actually meet and communicate” (Sterling 1992, 1). 
Cyberspace is also the ‘space’ where your money is (to paraphrase John Perry 
Barlow ^ ) and is fast becoming the primary archive of many of personal memories 
(through online diaries and blogs, emails and text messages, digital photographs, 
and so on). The Internet is most obvious element of cyberspace currently in 
Western societies, but it is only one particular socio-technical instance amongst 
many (albeit a very rapidly growing, complex and heterogeneous one).
Cyberspaces are not ‘real’ in terms of common-sense definitions of material 
‘stuff you can touch; they are, in Gibson’s phrase, a ‘consensual hallucination’ 
created by software code and visual interfaces, and made tangible by access
' Cited in Rheingold 1993, 68.
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devices (screens, keyboards, speakers, mice, joysticks, and so on). However, they 
are perceived as real places in that they can have very real, material 
consequences (e.g., money being stolen electronically from a bank account). This 
is because cyberspace is folded into everyday lived experience more and more, 
rather than being some exotic, dissociated paraspace"^ (as it was frequently 
depicted cinematically in the 1990s). Uses of ICTs are themselves embodied and 
the experiences of virtual spaces form a complex continuum from purely material 
spaces to wholly cyberspaces, with many social activities now taking place on 
the thresholds between the “virtually real and the actually real” (Madge and 
O’Connor 2005, 83). An illustration of this experiential continuum is the extent 
to which cyberspace explicitly draws on material socio-spatial relations and 
geographic metaphors to create new spatialities and a sense of place (see also 
chapter four discussions on role of metaphors to explain the nature of the 
Internet).
Paraspace means 'other space’ - a sublime space that has forms and practices alien to that in 
geographic space (see Bingham 1999).
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Figure 1.1: An attempt to sketch the principal online virtual spaces of cyberspace, circa 1994. 
While it is now out o f date factually, the map is still useful for the way it conceptualises 
cyberspace as multiple, irregularly-sized domains with fluid boundaries, and many 
interconnections and overlaps. (Source: December 1995, no pagination.)
Given the bleeding together of real and virtual activities, cyberspaces are always 
contingent on the time and place of their production. Typically, they are 
heterogeneous in structure and fast changing. There are a rapidly expanding 
range of online virtual spaces experienced through different forms of interaction 
and communication affordances (Figure 1.1). There is also convergence of 
technologies that allows new spaces to emerge (such as the rapid growth in text 
messaging on mobile phones, or the emergence of voice over Internet protocol 
telephony services). Reliable, representative and comparative statistics on the 
scope and structure of cyberspace are notoriously hard to gather and quickly 
become obsolete. All these characteristics mean it is challenging space to survey 
and has seized as a driver in the development of new techniques of mapping.
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1.2.2 Internet
The focus of this thesis is on just one element of cyberspace, the Internet, a 
global network of networks that uses TCP/IP protocols^ to communicate. It burst 
into the popular imagination in the early 1990s after a twenty year gestation in 
academic and research commimities. At a conceptual level the Internet is not a 
material entity, rather it is an agreement between a heterogeneous collection of 
networks to exchange data traffic using common protocols. The ease of 
connecting individual networks together, that is inter-networking, via IP (internet 
protocol) has been paramount to the Internet’s success and phenomenal growth. 
Importantly, the core Internet protocol, Searls and Weinberger (2003, no 
pagination) note, “doesn’t specify what people can do with the network, what 
they can build on its edges, what they can say, who gets to talk”. This openness 
gives rise to the Internet’s three key virtues: no one owns its, everyone can use it 
and anyone can improve it (Searls and Weinberger 2003).
Anyone with a computer, a modem and a telephone can connect to one of the 
networks and, through it, to the rest of the public Internet^. (Note, there are many 
private intranets which also use the same TCP/IP protocols but are not 
interconnected to the public Internet.) The sum of the Internet’s nodes and their 
connections is greater than their parts, forming a network of network that 
empowers millions of people to directly communicate and share information with 
each other for the first time in human history.
Built around this agreement is a vast socio-material infrastructure to move data 
and to provide services. The physical construction of the Internet ranges from 
individual PCs connected via modems, to small domestic LANs up to immense 
networked assemblages such as undersea cable systems linking continents that 
cost billions to construct and require specialised ships to maintain them in 
working order. Given its open architecture no one knows for sure quite how
' TCP/IP - Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol.
 ^ Various “digital divide’ issues exist, notwithstanding, relating to the unequal distribution o f the 
Internet access and production (e.g., Warf 2001); for example, the cost o f access, particularly 
telephone charges, vary markedly between countries (e.g., Petrazzini and Kibati 1999) along with 
the freedom to communicate without state censorship (e.g., Reporters without Borders 2003 
analysis o f  Internet surveillance). See wider discussion in chapter five.
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much infrastructure is enrolled in the ongoing production of the Internet, but it is 
significant. In January 2008, for example, there were some 541,677,000 hosts on 
the Internet according to one of the most creditable ‘hardware’ statistics^, an 
increase of 20% from January 2007.
The development of the Internet has not been achieved independently and is bound 
up in the histories of telecommunication technologies, computing and wider social 
and political-economic histories of media (including easily overlooked and banal 
infrastructures, such as the ASCII text encoding format). The contemporary Internet 
is the outcome of a specific set of political-economic relations, most especially to 
do with the Cold War funding for computing research; the Internet has a particular 
historical geography that centres it in the U.S., and early Internet development was 
guided by the military-industrial-academic complex (cf. Abbate 1999). It was only 
later that it became re-appropriated into the public and commercial domain.
The Internet itself is experienced as a variety of different virtual spaces and 
media channels that are built seamlessly on top of it, including email, instant- 
messaging, peer-to-peer file sharing, and, of course, the Web. As Castells (2001, 
269) rightly points out, the Internet is more than just the sum of its infrastructural 
parts; “it is the technological tool and organisational form that distributes: 
information power, knowledge generation, and networking capacity in all realms 
of activity.” It should be viewed as a general purpose technology, much like 
steam power and electrical current, in that it sets no preconditions on how it is 
used. As such, the Internet forms the vital motive force for ongoing processes of 
economic and cultural globalisation. The Internet is the cardinal infrastructure of 
the network society (Castells 1996).
1.2.3 Infrastructures
Conceptually, everything that works in the background necessary to effect a 
certain action or event is infrastructure. Infrastructures work transparently and
 ^The Internet Domain Name Survey, a biannual survey by Network Wizards, <www.isc.org>. A 
host is an Internet computer assigned a fix domain name, typically they are servers and routers 
which are permanently networked. The survey does not attempt to count the many hundreds of  
millions more PCs and computing devices that users connect to the Internet at various times.
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have innate tendencies to disappear from consciousness (except, of course, when 
they fail). Multiple infrastructures mesh together into complex assemblages (e.g., 
air transportation); new infrastructures are often built onto of existing ones (e.g., 
fibre-optic cables running through old steam pipes). New infrastructures can 
emerge rapidly, but then quickly become naturalised and taken-for-granted in the 
everyday landscape of consumption (mobile telephony for example). Many 
infrastructures, particularly utility networks, are largely hidden from view being 
conveyed underground and in unseen service spaces of buildings; further the 
production of the infrastructural services are often far removed from the point of 
their consumption (especially so with growth of global supply chains). “[UJsers 
tended not to worry where the electrons that power their electricity came from; 
how their telephone conversations (or later faxes and Internet messages) were 
flitted across the city or the planet; how complex technological systems sustained 
their journey to work; or what distant gas and water reserves they were utilizing 
in their homes" (Graham 2000, 184). In the context of affluent Western 
consumer societies it is easy to assume that some infrastructures, increasingly 
including the Internet, are geographically ubiquitous and socially universal; 
while the conveniences they bring become viewed as necessary to living.
Given these characteristics, infrastructures, including Internet networks, tend not 
to be studied sufficiently within the social sciences (except for policy studies 
focused largely on their regulation). Studying infrastructures academically is 
made harder because they are often deliberately 'black-boxed' to keep outsiders 
from observing (and questioning) their operational logics. (It could be argued 
such external ignorance of the internal workings of network infrastructures 
usually serves the interests of the organisations operating them.) Although they 
can easily appear ‘natural’, infrastructures are anything but. They are designed 
and operated in particular ways (e.g., universal service versus cherry-picking 
through differential pricing), they have politics. Internet network infrastructures, 
connecting places together at various scales to facilitate efficient data 
transmission, are no different; they are bound up in wider sets of power relations.
One productive route into the study of infrastructures and their politics, 1 would 
argue, is through map representations of them. Maps of Internet network
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infrastructures reveal something of the nature of Internet itself (such as 
differential ownership patterns and the unevenness of the places served), but 
more than this they also reveal how the Internet is being conceptualised by the 
organisation behind the map. Maps then can make the Internet’s politics visible 
for scholarly analysis because they ineluctably make the agenda of the map- 
makers visible.
1.2.4 Mapping
And this, essentially is what maps give us, reality, a reality that exceed s our vision, our 
reach, the span of our days, a reality we achieve no other way. We are always mapping the 
invisible or the unattainable or the erasable, the future or the past, the whatever-is-not-here- 
present-to-our-senses-now and, through the gift that the map gives us, transmuting it into 
everything it is n o t ... into the real. (Wood 1992, 4-5)
In this research I take a broad view of what constitutes ‘mapping’. Following 
Harley and Woodward (1987, xvi), I define it as the application of any graphic 
representation to facilitate a spatial understanding of things, concepts, conditions, 
processes, or events in the human world. The development of cartographic 
modes over millennia have provided in the Western cultural context uniquely 
powerful means by which to classify, represent and communicate information 
about areas that are too large and too complex to be seen directly. Well designed 
maps are relatively easy-to-interpret within their own socio-cultural milieu, and 
constitute concentrated repositories of information about the location, shape and 
size of key features of a landscape and the connections between them. More 
recently, it has been recognised that the process of spatialisation can provide an 
interpretable structure to other types of non-geographic data. In essence, maps 
and spatialisations exploit the mind’s ability to more readily see complex 
relationships in images, providing a clear understanding of a phenomena, 
reducing search time, and revealing relationships that may otherwise not have 
been noticed. As a consequence, they form an integral part of how people 
understand and explain the world.
It is now widely recognised that mapping is a process of creating, rather than 
revealing, spatial knowledge. This applies to cyberspace cartographies as well.
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Throughout the process of map creation a large number of subjective, often 
unconscious, decisions are made about what to include and what to exclude, how 
the map will look, and what message the map-maker is seeking to communicate. 
In this fashion, maps necessarily become imbued with the social norms and 
cultural values of the people who construct them. Commonly these norms and 
values reflect dominant power relations in the society, especially because 
individuals and institutions with power commission a great deal of cartographic 
production.
Maps are used in diverse ways by diverse audiences as the work that maps 
perform is contingent on the times and places in which they are consumed. Maps 
are situated and selective re-presentations of spatial knowledges. They are not 
objective, neutral artefacts, but a view point onto the world from a particular 
perspective. This thesis is concerned with understanding the nature of these view 
points and perspectives into cyberspace revealed through case studies of how and 
why Internet infrastructures have been mapped.
1.3 Theoretical approach
The research undertaken on the cartographies of cyberspace, their design, 
authorship, dissemination and circulation, draws theoretically on concepts from 
two domains: semiotics of map design and critical cartography. The fusion of 
these two conceptual domains provides the means to interpret the nature of maps 
from two distinct, but I would argue complementary, ‘viewpoints' -  an ‘interior’ 
view for reading the signs within the map, and an ‘exterior’ gaze revealing the 
power from the around map.
The conceptual basis of a semiotic reading of map representations is to describe 
how the cartographic design works in terms of both the denotative signs created 
by mapmakers to express meaning explicitly, and their multiple possible 
connotative interpretations by users of the map. As MacEachren (1995, 331) 
explains “[tjhis is the difference between knowing that a line on a map is a 
boundary and what boundaries stand for in various political, community, or other 
contexts (i.e., what it means to establish and defend a ...dividing line).” As an
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analytical strategy, making this distinction between denotative and connotative 
signs has been shown to be effective for understanding how maps work at 
multiple levels of meanings, some which can be quite subtle but nonetheless 
influential (cf. work of Vujakovic (1999a, b) reading the connotation embedded 
in geopolitical maps in the media). As MacEachren’s boundary line example 
illustrates, interpreting the connotative meanings of signs has potential to 
generate insights into how maps emotively effect people’s perceptions and 
modifies the understanding of space denotatively represented (although not 
always in the way intended by the cartographer or the institution publishing and 
endorsing the map). As such this analytical focus on connotative meanings is 
complementary with the second methodological approach employed in the thesis 
involving the deconstruction of maps to understand how they work as sources of 
power, as asserted by the critical cartography paradigm.
Broadly speaking, the goal of critical cartography as a field of enquiry is to 
challenge normative and conventional mapping practice (focused on technique) 
by employing poststructuralist approaches to deconstruct and denaturalise 
cartography’s scientific truth claims and to demonstrate how maps are socially 
constructed and historically contingent (focused on political readings). The map 
when viewed critically, is recognised as always partial and provisional ordering 
of spatial knowledges, and the outcome of processes actively shaped by the 
choices, intentions and ideologies of map-makers and cartographic institutions.
Both semiotic interpretation and critical deconstruction see maps as cartographic 
texts which are more than functional, they are imbued, both, with subjective 
meaning and with power to do work in the world. These approaches are 
conceptually aligned to broader cultural re-reading of images following the 
'crisis of representation’ in contemporary scholarship. New visual methodologies 
that have emerged for analysing representations are interested in more than just 
the site of the image itself, seeking to untangle the full web of relationships of 
meaning and power in the design of signs, in the methods of production, the 
mode of dissemination, and contingent intertextual interpretations as they 
circulate and get read and re-read.
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Many of the key themes emerging in semiotic interpretation and critical 
deconstruction of the meanings and power of maps can equally be applied to the 
newly emerging cartographies of cyberspace, as to old paper maps of the ‘real 
world’. Cyberspace maps, for all their cutting-edge graphical sophistication, can 
be conceptualised as texts with signs open to connotative readings and structures 
of power-knowledge that have important, and often overlooked, social 
implications for how cyberspace is perceived and consumed.
1.3.1 Cyberspace cartographies
It is important not to subscribe to technological determinist notions whereby 
cyberspace cartographies are presented as autonomous tools and essentially 
benign agents operating outside of society, and which ‘impacts’ in predictable 
and universal ways, ignoring the problematic contingencies of readership and the 
unstable and partial connotative interpretation picked up.
If one views cyberspace cartography through a deterministic and uncritical lens 
then it can be seen as a logical and even ‘natural’ evolution of map 
representations, whose aim is to enhance knowledge of new virtual spaces, 
making online navigation (and commercial exploitation and governmental 
surveillance) more efficient and increasing the ‘ retum-on-investment’ in existing 
geospatial data by facilitating wider distribution on the Web. Making maps of 
cyberspace will make cyberspace a better place for business, governments and 
other elite institutions. However, I would argue the situation with cyberspace 
cartographies is much more contestable. Only certain maps of cyberspace get 
made and they show only certain aspects, in certain ways. They are not 
inherently ‘good’ and will certainly not be beneficial to all users and non-users of 
cyberspace. The mapping of cyberspace is not a benign act, instead particular 
maps are designed to serve certain interests.
Cyberspace cartographies do not emerge by themselves in a cultural or political 
vacuum. They are a product of particular individual endeavours, usually framed 
within institutional agendas. To really understand cyberspace cartographies, it is 
necessary to both interpret the semiotics of the signs within the representation 
and explain the power circulating ‘around’ the map representation itself. The
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theoretical tools applied here to achieve this are a combination of semiotics and 
political economy, what one might consider a reading of both the ‘local’ and 
‘global’ contexts in which cyberspace cartographies are design and consumed. 
This theoretical approach to cyberspace mapping is applied to two significant 
case studies of maps of Internet network infrastructures in chapters five and six. 
The analysis has required a broad, contextual knowledge of cyberspace 
cartographies, synthesising materials from a wide range of sources, along with 
several short email interviews with map-makers to leam about their stated aims, 
and their professional and institutional contexts. The analysis also draws upon 
the wider cybergeography research I have undertaken, whose goal has been an 
empirically-driven auditing of the different types of cyberspace mapping, 
through comprehensive cataloguing and classification of artefacts, as well as 
providing technical and functionalist descriptions of their communicative 
properties (see discussion in appendix one).
The analysis is an academic critique and not a personal criticism of individuals or 
groups involved. It does not seek denigrate or disparage the diverse work of 
cyberspace cartographers, which I have found stimulating over the past ten years. 
It is also important to acknowledge that the 'failings’ in many maps of 
cyberspace results from expedient design decisions by people not trained as 
cartographers and often working under pressure and not fully understanding the 
consequence of a particular cartographic choice, rather than the result of 
conspiracy to mislead or maliciously conceal a particular social reality^. 
Furthermore, this thesis does not provide a formal evaluation of cyberspace 
cartographies in terms of cognitive perception/usability testing, the customary 
methodological approach of researchers in the map communications paradigm, 
although this is in itself valuable work in regard to new map forms^. In some 
senses, it does not really matter if they look good or look bad in terms of 
normative design criteria or if they ‘work' or do not ‘work’ as efficient
* This equally applies to geographers who use inappropriate world maps in their textbooks 
(Vujakovic 2002b).
 ^ For example, the Spacecast project lead by Sara Fabrikant and Dan Montello behavioural 
testing perceptions o f spatialisations (latest results, see Fabrikant et al. 2004; Fabrikant and 
Montello 2008).
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communication media, for my purposes they still yield insights into their 
connotative meanings and their socio-political workings.
Having said that, I do believe it is important to fully grasp the normative 
technical scope of the maps, in terms of how they were produced (e.g., what data 
was used, how it was gathered and processed, and so on) and how they are 
designed to be used. I think the critic does need to be fully conversant with the 
practicalities of the maps they are critiquing. A weakness with much of social 
and cultural 'deconstruction’ of technological phenomena, in particular, is its 
failure to appreciate the genuine potentialities of the technology and tendency to 
overstate its capacity to change social relations.
It is also important here to acknowledge my own role as an agent in actively 
constructing cyberspace cartographies as a coherent research topic over the past 
ten years through a range of print publications and a website (see 
www.cybergeography.org/atlas). This is discussed in appendix one.
Lastly, while this thesis does not attempt to offer a 'better’ practice of cyberspace 
mapping that in some way 'answers’ the weaknesses highlighted by semiotic 
interpretation or the criticisms arising from critical deconstruction, it does offer 
up a positive and productive re-reading of what the Internet is made to look like 
by challenging the truth claims of its dominant cartographic imaginary and 
revealing something of the partial and unstable possible readings of the maps and 
thus the infrastructure itself.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The thesis comprises five main chapters, with chapters two and three reviewing 
relevant literatures and discussing conceptual ideas for undertaking the analysis 
of cyberspace cartographies. Chapter four considers how the Internet has been 
made knowable and tangible through spatial metaphors and various network 
representations. Chapters five and six are in-depth case studies interpreting 
specific set of examples from the 'maps of cyberspace’ mode. The empirics 
focus on the geographic representation of the Internet as a material network
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infrastructure, examining examples, at the global scale, from two distinctive 
cartographic g en ress ta tis tica l maps and marketing maps.
Chapter two provides a substantive overview of the core elements of the research 
in terms of defining the nature of the map and discussing contemporary theories 
of mapping (particularly, the critical cartography paradigm).
Chapter three describes the three modes of cyberspace cartography, outlining 
their distinctive social relations, organisational settings and conceptions of space. 
I review the literature in the field, paying attention to the varying definitions, 
taxonomies and research questions relating to the cartographies of cyberspace.
Chapter four characterises Internet network infrastructures in relation to the 
problem of ‘invisibility’ and considers how they have been imagined using 
different spatial metaphors. The discussion then considers how the Internet is 
made into a tangible phenomena for scientific research by particular types of 
inscriptions of the network infrastructure. Using ideas from science and 
technology studies I argue that these network inscriptions work as a form of 
‘virtual witnessing’ for ‘matters of fact’ about the Internet.
Chapter five is the first of the two case study chapters and it examines the genre 
of statistical cartography as deployed to map the worldwide globalisation of 
Internet infrastructure and use. The focus of the analysis is on global scale maps 
created to present different viewpoints on the scope and speed of the spread of 
the Internet internationally, particularly during the 1990s (a crucial phase in the 
maturation of the Internet, when its network infrastructure grew from technical 
novelty linking thousands of sites to a powerful communications medium 
directly connecting hundreds of millions of people). The principal actors in this 
mapping genre are academics, network activists and consultants, and
A genre here is a distinctive type o f  communicative event or text which is characterised in 
terms o f its central purpose, its prototypical content and form, it being conventionally recognised 
and labelled as such by the discourse communit}' o f which it is a part (Thurlow and Jaworski 
2003). Genres are conventionalised, yet their boundaries are always indistinct; they are powerful 
because they "establish particular ways o f organizing and looking at the world’’ (Thurlow and 
Jaworski 2003, 584).
27
Chapter One: Introduction
international agencies and NGOs, who are working to spread Internet 
connectivity worldwide. They have distinctly different perspectives on the 
potential role of ICTs and network connectivity for social and economic 
development -  some pushing to get everyone onto the ‘information 
superhighway’ as soon as possible, whereas others are sceptical of the benefits of 
such a ‘digitising mission’ to wire up the world. While the map texts analysed 
are largely conventional in cartographic design terms, they nonetheless provide a 
revealing connotative window into how Internet globalisation is conceived and a 
way to think about the political implications of a global Internet that remains 
unevenly distributed.
Chapter six case study is an alternative view of the evolution of the Internet 
gleaned through the analysis of the commercial marketing map genre of 
cartography. The analysis of maps deployed as integral elements of the 
promotional strategies of large telecommunications corporations, examines how 
they work semiotically and politically to sell global network infrastructure. The 
chapter begins with a contextual history of network marketing maps and then 
evaluates the importance of cartography to a sample of fifty major 
telecommunications companies. The analysis then proceeds with a detailed 
consideration of the semiotic mapping strategies for displaying networks in an 
advantageous fashion, illustrated with a critical comparison of the promotional 
cartographies deployed by five of the most significant Internet network providers 
who promote their global spanning infrastructures. This is followed by a tracing 
of the role changing marketing maps used by WorldCom in the period of 
commercial take-off of the Internet through the second half of the 1990s when 
the Web spurred unprecedented levels of hype, culminating in the dot-com 
bubble at the end of the decade. The analysis shows how marketing maps have 
an active role in the promotional discourses that lead to large speculative, and 
selective, overbuilding of expensive new fibre-optic cable infrastructures across 
the globe.
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Delineating the Map
A map is, In its primary conception, a conventionalized picture of the Earth’s  pattern as seen  
from above.
-  Erwin Raisz, General Cartography, 1938.
Every map is som eon e’s way of getting you to look at the world his or her way.
-  Lucy Fellowes, Smithsonian curator (quoted in Henrikson 1994).
2.1 Introduction
Mapping provides a uniquely powerful means to classify, represent and 
communicate information about places that are too large and too complex to be 
seen directly. Importantly, the places that maps are able to represent need not be 
limited to physical, geographical spaces like cities, rivers, mountain ranges and 
such like: maps can be used to represent virtual spaces of cyberspace and their 
supporting network infrastructures. This chapter seeks to delineate the nature of 
maps and outline the major theoretical perspectives that have been used to 
understand and critique cartography in Western academia in the last fifty years.
The ability to create and use maps is one of the most basic means of human 
communication, at least as old as the invention of language and, arguably, as 
significant as the discovery of mathematics. The recorded history of cartography 
clearly demonstrates the practical utility of maps in all aspects of Western 
society', being most important for organising spatial knowledges, facilitating 
navigation and controlling territory. Some have gone further, to argue that 
mapping processes are culturally universal, evident across all societies (e.g., 
Blaut ef al. 2003), although the visual forms of the resulting map artefacts are 
very diverse. At the same time, maps are also rhetorically powerful graphic 
images that frame our understanding of the human and physical world, shaping 
our mental image of places, constructing our sense of spatial relations. So, in a 
very real sense, maps make our world.
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Conventionally, maps are material artefacts that visually represent a geographical 
landscape using the cartographic norms of a planar view - looking straight down 
from above - and a consistently applied reduction in scale. However, it is 
impossible neatly to define maps according to the type of phenomena mapped or 
the particular mode of presentation, or their medium of dissemination (Dorling 
and Fairbaim 1997). Maps have traditionally been used as static paper 
repositories for spatial data, but now they are much more likely to be interactive 
tools displayed on a computer screen. (Some national mapping agencies are 
contemplating discontinuing the printed topographic map products as customers 
increasingly use digital geospatial data^). Today, we live in a map-saturated 
world (Wood 1992), continually exposed to conventional maps, along with many 
other map-like spatial images and media (e.g., animated satellite images, three- 
dimensional city models, MRI scans of the brain).
Maps have long been used in scholarly research into social and physical 
phenomena. They provide, of course, a primary technique in geography^ but they 
are also used widely in other disciplines such as anthropology, archaeology, 
history, and epidemiology, to store spatial information, to analyse data and 
generate ideas, to test h}q50theses and to present results in a compelling, visual 
form. Mapping as a method of enquiry and knowledge creation also plays a 
growing role in the natural sciences, in disciplines such as astronomy and particle 
physics, and in the life sciences, as exemplified by the metaphorical and literal 
mapping of DNA by the Human Genome Project (cf. Hall 2003). This work is 
not limited to cartography; many other spatial visualisation techniques, often 
using multi-dimensional displays, have been developed for handling very large, 
complex spatial datasets without gross simplification or unfathomable statistical 
output (e.g., volumetric visualisation in atmospheric modelling, three- 
dimensional body imaging in medical diagnostics). "More mapping of more 
domains by more nations will probably occur in the next decade than has 
occurred at any time since Alexander von Humboldt 'rediscovered' the earth in
' For example in Canada, see “Ottawa plots making maps without paper’’. Globe and Mail, 
October 4, 2005, <www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20051004.wionaps 104/>.
~ Although denigrated methodologically in some quarters; see Dodge and Perkins (2008a).
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the eighteenth centur>', and more terra incognita will be charted than ever before 
in history” (Hall 1992, 22). Cyberspace cartographies form one of the most 
significant new domains of this mapping activity.
2.1.1 Mapping processes
The production of cartography and other spatial visualisation involves a whole 
series of mapping processes, from the initial selection of what is to be measured 
to the choice of the most appropriate scale of representation and projection, and 
the best visual symbology to use. The concept of 'map as process’ is useful 
methodologically because it encourages particular ways of organised thinking 
about how to generalise reality, how to distil inherent, meaningful spatial 
structure from the data, and how to show significant relationships between things 
in a legible fashion. Mapping provides a means to organise large amounts of, 
often multi-dimensional, information about a place in such a fashion as to 
facilitate human exploration and understanding. Yet, mapping practices are not 
just a set of techniques for information ‘management’, they also encompass 
important social processes of knowledge construction. As scholars have come to 
realise, maps and culture are intimately entwined and inseparable.
Mapping not only represents reality, it has an active role in the social 
construction of that reality. Map-makers should be seen as creators rather than 
copyists of the landscapes represented. However, people are often not conscious 
of this constructive role when they use maps. Sparke (1998, 466) calls this the 
"recursive proleptic effect’ of mapping, ‘"the way maps contribute to the 
construction of spaces that later they seem only to represent”. The power of maps 
comes from the fact that they are both a practical form of information processing 
and also a compelling form of rhetorical communication.
Maps work, essentially, by helping people to see the unseen. This is achieved 
through the act of visualisation, premised on the simple notion that humans can 
reason and leam more effectively in a visual environment than when using 
textual or numerical descriptions. Maps provide graphical display which renders 
a place, a phenomenon or a process visible, enabling our most powerful 
information-processing abilities - those of spatial cognition associated with the
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human eye-brain vision system - to be brought to bear. Visualisation is thus a 
cognitive process of learning through the interaction with visual signs that make 
up the map and it differs from passive observation in that its purpose is to 
discover unknowns, rather than to see what is already known. Effective 
cartographic visualisation can reveal novel insights that are not apparent with 
other methods in terms of spatial relations, patterns and trends. In an instrumental 
sense, then, map use is a powerful prosthetic enhancement for the human body: 
”[l]ike the telescope or microscope, it allows us to see at scales impossible for 
the naked eye and without moving the physical body over space” (Cosgrove 
2003, 137). The ideal of obtaining a reliable capacity to see the unseen is 
particularly applicable to much of cyberspace cartography, because of the 
invisibility of the infrastructuie and the intangibility of the virtual spaces (see 
chapter three).
The power of map use as spatial visualisation to elucidate meaningful patterns in 
complex data is well illustrated by some of the 'classics' of pre-digital era, such 
as Charles Joseph Minard’s 'Napoleon map’ of 1869 or Harry Beck’s 'Tube 
diagram’ of 1933 (see Garland 1994; Tufte 1983). Even though these were hand- 
drawn on paper, they are nonetheless still powerful today and show the potential 
of visualisation to provide new understanding and compelling means of 
communicating to a wide audience. Through their novel visual forms they also 
demonstrate the extent to which mapping can be a creative practice in and of 
itself. The best maps also go beyond merely representing to become a kind of 
cognitive shorthand for the actual places and processes themselves, as illustrated 
in Beck’s celebrated diagrammatic design of the Underground (the Tube map) 
which has become such a powerful cartographic imaginary and spatial template 
for the 'real’ layout of London in the minds of many visitors and residents. The 
'problem* is that while Beck’s map works well for underground movement, it 
can be confusing for surface navigation because it famously sacrifices 
geographic accuracy for topological clarity.
Map effectiveness is also engendered because they are visually appealing 
objects. As Keates (1996, 174) argues art "is fundamental to cartography itself* 
and the aesthetic of cartographic representations is central to their success in
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rhetorical communication and means they are widely deployed as persuasive 
devices to present ideas, themes, and concepts that are difficult to express 
verbally (cf. Edsall 2007; Keates 1996). The result, according to Francaviglia 
(1999, 155) is that “[cjartographers draw maps that have the power to both 
inform and beguile their users”. Most of the maps encountered on a daily basis 
(often with little conscious thought given to them) are used in the service of 
persuasion^, ranging from marketing maps and city-centre tourist maps to the 
more subtle displays such as states’ claims to sovereign power over territory, 
implicitly displayed in daily weather maps seen on the news. Maps work because 
they are able to sell a particular vision of the world and because people are 
willing to bicy into this vision because they believe in the authority of the image 
as a trustworthy representation.
The persuasive power of Tnformative-yet-beguiling’ maps is equally applicable 
to cyberspace cartography projects. Indeed, much of this mapping is used 
precisely because it has an appealing visual sense of what cyberspace should 
look like, matching the metaphorical preconceptions of the designers, journalists 
and editors. (See chapter four for discussion of the visual tropes used to spatially 
imagine Internet infrastructure.) Yet, the lack of established conventions in 
mapping aspects of cyberspace (what should a map website look like?" )^ have 
provided significant scope for design and aesthetic experimentation. And in this 
regard, some of the most innovative cartographies of cyberspace are pushing the 
definitional boundaries of the map (as opposed to a graph or merely a ‘pretty 
picture’). As such, I would argue, cyberspace cartography is one of the few 
genuinely ‘cutting edge’ developments in map design practice in the twenty-first 
centurv'.
 ^ Many of these illustrations are what is known as ‘popular' maps and they use figurative 
infographics style rather than geometrically accurate representations (see Holmes 1991).
A diversity o f metaphors and design styles have been developed, see Kahn (2000) for examples 
and discussion o f some o f the issues.
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2.2 Cartographic history , mapping modes and the digital transition
Attempts to historicize the nature of (Western) cartography through 
categorisations of map forms and taxonomies based on purpose often implicitly 
use the notion of evolutionary advancement driven by technological development 
as an explanation. The end result, often conceptualised as a tree (Figure 2.1), 
narrates cartography as a beneficent pursuit, characterised by improving accuracy 
and comprehensiveness with each new generation of map. Examples of this 
conceptualisation are quite common in the literature, such that “[t]he normative 
history of cartography is a ceaseless massaging of this theme of noble progress” 
(Harley 1992, 234). For example. Crone (1953, xi) notes, “[t]he history of 
cartography is largely that of the increase of accuracy with which ... elements of 
distance and direction are determined and the comprehensiveness of the maps’ 
content.”.
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Figure 2.1: Cartography explained as a ‘stor>' o f progress’. Mapping is shown to evolve over time 
w ith the development o f increasingly complex forms. (Source: Robinson et al. 1995, 22.)
Histories of cartography tend to be written as a history of technique, with an 
underlying assumption that rational decision-making leads to the adoption of 
improved technologies and institutional practices when they become available. In
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some narrative histories cartographers are portrayed as benign artisans and later 
skilled technicians striving to make ever more accurate depictions of space. 
Technical development is conceived as a continuous path of improvement, 
punctuated with particular bursts of intense innovation and progress (e.g., John 
Harrison's 1761 invention of the chronometer and the reliable production of 
longitude at sea; cf. Sobel 1995). Within this ‘onward march’ view of map- 
making history, distinct phases are conveniently identified: the Eurocentric 
sequence runs typically through primitive medieval cartography based on 
religious imagination, followed by revolutions in measurement and projective 
geometry, flowing from Ptolemaic geography, leading to Renaissance mapping 
and the first atlases, then moving forward with the scientific formulations of the 
Enlightenment and geodetic national surveys, ending up with the most 
‘advanced’ digital map-making founded on GIS and GPS technology. Above all 
else, such ‘progressivist’ narratives stress the changes in (Western) cartography’s 
state from essentially a descriptive art to a thoroughly scientific endeavour 
embracing the doctrine of objectivism. This ‘cartographic reformation’ in which 
map-makers strove for intellectual respectability as ‘men of science’ was 
inscribed on the maps themselves in terms of the “decline in florid decoration 
and the rise of the factual neutrality of white space” (Edney 1993, 56). This 
‘reformation’ marked a shift in authorship from named cartographers (the 
individual artisan map-makers) to the anonymised mass-produced maps of print 
capitalism, paralleled by an economic reorganisation of map production from 
small-scale, uncoordinated and sporadic efforts to systematic and later 
industrialised methods of large cartographic institutions working to formalised 
standards, typically in the service of the state.
The apparent ‘naturalness’ of this account belies the politics behind the 
conceptualisation of the progressive development of cartography from a 
primitive past to the sophisticated present (Edney 1993; Pickles 1999). The 
underlying goal of this kind of construction of cartographic history - achievable 
only through a carefully selective reading of extant map artefacts according to 
Edney (1993) - is to ‘prove’ that the objectivity of current scientific methods is 
predestined. It grants an important legitimation to the positivist notion of 
contemporary professional cartography as the ‘best" and provides a discursive
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mechanism to dismiss maps that do not fit ‘acceptable’ scientific standards (e.g., 
dismissal of non-Western mapping practices). Social studies of science have 
shown that this type disciplinary ‘storytelling’ is a form of scientism, a 
metanarrative underlying modernist science’s claims to exclusive truth based on 
the superiority of empirical measurement to describe reality and the privileging 
of the resulting representations. Scientific worldviews see technological progress 
almost like a force of nature that somehow operates outside society and beyond 
the political concerns of money, power, and ego. The way one approaches 
cartographic history is therefore worthy of consideration, as it is at the heart of 
the recent political theorisation of cartography and directly informs our 
understanding of the nature of the map and contemporary positivistic 
epistemological foundations of cartography (including much of the work 
mapping cyberspace).
There are alternative ways to conceptualise cartographic history that are not so 
wedded to modernist narratives. One of the most useful is provided by Edney’s 
(1993, 54) theorisation of ‘cartography without progress’, in which mapping is 
read as “a complex amalgam of cartographic modes rather than a monolithic 
enterprise”. For Edney, a cartographic mode is not simply a time period in a 
linear chronological sequence, but is a unique set of cultural, social, economic 
and technical relations within which cartographers and the map production 
processes are situated. The mode is the milieu in which mapping practices occur. 
Each cartographic mode gives rise to its owm kind of map artefacts, and these 
may well look different from other modes, but critically this conceptualisation 
does not assume that one is inherently better than another, or that one mode will 
inevitably evolve into a ‘better’ mode. As Edney (1993, 58) says: “[t]he mode is 
thus the combination of cartographic form and cartographic function, of the 
internal construction of the data, their representation on the one hand and the 
external raison d'être of the map on the other'. Modes are unique to their time 
and places, and are transitory. There can be multiple distinct cartographic modes 
operating at the same time, in the same place. Modes can interact and may well 
overlap, merge or split. The boundaries between modes are likely to be fuzzy and 
permeable.
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Cartographic history', according to Edney's theorisation, is a pluralist and 
relational network of activities rather than a single linear process. The end result 
is not the unidirectional evolutionary tree but a complex, many-branching, 
rhizomatic^ structure (Figure 2.2). In contemporary cartographic epistemologies, 
a diverse range of mappings is seen to emerge from a shifting creative milieu 
rather than in a systematic fashion.
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Figure 2.2: Cartography alternatively characterised as a rhizomatic network of competing and 
overlapping modes o f mapping. This example shows the post-Renaissance convergence o f modes 
into mathematical cosmography and then the gradual bifurcation into several more distinctive 
modes following the Enlightenment. (Source: Edney 1993, 59.)
As stated in the introduction, the theorisation of this thesis is built on modes 
rather than trees. The development of new forms of contemporary mapping 
practices and artefacts - what I term cyberspace cartographies - is best 
conceptualised as three distinct modes rather than a new branch at the end of the
A rhizome is a tangled root system that develops horizontally, and in a non-hierarchical fashion.
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family-tree of cartography history. The rhizomatic notion of cartographic modes 
suits the emergent and variegated nature of cyberspace mapping, which has 
drawn on many disparate ideas, approaches and visualisation forms; it is 
thoroughly situated in wider socio-technical changes (particularly the diffusion 
of the Internet throughout map production and the use of the Web as the primary 
media of dissemination). The empirical analysis (presented in chapters five and 
six) tries to unpack the some of cultural, social, and technological relations which 
determine the cartographic practices of one of these modes, the ‘maps of 
cyberspace’ mode, using a range of cartographic genres from Internet network 
infrastructure mapping.
2.2.1 Digital transition and cartography
The development and rapid diffusion of information and communication 
technologies in the last three decades has affected all modes of mapping, 
changing methods of data collection, cartographic production, and the 
dissemination and use of maps. This has been termed the ‘digital transition’ in 
cartography (Goodchild 1999; Pickles 1999) and it is continuing apace (for 
example, developments in satellite navigation displays and mobile mapping 
services). As such it is a vital component in understanding the milieu in which 
new modes of cartography are emerging.
While the detailed social and technical histories of the digitisation of the 
cartographic industry are complex and largely unwTitten, it would be fair to say 
that in the last decade cartography has been almost wholly subsumed in a rapid 
convergence of spatial technologies, such that today, professional cartography is 
seen as little more than an ‘end-service’ component of the multi-billion dollar GI 
industry. Nowadays, the majority of maps are digital and created only ‘on 
demand’ from geospatial databases for temporary display on screens. The days of 
the unwieldy folded map sheet and heavy paper atlases are quickly becoming a 
thing of the past, replaced by the rapid technological development of GIS, spatial 
databases and real-time navigation systems. The Web mapping portal 
MapQuest.com, for example, has already generated more digital maps than any 
other publisher in the history of cartography (Peterson 2001); the huge popularity
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of Google map’s API^ in the summer of 2005 has inspired an explosion of new 
online mapping tools and hacks (see Gibson and Erie 2006), and there is even the 
prospect that GIS itself will begin to adapt and evolve around such a Web 
services mapping model.
As the map itself has became a fully digital text, many of its basic properties 
have changed. The digital map is infinitely copiable, infinitely transportable, and 
a highly mutable representation (switching thematic layers on and off, easy 
modification of symbols, the ability to make selections by spatial/attribute 
queries, and so on). Cheap, powerful computer graphics on desktop PCs, and 
increasingly mobile devices, enable much more expressive and interactive 
cartography, potentially available to a growing number of people. The pervasive 
paradigm of hypertext as a way to structure and navigate information has also 
influenced digital maps. Increasingly, maps are used as core components in 
larger multimedia information resources where locations and features on the map 
are hotlinked to pictures, text and sounds, to create distinctively new modes of 
map use (Cartwright et al. 1999). In design terms, the conventional planar map 
form itself is, of course, only one possible representation of spatial data and new 
digital technologies have enabled much greater diversity of forms including 
pseudo three-dimensional landscape views, interactive panoramic image-maps, 
fully three-dimensional flythrough models, and virtual globes (e.g., Fisher and 
Unwin 2001; Goodchild 2008; Hudson-Smith 2008).
Developments in computer graphics, computation and user interfaces have begun 
to fundamentally transmute the role of the map from the finished product to a 
situation where the map is displayed within a visual tool to be used interactively 
for exploratory data analysis (typically with the interlinking of multiple 
representations such as statistical charts, three-dimensional plots, tables, and so 
on). This changing conceptualisation of the map is at the heart of the emerging 
field of geovisualization, which in the last five years or so have been one of the 
leading areas of applied cartographic research (cf. Dodge et al. 2008; Dykes et 
al. 2005; MacEachren and Kraak 2001).
 ^An API (Application Programming Interface) allows technically savvy users direct access to the 
database enabling sophisticated and novel third-party applications to be developed.
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As well as making maps more interactive, information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) are also helping to give many more people access to 
cartography as map-makers themselves, be it via the ‘map charting’ options in 
spreadsheets to produce simple thematic maps of their own data or through 
desktop GISs such as Arc View or Maplnfo. As more and more people ‘by-pass’ 
professional cartographers to make their own maps as and when required, it is 
likely that the diversity of map forms and usage will expand. Of course, access to 
‘point and click’ mapping software itself is no guarantee that the maps produced 
will be as effective as those hand-crafted by professionally-trained cartographers 
(C. Board, PhD examiners report, 24^ October 2006).
Developments in networking and computer-mediated communications, and the 
rise of the World-Wide Web in the mid 1990s, means that digital maps are now 
veiy  ^ easy to distribute at marginal cost and can be accessed ‘on demand’ by 
many (see Kraak and Brown 2001; Peterson 2003a and 2008; Plewe 1997). One 
of the first examples was the Xerox PARC Map Viewer^ online in June 1993 and 
the threshold of online mapping continues to rise (e.g., in June 2005, Google 
Maps service provided seamless satellite image coverage of the world). These 
Web mapping services are free at the point of use and are encouraging the casual 
use of cartography^.
The provision of Web mapping and online GIS tools is significantly shifting the 
accessibility to mapping and spatial data, as well as altering the user perception 
of what a map should be. There are clear signs that cartography will be seen as 
simply one of many available ‘on demand’ Web services. As the digital map 
display becomes more flexible and much more accessible, it is also, in some 
respects, granted a less reified status than analogue map artefacts of the past. 
Maps are increasingly treated as transitory information resources, created in the 
moment, and discarded immediately after use. In some senses, this devalues the
Created by Steve Putz. The map is no longer online, however further background details are 
available at <www2.parc.com/istl/projects/www94/iisuwwwh.html>.
* Although, there are many much thornier, political, issues about access rights and intellectual 
property, especially so in the UK; see for example Dodson 2005.
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map as it becomes just another form of ephemeral media, one of the multitude of 
screen images that barrage people everyday. Cartographic knowledge itself is 
just another informational commodity to be bought and sold, repackaged and 
endlessly circulated^.
The production of cartographic knowledge has always been dependent, to large 
degree, on the available methods of data collection. These are being greatly 
augmented in the digital transition. The wide-spread importance of new digital 
measurement was noted by U.S. National Science Foundation Director Rita 
Colwell (2004, 704): “new tools of vision are opening our eyes to frontiers at 
scales large and small, from quarks to the cosmos.” Cartography’s ability to 
‘capture’ the world has been transformed by digital photogrammetry, remote 
sensing and GPS-based surveying. Cartography can not only ‘see’ the world in 
greater depth (Pickles 2004b), but it can also ‘see’ new things (including virtual 
spaces), and with new temporalities.
Vast geospatial databases underlie the modem digital topographic maps, such as 
the Ordnance Survey’s Digital National Framework comprising over 400 million 
fea tu res .T h ese  are growing as part of the ‘exponential world’, being fed in 
particular by high-resolution imagery from commercial satellites. Interestingly, 
in the future, much of this growth will come from people gathering geospatial 
data as they go about their daily activity, automatically captured by location- 
aware devices that they will carry and use. From this kind of emergent mobile 
spatial data capture it will be possible to ‘hack’ together new types of maps 
rather than be dependent on the map products formally published by 
governments or commercial firms. Such individually-made, ‘amateur’ mapping 
may be imperfect in many respects (not meeting the positional accuracy 
standards or adhering to the TOPO-96 surveying specifications for example), but 
could well be more fit-for-purpose than professionally produced, general map
 ^ The emergence o f open-source cartography, as exemplified by the OpenStreetMap project, has 
the potential to challenge the commercial commodification o f geospatial data by developing a 
‘bottom-up* capture infrastructure that is premised on a volunteerist philosophy (Perkins and 
Dodge 2008).
Source: <ww^v.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/oswebsite/media/news/2001 /sept/^masterchallenge.html>.
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products There is also exciting scope for using locative media to annotate our 
maps with ephemeral things, personal memories, messages for friends, that are 
beyond the remit of governmental cartography or the commercial cartography 
industry
In some respects, then, the outcome of the digital transition can be read as a 
démocratisation of cartography, widening access to mapping and breaking the 
rigid control of authorship by an anonymised professional elite. However, if one 
looks more closely (and sceptically), the freedom for people to make their own 
maps with these types of software tools is strongly inscribed in the design and 
functionality of the software itself. The maps one can make in Excel or Arc View 
are only the maps the program allows one to make. The majority of people still 
do not have the time or skills to break free from the functional constraints that 
the software i m p o s e s G o o g l e  may currently make a vast amount of mapping 
freely available online (supported by advertising) but it is subject to their terms 
and conditions of use and raises risks of monopolistic provision (cf. Zook and 
Graham 2007).
Furthermore, interpreting the digital transition should not merely be about 
plotting technical ‘impacts', but should also involve assessing the political 
implications of changing social practices in data capture and map authorship. 
Being wary of linear narratives of progress, one should not read the digitisation 
of the map as seamless, unproblematic or inevitable (Pickles 1999; 2004a). 
Technological change is always contested, driven by competing interests and 
received in different ways and at different speeds in particular institutional 
settings. Technology is never a neutral actor. It is shaped by social forces and is 
bound up in networks of power, money, and control of new institutional practices
O f course, many would argue that Ordnance Survey mapping is not perfect or perfectly 
accurate (source: C. Board, PhD examiners report, 24* October 2006).
An example would be Christian Mold's on-going emotion mapping project, 
<www.emotionmap.net>.
 ^' See Fuller’s (2003) analysis o f the framing power o f Microsoft Word on writing and Tufte’s 
(2003) trenchant critique o f Microsoft PowerPoint on how people give presentations. The effect 
o f the software 'defaults’ on the look o f maps produced by GIS packages such as Arc View and 
Maplnfo is also evident in a good deal o f generic presentation cartography produced these days.
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in the processes of cartographic digitisation - and the benefits and costs are never 
felt evenly. “The mappings of the digital transition have their own geographies” 
Pickles (2004a, 149) argues, which are intimately bound-up with “new 
Americanism, a thorough-going post-Fordism, and a resurgent geopolitics of 
global hegemony.” Government agencies and large commercial mapping firms 
have invested heavily in digitisation not from enlightened ideals to improve 
cartography but because it serves their interests (such as to maximise efficiency, 
to reduce costs by de-skilling production), and to boost revenues. The popular 
discourses of digitisation in cartography and elsewhere are often uncritical, 
driven in large part by the boosterism of the vendors of hardware, software and 
IT consultants offering ‘solutions’. The reality of the ‘messy’ social aspects of 
digitisation are glossed over in techno-utopian fantasies.
As such, the transition has made it more urgent to understand the wider social 
milieu in which maps are produced and disseminated, because as Harley (1992, 
231) argued at the start of the 1990s, digital cartography and GIS works “to 
strengthen its positivist assumptions and it has bred new arrogance in geography 
about its supposed value as a mode of access to reality.” One needs to realise that 
the path of digitisation in cartography has been driven in large part by militaristic 
interests in various guises (e.g.. Cloud 2002). The underlying geospatial 
technologies and capture infrastructures (such as earth imaging and GPS) are still 
dependent on state funding and imperatives of territorial security. Rather than 
becoming more democratic, one could argue that the surveillant power of the 
cartographic gaze is deepening, particularly after 9/11 (Monmonier 2002), 
accompanied by a fetishization of the capability of geospatial technologies to 
‘target terrorism’. The mundane disciplining role of the digital map in systems of 
computerised govemmentality continues to grow, for example in consumer 
marketing and crime mapping (Crampton 2003). Such surveillance requirements 
are also a key driver in the development of new mapping techniques for 
cyberspace (e.g., Gorman’s (2004) work mapping infrastructure networks in the 
U.S. to assess their vulnerability to attack). In conclusion. Pickles (2004a, 146) 
notes cautiously: “As the new digital mappings wash across our world, perhaps 
we should ask about the worlds that are being produced in the digital transition of
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the third industrial revolution, the conceptions of history with which they work, 
and the forms of socio-political life to which they contribute.”
2.3 Cartographic theories
The theoretical perspectives in academic research that seek to understand the 
nature of cartography - both the map as object and wider conceptions of mapping 
practices - can be grouped into three broad but distinct paradigms, each based on 
a common set of beliefs about what represents a valid area of research These 
respectively conceptualise cartography as (1) a means of communication, (2) a 
form of representation, or (3) an expression of power. These three different 
theoretical approaches provide a useful way to begin to understand how scholars 
have interpreted, analysed and read the nature and meaning of cartography in 
recent history.
These theoretical positions have framed the types of 'questions’ that are asked of 
the map and, therefore, the ways of approaching empirical cartographic research, 
and they have also informed the way cartography is taught^^. It is clear that 
scholarly cartography research remains a contested subject, with significant 
alternative epistemologies in play, and offers no definitive answers (there is no 
'true’ nature of the map in some senses). As such, I concur with Perkins (2003, 
342) when he says "it makes more sense to understand contrasting approaches as 
representing different knowledge communities telling very different stories.’* As 
outlined in the introductory chapter, I employ a hybrid theoretical 'story’ which 
uses concepts from both the ‘maps as representation’ and the ‘power of maps’ 
knowledge communities. This theoretical frame is applied to interpret the
It should be acknowledged that attempts to impose simple paradigm categories inevitably 
means the lost o f much detail and nuance in such narratives. Describing trends through paradigms 
can also be problematic as it creates sharp divides, where scholar often come to see those work in 
supposedly ‘opposing' paradigms as threats to their ideas and unjustly undermine their work 
through caricatures and ‘straw-men’. As Keates (1996, 192) put it: “the arguments are sustained 
by all sorts o f unproven assertions, and the well-known ‘rhetorical' device of misrepresenting the 
views o f the 'opponent* in order to demolish them."
Although, they have often had little impact beyond the academy on practising cartographers; as 
Petchenik (1983, quoted in Keates 1996, 188) says “specialization in cartography has developed 
to the point where academic studies o f map design and map use may be completely divorced 
from the non-academic, routine map production milieu."
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cartographies of cyberspace as both sign systems with important connotative 
meanings and as social constructions that do work in the world. I review the 
major focus of the three paradigms in turn as these shed light on the types of 
analytical work that has been done in analysing different modes of cyberspace 
mapping.
2.3.1 Cartography as communication
It is a truism to assert that maps are vehicles for the flow of information. Som e are better 
vehicles than others, but the functions they perform are nevertheless similar, irrespective of 
their quality. It is instructive to look at the role of maps in an adaptation of a general 
communications system . (Board 1967, 673)
The dominant theoretical paradigm in academic cartographic research in the last 
forty years or so (1960s-90s) has been based the ‘map communication modeT. 
Developing from initial but significant conceptualisations espoused by Moles 
(1964), Board (1967) and Kolâènÿ (1969), the goal of this theoretical approach, 
broadly speaking, was to work to improve cartography by determining how map 
representations communicate geographic information to the user, primarily 
through psychological testing. The appeal of such an experimentalist approach 
was its potential to systematically determine the parameters of the map user’s 
capabilities in reading, comprehending and remembering information from 
different types of cartographic representations. Board and Taylor (1977, 19), in 
their review of preliminary work on design and map perception, argued it was 
important for advancing cartographic communication research that, “realistic 
map-reading tasks should be used in experimental evaluations”. Such work 
would generate robust psychophysical data which could, in turn, form the basis 
for quantifiable, consistent rules for the most appropriate cartographic design 
decisions (such as symbol sizes, colour ranges, classification schemes and so on; 
see, for example, MacEachren’s (1982) work on design parameters and 
complexit}' in thematic maps). Such striving for objective rules in map design 
was premised on the positivistic belief that it was possible to produce optimal 
mapping for a given purpose and the acceptance of cartographic research was 
able to produce more ‘accurate’ mapping in terms of effective communication to 
the reader.
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In the communications model there is a clear distinction made between the map- 
maker and the map user, with the map representation itself being essentially a 
neutral medium of one-way information transmission between the two. 
Accordingly, Robinson and Sale (1969, 18) asserted: “Maps today are strongly 
functional in that they are designed, like a bridge or a house, for a purpose. Their 
primary purpose is to convey information or to ‘get across’ a geographical 
concept or relationship; it is not to serve as an adornment for a wall.” The model 
was often depicted in a summary flow chart as a linear process with distinct 
entities and a directed flow of information from originator to receiver (Figure 
2.3). The role of the cartographer in the model was cast as someone who 
essentially works in a technical, impartial way, taking a body of geographic data 
and applying rules of functional design, which resulted in a map that works as a 
‘scientific’ tool for the visual communication of the information in the public 
realm. Map users were accordingly afforded a relatively passive role of readers 
as receivers of a fixed message from the cartographer.
Cartogiapdier Nfep IVfepuser
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Figure 2.3: The basic map communication model, conceptualising cartography in terms of stages 
in the transmission o f spatial data from cartographer to reader via the map. (Source: redrawn 
from Keates 1996, 114.)
The ‘map communication’ paradigm marked a significant epistemological shift 
in cartographic research and its advocates, led by Arthur H. Robinson, wished to 
remould cartographic scholarship as a scientific practice, moving it away from its 
existing interpretative, qualitative and artistic nature. This major modification to 
map theorisation was itself bound-up with rapid quantification and a rush to more 
‘scientific’ methods of research in the late 1950s in other social science 
disciplines, including human geography and psychology. The basic premise of 
the ‘map communications model’ held sway for decades in Anglo-American
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academia and was a major influence in cartographic education, as can be clearly 
seen in the content of leading English-language textbooks such as Robinson’s 
Elements o f  Cartography (which went through six editions, with various 
coauthors, from 1953 to 1995) and Dent’s Cartography: Thematic Map Design 
(which went through five editions).
By the 1990s, the dominance of the 'map communication’ paradigm had waned 
considerably, as the focus of scholarly cartography research shifted direction and 
methods of behavioural psychological testing were discredited as excessively 
reductionist. Although it contains much of practical value, especially in teaching 
notions of effective map design, the tide of academic ideas has moved against its 
agenda, driven in part by rapidly changing technology (many researchers having 
moved into research in GIS and geographic visualisation), and also the ‘cultural 
turn’ in theoretical perspectives in the social sciences. Some of the key concepts 
of ‘map communication’ theor>  ^have been challenged in the last decade or so by 
scholars advocating a different cartographic theorisation, in which mapping is 
conceptualised cognitively as spatial representations that can have multiple 
semiotic meanings and uses, and where the map reader actively constructs 
knowledge from the representation in relation to their particular experience, 
skills and circumstances. The role of the cartographer as the primary arbiter of a 
single message encoded in the map is questioned.
Having said this, the ‘map communication' paradigm still has influence, 
particularly in U.S. cartographic research (Montello 2002) and important work 
being done around map perception (such as Brewer’s influential work on 
optimising colour selection on thematic maps’ )^. Much of the recent work on 
Web cartography, for example, has a distinctly ‘communicative’ epistemology, 
with its focus on testing users and determining new map-design guidelines for 
optimum graphical presentation for Internet media (e.g., Kraak and Brown 2001; 
various chapters in Peterson 2003a and 2008), Fabrikant work on evaluative 
testing of the informational meanings users gain from spatializations (Fabrikant
One o f the novel outputs o f this research is the online tool called ColorBrewer that mapmakers 
can use to select colours for their own cartographic design work; available at 
<www.personal.psu.edu/cab38/ColorBrewer/ColorBrewer_intio.html>.
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et al. 2004; Fabrikant and Montello 2008); while Jiang and Ormeling’s (1997, 
112) initial analysis of 'cybermaps' is premised on the notion of optimising map 
design, in which they claim: “in long standing cartographic practice, maps have 
been considered as communications tools”.
2.3.2 Cartography as representation
The map is examined here.... not as a communications vehicle but as one of many potential 
representations of phenomena in space that a user may draw upon as a source of 
information or an aid to decision making and behaviour in space. (MacEachren 1995, 12)
A new paradigm has emerged in academic cartographic research, since the early 
1990s, that views the map as a representation which should be analysed and 
understood through a combined cognitive-semiotic lens. The paradigm is best 
articulated by MacEachren's (1995, 12) book ‘How Maps Work' where he 
argues, “[e]mphasis is placed on how the map ‘represents' in both a lexical and a 
semiotic sense and how vision and cognition represent that representation in 
forms that allow the map viewer access to meaning.”
In some respects the ‘representation' approach has significant commonalities 
with both the other two active cartographic research paradigms identified here. In 
terms of the focus on the cognitive understanding of visual processing, 
particularly through experiments using visualization software, the 
‘representation' paradigm has strong methodological and ontological overlaps 
with the ‘communication' paradigm. While the semiotic component of the 
'representation' paradigm, seeking to understand the meaning of representational 
signs has significant accordance with the ‘critical cartography' agenda to expose 
the ‘hidden' power of the map.
Given the dual aspects of the ‘representation' paradigm, and there potential 
relevance to the analysis of various aspects of the cartographies of cyberspace, it 
is worthwhile to discuss, firstly, how semiotics might have utility' in unlocking 
meanings in the map and, then, to consider how an interest in the cognitive basis
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of cartography is being advanced in applied research on visualization, 
particularly building and testing realistic and multi-modal interactive mapping 
software.
2.3.2.1 Lexical understanding of representation through semiotics 
Semiotics is the study of signs, concept-objects that, it can be argued, are 
fundamental units of understanding that humans use to make sense of the world 
and to communicate ideas and exchange information. Language and visual 
representations (including maps) are lexical, being composed of signs that carry 
messages/meaning about things or concepts. As Pierce, one of the founders of 
semiotics, put it: “something stands to somebody for something else in some 
respect or capacity.” (quoted in MacEachren 1995, 213). A sign on a map 
represents things from reality to somebody. The ‘sign’ has been theorised in a 
multitude of ways in different areas of scholarship, but in simple terms can be 
thought of as concept-object comprising three distinct parts which work in 
relation (Figure 2.4).
Sign-vehicle
(mediating gapH c entity)
Codes - sym bolisesStands fo r
Sign
Signified . - Signifier
(a real thin^ (a concept)
JCkanings which describe
Figure 2.4: A simplified notion o f a sign as a triangular relation.
The three parts of the triangle operate in unison to represent something by 
creating a unit of understanding. This is done by assigning a meaning (signifier) 
to something (signified) by a mediating sign-vehicle. In the cartographic case, a 
sign-vehicle is a graphic element on the map itself (a blue line symbol say) which
49
Chapter Two: Delineating the Map
is a signifier (for rivers) which describes, through meaning, a signified instance 
(a ‘real’ river, with attributes and located in space and time). (At another scale, 
the map as a whole could be viewed as a single sign within a large system of 
signs, such as a book.) The relations between the sign-vehicle and signifier are 
potentially made up of multiple codes (e.g., symbols to code a river); and for 
visual representations have been classified into various kinds typologies of 
design codes (which are often complex and hard to apply to real data). Codes of 
sign-vehicles for cartographic design can be classified in various ways, including 
according to their visual iconicity, running on a continuum from wholly mimetic 
symbols which are pictorial equivalents of the real thing (e.g. a bike representing 
a cycle path) to completely arbitrary symbols which only represent the real thing 
when specified to be so (e.g., a triangle symbol representing a post office).
Of more interest for understanding cartographic representations is the outcome of 
the relationship between signifier and the signified (mediated by the sign- 
vehicle) as this gives rise to meanings in mind of the reader about mapped 
reality. Such meanings can be multiple, unstable and unanticipated by sign maker 
(i.e., cartographer). Meanings are dependent, in varying degrees, on the social 
context of the sign and the experience of the reader, i.e., meanings often lie 
beyond the map and are brought to it. As MacEachren (1995, 311, original 
emphasis) notes, therefore, “a lexical approach to cartographic representation 
accepts a potentially broad range of legitimate meaning for individual or groups 
of signs. The issue of correct or incorrect signs becomes secondary to that of 
exploring the various perspectives from which, or levels at which, map signs 
might be understood.”
There is no universal set, or guaranteed single, meaning for a given sign, 
although social convention and lived experience means that most people, most of 
the time, will get broadly similar meanings from the same signs. For 
understanding maps then, one of the goals of semiotic analysis is to trace out the 
multiple levels of meaning created by a sign and think through the implications 
of this for how maps are used in the world.
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In tracing out meaning in signs, researchers have found it useful to try to 
categorise them. One useful categorisation, that has been applied productively for 
cartographic interpretation, is a division of meaning into two levels.
Denotative Connotative
Explicit, primary Implicit, secondary
(overt, obvious) (hidden, unspoken)
The difference in levels is significant, as Guiraud (1975, quoted in MacEachren 
1995, 229) puts it: “A uniform denotes rank and function; it connotes the prestige 
and authority attached to rank and function.” Moreover, in maps, according to 
MacEachren (1995, 311), “denotative meanings [are] either specified precisely in 
a map legend or assumed to be part of the normal reader's general map schema”, 
(e.g., the blue line has specific meaning of ‘rivers’). Connotative meanings are 
latent and contingent, but can be as important, and on occasion more important, 
than the denoted meaning of a sign. For example, Vujakovic (2002b, 372, 
original emphasis), in his interpretation of world maps in textbooks, says about 
the (problematic) different meanings of the Mercator projection: “[wjhile 
direction, and to some extent continental shape, are (correctly) denoted, the 
choice of this projection for a map would create, through its usual centring on 
Europe, its orientation, and its exaggeration of higher latitude landmasses, a false 
connotation of the importance of Europe.” Connotative meanings can be picked 
up unconsciously and can be obscure (they exist only in the ‘eye of beholder’ but 
are nonetheless real meanings; this has methodological issues for decoding 
them), and may not have been in the mind of the sign maker (cartographer). The 
kinds of intention that lies behind a connotative meaning attached to a sign is an 
important philosophical/ethical divide between the ‘critical’ and ‘representation’ 
paradigms. Critical deconstruction would typically see connotative meanings as 
insidiously hidden, manipulative and created with malicious intent on the part of 
the cartographer. A representational point of view, as espoused by MacEachren 
(1995) for example, would tend to see connotative meanings as largely 
‘innocent’ and unintended by the cartographer.
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Accepting that connotative meanings can be of different kinds also implies the 
potential to derive potentially useful and useable typologies of meanings. 
MacEachren (1995, 336-338) presents his initial typology of map connotation, 
which he acknowledges is tentative. The typology schema has two high levels 
and then a five level subdivision, as follows:
1. Connotations about the map
1.1. Connotations of veracity (people believe maps because they think 
they are free from error),
1.2. Connotations of integrity (people believe maps, especially official 
ones, because they think they are free from bias),
2. Connotations about the topic mapped:
2.1. Valuative connotation (maps proffer a value judgement),
2.2. Incitive connotation (maps are intended to arouse emotions and 
prompt particular actions),
2.3. Connotation of power (maps often exert control over places or 
people)
MacEachren only provides limited hypothetical examples to support each 
category in his typology and they remain largely untested. It is also apparent that 
they overlap with map deconstruction espoused by 'critical cartography’ 
paradigm, discussed in section 2.3.3 below.
The classification of denotative and connotative meanings of map signs is an 
analytic that begins to get at the different affects maps have on people’s 
understanding of what is being represented, of how people understand the 
mapped reality. Given that connotative meanings are not explicit, a method of 
analysis is need to expose them. MacEachren (1995) advances two routes, firstly, 
that of intensive and careful individual reading and hermeneutic interpretation by 
the researcher and, secondly, a more quantitative semantic differential testing 
using multiple human subjects. The second method has been applied to map 
signs, for example in classic early work by Petchenik (1974) and more recently 
by Harrower et al. (1997) investigating the meanings of online maps. The first 
method for decoding connotative meanings has also been profitably applied to
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understanding cartographic representations, often drawing on an intertextual 
reading of map materials from competing sources; examples include Vujakovic’s 
(1999a and b) work interpreting the mapping of changing European geopolitics 
as presented in newspapers; EdsalEs (2007) work on the meanings of national 
and world maps as deployed in U.S. political campaigning; and Kosonen’s 
(2008) analysis of the meanings of maps portraying the emerging Finish national 
identity in the first half of the twentieth century. As noted previously semiotic 
analysis of connotative meanings is one of the methods used in this thesis to 
understand the two different genres of maps of Internet infrastructure. Chapter 
five analyses statistical maps of Internet globalisation using a four fold typology 
of connotative meanings based around axis of ‘difference’ and ‘complexity’. 
Chapter six considers marketing maps used by Internet network operators to 
promote their infrastructure and deploys a typology of eight connotative 
meanings that work to demonstrate that the company has the ‘biggest and best’ 
network, that the network is a tangible entity and that the network can be trusted.
2.3.2.2 Cognitive understanding of representation through visualization 
Besides an interest in semiotics, another central focus of the ‘representation’ 
paradigm has been on the visualization of geographic data (rather than on its 
communication), which according to one of it leading practitioners, is focused on 
researching “human-centred methods and technologies that make it possible for 
scientists and decision-makers to solve scientific, social and environmental 
problems through computer-supported, visually-enabled analysis of the growing 
wealth of geospatial data” (Peterson 2003b, 441). To a large degree its research 
questions and methods of work have been driven by computer technology, with 
the digital transition of the map and rise of GIS being the crucial catalysts for 
new research questions. In this sense, visualization research in the 
‘representation’ paradigm can be characterised as a tool-driven epistemology.
A core concern for visualization research has been to examine the potential of 
interactivity and multi-modal computerised graphic displays of cartographic 
information and how this can facilitate so-called ‘knowledge discovery’ by users. 
Consequently, the typical separation of reader from cartographer inherent in the 
communication paradigm collapses. Map users make their own map; they are
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actively engaged using their innate cognitive capability, combined with 
interactive displays, to analyse geographic patterns and visually explore spatial 
relationships in the data. The map is not a fixed communicative artefact for 
public presentation, but an element in a process of individual exploration in 
private environments (Figure 2.5). The research goal is no longer to produce 
optimal map design rules, but to develop better visualisation ‘toolboxes’ that can 
most effectively support ‘visual thinking’ - “the generation of ideas through the 
creation, inspection, and interpretation of visual representations of the previously 
non-visible” (DiBiase 1990, 4). A great deal of this work is influenced by ideas, 
techniques and experiences from scientific visualisation and computer science 
research in interactive graphics and virtual environments. A good amount of 
research being undertaken in terms of visualisation is also relevant to understand 
the interactivity and user-controlled representations produced to map cyberspace.
t c  VISUAL
COMMUNICATION
Synthesis
Presentation
PUBLIC REALM
Figure 2.5: DiBiase’s conceptualisation o f role of cartography in the research process. The focus 
of the ‘map communication’ paradigm is on optimising cartography for use in the right hand side 
of the diagram, more recent work under the rubric of cognitive geovisualisation is concerned with 
developing cartographic tools for use in the left hand part of the process. (Source: DiBiase 1990.)
Proponents of ‘representation’ as a form of geographic visualisation (so-called 
geovisualisation), have argued ebulliently that it represents “the most important 
development in cartography since the thematic mapping ‘revolution’ of the early
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nineteenth century. For map users, [it] represents nothing less than a new way to 
think spatially” (MacEachren 1995, 460). The direction of this paradigm through 
the last five years or so has been set, in large part, by the work of International 
Cartographic Association (ICA) Commission on Visualization and Virtual 
Environments’  ^in developing a comprehensive geovisualization research agenda 
(see Dykes et al. 2005). Leading proponents of ‘representation’ paradigm, 
MacEachren and Kraak (2001, 4) argued geo visualisation’s agenda should be 
focused on supporting researchers dealing with data-rich human-environment 
problems, to ‘‘provide ‘windows’ into the complexity of phenomena and 
processes involved, through innovative scene construction, virtual environments, 
and collaboration, thus prompting insight into the structures and relationships 
contained within these complex, linked datasets.” Key issues of concern were 
providing map-based visualisation tools that could be distributed amongst 
diverse research teams and used in group working tasks; research into three- 
dimensional representations and immersive modes of interactions (the ‘fly-thru- 
map’); along with empirically driven work on evaluation and usability of these 
software tools. In evaluating geovisualisation, the concern has been on the 
fidelity of representation (often with a concern for mimetic ‘reality’), issues of 
scale and level-of-detail on cognitive perception and the potential of 2d-to-3d 
transformations and linked representations to expose novel spatial data relations. 
There are also growing linkages with other innovations in representing non­
geographic data using spatial metaphors in the field of information visualisation 
(see Skupin and Fabrikant 2003). Although the map as a graphic image is central 
to the geovisualisation paradigm, there are also wider concerns with facilitating 
analytical methods within a visualisation environment (such as interactive 
parameter testing in spatial statistics and simulation modelling). This concern 
overlaps heavily with the development of GIScience. Whilst distinctly positivist 
epistemologies underlie the geovisualisation paradigm, some have tried to open 
up the scope of visualisation in more politically progressive directions, for 
example Kwan’s (2002; 2007) work in fusing geospatial technologies with 
feminist theory to map affect and emotional geographies.
Commission's homepage at <http://kartoweb.itc.nl/icavis/index.html>.
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Many of the most interesting developments in cyberspace cartographies have 
clear linkages and overlaps with developments in geovisualisation, in terms of 
using interactive spatial representations -  the ‘map’ -  as an interface tool for data 
exploration and knowledge discovery. Developing new forms of interface and 
interaction that let the analyst explore and cognise cyberspace in terms of spatial 
patterns and semantic relationships that are not readily apparent in the raw data 
(very often large databases of automatically logged records); for example, the 
visualisation of Internet infrastructure by three-dimensional geographic 
visualisation of network address ownership (Shiode and Dodge 1999).
2.3.3 Cartography as power
Robinson tried to describe how maps are, whereas Harley asks why maps are as they are, 
and how e lse  they can be. It Is this latter project which is the political one. (Crampton 2002,
15)
No sooner are maps acknowledged as social constructions than their contingent, their 
conditional, their... arbitrary character is unveiled. Suddenly the things represented by these  
lines are open to discussion and debate, the interest in them of owner, state, insurance 
company is made apparent. (Wood 1992, 19)
Cartographers would agree that all maps are, by necessity, selective and that all 
maps are designed to serve particular purposes. This somewhat innocuous 
admission, however, can - depending on the philosophical position one holds - 
lead to a significant re-interpretation of the nature of mapping. In the last fifteen 
years or so, a new strand of critical cartographic theory has emerged, which takes 
a fundamentally different viewpoint as to what is the purpose of maps is and the 
social significance of human agency in map-making. The thrust of this 
perspective is twofold: first, the acknowledgement that the map is a form of 
power-knowledge, and second, the rejection of the cartographic orthodoxy of 
representational objectivism and communicative efficiency. The concern of this 
paradigm, as Crampton alludes to in the quote above, is not to accept normative 
cartographic discourses, but to “subvert the apparent naturalness and innocence 
of the world shown in maps both past and present” (Harley 1992, 232).
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Scholars advocating a critical theory concerning the ‘power of maps’ argue that 
maps are social constructions that reflect the ideological structure of their 
production and work actively in the ongoing reproduction of these structures. 
Maps are never neutral ‘scientific’ representations, instead they are powerful 
heuristic devices serving particular interests. Furthermore, the consequences of 
what Wood (1992) conceptualises as the ‘interested selectivity of cartography’ 
flow well beyond the semiotics of the map image itself. These consequences of 
map power on human lives have been largely overlooked by earlier academic 
cartography discourses focused on design and technique. To reverse this, critical 
scholars sought to bring concerns for cultural, social and ethical issues into the 
centre of the academic cartography discipline. Indeed, strident advocates of 
critical cartography view the map with suspicion, seeing it as a hegemonic object 
in struggles for social domination, and regard cartographers as guiltily implicated 
in the production of social difference (such as governance of populations, 
enforcement of property rights, imperial conquest and colonial exploitation, and 
military violence and environmental destruction). Mapping for them is a deeply 
politicised process.
The socially constructed nature of contemporary cartography itself is not readily 
apparent because the reader shares, often at the subconscious level, much the 
same values as the map-maker. Most conventional map representations are ‘in­
step’ with norms of the society in which they are made, agreeing on what is and 
is not important in that socio-political milieu. Occasionally, however, the map- 
maker’s social values will be at odds with the reader’s, so that the map will be 
viewed as unconventional or controversial (e.g., Bunge’s (1975) maps from the 
Detroit Geographical Exploration or CCTV maps produced by the New York 
Surveillance Camera Players^^). Similarly, maps from earlier historical periods, 
when viewed from the perspective of contemporary cultural norms, often seem 
‘wrong’ (people can see them as social constructions). Contemporary politically-
See <www.notbored.org/scp-maps.html>.
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motivated counter-mapping^^ projects set out to produce maps that reveal ‘truth’ 
by deliberately unsettling the pact of shared social values between reader and 
map-maker.
To begin to understand the politics of cartography, advocates of the ‘power of 
maps’ paradigm argue, one must ‘deconstruct’ and ‘demystify’ the implicit and 
explicit power relations imbedded in the representation, questioning why the map 
was made, who paid for it to be made, exposing who gains from the map, and, 
equally, who loses from the map’s work in the world; it is necessary to expose 
what point-of-view the map takes while it assiduously pretends to be a ‘view 
from nowhere’. Harley (1992, 232), set out in his methodological agenda to, 
“show how cartography also belongs to the terrain of the social world in which it 
is produced. My key metaphor is that we should begin to deconstruct the map by 
challenging its assumed autonomy as a mode of representation.”
The critical paradigm emerged in academic cartographic research, particularly 
from the sub-discipline of the history of cartography, in the late 1980s, propelled 
in large part by the influential work of Brian Harley and Denis Wood. It can seen 
as following along with a much broader critical ‘project’ across the social 
sciences, focused on rethinking the nature of representations within 
contemporary visual cultures. Harley, and other cartography theorists, drew on a 
range of poststructural ideas to question the Cartesian surety of the map as a 
‘natural’ representation of reality, particularly the influential work of the social 
theorists, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Walter Benjamin in analysing 
texts, sign systems and the political economy of images. Besides such textual 
deconstruction, other concepts have been drawn from feminism (particularly the 
work of Donna Haraway) and govemmentality (especially the work of Michel 
Foucault). Critical ideas on the politics of mapping have informed a number of
Counter-mapping is the conscious deployment o f maps to exploit the authority embedded 
within cartographic representation to challenge established power relations. As Peluso (1995, 
387) argues in relation to struggles over natural resources in Indonesia, “[c]ounter-maps ... have 
the potential for challenging the omissions o f human settlements from forest maps, for contesting 
the homogenization o f space on political, zoning, or property maps, for altering the categories o f  
land and forest management, and for expressing social relationships in space rather than depicting 
abstract space in itself.” See also, Aberley (1993) and Harris and Hazen (2005).
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substantive, theoretically-driven ‘archaeologies’ of cartographic knowledges in 
specific geopolitical contexts^^.
The ‘crisis of representation’ as it pertains to maps, seeks to undermine the truth 
claims of mainstream ‘scientific’ cartography in at least three ways. Firstly, it 
questions modem (Western) science’s privileging of representations of real- 
world phenomena based on empirical observation, overlooking the social and 
cultural conditions within which such observations are grounded. Fundamental to 
this privileging is the ontological dualism of observer and subject, which is 
replicated in cartography as the separation of the map from the territory it 
represents. As Edney (1993, 54) put it; “[tjhere is a world of geographic facts 
‘out there’ - separate and distant from the observer - which are to be ‘discovered’ 
by the explorer and surveyor”. If there are errors in the map, these are technical 
and do not effect the representational essentialism of cartography, i.e., maps can 
capture faithfully the details of the landscape, they are ‘mirrors of nature’ (Rorty 
1980).
Secondly, critics dispute the possibility of producing ‘mirrors of nature’, arguing 
in many ways that the map precedes the territory. As Pickles (2004a, 145) 
asserts: *‘[f]ar from being a mere representation of private property, cadastral 
mapping gave legal and material form to the new territories and landscapes of 
private property”.
Thirdly, the fallacy of modem representationalist logics has been highlighted by 
altemative measurement methodologies. From a philosophical point of view, the 
application of fractal analysis to geographic features, for example, breaks the 
faith in being able measure "facts’ with certainty. Benoît Mandelbrot’s (1967) 
simple question about ‘how long is the coastline of Britain?’ exposed the scale- 
dependent nature of capturing cartographic data. While the increasing diversity
Examples include: Schulten’s (2001) in-depth study o f U.S. mapping institutions, focused on 
popular world maps and atlases produced by Rand McNally and National Geographic, and their 
role in the social construction o f modem American geographical imagination; Edney’s (1997) 
detailed study o f British colonial mapping in India; Winichakul’s (1997) examination o f the role 
o f cartography in the construction o f national identity o f nineteenth century Thailand; Herb’s 
(1997) reading o f map use in Weimar and Nazi Germany.
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of data sources, from surveys, sensors, and satellite imaging, means the 
appearance of empirical unity and universality in state-produced topographic 
representations dissolves. The ease with which aerial photographs can now be 
directly compared to topographic maps, using for example Google Maps, is 
powerful exemplar (Dodge and Perkins 2008b). Ultimately, the technologies of 
cartographic measurement are dialectical. As Turnbull (2004, 209) argues: “Our 
devices for measuring the world frame our understanding of nature but cannot by 
themselves lead to greater correspondence with reality, rather they require the 
proliferation of evermore sophisticated technical devices and social strategies to 
keep our conceptions and nature in line.”
The focus of critical cartography deconstruction has been principally historical in 
character, rather than focused on contemporary mapping practice (although, see 
Pickles 2004a, chapter 8). There has been little published research that has 
applied the ‘power of maps’ theoretical perspective to begin to understand the 
ideologies of cyberspace cartographies (although, see Crampton 2003, chapter 
two; Dodge and Kitchin 2000b; Harpold 1999).
While this body of critical writing on cartography has been forceful (and 
sometimes polemical), it is not without its problems, inconsistencies and critics 
(e.g., Andrews 2001; Belyea 1992; Godlewska 1989). Keates (1996, 194), for 
example, undermines the methodological agenda of Harley and ‘critical 
cartography’ paradigm more broadly, commenting: “The question of how the 
production and publication of maps is controlled in any society is an interesting 
and important issue, but it is not illuminated by uttering clichés about hidden 
agendas.”
Ideologically-driven cartographic deconstruction can also be seen as 
unproductive in that it offers little in the way of an agenda for map-making 
practice to carry forward (Crampton 2001; Kitchin and Dodge 2007). Indeed, the 
influence of new critical theoretical approaches within academic discourse is in 
marked contrast to the work of the large majority of cartographers in practitioner 
communities, in university drawing offices, in government departments and in 
commercial design firms. The profession has not followed this new
60
Chapter Two: Delineating the Map
epistemological line as it offers little of value for those tasked with real world 
demands of making effective maps^* and they have little reason to contribute to 
theoretical debates; as Petchenik (1985, quoted in Keates 1996, 190) wryly notes: 
“Practising cartographers tend to be so busy earning their living by making and 
selling maps that there isn’t ‘free’ time or energy left to be expended on research 
and writing projects: as a consequence, their point of view is not accurately 
reflected in the literature.” Equally disappointing in terms of effecting 
progressive change in the nature of cartography is the failure of human 
geographers to make critical use of maps in their researches. Accordingly, 
Perkins (2004, 385) laments: “[djespite arguments for a social cartography 
employing visualizations to destabilize accepted categories most geographers 
prefer to write theory rather than employ critical visualization”. The humanistic 
cartography of Dorling, discussed below, is a notable exception to this (the 
Worldmapper cartograms project he leads has enjoyed considerable success; also 
Dodge and Kitchin 2008a).
Other accusations levelled at critical cartography include: a misreading and 
superficial misusing of social theories, of simply jumping on the cultural 
‘bandwagon’ of deconstruction and the foisting of a false ‘conspiracy’ view of 
cartography through biased sampling of empirical evidence (Black 1997). “In 
contrast to Harley’s experience of cartographers”, Godlewska (1989, 97) notes, 
“I have found that most have a subtle and critical sense of the nature of their 
work and do not perceive cartography as an objective form of knowledge”. Of 
course, the critical scholars themselves had an agenda in their attacks on 
mainstream cartography, being “propelled by an odd mixture of cynicism and 
idealism” (Lemann 2001, no pagination).
It is also worthwhile noting, that besides the ideologically-driven 
‘deconstructionists’, this paradigm includes other socially-informed and 
progressive scholarship. One might term this work ‘map scepticism’ rather ‘map
Much the same situation pertains to the case o f GIS research and the Ground Truth’ debate (cf. 
Schuurman 2000).
61
Chapter Two: Delineating the Map
c r i t i c i s m I t  is significant work, I think, as it has tried to move mapping 
practice forward in addition to commenting on the politics of map-making. The 
position is highlighted best by Monmonier’s empirically-informed works which 
consistently pointed up the social implications of mapping across a range of 
pertinent topics. His work is also valuable as it is consciously written to reach 
beyond the confines of academia to inform a wider readership. In addition to 
Monmonier, the work of quantitative social geographer Dorling (1995; 1998) is 
noteworthy in questioning conventional statistical mapping practices and also 
offering up a range of altemative, more ‘democratic’ visualisation techniques 
(especially the use of cartograms). Dorling (2005), for example, produced 
socially-informed mapping applicable to educating the next generation of 
geographers and also to influence public policy by more effectively highlighting 
the extent of social inequalities across space; “[m]aps are powerful images”, 
acknowledges Dorling (1998, 287), but this can be exploited in a progressive 
way, “[f]or people who want to change the way we think about the world, 
changing our maps is often a necessary first step”.
2.3.3.1 Three levels of map ‘deconstruction’
In terms of undertaking a deconstmctive type of interpretation of cartography, it 
is useful to think of the process as working on three levels: ‘power on the map’, 
‘power in the map’ and ‘power through the map’. We consider each level in turn.
• ‘Power on the map’
“Maps are stories we tell about ourselves, but they are stories with political 
payoff’ notes Crampton (2004, 41) and “the question for map criticism is then to 
expose who is getting the payoff and how it is achieved.” To begin this work, 
one needs to focus on the power exerted on the map in its production. Maps are 
embedded within a relational network of power/knowledge. The map-maker is 
not a lone individual or organisation, but encompasses a whole set of actors - 
explorers and surveyors, designers and printers, publishers and politicians - all 
with interests and particular agendas working in ongoing processes. The map
This kind of realist conceptualisation o f cartography as an imperfect enterprise has a longer 
pedigree o f course, for example dating back to J.K. Wright’s 1942 paper, Map makers are 
human: comments on the subjective in maps.
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necessarily emerges from this milieu, as a codified and conventionalised text that 
stabilises the network into visual form at a particular point in time. Within the 
network geometry of the map's production there are unequal relationships, with 
much power resting on the patrons (be they the military, local government, 
commercial firms or the patronage of kings and princes of times past)^^. The 
power exerted in the network of cartographic production leave visible traces, to 
varying degrees, in the actual content and graphic form of map text itself. Power 
resides within the map’s image. Critical analysis seeks to reveal the traces.
• ‘Power in the map’
The application of epistemological tools from social theory can provide a new 
reading of map artefacts as texts. This analysis looks beyond the aesthetic 
connoisseurship of the map collector or the Tufre-type rules of good design and 
focuses on the ‘second text’ of the map. As such, deconstructing the map means 
exposing the reasons underlying the selectivity of what is displayed and 
demystifying the origins of the signs used. This focus has clear links to semiotic 
concern for connotative meanings examined by the ‘representation’ paradigm.
Everything about the look of a map is subjective and to some extent arbitrary in 
semiotic terms, but people usually ignore this because they read modem maps as 
‘natural’, having been thoroughly indoctrinated into the conventions of 
cartographic sign systems (i.e., a blue line for a river) "^ .^
The power in the map text through the conventionality of sign systems can be 
deconstructed in terms of ‘rules of cartography’ (Harley 1992). These rules 
enable certain map texts to be conceived and made, whilst at the same time 
making other maps unacceptably unconventional and, therefore, unmade. The 
mles are generally not openly acknowledged and many operate in unspoken and 
unconscious ways (i.e. ‘this the way we always represent churches’). Traditions,
When talking critically to individuals at Ordnance Survey (the epitome o f professional map- 
makers in many respects) one often discovers the severe limits on their freedom o f action in 
terms o f what gets mapped and what is left unmapped by the ‘government’.
Furthermore, as noted by Board, the “very existence o f conventions allows the ‘counter­
mapper’ to shock by breaking with conventions.” (Source: Chris Board, PhD examiners report, 
24* October 2006.)
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customary working practices, professional standards, institutional cultures, all 
help to simultaneously mask the rules and enforce the rules, as well as ensuring 
their perpetuation. The ways of ‘policing’ the rules become more overt, with 
external threats (the reaction by some in the mapping ‘establishment’ to the 
Peters projection and his agenda, for example; cf. Vujakovic 2002 for discussion 
and sources). Even though these rules are very powerful, they are never universal 
and are also contingent on the time and context of production. Such rules also 
provide opportunities for resistance by exposing their conventionality.
Harley (1992) advances two exemplars of these subtle yet powerful cartographic 
rules: the ‘rule of ethnocentricity’ and the ‘rule of social ordering’. The first rule 
is premised on the tendency for any society to place itself (its territorial base or 
metropolitan heartland) at the centre of its maps, thereby, granting more 
significance to itself and ‘pushing’ other peoples and places to the periphery. The 
subliminal geometry of the map image is used to achieve this. For example, it is 
evident in the choice of orientation and projection used on world maps. 
Eurocentric dominance in cartography means a map of the world conventionally 
centred on the Atlantic, with north at the top. While Mercator ‘biases’ in relative 
apparent sizes of nations are long-lasting in the cartographic imaginary and as 
Stewart (1943, 589) noted more than sixty years ago: “Children studying 
elementary geography should be warned that a Mercator map of the world, .. is 
not a picture but a representation in code; specifically, the ‘Mercator code’.” 
Breaking the convention on world maps (such as ‘upside down’ projections like 
McArthur's Universal Corrective Map) shows just what a powerful hold the 
‘rule’ of Eurocentricism has on cartography.
In the second rule, the sign systems employed on maps encode an implicit 
hierarchy of space based on social power rather than objective measures of 
importance. So, the ‘‘distinctions of class and power are engineered, reified and 
legitimated by means of cartographic signs” (Harley 1992, 237). The palace, 
cathedral, and castle have, historically, been most prominently represented on 
maps because they are classified as socially significant (i.e. powerful). The rule 
of thumb is that the more powerful you are, the more visible you will be on the 
map. A stark example of this is the urban mapping in apartheid South Africa,
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where small typefaces were used to label large black townships, while much 
larger, more prominent labels were used to show white settlements which often 
had far fewer inhabitants (Stickler 1990). However, there are many other more 
subtle examples, such as the prioritising of mapped landscapes for car drivers in 
almost all general cartography, at the expense of other forms of mobility (Perkins 
and Thomson 2005).
Another important concept elaborated by Harley (1988b) to deconstruct the 
power in the map was the theory of cartographic silences. The idea that what is 
not shown on a map can be as revealing to the implicit agenda as what is shown. 
The absence of a feature on a map that one would normally expect to see (i.e. it 
is technically possible to survey and represent it at the nominal scale of the map) 
is read as a positive statement in the mapping process, rather just a passive gap in 
representation. There is a range of intentional and deliberate silences, where 
geographic information is suppressed and censored from maps - often, due to 
strictures of security or exigencies of commercial confidentiality. So, for 
example, certain military bases and security installations in the UK have been 
absent or masked on successive official maps (cf. Board 1991; Hodson 1999), 
even though they are evident on aerial photographs (Dodge 2004). Increasing 
fears of terrorism following 9/11 have led to a much wider definition of 
‘sensitive sites’, including various infrastructure networks, and the ‘chilling’ of 
previously published map information on these (see Zellmer 2004 for the 
perspective of map librarians).
Beyond such wilful censorship there is a range of subtle and insidious silences 
that operate as a ‘hidden’ rule. Certain aspects of the material landscape of 
society are silenced because they are not appropriate -  they are ‘not the things we 
put on our maps’; “objects outside the surveyor’s classification of ‘reality’ are 
excluded” (Harley 1988b, 65). These objects might be inconvenient, 
embarrassing or deemed insignificant and are made to disappear figuratively 
from the map. The active denial of indigenous place-names on colonial 
cartography or the erasure of politically-incorrect toponynms on official maps are 
examples the power of silencing (cf. Monmonier 2006).
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• Tower through the map'
The power relations encoded semioticaliy within the map text do not exist in 
isolation, they (re)project outward from the image onto the space and social lives 
they purport to represent. The map can create power itself - just like the power of 
a photograph, film or song - by changing opinions, stirring the emotions and 
inspiring and enabling action in the world. As such, cartographic knowledge has 
often been jealously guarded because it is perceived to be so powerful (Harley 
1988b).
''Cartographers manufacture power: they create a spatial panopticon” (Harley 
1992, 244) and use of official cartography, according to critical
deconstructionists, demonstrates that the map to be a pre-eminent device of 
social domination by manufacturing not just visibility over space but also 
legibility throughout the social-material landscape, "rendering the broad swathes 
of worldly complexity and enormity in miniature form for a discrete purpose” 
(Pickles 2004a, 80). Hegemonic power exercised through the map is evident in 
the conduct of wars, the delineation and enforcement of property rights (at all 
different scales), for counting and monitoring population, and maintaining law 
and order. The instrumental role of government mapping in European imperial 
exploitation through the erasure of indigenous peoples from the colonisers’ maps 
provides strong evidence of exercise of power through cartography. In the 
partition of India, the annexation of Palestinian land or the "terra nullius' of 
Australia, cartography has been integral to colonial practices, providing both 
spatial justification and a rationalising tool for colonisers, past and present. For 
example, Bassett’s (1994, 333) analysis of maps made by European imperial 
powers at the end of the nineteenth century demonstrates how effectively they 
"promoted the appropriation of African space under the rhetoric of commerce 
and civilization.”
An important way that the power of the cartography works in the world is by 
dehumanising the landscape, allowing powerful groups to exercise power at a 
distance, "removed from the realm of face-to-face contacts” (Harley 1988a, 303). 
Maps are foundational to modem systems of govemmentality, as evidenced in 
the extensive use of statistical mapping by bureaucracies and businesses (see
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examples related to Internet in chapter five and appendix two). Maps have come 
to actually symbolize the governmental processes of regimentation, in which 
people and places are rendered as mere dots. This kind of de-socialisation of 
space through cartographic abstraction is seen most brutally in the military. 
Modem war making is now frighteningly like a game played out on digital map 
interfaces that render human landscapes into an impersonal terrain of targets and 
threats that can be engaged by so-called precision-guided weapons (cf. 
Vujakovic 2002a).
Beyond war fighting, states also actively uses cartography to foster national 
identity and legitimate the sovereignty over territory (cf. for European nations, 
Vujakovic 1995 and 1999b; for Finland, Kosonen 2008; for the U.S., Edsall 
2007). The map provides one of the most potent images of unity between people, 
territory and the government (Biggs 1999). Anderson’s (1991, 175) thesis of 
nationalism as imagined community, for example, highlights the extensive 
symbolic power of ‘map-as-logo’, deployed in an “infinitely reproducible series, 
available for transfer to posters, official seals, letterheads, magazine and textbook 
covers, tablecloths, and hotel walls. Instantly recognisable, everywhere visible.” 
Maps showing the world divided geopolitically have become so ingrained as 
‘natural’ template that such borders are present even in maps which are not 
explicitly political (e.g., weather maps). (See also discussion in chapter five on 
the connotations arising from the use of nation state as the mapping template for 
representing the Internet.) The symbolic power of cartography to make borders is 
endlessly exploited in the ‘grand games’ of geopolitics between states, including 
Halford Mackinder’s cartographic articulation of the ‘Eurasian heartlands’ thesis 
at the height of British imperial power (Mackinder 1904).
The myriad ways that the state has come to rely on ‘power through the map’ to 
govern means that it is far and away the largest patron of cartography, but 
mapping is also integral in the processes of capitalist accumulation by 
(re)ordering lived lives into markets, potential markets or obstructions to 
markets. For example, geodemographic mapping reductively profiles individuals, 
fitting them into idealised consumer types, fixing them into a spatial grid of 
quantifiable economic value and ranking them based on ‘worth’ or ‘risk’ (see
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Curry 1997; Goss 1995). This easily leads to discriminatory practices of 
‘redlining’ - the term is derived from the mapping practice - where whole 
communities deemed unprofitable or high risk and are denied services (e.g., see 
Hillier’s (2005) historical analysis of mortgage loan discrimination in 
Philadelphia).
Region of Rat-Bitten Children
CITY OF DETROIT
Figure 2.6: Example of the counter-cartography o f William Bunge showing the rhetorical power 
o f thematic maps to challenge the status-quo. (Source: author scan from Bunge 1975, 161.)
The potent role of cartographic power in social domination by states and 
corporations is certainly strong, such hegemonic mapping is also dialectical 
because it always opens up ways to resist. The practical and rhetorical power of 
maps to articulate altemative perspectives is always available. The power of the 
map can be used to re-frame the world in the service of progressive interests and 
to challenge inequality (such was the overt goal of the Peters projection project), 
while the logo-map used to bolster the state can re-imagined as a potent emblem 
in anti-colonial stmggles (Huggan 1989). Cartographic power has also been 
exploited by environmental pressure groups and anti-globalisation activists to
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counter the dominant corporate discourses, usurping the authority of the map 
against hegemonic interest (e.g., ‘scientific’ maps of the global temperatures and 
shrinking ice sheets have become potent images for climate change 
campaigners). This kind of counter-hegemonic cartographic potential was 
evident in the work of radical geographer Bunge (1975, 150) and his 
expeditionar)' geography, mapping socially-polarised urban America, to “depict a 
region of super-abundance adjacent to a region of brutal poverty”; an example in 
Figure 2.6 uses a conventionally designed statistical map to challenge 
convention^^. The distinction that marks these mapping projects as ‘subversively’ 
powerful is that they exploit the authority of cartography to ask difficult 
questions by mapping the types of human phenomena (war, poverty, racism 
violence against women) and landscape features (toxic waste sites, rat bites) that 
are usually deemed insignificant, inappropriate or otherwise ‘difficult’ by 
mainstream government and commercial cartography and, therefore, left 
unmapped. They confront the norms of society by using the conventional signs 
of the society’s elite. Another significant tactic in counter-cartography is 
changing scale and opening up authorship, for example in eco-mapping, which 
stresses the importance of mapping local areas by local people (Aberley 1993), 
and the empowering of marginalised groups, such as having physically disabled 
people participate in mapping their experiences of navigating streetscapes 
(Vujakovic and Matthews 1994).
2.4 Conclusions
In conclusion, one might ask to what extent can the ideas from the ‘map as 
representation’ and the ‘power of maps’ paradigms be productively applied to 
cyberspace cartographies? To answer this, I would argue, firstly, that ideas on 
semiotic interpretation from the ‘representation’ paradigm can highlight the 
conventional notions that underlie much cyberspace mapping and lead to 
analytical insights on the partial nature of new maps, and the contested social
Vujakovic (notes on thesis draft, October 2006) observes that Bunge also uses deliberate 
cartographic design “slight o f hand’' in terms o f widely extrapolating the extents o f the rat-bite 
area from a sparse distribution o f data points.
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meanings of the map signs, the wider social milieu in which they are embedded, 
and how they work as cartographic imagination shaping the perception of 
cyberspace for users.
Secondly, that concepts from the ‘critical cartography’ paradigm can and should 
be connected to understanding these new modes of mapping, not least because 
the hegemonic work of cartography is being replicated to a large degree in 
cyberspace. The luxury of hindsight and the distance of time seem to make the 
political agendas and social consequences of old maps more apparent, but there 
is a need to critically read contemporary maps because they are the ones directly 
affecting people’s lives today. Many of the implicit purposes of today’s maps of 
cyberspace are the same as those of maps from earlier times -  to control space 
and exert sovereignty, to legitimate private property rights, to surveil people, to 
defend social difference, to make a profit. The theoretical ideas, such as rules of 
ethnocentric geometry and social ordering, the concepts of mapped silences, 
spatial govemmentality and dehumanisation through cartographic abstraction, 
along with the focus on authorship and contested practices, can open up 
cyberspace cartographies critically and as shown in the empirical analysis 
presented in chapters five and six help reveal the ideology of the maps of Internet 
infrastructures.
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Cyberspace Cartographies
[N]ow we have the em ergence of cyberspace ... It is largely invisible to conventional 
methods of observation and measurement ... We need to begin to map this space, to 
visualize its architecture, and to show how it connects to and transforms our traditional 
geographies. The task before us is urgent, baffling, and exciting...
-  Michael Batty, The Geography of Cyberspace, 1993.
The mapping of that vast territory known as cyberspace has begun in ea r n e st ... They range 
from glorious depictions of globe-spanning communications networks to maps of Web 
information. Many have no geographic references, instead turning to nature, the cosm os or 
neuroscience for spatial models.
-  Pamela Licaizi O’Connell, Beyond Geography: Mapping Unknowns of 
Cyberspace, 1999.
3.1 Introduction
A major part of my interest researching cyberspace cartographies has been to 
leam about the authorship of the new map representations produced outside of 
the mainstream mapping industry. Who are the new map-makers and what 
motivates them to tackle the challenge of mapping aspects of cyberspace? Over 
the past thirty years many different map-makers, from a diverse range of 
academic, technical and institutional backgrounds, have mapped different aspects 
of cyberspace. It is apparent that cyberspace cartographies are one of the 
significant areas of creativity in map-making, with a considerable amount of 
experimentation with new visual metaphors, new survey methods and data 
sources, and above all new forms of users interaction with map artefacts. Indeed, 
as cyberspace is lacking established conventions of representations, it is a 
domain ripe for real cartographic innovation, along with opportunities for 
counter-hegemonic and ‘bottom-up' mapping activity outside of established 
institutional boundaries. As such cyberspace cartographies need to be studied in 
greater depth.
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This chapter, therefore, begins by offering a substantive review of cyberspace 
cartographies using a three-fold classification of mapping modes identified in the 
introduction. This is followed by a review of relevant theoretical literature 
focusing on how other scholars have defined the domain of cyberspace 
cartographies and the issues implications they highlight. The review also 
considers the more significant media reporting of the field revealing how these 
new mapping modes have been presented to the general public.
3.2 Cyberspace and new modes of cartography
The cartographic imagination in Europe was profoundly changed during the ‘age 
of discovery' in the fifteenth century as the bounds of geographic knowledge 
expanded. Now, at the digital ‘fin de siècle', a new and diverse range of mapping 
activities has emerged in concert with the so-called ‘age of information', giving 
rise to new cartographic imaginings encompassing cyberspace. As discussed in 
chapter two there are a range of ways to theorise such cartographic change and 
innovation and here I follow Edney's (1993, 54) non-progressive genealogical 
approach in which map-making is composed of a number of modes, that are 
historically contingent sets of “cultural, social, and technological relations which 
define cartographic practices and which determine the character of cartographic 
information". Modes of cartographic practice are coupled to the continual 
emergence of new knowledges, problems, methods, and institutions, driving 
developments in both the design of map representations and roles that 
cartographic artefacts serve in society.
Contemporary mapping practices for the information age - what I term 
cyberspace cartographies - can be categorised into three distinct modes:
• maps in cyberspace, 
maps of cyberspace, 
maps cyberspace.
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The first mode, 'maps in cyberspace’ involves putting existing forms of 
terrestrial cartography online to widen access and add user interactivity. Whilst 
somewhat more prosaic than the other two modes, work in this area to distribute 
existing map information in new ways, and to new audiences, has undoubtedly 
had the widest impact on the discipline of cartography (e.g., many millions of 
people use Web mapping services daily to create custom maps). Maps in this 
mode are characterised by their spatial conception based exclusively on 
conventional geographic frameworks. In institutional terms, the established 
cartographic industry is at the centre of these developments (although being 
challenged by new players, e.g., Google Maps).
The second mode of ‘maps of cyberspace’ is focused on mapping that describes 
the structures of networks and documents the operations of cyberspace itself, as 
viewed from external positions. In some senses they can be thought of as the 
engineering and thematic maps of cyberspace infrastructures and customer 
statistics. (As already noted, this thesis is focused on this mode through the 
analysis of two different genres of Internet network infrastructure mapping, of 
network routes and national connectivity statistics) The scope of this mode is, 
therefore, primarily defined by the subject of the maps rather than the spatial 
conception of the map representations or the tasks undertaken with them. The 
resulting maps encompass a multitude of graphic forms, some of which appear 
quite un-cartographic in a normative sense, such as topological network graphs 
and abstract flow diagrams (see discussion in chapter four on spatial metaphors 
to envision Internet infrastructure).
The last mode produces maps fm navigating through cyberspace, their purpose is 
to guide users within the virtual spaces themselves. They are mostly created 
through the spatialization of non-geographic information structures to produce a 
visual map-like interfaces to virtual space that can support interactive browsing 
and searching. As such this mode is primarily defined by the task to which the 
maps are put rather than their subject or spatial conception. Many of the maps 
from this mode are experimental interfaces and produced in different institutional 
contexts to the other modes, particularly academic computer science and
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commercial software research laboratories, as well as more expressive and 
experimental work from new media artists.
The formal nature, and wider cultural meanings and social implications, of these 
three modes of cyberspace cartography is a novel area for scholarly research. It 
has received relatively little consideration within academic cartography and 
geography (although, the ‘maps in cyberspace’ has been subject to a sizeable 
amount of analysis, but this tends to be technical rather than conceptual or 
political). While this framing of cyberspace cartographies into three modes is an 
imposed classification and somewhat artificial, I think it does provide a useful 
conceptual aid to analysis. It is useful to try to group social-technical innovations 
into a new modes to see the overlaps between them, to identify the distinctive 
themes (in terms of ‘what’ to map and ‘how’ to map it) that divide them, and to 
mark out their particular relationships to wider ‘information age’ discourses (e.g., 
the pluralism of authorship and open content versus enforced marketisation and 
the greater corporate control; enhanced activism and transparency versus 
increased securitisation and the rise of the ‘fear economy’; strengthening of 
localism and regional diversity versus deepening cultural globalisation and 
homogenising consumption patterns).
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Figure 3.1: Telecommunications atlas of network infrastructure in Georgia, USA is an example of 
‘maps o f cyberspace’ mode based on it thematic interest and was disseminated using Web 
mapping technology that is more characteristic of the ‘maps in cyberspace’ mode. (Source: 
Center for Geographic Information Systems, <http://maps.gis.gatech.edu/>, no longer available 
online.)
3.2.1 The ‘maps in cyberspace’ mode
The work in this mode has already produced demonstrable utility and 
commercial viability in putting ‘real-world’ cartography online through 
developments in Web mapping portals and Internet-based GIS services. Much of 
the innovation in this mode has links into the visualisation research in the 
representation paradigm, however, the large-scale deployment is very much 
commercially driven, often through joint ventures between established mapping 
organisations and newer Internet-focused companies with e-commerce
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experience (e.g. Google launching its impressive online mapping service in the 
summer of 2005 with topographic data primarily from Tele Atlas and imagery 
sourced from its purchase of Keyhole). GIS software vendors are also active in 
this mode, developing platforms for customers to distribute maps via the Web 
(e.g., built using ESRI’s ArcIMS software, such as in Figure 3.1; see also French 
and Jia 2001). Many in the mapping industry see the future as one in which they 
provide cartographic information as a bespoke Web service rather than 
publishing general-purpose map products.
This mode has received much greater attention from cartography practitioners 
and academic researchers because it represents an obvious continuation of many 
of their ongoing activities. Nearly all the work examining this mode is technical 
in scope, concerned with adapting existing mapping practices for the new media 
and adopting new technological solutions for user interactivity (e.g., Kraak and 
Brown 2001; Peterson 2003 and 2008; Plewe 1997). The edited volume by Kraak 
and Brown (2001, 1) for example delineates Web cartography straightforwardly 
and instrumentally as maps “presented in a Web browser’ and is primarily 
concerned with design and presentation issues in relation to the constraints and 
opportunities of the new medium of publishing. Two notable exceptions to the 
focus on the ‘engineering’ side are Crampton’s (2003) useful genealogical 
analysis of distributed mapping and Monmonier’s (2002) consideration of some 
of privacy implications of making cartographic information widely available 
online.
One of the more sophisticated research efforts to understand this mode of 
cartography is led by Taylor and colleagues at Carleton University in Canada, 
under the project they call ‘cybercartography’ (Taylor and Caquard 2006). He 
argues that the Internet, as a new publishing media, is ‘'revolutionising 
cartography” and that the map reconceived as an interface tool will be “key to 
navigation in the information era, as both a framework to integrate information 
and a process by which that information can be organized, understood and used” 
(Taylor 2003, 405). Their research agenda in many respects sets the techno- 
cultural imperatives underlying this mode of cartography, focuses on new
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multiple representation for maps and the media to deliver them. It comprises 
seven core elements aimed at creating new maps which:
- are multisensory (vision, sound, touch and leading to smell and taste),
- are multimedia format, exploiting new media,
- are highly interactive and engage users in new ways,
- are applied to a wide range of topics of interest to society,
- are integrated with analytical capability rather than a ‘stand-alone’ 
products
- are compiled by teams of individuals from different disciplines,
- involve new research partnerships among academia, government, civil 
society and the private sector.
(following Taylor 2003, 407).
The agenda is clearly building upon a communicational view of cartography with 
the focus on designing better map artefacts for representing data about 
geographic spaces rather than as an immersive navigation tool for information 
space (hence it should be seen as distinctive from the third mode of cyberspace 
mapping, ‘maps f ^  cyberspace’). If this research agenda is achieved - and much 
is being actively pursued by geo visualisation researchers (cf. Dodge et al. 2008; 
Dykes et al. 2005) - the nature of mapping as experienced by a general audience 
will likely be profoundly changed in the next decade. One might argue that 
Google Earth is already delivering much of this.
3.2.2 The 'maps o f  cyberspace ' mode
A functional definition of the 'map of cyberspace’ mode is any visual image that 
facilitates the spatial understanding of the physical makeup and operation of 
cyberspace itself. Their distinctive subject matter is to show what cyberspace 
'looks like’ by mapping how it is produced, revealing unseen details of its 
technical geography: infrastructure, operations and the patterns of customer 
activity. (See also chapter four on the role of spatial metaphors in this context.) 
There are overlaps between this mode of cyberspace cartography and the ‘maps 
in cyberspace’ mode outlined in the preceding section; for example, the 
commonality of practice and visual form in online mapping techniques used to 
display network routes (e.g., in interactive telecommunications atlases; Figure
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3.1 above). One of the key denominators of the ‘maps of cyberspace’ mode from 
the other modes is, therefore, its thematic focus. Its ‘external’ descriptive 
approach distinguishes it from the ‘maps for cyberspace’ mode that are designed 
to be used ‘internally’ for searching and navigating online spaces.
The ‘maps of cyberspace’ mode encompasses a broad range of representational 
genres: cartography, abstract diagrams and charts and graph visualisations 
(chapter four details examples relating specifically to Internet network 
infrastructures; see also Dodge and Kitchin 2001). It is, therefore, difficult to 
taxonomise this mode based on graphic form or spatial conception of 
representations.
Many of the maps produced in this mode do look familiar in that they use 
semiotic conventions of mainstream cartography -  for, example mapping the 
routes of cables as colour-coded line symbols on a generic geographic base map 
in the Georgia Telecommunications Atlas (Figure 3.1 above). A large proportion 
draw directly on the practices of thematic mapping to spatially represent 
statistical data on cyberspace’s production, such as mapping telephone calling 
pattern (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3); chapter five analyses a series of conventional 
choropleth maps, produced at the world scale, to track the national diffusion of 
Internet connectivity and technological progress towards the ‘information 
societ}’.
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Figure 3.2: Statistical map of telephone calling patterns from Washington DC. This is a typical 
example of ‘maps of cyberspace’ mode presenting results of cyberspace census-taking in the 
context of academic analysis. (Source: author scan from Gottmann 1961, 593.)
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Figure 3.3: Statistical flow map of the volume of trunk telephone traffic between metropolitan 
centres in South Africa, 1963. (Source: author scan from Board et al. 1970, 381.)
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A significant amount of geographical research on various types of networks has 
been undertaken by geographers and regional scientists in the last fifty years. A 
good deal predates the emergence of cyberspace per se and the tremendous 
growth in the Internet, but does offer insights in terms of analytical methods and 
patterns of interpretation that could inform contemporary work on the spatial 
impacts of ICTs on the economy and society. Much of this work focuses on 
understanding the spatial structures of the economy as measured by 
geographically differentiated patterns in flows, including ‘invisible’ flows of 
information via telecommunications and visible, yet ephemeral, transportation 
and communications flows such as road traffic or postal mail (C. Board, PhD 
examiners report, 24^ October 2006). Noteworthy early work on geographical 
analysis of information flows includes the work of Gottmann (1961) who 
examined inter-city telephone call patterns as part of his assessment of the 
emerging ‘informatisation’ of the U.S. economy (example of the mapping 
produced is shown in Figure 3.2 above). Board et al. (1970) analysed telephone 
call statistics as one of a number of empirical variables in their integrative spatial 
analysis of the economy in South Africa (example of the mapping produced is 
shown in Figure 3.3 above) and they found that “the network closely integrates 
the northern metropolitan nodes and joins the system to Cape Town, through 
Johannesburg, the national focus; [while] Port Elizabeth and East London are 
isolated in a secondary and peripheral nodal system.” (p. 380). Lastly, Pred’s 
(1973) historically-focused analysis of intra-urban information flows and 
industrial growth and innovation in U.S. antebellum cities in the nineteenth 
centuiy derived, in part, from empirical analysis of newspaper circulation.
In terms of physical movement of goods, vehicles and people in transitory 
patterns and cyclical patterns across space, there is a lot of literature at various 
scales. For example, ranging from Goddard’s (1970) factor analysis of the 
movement economy of central London based on taxi flows, to Mitchelson and 
Wheeler’s (1994) analysis of the aggregate patterns of inter-urban FedEx parcel 
deliveries to infer the hierarchy of U.S. cities; and up to global scale 
investigation such as Taylor (1999) and colleagues quantitative analysis of airline 
networks and passenger flows, as an element in their much larger empirical 
understanding of the systems of world cities, showing through network links how
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the major cities for chains and clusters of specialisation that underpins the global 
economy.
Tracing out more generalisable theories on spatial impacts of networks on 
society and the meanings embed in different kinds of flows and movements has 
tended to be dominated by other fields of social sciences than geography. The 
sociologists in the form of Manuel Castells, Anthony Giddens and John Urry 
seem to have been particularly successful in galvanising support for their ideas. 
An exception is the work of Ron Abler who has attempted to develop a general 
geographical theory relating distance to communication flows (cf. Falk and Abler 
1980).
3.2.2.1 Representational forms
Other products of the ‘maps of cyberspace’ mode go beyond what many people 
would think of as ‘maps’ in their use of non-geographic forms of representations. 
For example, non-Euclidean visualisations of the topological structure of 
network infrastructures (e.g., Figure 4.10 in the next chapter). These abstract 
graphs focus on showing the connectivity between nodes rather than their 
position in geographic space. (In some cases such non-geographic visualisation is 
undertaken because of the difficulty in meaningfully and reliably geo-coding data 
objects, e.g. problems of locating Internet network addresses; see discussion in 
Grubesic and Murray 2005; Shiode and Dodge 1999).
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Figure 3.4: A screenshot o f a three-dimensional hyperbolic visualisation of Internet topologies 
created by Young Hyun in 2000. It was produced using custom-written hyperbolic graph viewer 
called Walrus designed to allow researchers to interactively browse huge graphs (greater than 
100,000 nodes). (Source: Courtesy o f Young Hyun, Cooperative Association for Internet Data 
Analysis (CAIDA), <www.caida.org/~yoimgh/walrus/walrus.html >.)
In terms of map use, a good many ‘maps of cyberspace’ move beyond the static 
two-dimensional representational norms of mainstream cartography to provide 
interactive multi-dimensional visualisations. There are overlaps in this case with 
visualisation research being undertaken in the representation paradigm in 
cartography (discussed in chapter two). The lure of sophisticated three- 
dimensional graphics and virtual reality interfaces to produce mapping with the 
requisite ‘cyber’-look has been a recurrent feature of this mode. The Earth globe 
aesthetic has proved to be a particularly popular backdrop onto which 
infrastructural data can be mapped (see the discussion in chapter four of the 
power visual metaphor for imagining the Internet). For example, Lamm et al.
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(1996) visualising Web server traffic as ‘skyscrapers’ on VR Earth. (The striking 
images from this research proved to be suitably iconic that one was used as the 
major illustration of the 1999 New York Times story on cyberspace cartographies 
(see Figure 3.8 below). Eschewing the globe and restrictions of terrestrial 
referencing, others have produced immersive three-dimension visualisations of 
cyberspace operations in abstract space, such the Walrus system used to 
interactively display huge graphs of data routing in a hyperbolic space (Figure 
3.4). In some respects these types of interactive three-dimensional visualisations 
of topological structures are the most innovative for cartographic practice by 
pushing outwards the boundaries of the map users experience. However, most 
also suffer with poor semiotic performance in actually conveying information for 
general audiences (Dodge and Kitchin 2000a). In terms of DiBiase’s schema of 
the role of maps in the research process discussed in chapter two (see Figure 2.5), 
these kinds of interactive graph visualisations are designed primarily for use in 
private realm for ‘visual thinking’ rather than for public communication.
Many of the map-makers creating ‘maps of cyberspace’ would not class 
themselves as ‘cartographers’. They are a diverse collection of individual 
explorers/programmers, academic research groups (typically from the computer 
science domain), market research companies, the marketing departments of 
networking / telecommunications corporations, and government statistical and 
regulatory agencies. Unsurprisingly, they tend to come from fields that are most 
involved in the daily production of cyberspace, having the need for maps to 
accomplish immediate pragmatic goals (e.g., engineers analysing network traffic 
and planning new infrastructure deployment, market researchers tracking and 
predicting the growth of the network, industry regulators monitoring 
competitiveness of provision for multiple services areas). Those directly 
responsible for building and operating the data networks underlying cyberspace 
are the most prolific single group of map-makers in this mode; however much of 
their work is for internal use and is never made public, except for specifically 
designed marketing maps (examined in chapter six).
In some senses then, many of these people are compelled to become cyberspace 
map-makers because the basic maps they needed to do their jobs do not exist
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within the normal cartographic supply-chain. There is no coverage of cyberspace 
in major world atlases, for example and the national mapping agencies, like 
USGS and Ordnance Survey, do not record telecommunications infrastructure in 
small scale topographic mapping; it is very much the poor cousin to other 
infrastructures, like railways, that are mapped in much greater depth'. A key 
reason for this is the ‘invisibility’ of much of the Internet’s infrastructures, 
relative to other networks like rail or roads (see discussion in chapter four).
In terms of authorship, the ‘maps of cyberspace’ mode has offered a renewed 
scope for dedicated individual endeavour to make an impact. In much of 
conventional commercial and state-sponsored mapping, cartographic authorship 
has been firmly professionalised and largely anonymised. This is not the case 
with mapping the Internet, for example, because the network infrastructures open 
up new technical opportunities to be used to map themselves in really quite 
innovative ways and at very low costs (see Dodge and Kitchin 2006). This allows 
novel opportunities for what might called ‘super-empowered individuals’ to chart 
vast swathes of cyberspace with minimal resources, utilising recursive software 
algorithms to automate the surveying process and reduce the burden of charting 
huge volumes of data. The work of undergraduate physics student Stephen 
Coast^ is a telling example. Individually he mapped the core topology of the 
Internet as a summer internship project in the Centre for Advanced Spatial 
Analysis in 2001 using software ‘hots’ to scan the network and report results to a 
database (in much the same way that search engines monitor the Web). Coast’s 
work also highlights how whole territories of cyberspace can be remotely sensed 
from a single survey location.
Given the diversity of institutions and individuals producing ‘maps of 
cyberspace’ it is not surprising that they serve multiple normative purposes. At a 
basic level, most of the maps in the mode provide a visual census of where 
cyberspace nodes are located, and in very few cases the traffic that flows
‘ The Ordnance Survey’s ‘Digital National Framework’ (marketed as their MasterMap product), 
for example, does not contain a coherent representation o f telecommunications networks suitable 
for spatial analysis.
■ Results o f the project are available at <www.fractalus.com/steve/stuff7ipmap/>.
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between them. (The ‘where' in this case can be plotted in geographic space or 
according to some other topologic framework). ‘Maps of cyberspace' at the level 
of infrastructure can detail how computers are physically wired together to create 
complex networks that operate over several spatial scales, from individual 
buildings up to global scale systems. Depending on scale, these maps can be used 
by engineers to install and maintain the physical hardware of the networks, by 
system operators to manage networks more effectively, and by marketing and 
business development departments to demonstrate the size and penetration of 
networked services (see chapter six for analysis of examples of the last instance).
Many of the ‘maps of cyberspace' serve as significant components in the market- 
driven development of cyberspace fostered by global capital. They are produced 
as cartographic propaganda by companies and consultants who have vested 
financial interests in the expansion of cyberspace. Maps are deployed as 
persuasive devices (Tyner 1982) because they provide authoritative support to 
the rhetoric of universal expansion, helping to visually assert the global 
ambitions of corporations and as a means to exert sovereignty of private capital 
over public electronic spaces (Dodge and Kitchin 2000b). A examination of most 
ISP Web sites, undertaken in chapter six, reveals the presence of ‘high-gloss' 
marketing maps showing a generalised and simplified view of the company's 
nets\'ork. They usually represent the network on a familiar template of real-world 
geography. As such they have many design commonalties with airline route 
maps displayed in the back of in-flight magazines and are part of an established 
cartographic lineage of marketing maps used to highlight the advantages of the 
latest communications technology to prospective investors and potential 
customers (see chapter six for full discussion).
Beside selling cyberspace, another motive is census-mapping cyberspace in 
support of academic and policy analysis (see the analysis in chapter five for 
detailed empirical discussion). The results, with varying degrees of reliability and 
impartiality, are fed back into business strategies and government policy 
formulation, thereby directly effecting the future production of cyberspace. More 
recently, much of policy analysis work using census type mapping focused on 
explaining the exponential growth in Internet infrastructures, connectivity and
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usage. Visual summary presentation using statistical charts, diagrams and maps 
is common (Figure 3.5).
Nofwty
Cftfitda
O
, i ^
Po;«nd
Unitêd States
 O  SwittertewJ
Oltaty
AtnciBackbone Capacfty fSept 19981Host eo»m
Smpepore
Tl»« MW cf MCfc WA # Cwwein wife imt TifiBO
MMNr of bam n é  bétébamn u  im
Figure 3.5: Diagrammatic summar>' of Internet bandwidth capacity between core countries in 
1999. (Source: TeleGeography 1999, 34.)
TeleGeography, a market analysis firm based in Washington DC has produced 
some of the more innovative examples of cyberspace mapping for policy. They 
measure and map telecommunications traffic flows and Internet bandwidth 
between countries (Figure 3.5), and provide one of the most important and 
credible data sources for the growth of cyberspace. The company grew out of the 
pioneering work by telecommunications lawyer Gregory Staple in the late 1980s, 
who gathered telecom traffic flow data between countries for the first time (see 
Staple and Dixon 1992). Staple’s goal was to map out the structures of 
telegeography; his motivation in doing this was simple: “At the time, I was a few 
streets away from one of London’s best stocked book stores and I had the same 
frustrating experience; the information society was eveiywhere, but you couldn't 
find a map of who was connected to whom to save your job.” (quoted in Dodge 
2000e). While some of Staple’s output used conventional statistical cartography
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templates (for example, see TeleGeography’s wall posters^), he is also interested 
in more innovative visual vocabularies for ‘maps of cyberspace’ as evidenced by 
his publication of the ‘The Whole Internet’ maps"  ^ (based on the graph projection 
by Hal Burch and Bill Cheswick, see chapter four, Figure 4.10).
There are several reasons why ‘maps of cyberspace’ are important beyond their 
normative roles in planning network construction, in selling network access or 
network census-taking for policy-making. Firstly, taken as a whole the output 
from this mode has significant pedagogic utility in challenging the misconception 
of cyberspace as a paraspace^ and the naïve notions that the potential for virtual 
interaction spells the ‘death of distance’ and somehow renders geographic 
location almost insignificant (Caimcross 1997). As noted in the introduction 
these notions have been prevalent in cyberspace discourses, particularly in much 
of the business-orientated coverage in the 1990s, and stemmed in part from 
infrastructure invisibility (discussed in chapter four), combined with techno- 
utopianist fantasies of transcendence of the physical constraints of embodied 
human lives and corporate dreams of borderless worlds.
The seemingly magical ability to surf effortlessly through online information, 
moving from website to website in a single click, belies the scale and 
sophistication of the socio-technical assemblage of protocols, hardware, capital 
and labour that makes this possible. Despite the virtualised rhetoric, this 
infrastructure assemblage remains embedded in real places and ‘maps of 
cyberspace’ have utility in revealing the intersections between virtual space and 
geographic space. Mapping is, therefore, significant as it can provide insights 
into who owns and controls the supporting infrastructure from where cyberspace 
is being produced. In addition, maps are especially useful for communicating this
■’ See <www.telegeography.com/products/maps/cable/index.html>. The basis o f the undersea 
cable map published in a Guardian news stoiy was TeleGeography, see chapter four, Figure 4.1.
Four iterations of this striking poster were sold by Staple’s company Peacock Maps, 
<www.peacockmaps.com>. Note, I worked for Peacock Maps in 2001 and participated in the 
publication of the last version.
 ^Paraspace means ‘other space’ - a sublime space that has forms and practices alien to that in 
geographic space (see Bingham 1999).
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kind of detail to public audiences because they use a familiar template of 
countries and continents.
Understanding the 'where' and ‘how' of the physical embeddedness of data 
networks and information flows through mapping is also important because of 
the uneven geographical distribution of cyberspace and the consequent socio- 
spatial implications in terms of access and inequalities. The location and 
structure of infrastructure is a key determinant in access to cyberspace, affecting 
cost, speed, reliability, and ability to connect (Holdemess 1998; Warf 2001). 
Maps in this cartographic mode can illustrate how, on a global scale, 
infrastructure is concentrated in certain countries (such as the USA, UK, 
Scandinavia), at the national scale how it is concentrated in certain regions (e.g., 
Silicon Valley, the west London-M4 corridor, the Helsinki metropolitan area), 
and even at very localised neighbourhood clusters within ‘high-tech’ cities like 
San Francisco or New York (see for example Zook’s (2000; 2005) cogent 
economic analysis and mapping of Internet domain name ownership). Accessing 
cyberspace is fragmented along traditional spatial and social divisions with 
infrastructure density and variety being closely related to areas of wealth (see Warf 
2001). These issues are discussed in depth in chapter five in relation to maps of 
Internet globalisation.
Despite much innovation and effort from the range of map-makers, in terms of 
coverage, the available ‘maps of cyberspace’ give only a partial view of the 
production of cyberspace. Mappable information is still limited in many areas; 
for example, the inability to measure information flows between and within 
cities. The early work by Gottmann and Board et al. analysing telephone call 
traffic discussed above has not been repeated for the Internet because of limited 
availability of representative datasets. And in some important respects, mappable 
information of cyberspace is actually diminishing. The growing diversity, size 
and privatisation of cyberspace are making it harder to survey and map legibly 
compared to say ten years ago. This has been acerbated with recent post-9/11 
‘chilling’ (Zellmer 2004) in which details on cyberspace infrastructures and 
operating procedures are kept from public purview for ‘security’ reasons; for 
example, the Georgia Telecommunications Atlas (Figure 3.1 above) is no longer
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online. Visitors to the site looking to produce maps of network infrastructure are 
now informed: “Due to security concerns from telecommunications providers, 
the Georgia High-Speed Telecommunications Atlas is no longer available.”^
Yet the 'maps of cyberspace' that have been created and published remain 
politically important, not because they accurately and reliably denote the shape 
of cyberspace itself, but because they reveal how certain people, groups and 
organisation perceive and (re)present cyberspace to themselves and to the outside 
world. All the ‘maps of cyberspace' necessary have connotative meanings that 
expose the interests and agendas of the people who make them: for example, is 
cyberspace being presented as a dangerous, threatening place needing to be 
controlled? or as a new digital ‘public square’ for invigorating communit}' and 
democracy? or a new market ripe for economic exploitation? The agendas in two 
particularly important classes of ‘maps of cyberspace’ are made apparent in 
chapters five and six through a semiotic reading of their connotative meanings.
3.2.3 The ‘maps for cyberspace ’ mode
The extent and usage of cyberspace has grown very rapidly in the last decade. 
With so many distinct virtual spaces and users online, cyberspace has become an 
enormous and often confusing entity that can be difficult to cognise and navigate. 
The ‘maps fm cyberspace’ mode focuses on helping people understand the 
structures of online spaces of information and social interaction, rendering them 
in visual form and enabling people to navigate through them. These are 
cyberspace cartographies designed purposefully as a means to explore ‘inside the 
wires’, rather than to see how the ‘wires’ themselves are produced.
It may seem surprising, in the first instance, that a worthwhile case can be made 
to use cartographic maps to navigate cyberspace. This surprise is based on two 
false assumptions: firstly, that cyberspace has no meaningful spatial structure and 
is somehow ‘unmappable’; and secondly, that maps can only represent 
geographic phenomena in relation to the surface of the earth. Both these
See <http://maps.gis.gatech.edaTelecom\veb/index.htTnl>.
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assumptions are untenable for maps are not just geographic and cyberspace has 
meaningful structures to be surveyed (and calculated) and mapped, such as 
semantic similarity between content, affinity ties of differing strengths in online 
social networks, turn-taking in mediated conversations. The self-evident answer 
is that it is possible to make “maps for cyberspace’ - as many researchers have 
indeed done (cf. Dodge and Kitchin 2001, chapters three and four for myriad 
examples) - although as yet map-makers in this mode have largely failed to 
produce effective maps suitable for widespread public usage. In cognitive and 
semiotic terms there is no equivalent to the Tube map for the navigating the 
Web.
In terms of authorship, the range of work in this mode is undertaken by a 
surprisingly diverse group of map-makers, including graphic designers, 
sociologists, new media artists, information scientists, librarians and software 
interface engineers. Contributions by cartographers and geographers have been 
minimal (with the exception of the notable work by Skupin (2000) and Fabrikant,
(2000)). The bulk of the work is being done within academic contexts, 
particularly in U.S research labs and universities. Also, quite a number of start­
up companies have spun-out from academic research to develop novel interface 
concepts into commercial products^, particularly so in the late 1990s dotcom 
boom when venture-capital was readily available. (Few survived the subsequent 
technology market crash and none has achieved large scale success in the 
commercial market.)
A number of computer science specialisms interested in the “engineering’ aspects 
of new interactive visualisation have also been heavily involved in the ‘maps for 
cyberspace’ mode, including researchers in computer graphics, human-computer 
interaction, visual analysis of massive datasets, and virtual reality areas. Many of 
these fields share common goals of being able to better understand information 
navigation and, thereby, create more efficient means of human-computer 
interactions. In some respects online spaces, such as the Web, provide a
 ^ For example, Visual Insights, Perspecta, Inxight Software and Cartia were spins-off from 
cutting-edge research at Bell Labs-Lucent Technologies, MIT Media Lab, Xerox PARC, and 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratories respectively.
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conveniently accessible, large-scale testbed for this work. In addition to these 
fields within computer science, an allied research community has grown up in 
the 1990s under the banner of information visualisation^ which provides many of 
the most innovative ‘maps for cyberspace' exemplars because of their specific 
emphasis on developing dynamic interfaces to navigate large volumes of textual 
data (see Card et al. 1999; Spence 2001).
Outside of computer science and technically-focused visualisation research, the 
information design community, with direct responsibly for the architecture of 
online content has been most active within the ‘maps cyberspace’ mode; for 
example in terms of site maps on websites (e.g., Kahn 2000). Valuable but 
eclectic contributions have also come from new media artists, who are 
developing interactive maps as works of art (see reviews in Anders 1998; 
Holtzman 1997; Paul 2003) and as virtualised architectural spaces (e.g., Benedikt 
1991; Spiller 1998). One especially interesting group here, working at the 
intersection between online art installations and software computation, are the 
new breed of so-called ‘data-viz’ artist/programmers including Ben Fry at the 
MIT Media Lab and Martin Wattenberg at IBM Research (see Dodge 2001c, 
2 0 0  Id).
3.2.3.1 The potential of information mapping
Cartographic concepts have utility for the maps for cyberspace mode since they 
can help render the intangible virtual media, composed of immaterial code (in 
essence just software algorithms manipulating database records) into visually 
tangible spaces^. Even though one cannot ‘touch’ hypertext, for example, it is 
possible to visually plot its structures on screen to aid navigation. Depending on 
their scale and design, maps of virtual media can give people a unique sense of 
spaces difficult to understand from navigation alone (Dodge 2000a). As such
* It has been defined by three of leading academic computer science researchers as follows: “The 
use o f computer-supported, interactive, visual representations of abstract data to amplify 
cognition” (Card e / ûf/. 1999,2).
 ^ Of course, there are many other visual interface approaches beside cartographic mapping - the 
most common is the temporally ordered list o f items, which underlies the experience of email for 
example.
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notions from cartographic mapping applied to virtual media offers three distinct 
and interlinked advantages over other interfaces to cyberspace:
• Creating a sense of the whole information space,
• Supporting ad-hoc, interactive user exploration,
• Revealing hidden connections between data objects.
In a metaphorical sense information maps enable users to get ‘above’ the virtual 
space. In terms of the Web this kind of ‘birds-eye view’ function has been 
described by David D. Clark, Senior Research Scientist at MIT's Laboratory for 
Computer Science, as the missing ‘up button’ on the browser (Dodge 2000a). 
Such overview visualisation, displayed on a single screen for cognition at a 
glance, is particularly important when combined with support for interactive 
exploration given the nature of much of online information seeking is via 
unstructured and poorly formulated browsing and foraging techniques. “[A] user 
may be unable to say exactly what they are looking for in a collection of 
documents because they may not know exactly what they are looking for. They 
may want to discover roughly what is available in the collection and then, by 
exploration, gradually refine their inquiry” (Spence 2001, 179, original 
emphasis). Maps cyberspace need to be able to show, in an intuitive and 
meaningful fashion, the structures of the information space in terms of direct 
relationships between documents (via citations or hyperlinks, for example), but 
also similarity in terms of shared themes, semantic connections and common 
patterns of usage. These structures and relationships are usually completely 
hidden in the presentation of conventional media interfaces, like the Web 
browser. Yet, this is often where users need insights to assist their visual- 
cognitive assimilation of the mosaic of available information. As cartographic 
theorist Bertin (1981, 64) reminds us: “Items of data do not supply the 
information necessary for decision-making. What must be seen are the 
relationships which emerge from consideration of the entire set of data. In 
decision-making, the useful information is drawn from the overall relationships 
of the entire set.” The effective power of ‘maps fm cyberspace’ comes from 
showing these relationships to users to enable them to make better decisions.
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3.2.3.2 Spatialization for information mapping
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Figure 3.6: The NewsMaps interface was a navigable information terrain where the hills and 
valleys represented variable volumes o f textual information. The white peak represents a large 
number of news stories discussing the same topic (labelled with keywords). The axes are a 
decorative device to frame the display and do not provide useful measurement. The interface was 
based on Cartia’s Themescape spatialization system and was one of the more effective ‘maps for 
cyberspace’ produced in the late 1990s. (Source: author screenshot.)
Developments in the field of information visualisation in last decade have proved 
particularly fertile in creating novel visual metaphors for navigating high­
dimensional information spaces through processes of spatialization (see 
Couclelis 1998; Fabrikant 2000; Fabrikant and Buttenfield 2001; Fabrikant and 
Montello 2008; Fabrikant et al. 2004). These are map-like interfaces that ‘frely on 
the use of spatial metaphors to represent data that are not necessarily spatial” 
(Fabrikant 2000, 67-68). According to Couclelis (1998, 209), ‘True spatialization 
goes beyond the conversion of information into general visual patterns to 
reproduce aspects of the kinds of spaces that are familiar to people from 
everyday experience ... Spatializations work by allowing the establishment of 
metaphors linking a particular task domain with a familiar domain of experience
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in such a way that the modes of thought and action appropriate in the familiar 
domain area also appropriate in the task domain.”
Spatialization renders large amounts of abstract data (usually textual corpus) into 
a more comprehensible, compact visual form by generating meaningful synthetic 
spatial structure (such as distance on the map display scaled according a 
measurement of lexical similarity between data items; see Fabrikant et al. 2004) 
and applying cartographic design concepts from topographic mapping and 
thematic cartography (Skupin 2000). Some of the most map-like examples have 
used the conventions of hill shading and contouring from terrain mapping to 
create browseable virtual ‘information landscapes’ (Wise 1999: Dodge 2000f) 
(Figure 3.6 above). Skupin and Fabrikant (2003, 113) have called for much 
greater involvement of cartographers in information visualisation to develop 
improved spatializations for non-geographic data, arguing that “it may lead to a 
renewed interest among non-cartographers in how our community has managed 
to not only represent the infinitely complex geographic reality within a limited 
display space, but also do it in a manner that enables people to recognize their 
world within it.”
3.2.3.3 Challenges in information mapping
Given these potential advantages, actually creating practicable spatializations, 
however, faces real challenges. This is particularly the case, firstly, because 
cyberspace is new and diverse. It is not a single, homogenous and continuous 
phenomenon, but a myriad of rapidly evolving digital databases, channels, and 
media, each providing a distinct form of virtual interaction and communication 
(as shown in Figure 1.1 in the introductory chapter). Secondly, many virtual 
spaces are overlapping and interconnected, but often in ad-hoc and unplanned 
ways, giving rise to complex rhizomatic*^ structures that can not easily be 
surveyed and mapped. Cyberspace, composed of infinitely malleable software 
code that can produce numerous media forms - including Web pages and their 
hyperlinks, social interactions as text in synchronous chat rooms and
A rhizome is a tangled root system that develops horizontally, and in a non-hierarchical 
fashion. Hypertexts are said to be rhizomatic in form because any node may connect with any 
other.
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asynchronous mailing lists, three-dimensional VR environments, huge 
distributed file corpuses on peer-2 -peer networks - all with “their own sense of 
place and space, their own geography” (Batty 1997, 339).
Some virtual spaces can be highly mutable and in continual informational flux as 
content is refined, expanded and deleted in unpredictable ways - the average life 
span of a Web page in 2000 was reported to be only 44 days (Lyman 2002). 
These are inherently transient landscapes, but where changes are ‘hidden’ until 
they are encountered. Change can happen instantaneously, for example deleting a 
Web page leaves behind no trace (unless archived elsewhere previously). The 
lack of reciprocity in relations means an information node can vanish without 
notice or notification to any other party (hence the problem of * dead-end’ 
h)T)erlinks on the Web). The programmed logic of cyberspace -  presence or 
absence, zero or one -  makes for a hard landscape to map.
Furthermore, these issues of information mutability and transience are likely to 
grow, and become obfuscated by increasing use of encryption and ad-hoc 
distributed architectures (e.g., P2P and WI-FI mesh networks) making mapping 
even harder^ ^  The task of generating even a basic index of parts of cyberspace 
for example, continues to tax the largest corporations and government agencies. 
The Web search engines, for example, have failed to keep pace with the growth 
and mutability of just this one part of cyberspace. Of course, issues of data 
currency and change management are well known in cartography (e.g., the 
uneven revisions cycles of paper topographic maps by some organisations). 
However, the surveyed environment represented on conventional topographic 
maps is really quite a stable place (change tends to be gradual in relation to 
human perceptions; most things stay the same, and when they do change, they 
typically leave evidence behind in the material landscape.) The physical fixity, 
friction and inertia of geographic space means the ‘shelf-life’ of most maps is
'' Tim Bemers-Lee and others counter that the growth and complexity of online information 
resources can be more effectively managed with application of XML to encode semantic 
meanings and the use of collaborative user tagging and rating. Additionally, the wholesale 
automatic geocoding of information objects, as they are created and transmitted, opens up 
interesting possibilities for spatial indexing, filtering by distance and searching by geographic 
location.
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quite long (most of the information printed on a Ordnance Survey Landranger 
map remains valid for decades). There is no such friction or inertia in cyberspace 
and the ‘shelf-life’ for many cyberspace maps is terribly short. What is really 
needed are ‘maps ^  cyberspace’ that are capable of dynamically mapping out 
virtual space in real-time, much like a radar map for tracking weather patterns.
A third set of challenges in mapping relate to the nature of the space. Cyberspace 
offers media that at first, often seem contiguous with geographic space, yet on 
further inspection it becomes clear that the space-time laws of physics have little 
meaning online. This is because virtual spaces are purely relational. They are not 
‘natural’, but are solely the productions of their designers and, in many cases, 
users. They adopt the formal qualities of geographic (Euclidean) space only if 
explicitly programmed to do so, and indeed many media such as email have 
severely limited spatial qualities. Significantly, many virtual spaces violate two 
principal assumptions of modem (Western) cartography making them difficult to 
map legibly using conventional techn iquesT he first of these are the Cartesian 
properties of space as continuous, ordered and reciprocal; there are no sudden 
gaps or holes in the landscape, everything is somewhere, and the Euclidean 
notion of distance holds true, i.e. the distance from A to 5  will be the same as 
from B to A (Staple 1995). Yet parts of cyberspace are discontinuous, lacking 
linear organisation and in some cases elements can have multiple locations.
The second assumption is that the map is not the territory but a representation of 
it, (i.e. the territory has a separate, ongoing existence and meaning beyond the 
map.) Yet there are examples of virtual space where in a literal and functional 
sense the map is the territory. Cartesian logic collapses and there is no reality 
independent of the representation (Dodge and Kitchin 2000a). This conflation of 
the map and the territory is most obviously seen in hypertext spaces when the 
structuring of the data is both the space and its map. This can be experienced in 
the experimental three-dimensional ‘fly-through’ spatializations of hypertext, 
such MIT Media Lab’s Perspecta system (Holtzman 1997) or Apple’s HotSauce
Of course, a number o f geographers have undertaken work on non-Euclidean geographies 
using relational measurements of distance (e.g., Gould 1991).
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navigation map-interface (Figure 3.7) (cf. Dodge 2001a). Staple (1995, 71) 
comments further that in “a very real sense the session is the map. Or paraphrase 
Marshall McLuhan, the medium is the map.” Interestingly, none of the 
experiments in ‘fly-thru’ map-spaces that emerged in the 1990s gained 
widespread usage despite great hope by some pundits that they would overturn 
the page-by-page view of the Web (a visual paradigm based largely on book 
metaphors) ingrained in browsing software.
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Figure 3.7: A screenshot of the HotSauce fly-through interface to Web space produced in the mid 
1990s by Ramanathan V. Guha while working at Apple Research. It was an experimental three- 
dimensional abstract representations and illustrates the degree to which ‘maps for cyberspace’ 
mode stretches beyond cartographic conventions. As an effective navigation map it was a failure. 
(Source: author screenshot.)
At present, it is probably fair to say that in relation to the challenges of producing 
effective ‘maps for cyberspace’, the current map-makers are at a comparable 
stage of development to the cartographers at start of Renaissance period in 
creating comprehensive and useful maps. Although armed with a knowledge of 
traditional mapping and sophisticated computing, mapmakers are lacking the 
vita] ‘blueprints’ that Ptolemy provided for European cartographers in terms of a 
projective grid for plotting the knowledge of vastly expanded territories that the 
New World explorations brought back. At present there is no equivalent world-
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making grid of latitude and longitude for cyberspace. As a consequence, many 
cyberspace cartographers have generally resorted to extending existing methods.
One productive route forward for this mode is to draw upon the mapping 
epistemologies of non-westem, aboriginal cartographies, which are markedly 
different from the dominant conventions and norms of Western cartography, and 
might well provide insights for future cyberspace mapping projects. Much of the 
focus in indigenous cartography is on the non-textual visualisation of conceptual 
links, pathways and relationships between space rather than the geometric grids 
and locational accuracy emphasised in modem (Western) cartography.
3.3 Literature on the cartographies of cyberspace
There is a substantial body of critical analysis on the history of cartography, and 
on contemporary digital mapping and the practices of GIS, yet there has been 
little scholarly work examining cyberspace cartographies per se. While examples 
of cyberspace maps crop up frequently in different literatures, such as network 
maps used as illustrations in technical guide books (e.g., Quarteiman 1990) and 
histories of the Internet (e.g., Abbate 1999; Hafner and Lyon 1996; Salus 1995), 
most are without systematic comment on their semiotic properties or their wider 
social significance.
To begin the summary of relevant literature on cyberspace cartographies, I want 
to consider Gregory Staple’s paper, Notes on Mapping the Net: From Tribal 
Space to Corporate Space (1995). (Staple is a telecoms lawyer and the founder 
of TeleGeography, as noted above.) Although it is a non-academic treatise in 
some respects, and was published in grey literature, the paper provides a valuable 
perspective on the emergence of cyberspace cartographies from one of the 
pioneers in the field. Staple argues firstly that cyberspace is significant in 
extending the centuries old debate about ‘what are maps’ and starts by drawing 
direct parallels to the explorative drive from the ‘age of discovery’ to define 
contemporary cartographic motivations. He notes that effective maps of 
cyberspace are rare because “[f]ew among this frontier fraternity” of hackers and 
webmasters, “have both the navigational and drafting skills of a Ferdinand
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Magellan or a James Cook” (Staple 1995, 6 6 ). He then provides a role call of 
‘issues’ that make cyberspace mapping challenging, including the lack of an 
established mental conception of what cyberspace should look like: “Ask a 
communications engineer to draw a picture of cyberspace and you are likely to 
get a sea of clouds each representing a different network” (Staple 1995, 67) (see 
also chapter four). The confusion in how to represent cyberspace calls for a clear 
separation of the “hardware and software side of the on-line world.” (Staple 
1995, 67), matching partially the mode conceptualisation used here in this thesis 
(i.e., ‘maps of cyberspace’ and ‘maps fm cyberspace’).
Staple’s principal interest is in ‘cybermaps’ to represent information spaces for 
user navigation (what I define as the ‘maps for cyberspace’ mode). To achieve 
this, he notes, new maps will likely be cartographically unconventional (i.e. 
breaking the Euclidean conventions of most Western maps) and he draws on 
ideas from tribal mapping as a source for such alternative conceptions. 
Importantly, connectivity rather than continuity of virtual spaces of cyberspace 
need to be represented to users and he cites American Indian and Australian 
Aboriginal mapping as a useful model for this: ‘‘Cybermaps like tribal maps may 
... dispense with conventional perspective to conseiwe connectivity. They are true 
to the land, not to the theodolite” (Staple 1995, 6 8 ). Staple means the focus of 
measurement and mapping should be on overall topology rather than topographic 
detail. He concludes the paper by discussing the social implications of cybermaps 
in relation to the changing forms of cyberspace evident in the mid 1990s with the 
start of rampant commercialisation, arguing that initial exploration mapping will 
open up cyberspace to the controlling cartography of ‘ a more mercantile genre” 
with universalising grids capable of locating all virtual territory. “Tomorrow’s 
cybersmaps’* he concludes “will record the boundaries of corporate space on the 
Net even as earlier ones illustrated its tribal origins” (Staple 1995, 72).
In terms of writing by academic cartographers, there are two descriptive papers 
by Jiang and Ormeling (1997 and 2000) which do engage with cyberspace 
cartography directly, although they do not attempt any theoretically-informed 
critique of their social implications. The lead author is heavily involved in 
visualisation research and the papers were both published in the Cartographic
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Journal, the house journal of the British Cartographic Society which speaks to 
‘mainstream’ practitioners and researchers. Both papers review a range examples 
of ‘cybermaps’ with an explicit ‘call to arms’ to cartographers to lend their skills 
and experience to make improved maps, asserting that: “cartographers with a 
long standing tradition of mapping geographical space, can make an important 
contribution to mapping cyberspace” (Jiang and Ormeling 1997, 111).
Jiang and Ormeling’s first paper. Cybermap: The Map for Cyberspace (1997), 
defines the nature of the ‘cybermap’ elliptically as a “special map for 
cyberspace” (p.1 1 2 ) that encompasses representations of both the physical 
network and the information spaces. Drawing on theories of maps as 
communication tools, they set out a three-fold ‘functional classification of 
cybermaps’: navigation maps, maps for cyberspatial analysis, maps for 
persuasion. The short paper includes five colour cybermaps as illustrations, but 
these are not politically critiqued. The authors use them in the affirmation of the 
need for professional cartography, somewhat snobbishly noting that “[a]s many 
cybermaps are produced by non-cartographic professionals, it is unavoidable that 
some low quality maps are created.”
Jiang and Ormeling’s second paper. Mapping Cyberspace: Visualizing,
Analysing and Exploring Virtual Worlds (2000), covers similar ground to the 
first, with the map again normatively defined as “a visualisation tool for 
understanding and perception of space” (p. 118). They set out a somewhat 
modified conceptualisation of cyberspace mapping as being concerned, firstly, 
with analysing the geography of the “physical anchorages” of Internet following 
the “principle of traditional thematic mapping” (Jiang and Ormeling 2000, 118), 
secondly, a typology of network forms in which the Internet is visualised as non­
geographic trees and graphs (they cite the Cheswick-Burch visualisation as an 
exemplar; see Figure 4.10). Lastly, they argue cybermaps are the means to 
produce “general purpose maps for virtual worlds” (Jiang and Ormeling, 2000, 
118) as an aid to user navigation through three-dimensional space.
Batty and Miller (2000) bring the concept from quantitative modelling of 
accessibility into their analysis of representations of different types information
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space. They are concerned with developing a research agenda for understanding 
the nexus between material and virtual spaces, the hybrid space that they argue 
will be the “focus for a new geography of the information age” (Batty and Miller 
2000, 134). Attempts to directly map out virtual spaces using traditional 
techniques developed for Euclidean landscapes, they argue, may well not be 
applicable because of the ease with which 'rules’ of geographic space are broken 
and the unsuitability of the existing tools: “current GIS software does not treat 
non-Euclidean space in an appropriate way” (Batty and Miller 2000, 136) they 
point out. An alternative, to map the real-world locations of the physical and 
logical components of virtual space, is again viewed with caution by Batty and 
Miller because “[t]he spatial/geographical metaphor may not be appropriate, 
particularly since information flow in most networks apparently does not 
correlate with geographical space” (Batty and Miller 2000, 136). This is an issue 
because fluid and uncertain phenomena are hard to represent in cartographic 
meaningful ways.
One route forward, they suggest, might be to look beyond mapping the 'surface’ 
morphology of cyberspaces towards an analysis of the structural process 
underlying cyberspatial production by modelling interactions using measures of 
latency instead of Euclidean distance to “see whether or not the frictionless world 
that has emerged has any parallel in traditional geographic spaces” (Batty and 
Miller 2000, 139) or by applying the notion of power laws and small world 
networks to understand the emergent properties of information objects (such as 
Web sites and their hyperlink structures). By way of conclusion they set out a 
fourfold research program for representing hybrid space (p. 144) focused on (1) 
visualisation of connections between material and virtual geographies by 
augmenting existing measures of accessibility and developing new ones; (2 ) 
researching information flows and costs in relation to existing market, social and 
institutional processes; (3) mapping activity spaces by extending time geography 
theories to take account of network flows; (4) developing tools for cyber­
navigation. This agenda has clear overlaps to my conception of cyberspace 
cartography, with the first two items aimed at advancing the 'maps of 
cyberspace’ mode and the other two items come within the remit of the 'maps for 
cyberspace’ mode.
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Castells' (1996) sophisticated sociological theorisation of the network society 
was founded on the power of informational flows to reconfigure time-spaces of 
material places. In his book, The Internet Galaxy^^ (2001) he analyses in more 
depth the material production of the Internet with a review of the geography of 
the infrastructure with descriptive statistics and census-type mapping. He sets out 
a three-fold schema for analysis that in many respects correlates to major types 
of ‘maps of cyberspace’ mode outline above. The first element in the schema is 
the “technical geography” by which Castells’ (2001, 208) refers to “the 
telecommunications infrastructure of the Internet, the connections between 
computers that organize Internet traffic and the distribution of ... bandwidth”. 
The second element is the customer statistics, especially concerning the uneven 
geographic distribution of access and usage. The final element in Castells’ 
schema is the economic geography of Internet production, which has a much 
more spatially concentrated pattern that usage. Drawing heavily on the work of 
economic geographer Zook, the chapter includes seven illustrative thematic maps 
of Internet statistics that show very much the conventional face (and normative 
utility) of cyberspace cartographies to make intangible spaces seem tangible to a 
non-technical audience.
Outside of academic geography, the most theoretically sophisticated work on 
cyberspace cartographies is the paper by Harpold, titled Dark Continents: 
Critique o f Internet Metageographies (1999). Coming from the cultural studies 
domain, Harpold provides a cogent postmodernist critique of maps of global- 
scale Internet infrastructure, richly illustrated with relevant empirical evidence. 
He views much of the output of the 'maps of cyberspace’ modes as a pernicious 
new ‘metageography’ sustaining the information society. “[T]he inherent 
selectivity and social subjectivity makes a map”, Harpold (1999, 18) argues, “a
As an interesting side point, the book's cover features a version o f the Burch-Cheswick Internet 
graph as its central motif. Clearly this image conjured up, both, the space of networks as well 
outer (galactic) space in the mind o f the designer (see discussion in chapter four).
Harpold’s concept of metageography, following Lewis and Wigen (1997), is defined as “sign 
systems that organize geographical knowledge into visual schemes that seem straightforward, but 
which depend on historically- and politically-inflected misrepresentation o f underlying material 
conditions.’' (p. 5).
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problematic construct for describing the heterogeneous conditions and practices 
of the emerging global telecommunications networks.” He is particularly 
concerned with the politics of silence and the iniquitous under representation of 
the peripheries of cyberspace as evidenced in the blank spaces of the African 
continent on most infrastructure maps. He draws direct ideological parallels here 
to the colonial mappings of the nineteenth century, arguing “[t]he blank region is 
‘empty’ only in relation to the comparable fullness of the rest of the map” 
(Harpold 1999, 3). He proceeds to trace out the implications of using nation-state 
boundaries as the ‘natural’ background to represent Internet diffusion, bandwidth 
and access, when the motive forces behind the processes are operating in a multi­
scalar networked political economy. The result, he agues, is that these kinds of 
‘maps of cyberspace’ are deeply deceptive, overstating the extent of Internet 
diffusion because fundamentally they are unable to “account for the extreme 
local obstacles which must be overcome before anything like a viable African 
Internet is possible, at least as netizens of digitally-saturated, liberal-democratic 
nations understand the Internet.” (Harpold 1999, 12)
In Harpold’s opinion (1999, 17), too many ‘maps of cyberspace’, by opting for 
conventional geographic projections, nation state boundaries and signs systems 
of thematic cartography, produce mythologies that reduce the Internet into 
categories of “on/off, traffic/no traffic, wired/unwired”. Thus the maps work, 
Harpold asserts, as a display of “counterfeit ubiquity and technological 
reasonableness” that masks the unevenness of the process of Internet diffusion 
and the extent to which the network will further acerbate social difference 
between places. He ends his analysis with a call to map the Internet using a 
different cartographic imagination, with “new schemes for representing the 
archipelagic landscapes of the emerging political and technological world order.” 
(Harpold 1999, 18). It is not clear whether these have been drawn yet or, indeed, 
whether they can be drawn at all by map-makers cultured with conventional 
Western metageography.
103
Chapter Three: Cyberspace Cartographies
Circuits G)THumnAŸ, sEPreMaBR36. im
êljc i|ork Etmcs
Beyond Geography: 
Mapping Unknowns 
Of Cyberspace
Mapmakers Stretch 
The Definition of Cartography 
To Help Visualize the Web
3
S> F W E tA  ÏX A tJ ’!
Trit lîiappM* ; • ü *  vj?%s -MrtlïT-, si- a:. cy6<-r-'jjacc sTRan *
( »>T prorfi-i - . 6v
pJiF?» f ^ r ta g ^ is A % <'»»3 .- i r  %» tIw'.
  a  » £ » » « .'
cas»- . a . ^ o ;  »-!.
«!v>; ntm tic n-r.-rr-^- %, i s t ; ; .. ' r-'-iKnf «o
jfi-îtiuo, fl* meùfowifnft ha -p*'. •• • They
ÜK, dcftttjîa» a atw  iP «h«ir î- « î^  tc
iiiîïWiW! Aw%yf*Ky. »*»• if — !> M i;. 8*
a*»**! fm yace:)- •?-■ ^  ». --^sae*
f r r O i
T V  mtp* li»- potent?;!! T- -tusfsE- saTiüv - > (letugi?.
Twtt tUnrtly, tiw .rf !bc ave*,..,, pcrw» t»
^1-.'rjp«ee. «w tssrta p.' <*W Æ î coar.- ■ ‘ Æffis A*; 
"KWro twt »  a «  !an*»! ta  &  .*«??'-- K. pscpv- a» a» nr,^  mjfertwr :
ncpe. expen*
■ W« «wü mae» oot àB!t u> tweigâü V I !•• Jeimt an! *ain4 stvr sermary.'’ r»ki Mor-üw » ,r»ê«KVT m
CyJwsiUîct ituf* tac  îs!h nsaoy fonas, îwiadsaï * 
maitiljytswî ï«aÿ n! tiw spaw fqxt&eatfil by tOû,âOO 
«alwtiùœrsrr Vftb addamw», a  nœ i-titw
-îjifCTCütstiws a» W tk  traîfs,-. W' k iu  v d  dw fns& erfe 
BWBiÿ» oï <i»te emact. jeft
•!?; 3Ba;<: : ! sT«*ît î^ AJMiyps *: Osr.r-yjty
t f-flefe t<»»(nr, -SùRjpy iMTiag * îoap «bo»; » tw» per- 
jpcstive, s  n. »  »t^- te yoL^self He!»i»p-^^.s oth*r- 
wiaaebeeon ; „ y i«  f t -raieft 'ÏV taiyt -:Ail#n«r ;t a.à(ncm>i kfoojot Ni XVye ^  
V t*  sue, */ -ùsiSK.
rsedOTt» .’ 'A.-.flüpîe-- tV ie  iiaW k m wy mm@r!% 
wleoee *M A-trapietiUà»*!, w iar nrîierj are mnre i^pd- «tïOf «nar‘ , !i«j,
“We »iT :) -, .f eyry ea fk  « ag e af t r ip  wtA ag • îiasy
m»S?-, »r» far f r o »  perfect et*, taoaœ ni ' « r  D « ^ e  « é ;
fcaee V6Tipti»jsie»«i v fir-ftssî eaite*r»ç*y 
i>y jo.ï&k aoci; K  a i t j  - 'meu-Vlxxii aim a n y
tr i  éveé eafl tfetjf , t-wîis a map ' ' 
M»i>»iitybfcT«i»*ï;faiiij»trt«ftra'*;g'B»er tPsêet^KC* 
ir,* rtw ^sysaal ^««cian: mk.- «xm swiew traSn pattar# 
isT tsrrwfwfcî v d  « r  ■• > -V<œ; Ae .rs5;:é*i. atji
swT*’ ypæe» «f The «àœjmfiï tn t» .
SlttKfaftii ntap4, r-itîwniii enemirtiîv •;;e««aiJofw*nT, 
bave pmved cpiH.’ tîMwnv to vntatt SàK.-,- Ba- X aikia! 
5-rlte»t fvusttiîOan rAVÿiMhee mn srsl-ibij» nf ipt- 
TpteèMi (rt ! %  ttse»- S».v heefi a», fenaw  w c e e  al etfarawk 
sa» aPaa 8 *  J«*cj hecMane SMe-K»:- apf ftaWk. kweW , 
fbtrc »  a jetrÿsJe :< ae taiat?  i*se<! P.- -a % r (nmpap*:
«ad ISJefM scTT K* ptPVàJen. & r,sé of thieh -ki eux shate
bitoi ttHiitao. Ae t'Mxwtjtiv* 
r tc  CoüçsertUtve Assofia.tj.t- V  latesTéK iiala Awhasb, 
oe CaMa, a t  Sac à.«sfns*y *1 f  àiïfttra-r, at S«s cWfiC 
siweWf- »sfl<t'«fc; aab arawepe tJasa aijou» ih t NeL h*e 
tîs#- spocdit pBths a rest p» jie: of tniwmatM» niav M&ia 
■■6‘è are M  ai » fnsat; vet *V ee v»  are drawing niaj» 
wSl) ars ' co m rc îte jî W-iitty te* aey  parnoW a: tm siM a isy ."  
iwwf'swdBeft'tyer
Figure 3.8: The highly illustrated first page of a major story in the New York Times that 
publicized the notion of cyberspace cartographies at the end of the 1990s. (Source: O’Connell 
1999,01.)
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3.3.1 Popular interest in cyberspace cartographies
The field of cyberspace mapping has also received coverage from the 
mainstream media in many parts of the world. Notable articles where the 
journalists provided useful analysis includes: Bodzin (1999), Forde (2000), 
Johnson (1999) and O'Connell (1999). The last of these was a substantive review 
article in the New York Times entitled Beyond Geography: Mapping Unknowns 
o f Cyberspace, which provided a coherent frame to the field, noting that 
cyberspace cartographies encompass a diverse range of representations and are 
being “produced by geographers, cartographers, artists and computer scientists" 
(p. Gl). The story was illustrated prominently with five colour examples from 
both modes with the front page dominated by an Earth globe from the 
visualisation research of Lamm et al. (1995) (Figure 3.8). Two other well known 
Internet visualisations were used, firstly a fragment of the Burch-Cheswick 
topology graph (see also Figure 4.10) and the 'arc across the world’ map by 
Stephen Eick and colleagues (see also Figure 4.4). O’Connell (1999, 01) argued 
that cyberspace cartographies stretch the “definition of a map in their effort to 
capture, sometimes fancifully, what is sometimes referred to as the ‘common 
mental geography’ that lies beyond computer screens.’’ Defining the field, she 
divided cyberspace cartographies into two types, infrastructure and traffic maps 
on one side, and “those addressing the content and social spaces of the electronic 
world.’’ (O’Connell 1999, 01) on the other. The quotes she includes from various 
domain experts create an impression of a nascent field with few practical maps 
available, but an upbeat prognosis about future developments; as she notes: “The 
maps hold the potential to change, subtly or perhaps more directly, the 
relationship of the average person to cyberspace.’’ (O’Connell 1999, 01).
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4.1 Introduction: explaining what the Internet looks like
There are several kinds of spatial imaginings that have been exploited to 
establish the Internet as something ‘real’ and to prove the ‘matter of fact’ 
existence of its infrastructure to different audiences by explaining ‘what the 
Internet looks like’. These are significant in how they work to overcome the 
problems of the invisibility and intangibility of the Internet as an infrastructure. 
How do you explain the Internet when you cannot see and touch it?
(Source of cartoon: Robert Thompson, The Guardian, Online section, 29 March 2001, page 4.)
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Imaginings of infrastructures were particularly prevalent in the first half of the 
1990s, when the Internet emerged rapidly as a new social-technical phenomenon 
in advanced capitalist countries and needed to be ‘explained’ in accessible ways 
to the majority of people who had not experienced it for themselves. This was 
especially because the Internet as a entity has no singular, manifest 
representation. Unlike transportation and telecommunications there is no one 
material device that unambiguously signifies the Internet. Further complicating 
the matter, the Internet is often typified as a place rather than an objeet or media 
(as illustrated by the cartoon above). Early in the Internets’ entry into the public 
consciousness, it had an imaginai malleability as people had no fixed conception 
of what it was, how it worked, whether it was valuable to them, or whether they 
could trust it. As a result the influence of particular spatial metaphors, 
geographical representations and scientific inscriptions in shaping perceptions 
was strong.
In this chapter, I consider how different types of spatial imaginary of the Internet 
have been deployed to overcome infrastructural invisibility and work to forge the 
disparate and fragmented networks into a unitary entity that could be trusted. 
This imaginary is examined in two broad categories. Firstly, for general 
audiences, the range of verbal and visual metaphors that were deployed is 
considered. While such metaphors can be dismissed as mundane, Vujakovic 
(1998, 158, added emphasis) points to their social power, noting the “common 
acceptance of a particular metaphors (propagated or reinforced by the media) 
may lead to a limited view of an issue and the elosure of constructive 
alternatives.'’; and I think this is apposite to particular kinds of spatial metaphor 
than have been applied to the Internet. Secondly, for the research-engineering 
audiences, I examine the role of scientific inscriptions in constructing facts about 
the Internet’s structure and operations. To begin, I unpack the nature of the 
Internet’s invisibility.
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Figure 4.1: Cartography denotation necessary to make invisible Internet infrastructure visible for 
readers of a newspaper story about cable cuts and their impact on the Internet. (Source: The 
Guardian 2008, 22-23.)
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4.2 Internet ‘invisibility’
There are several dimensions to the invisibility of the Internet: firstly, the unseen, 
ignored and hidden material nature of the wires and computers; secondly, the 
transparency of network activities and lack of tangible experience for users; 
thirdly, issues of rapid social naturalisation and the ‘taken-for-granted’ banality 
of technical systems; and lastly, the conscious occlusion through institutional 
normalisation within the wider neo-liberal political economy. I outline each of 
these dimensions in turn.
m
Figure 4.2: A road junction outside the One Wiltshire building, an internet hub in downtown Los 
Angeles, that is heavily marked with ‘utility graffiti’ signifying the location of underground cable 
routes leading into the building. Such markings are a kind of 1-to-l map of the complexity of 
what lies unseen just beneath the surface. (Source: Vamelis 2002, no pagination.)
4.2.1 Materially unseen
The first dimension of invisibility is that network hardware for data transmission 
is largely unseen in the everyday urban landscape, especially in comparison to 
the physical presence of other communications systems (roads, railways, airports, 
postal mail and the like). The Internet as infrastructure is very briefly visible as 
fibre-optic cables are rolled out in the streets, but is quickly subsumed beneath
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roads and pavements. The ‘wires’ of the Internet through cities and across 
countries are almost universally routed subterraneously (Figure 4.2), and 
between continents lie along the ocean floors (Figure 4.1). The Internet is also 
dematerialising further as the actual wires are rapidly being replaced by wireless 
transmission that invisibly carries data unfelt through buildings and bodies.
The infrastructure at the ends of the wires, the network switches and computer 
servers, have a small physical footprint, and are usually hidden away in 
unmarked service spaces and anonymous secure, windowless buildings. Other 
supporting hardware elements vital to ongoing Internet production, such as air- 
conditioning and backup power supplies, are separated from people by being 
located in basements or on roof tops. For all the hype surrounding the Internet 
and the billions in capital investment, it has remarkably little visual impact on the 
urban landscape. Other tangible or noxious externalities of the Internet are 
minimal because it does not produce noise or other noxious pollution^.
In addition to being out-of-sight and relegated to non-human serving spaces, 
other elements of the network hardware that are manifestly visible in the 
landscape are effectively made invisible because they are mundane (‘invisibility 
by being ignored’) or because they are not associated with the operation of the 
Internet (‘invisibility by misconception’). For example, the wiring cabinets^ 
aggregating customer telephone lines, which are now vital to broadband Internet 
distribution, are a common sight on pavements but are an anonymous and 
unmarked part of street furniture.
The material invisibility of the Internet is being actively encouraged in some 
quarters as part of more recent cybersecurity initiatives in which critical and
 ^ Moreover, the negative externalities o f manufacturing I.T. hardware are concentrated and 
largely remote from the affluent places o f Internet consumption as a consequence o f global 
supply chains. The disposal o f computing equipment is also highly polluting, but again is hidden 
from the view o f most people (see BAN 2002).
 ^ In the UK, British Telecom has some 90,000 such "primaiy cross-connection point’ cabinets. 
They are usually painted an unassuming green colour, see 
<mvw.btplc. com/Thegroup/N etworkstory>.
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vulnerable elements of the infrastructure are thought to be best protected by 
being kept anonymous and secret (Gorman 2004). Such ‘security through 
obscurity’, leaving important places deliberately undocumented, has a long 
tradition, including in the production ‘rules’ of state cartography (Board 1991).
It is not only the ongoing hardware production of the Internet that is unseen; at 
the infrastructural level what is carried by data networks is entirely invisible in a 
phenomenological sense. Unlike cars on the road, trains on the track, or letters in 
the mail, the packets of data flowing through the Internet do not exist at the 
analogue scales of human senses. Bits (binary digits) of data are composed of 
discrete states of energy propagated at various wavelengths (light, radio, 
microwave, and so on) and have “no colour, size, or weight, and can travel at the 
speed of light ... [they are] a state of being, on or off, true or false” (Negroponte 
1995, 14). While the bits are easily interpreted by software, they must be 
rendered through interfaces for people to comprehend. It is, therefore, not 
possible to observe the operation of the Internet unmediated. This is problematic, 
in particular, for companies selling Internet network services who need to make 
their infrastructure into something potential customers can trust. As a 
consequence they have to construct a connotation of infrastructure in a way 
people expect it to look using a range of visual metaphors, of which world maps 
showing the geography of routes is a primaiy  ^vehicle (see case study analysis in 
chapter six).
4.2.2 Transparent in use
At a higher level than traffic flows, the Internet is also ‘invisible-in-use’ because 
data networks are intangible in terms of consumer experience. In conventional 
transportation infrastructures, passengers and drivers have innate and 
phenomenological knowledge of the networks through the journey experience. 
They comprehend the physical nature of the infrastructure by kinaesthetic 
interaction with cars, trains and planes - the direct ‘seat of the pants’ feel of the 
network. Telecommunications, in their inherent virtuality, are completely lacking 
such experiential comprehension. The lack of human touch defines tele- 
communications.
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No knowledge of the Internet as infrastructure is gained from browsing the Web 
for example, it gives off no physical sensations. The majority of people on the 
Internet are never aware of the vast infrastructure they are utilising because it is 
consciously hidden from them, behind software interfaces. (Again, as noted 
above this is problematic for companies in the actual business of Internet 
infrastructure, who commonly use deploy market maps to give potential 
customers a visible sense of how extensive and powerful their network is; see 
discussion in chapter six.) Such infrastructural concealment is seen as a good 
thing by the industry - it is described as the ‘network being transparent to the 
user’"^. A key part of the power of the Internet has been its ability to provide 
seamless, end-to-end, communications services so that users do not have to 
worry about the structure of the underlying networks and the complex ways in 
which traffic is transmitted. Indeed, one might argue that the Internet could only 
become such a successful and widely used media of communication once its 
arcane technicalities were rendered sufficiently invisible to users, through 
developments such as the Web browser.
Moreover, a large cadre of computer science researchers, network engineers and 
industrial designers are striving to greatly increase the degree to which 
computers and the Internet fade into the fabric of everyday activities. Working 
under the banner of pervasive computing they are striving for systems that are 
“so imbedded, so fitting, so natural, that we use it without even thinking it’* 
(Weiser 1991, 94). Scholars in this area argue that current ICT use, is in fact, not 
transparent enough, requiring too much cognitive effort to achieve the desired 
results (cf. Norman 1998). The promise of nomadic, always-on access through 
wireless networks will, advocates argue, make the Internet as invisible and 
ubiquitous as air.
4.2.3 Disappearance by social naturalisation
The conduct of daily life surely demands a tactical lack of curiosity! But that lack of curiosity
carries costs and overhead expenses as well as benefits. (Bijker and Law 1992, 2.)
Transparency in this sense means that infrastructure “does not have to be reinvented each time 
or assembled for each task, but invisibly supports those tasks" (Star and Bowker 2002, 152); the 
archetypal of this, in developed countries, is domestic electricity supply.
II:
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As well as being materially unseen and intangible in use, probably the most 
effective way that Internet infrastructure is made invisible is through its subtle 
disappearance from people’s consciousness. As is well noted by scholars 
interested in the social shaping of technology, once an infrastructure becomes 
commonplace, people do not much care for how it is produced, for they exhibit 
“a tactical lack of curiosity” according to Bijker and Law (1992, 2). It becomes a 
‘taken-for-granted’ feature, fading into the background of everyday life. 
Infrastructure is something you notice more by its absence than its presence.
From being a novelty in the mid 1990s, the Internet has quickly become 
culturally naturalised, with email addresses and websites part of common 
vernacular. Concerns about ‘digital divides’ notwithstanding, many businesses 
and government agencies now presume that all people have Internet service and 
are sufficiently conversant with it to obtain information and perform transactions 
online. (Arguably, connotations of ubiquity and universality is, in part, 
constructed through the particular kinds of worldwide mapping of Internet 
penetration statistics by some organisations; see analysis in chapter five.) Such 
everyday social-cultural familiarity is clearly bound-up with transparency in use. 
As infrastructures become more transparent (and more reliable, affordable and 
universally available), so they morph in character from desired conveniences to a 
necessary and seemingly naturally-given part of the lived environment.
This is often conceived of as a process of ‘black-boxing’ in which infrastructures 
are “treated by users as unproblematic and ‘closed’ sociotechnical artefacts that 
[can] be relied on without much thought” (Graham 2000, 184). One might argue 
that the best infrastructures are those that are so ‘black-boxed’ they are not 
noticed at all; they are also the most powerful, able to affect deeper or wider 
ranging reorganisations of socio-spatial relationships without scrutiny or 
resistance (again, electrical power supplies serves as an archetypal case). Indeed, 
one way of assessing the extent to which technologies, including the Internet, 
have moved ‘backstage’ and been ‘black-boxed’ is by measuring the degree of 
dependency people are willing to place on them. Such dependency is exposed in 
the disruption caused when infrastructures temporarily fail, for whatever reason
ii;
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(e.g., the large degree of inconvenience to everyday activities caused by power 
cuts).
4.2.4 Occlusion through institutional normalisation
Large infrastructures are produced by institutions and their ongoing production 
requires huge amounts of mundane, easily-overlooked organisational work 
(construction plans and maintenance schedules, operational staffing 
arrangements, business processes, financial management, technical standards, 
and so on). Internet networks are as much an outcome of the institutional 
practices as they are the result of physical wires.
Yet this kind of institutional work tends to become normalised, bureaucratic and 
anonymous. Infrastructure invisibility is manufactured institutionally then, by 
obscure regulatory structures that make it hard to discern sources of decision­
making power, by complex pricing models that hide real costs and deliberately 
opaque ownership structures which make it unclear who controls companies. 
Ultimately, the complex institutional power structures underlying the supply of 
the Internet into people's homes contributes to making the infrastructure 
invisible. (Many of the companies examined in chapter six who run large parts of 
the Internet networks are obscure because they do not sell services to end- 
customers.)
Institutional working is itself is bound within the prevailing political-economic 
structures. Through much of the second half of the twentieth century utility 
infrastructures (electricity, water, telephone, transportation networks) were 
operated within monopolistic state ownership structures. Generally, these had 
clearly established remits and strong public identities for the infrastructure they 
managed (even if they were not well liked, e.g. British Rail). Since the 1980s, 
this institutional unity in provision has been deliberately broken apart - so called 
‘unbundling’ or ‘deregulation’- through processes of marketisation, privatisation 
and regulatory liberalisation. Such fragmentation means there is a lack of a 
constituted, agreed institutional identity for utility providers. In the case of the 
Internet, whose job is it to keep the infrastructure running? Graham and Marvin
(2001) characterise this shift as a ‘splintering urbanism’, arguing that it is giving
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rise to ‘“premium networked spaces’ that are customised precisely to the needs 
of powerful users and spaces, whilst bypassing less powerful users and spaces” 
(Graham 2000, 185). Internet provision is a prime example of such premium 
networked spaces, with its pricing, quotas and differential bandwidths.
Another significant element in this invisibility of institutions owning and running 
the infrastructures of the Internet is the obscurity of the workers who do this 
work. The skilled labour force required to build and operate the Internet is 
largely invisible, and when acknowledged they are often denigrated as just 
‘technicians’ in comparison to other more attractive occupations associated with 
the creative industries of new media. This aspect of the ‘hidden’ workforce in 
information infrastructures is not new, as Downey (2001) shows in relation to the 
telegraph era.
4.2.5 Implications o f infrastructure invisibility
Infrastructure can be dullest of all topics. It can also be the most Important. Infrastructure 
defines the basis of society: it is the underlying foundation of the facilities, services and 
standards upon which everything else builds. (Norman 1998, 55.)
The above dimensions of infrastructural invisibility have consequences, both 
pragmatic and political, for understanding the nature of the Internet. Firstly, from 
a practical point of view it means infrastructures tend to be little studied within 
social sciences. They are easily overlooked by scholars and deemed to be 
insignificant elements in wider analysis or are seen as ‘mere’ technicalities with 
little scope for socially informed research. Hillis (1998, 544), for example, 
argues that infrastructure invisibility across several registers has been the key 
reason why telecommunications have received scant attention by the human 
geography discipline^: “[f]or a discipline firmly rooted in an empirical and 
visually dependent understanding of the facts, too often, if it can’t be seen ‘it’s 
not geography’.”
 ^ There have been some noteworthy academic attempts to understand the physical construction 
and geographical embeddedness of network infrastructures, in spite o f the varying dimensions of 
invisibility, e.g.. Board et al. (1970); Gottmann (1961);Graham and Marvin (1996, 2001); Hugill 
(1999); Mitchell (1995); Townsend (2003).
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The failure of much of the social sciences to take a serious interest in 
infrastructures is compounded by the lack of published and comprehensible 
documentation of them. This is particularly the case with the Internet, with 
available data being partial, spatially incomplete, fragmented organisationally 
and often held to be commercially confidential (cf. Grubesic and Murray 2005; 
Jordan 2001). In relation to network maps for commercial promotion, chapter six 
discusses the impacts of partial and missing traffic data for misunderstanding the 
nature of Internet injfrastructure growth. Furthermore, as an infrastructural entity, 
the Internet is essentially made intractable because of its undocumented presence 
in standard government statistics and on general reference mapping. For 
example, the terrestrial fibre-optic cable systems which sustain the Internet are 
not present as a layer in published topographic map databases (e.g., in Ordnance 
Survey's MasterMap product in the UK)^. Being unmapped in this way is, in 
many respects, tantamount to being invisible for analysis^.
From a political perspective, critical studies of infrastructures are made harder 
because of the ways in which institutions deliberately keep them as ‘black- 
boxed’ systems, to keep people from easily observing (and questioning) their 
design and operational logics. Invisibility of the infrastructure provides an 
effective cloak under which dubious or iniquitous practices can be safely carried 
out by institutions owning and operating them. The lack of critical studies of 
Internet infrastructure mean intensifying bias in the ongoing production of 
networks that widen social difference and inequalities across space are 
unchallenged. It also precludes informed discussion of ways to build and operate 
infrastructure differently.
 ^Utility engineering departments do have facilities maps showing pipe and cable routes but these 
are typically not available to the public and in many cases are incomplete and o f vary ing degrees 
of accuracy.
As noted in chapter six, this limit has meant some academic and policy analysts have been 
overly reliant on the vagaries o f network marketing maps produced for commercial promotion as 
their source of primary data on the extent of Internet infrastructures.
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4.3 The role of verbal and visual metaphors
The generation of popular explanations of the Internet involves the classification 
and conceptualisation of an unfamiliar phenomenon (i.e., extensive but invisible 
infrastructures which support novel forms of interactive media) into a set of well- 
known categories. This process can be effectively accomplished using 
metaphors, which constitute an important and pervasive form of figurative 
speech, fundamental to human language and which structure cognitive 
experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Here I consider verbal metaphors first, 
followed by a discussion of common visual spatial metaphors, used to represent, 
imagine and ‘explain’ Internet infrastructures, thus, at least in part, overcoming 
its multidimensional invisibility.
4.3.1 Linguistic spatial metaphors
The expanding lexicon of the Internet... is not only replete with, but actually constituted by,
the use of geographical metaphors. (Graham 1998, 166.)
Metaphors are linguistic tools that facilitate understanding of a unfamiliar subject 
by bringing another, more familiar, concept in conjunction with it. According to 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphorical schemas ground the conceptual 
structures of a novel domain (target) to a known, physical one (source). The 
metaphor works as a transfer of concepts from source to target, in which the 
transferred, familiar concepts interact with the new unfamiliar context, 
highlighting its nature and producing effects in terms of potential shifts in 
meaning. As Sawhney (1996, 292) argues, metaphors “create a ‘stereoscopic 
vision’ which allows for simultaneous viewing of an idea from two or more 
points of view.” The unfamiliar motorcar when it first appeared in 1880s, for 
example, was explained as a horseless carriage, thereby grounding the unknown 
by proposing that it can be seen as being like the common horse and cart. The 
insight generated by a well-chosen metaphor comes from the point of interaction 
between familiar concepts and unfamiliar contexts. Metaphors create an image 
that is usually far from the actuality of the subject; for example, the reality of 
Internet access via dial-up modems in the early 1990s was at odds with 
‘highway’ metaphors, and yet effective metaphors can pervade the popular
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imagination through reproduction in the media, being endlessly circulated and 
refined, so that they become a natural and invisible part of language and thought. 
Furthermore, metaphors become part of defining the cultural contexts of 
communication and play a major role in the legitimisation of certain social values 
and in the denial of others. The choice of metaphors can reveal as much about the 
speaker as what they are actually talking about.
Metaphors can work as self-fulfilling prophecies in which the phenomena so 
described gets progressively remade to fit its dominant metaphor. “The 
metaphors that are used to study an emerging technology”, Sawhney (1996, 293) 
notes, “usually end up influencing the shape it takes.” This can be seen for 
example, in the legal frameworks enacted to regulate the Internet, which are 
based, in significant part, on metaphors from a transportation context relating to 
physical movement of goods (see below). The conceptual framework from which 
particular metaphors are drawn is important because they impart certain 
properties and favour certain implications. Contrast, for example, 
conceptualising Internet infrastructure as media with the associated range of 
broadcasting metaphors, instead of the more utilitarian transportation one.
Metaphors must, therefore, be read as political because their linguistic power can 
effect social change in terms of the way a new phenomenon is perceived, in the 
service of certain interests. Adams (1997, 156) calls this effect a “cognitive jolt” 
that makes people stop and think in a new way, and it can be used to destabilise 
accepted norms. Metaphors can also be deployed persuasively to contain and 
normalise threats to powerful interests from new phenomena, such as a disruptive 
technology like the Internet. Metaphors, then, are a contested domain of political 
action because they affect how people talk about the world which, in turn, affects 
the way they relate to it.
In circumstances where there is “high uncertainty, missing data, unclear goals 
and poorly understood parameters” (Klein 1987 quoted in Sawhney 1996, 292), 
the most productive means of explanation of a new technology can often be 
through metaphors and analogies. This was the case with the Internet in the early 
1990s when it was in its social ‘discovery’ phase of development in Western
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consumer societies. It is important to think about the politics lying behind the 
work metaphors were being employed at this time.
Metaphors from many different conceptual frameworks have been actively 
deployed to characterise the Internet. For example, the Internet as a living 
organism (such as a tree, a body or brain); the Internet as a city (with streets, 
towns halls and suburbs); the Internet as a marketplace (with online shops, 
virtual money, and e-trading); the Internet as written text (with its letter 
metaphors of web pages email, addresses and signature files). The map and 
mapping practices related to navigation were themselves also a prime source of 
metaphors for explaining the Internet. Metaphors from multiple domains were 
employed simultaneously, often in competition to dominate a discourse. The 
result was a confusing ecosystem of metaphors (see Palmquist 1996), being 
combined together and clashing against each other in confusing, sometimes 
creative ways (e.g., the notion of information presented as a ‘Web page’ 
combines the organic framework with a book-bound analogy).
Each of these metaphorical domains highlights certain aspects of the Internet, 
downplays some and hides others. Some clearly owe allegiance to U.S.-centric 
domination of the Internet’s infrastructure development and media-driven 
popularisation; for example, the large number of ‘frontier’ related metaphors. 
This metaphorical domain is seen as foundational to many American cultural 
myths, pregnant as it is with complex connotations of social autonomy and 
political conquest (cf. Adams 1997; Yen 2002). As example in 1990, Mitch 
Kapor and John Perry Barlow, co-founders of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
a U.S. interest group that works for Internet free speech, wrote: “In its present 
condition, cyberspace is a frontier region, populated by the few hardy 
technologists who can tolerate the austerity of its savage computer interfaces, 
incompatible communications protocols, proprietary barricades, cultural and 
legal ambiguities, and general lack of useful maps...”. The nature of social and 
spatial relations implied by this kind invocation of the frontier (zone beyond 
legal control, self-reliance, boundless opportunities for risk takers and so on) are 
seen as ideals, by some, for the kinds of new technological opportunities the 
Internet promised in the early 1990s. It also “supports an often-made claim that
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cyberspace is different from real space, and that government should generally 
refrain from regulating the Internet” (Yen 2002, 3). Yet the frontier is as much a 
romantised myth of progress that consciously elides the very detrimental 
experiences for many living on the frontier, with its profiteering, rough justice, 
racial prejudice and casual violence.
The notion of a frontier also has direct and significant connections to 
cartography. The act of mapping frontiers begins to render these uncertain spaces 
as definite lines (a classic example from history being the Tordesillas line that 
divided the New World for Portuguese and Spanish conquest). Inscribing the 
frontier begins to formalise its existence and representations necessarily fix its 
position. Mapping as an act of enclosure transforms frontiers into known borders, 
able to separate inside from outside, to determine who belongs and those who do 
not. In some senses all that world maps are semiotically is just frontier signs, but 
quite problematic for all their connotations of solidity and reality; as Black 
(2 0 0 0 , 218) observes: “[cjlearly contrasting primary colours and firmly 
delineated frontier lines do not describe adequately or accurately problems of 
multiple allegiances, overlapping jurisdictions and complex sovereignty...”. 
Also, on the ground, at the frontier line there is often no physical trace to be seen 
yet the map has real force in construction of territory.
Besides the ‘frontier’ metaphors, another noteworthy collection of spatial 
metaphors applied to the Internet uses familiar architectural places (e.g., library, 
shops, farms, etc). Others characterise the Internet in terms of container-like 
space (e.g., rooms, sites, malls, communities, cities, spheres, worlds and, of 
course, cyberspace itself). The metaphors in the container-spaces framework are 
somewhat more abstract than others, but have nevertheless proved to be 
particularly potent in defining the Internet as a territorial system, with discrete 
locations and a bounded sense of inside / outside.
Metaphors built around architectural places are also very common, subtly 
suffusing throughout Internet imaginary. Familiar domestic environments of the 
home and work have been metaphorically co-opted to give concrete cognitive 
forms to invisible Internet infrastructures and their intangible media (homepages.
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digital libraries, virtual classrooms, server farms and so on). There are almost 
endless combinations of them and they have been nested together by function or 
linked thematically. Internet evangelist, Howard Rheingold, who was the lead 
propagator of the ‘virtual communities’ movement (itself a potent metaphor), 
gave a vivid description in the early 1990s of the social forms of part of the 
Internet, by mixing together multiple architectural-place metaphors:
‘ ... a place for conversation or publication, like a giant coffee-house with a 
thousand rooms; it is also a world-wide digital version of the Speaker’s 
Comer in London’s Hyde Park, an unedited collection of letters to the 
editor, a floating flea market, a huge vanity publisher, and a collection of 
every odd special-interest group in the world.” (Rheingold 1993, 130.)
The coffee house is particularly interesting as a spatial metaphor with assorted 
meanings. It is applied to describe the social nature of cyberspace, imagining the 
Internet as an ideal venue for particular kinds of discourse and discussion. The 
coffee house has many connotations in European intellectual thought and public 
life, being regarded in the eighteenth century as one of the wellsprings of the 
Enlightenment, a place from which new ideas in science and politics emerged 
and could be openly debated. It was a place to meet like minded thinkers, share 
scholarly gossip, read political pamphlets and hear about new scientific 
discoveries from the men themselves. The coffee house was a public place where 
you could be seen to be in serious conversations, yet it also offering room for 
private dialogue (but with the risks of being overheard). Besides discourse, it was 
also a space for where business could be conducted, and contributed to the raise 
to form new forms of capitalism and entrepreneurship which were distinct from 
traditional sources of wealth and power -  the church, the king and landed 
aristocracy.
Yet for all the progressive idealism bound-up in the notion of coffee house 
culture -  which obviously made it an apposite metaphor to apply to mould the, 
then, formless Internet for ‘cyber-utopianists’ like Rheingold -  it implies certain 
kinds of acceptable context and social relations. The most obvious being around 
class and gender. The coffee house was not welcoming to all, it was only a 
convivial space only for certain class of men engaging in serious talk. It was
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distinct from the ribald alcoholic atmosphere of the (working class) public house 
or the trivialities of chatter of the (feminine) tea shop. While the coffee house 
metaphor connotes openness, it has distinct social and material boundaries that 
create categories of insiders and outsiders. It was also a space of labour relations 
with people serving and people being served. It was only democratic for those on 
the one side of the counter and with the level of income to be able to afford to 
indulge in the new taste for coffee, an expensive luxury, indicative of 
sophistication and certain social status. Even today coffee drinking implies a 
different set of behaviours and identities to, say, lager drinking, as does the use 
of the Internet which for some is about edification but it also offers prurient 
recreation for others.
A thorough application of architectural imaginar}' to metaphorically ‘explain' the 
nature of Internet infrastructures is given in the writings of William Mitchell 
(professor of Architecture and Media Arts at MIT). His influential book City o f  
Bits (1995) published in the midst of the Internet ‘take-off was one of the first to 
analyse the significance of emerging Internet infrastructures for the built 
environment. Mitchell’s (1995, 107) thesis claimed that “[cjomputer networks 
[will] become as fundamental to urban life as street systems. Memory and screen 
space become valuable, sought-after sorts of real estate.” The highpoint of such 
urban-centred metaphors came in the late 1990s with popularity of ‘virtual 
cities’, some of which were ‘grounded’ with real-world equivalents while others 
were purely imaginary (Aurigi 2005). This has now been large usurped by the 
rise of placeless social networking focused around individual ego rather than 
communal life, as seen in the popularity of services such as Facebook and 
Myspace.
The widespread application of such architectural and city metaphors clearly has 
utility in making foreign media-based environments feel familiar, yet they are not 
innocent (mere convenient linguistic devices). The over-reliance on such 
metaphors, Graham (1998, 167) argues, “actually serves to obfuscate the 
complex relations between new communications and information technologies 
and space, place and society”. How far is a digital library really like a ‘real’ 
library, for example, in relation to issues of access, usability and privacy? More
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subtly, these metaphors bring with them the oppressive potential of manmade 
environments, with their established power geometries of ownership and rules of 
access and exclusion. As Adams (1997, 167) notes: “We might worry that the 
primary function of virtual architecture would be a kind of containment, in which 
there was no longer an ‘outside’ and populations were everywhere contained and 
subjugated.”
Beside place-based ‘nouns’ to describe the forms of the Internet, the action of 
using the network is frequently described in terms of spatial ‘verbs’ of physical 
movement and embodied travel. The lexicon of such metaphors includes: surfing, 
navigating, exploring, homesteading. (They are quite different from ways of 
describing other media use, e.g., book reading and television viewing.) These 
metaphors of movement also encompass spatial notions of following paths, 
getting lost, hitting dead-ends and the discovery of new places. Online activity 
draws from “every imaginable environmental situation, suggesting not simply a 
virtual place but an entire virtual geography” (Adams 1997, 155).
Closely allied with the spatial metaphors of movement used to explain 
participation in computer networks, are the transportation-oriented metaphors of 
pipes, routes, rails and especially roads used to analogise data flows. 
Transportation metaphors conceptualise the wider effects of the Internet 
infrastructure not as a virtual territory but as a means to traverse real territory, 
typically at great speed. (The nature of maps of transportation and travel 
contribute to this, with their highlighting of network above topography, see 
discussion in chapter six in relation to marketing maps.) The implication of this 
metaphorical approach to infrastructure, is that Internet’s role is primarily about 
improving efficiency in shipping data, which is treated as a bulk commodity to 
be rapidly moved from point-to-point. The most common of these traversal 
metaphors is, of course, the ‘information superhighway’, which coupled the 
nascent Internet directly with ingrained American notions of au tom obilityA t 
the end of 1993 the highway metaphor was invoked directly as a political ideal of
Of course mapping played a part in the rise o f car culture, representing the landscape in ways 
amenable to drivers as the analysis by Akerman (1993, 2002) has shown; see chapter six for 
discussion.
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what the Internet should become, as then U.S. Vice President A1 Gore asserted: 
“Today, commerce rolls not just on asphalt highways but along information 
highways" (Gore 1993, 3).
Coming from a strongly techno-utopianist perspective. Gore championed a vision 
of universal public access to the Internet, explaining that a helpful way to think 
about such an infrastructure was as “a network of highways — much like the 
Interstates begun in the ‘50s. Highways carrying information rather than people 
or goods” (Gore 1993, 5). Although these new ‘information highways’ would be 
built by private capital, the clear analogy with road infrastructures of the past 
implied that the government had a positive social remit to oversee development 
of the Internet, to ensure equality of provision and that all places are connected. 
Furthermore, the government had a duty to set the framework of the market 
(equivalent to the highway code) to ensure “there will be a ‘public right of way’ 
on the information highway” (Gore 1993, 10), rather than a private network, such 
as cable television.
The ‘information superhighway’ metaphor proved to be a potent choice and it 
quickly grew to be one of the dominant metaphors applied to ‘explain’ the nature 
of Internet infrastructure in the mid 1990s, endlessly promulgated in media 
coverage and in government reports^. While the socially progressive goals of 
Gore’s vision were clearly articulated, the choice of the highway metaphor itself 
imposed distinctly instrumental notions on the future shape of network 
infrastructure: it would essentially be a flat hierarchy, accessible only at certain 
junctions, with people as passive drivers only able to go in certain directions'^. 
Highways are, after all, built for efficiency and this has been paralleled in the 
Internet’s subsequent development. As such the ‘superhighway’ had a “strong 
aura of linearity” (Sawhney 1996, 304) and can be read as an extension of the 
individualistic economic model over the communitarian one that dominated 
much of the Internet’s nascent development in the late 1980s (emphasised, for
 ^ The British Libraiy catalogue lists 71 books which contain the phrase ‘information 
superhighway’ in their titles. Thirty-four o f these books were published in 1995.
Interestingly, this passivity was itself subverted metaphorically when commentators argued 
users should be allowed the freedom to ‘go off road’.
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example, in Rheingold’s deployment of the 'virtual community’ metaphor). 
Sawhney (1996, 307) argues that at its heart, the highway metaphor is 
reductionist: “[t]he ritual or the communal aspect of human communication is 
almost totally neglected” in favour of maximising the transfer of information.
The subsequent demise of the ‘highway’ as a meaningful explanation of the 
Internet shows how metaphors are contingent, partial and contestable^ \  By the 
end of the 1990s the ‘superhighway’ metaphor had become a thoroughly clichéd 
moniker and was being used most often in a derisory sense. It was also deployed 
counter-factually as commentators pointed up the reality of network ‘dirt tracks’ 
outside the developed core in discussion of global Internet diffusion and digital 
divides (The dichotomy of diffusion versus divides is considered in depth in 
chapter five in relation to the role played by global scale mapping of statistics on 
Internet globalisation.) As Sawhney (1996, 300) notes: “The initial metaphors 
basically function as provisional hypotheses which can be held only as long as 
the facts permit”. As more people experienced the Internet first hand, and used it 
productively for everyday tasks, the appeal of the ‘highway’ metaphor waned, to 
be replaced by more organic metaphors of Web environments and social 
networks.
4.3.2 Visual metaphors for Internet infrastructure
Metaphors are not just verbal constructs, they can equally be fabricated through 
visual imagery. Given that much of modem experience is constructed ‘second­
hand’ through visual media and marketing imagery in print and on screen, in 
many respects visual metaphors enjoy even greater political significance in 
defining ‘what the Internet is like’ than their verbal counterparts. This is well 
recognised by designers of advertising who strive to invent new metaphors and 
them taken up into circuits of cultural communication (see De Cock et al. 2001; 
Goldman et al. 2003).
" Of the 71 books with ‘information superhighway’ in their title catalogued by the British 
Library, only four have been published since 2000.
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As noted in the introduction, the Internet lacks a single, obvious, physical 
representation that people experience for themselves, which could be moulded 
into its defining visual metaphor^^. Uncertainty on the ‘natural’ visual shorthand 
for the Internet for a general audience is apparent; for example, in newspaper 
coverage in the 1990s that juxtaposed quite different image types. A significant 
proportion of these visual metaphors called upon explicitly spatial constructs to 
make the Internet appear as a tangible entity or to place it within familiar 
geographical contexts. Here, I audit and interpret the significant types of visual 
spatial metaphor that imagined the Internet infrastructure in four categories: (i) as 
a network of wires, (ii) as flows around the globe, (iii) as machines for moving 
objects and, lastly, (iv) as abstract clouds and organisms.
4.3.2.1 Wiring visions
The commonest visual analogy to explain the Internet as a spatially extensive 
infrastructure is a physical network of wires. Very often this imagery uses arc- 
node route lines plotted on top of a geographical base map such as the illustration 
of undersea cables shown above (Figure 4.1 ). As such they are part of a lineage 
of sketching the pathways of human movement stretching back throughout 
cartographic history to the earliest maps scratched in the sand. Route maps have 
been applied to telecommunication systems since they emerged in the mid 
nineteenth century, as shown in chapter six. As a visual analogy they 
demonstrate the material reality of the infrastructure in relation to a familiar and 
trusted geographical backdrop and are most widely deployed in commercial 
promotions as the analysis in chapter six demonstrates.
The ‘wires-on-the-world’ visual analogy also underlies a great deal of ‘maps of 
cyberspace’ produced (see examples in chapter three). They can be produced at 
different scales, from local maps in the form of wiring schematics for a 
neighbourhood or an individual corporation, up to global scale maps of 
transcontinental cable systems (Figure 4.1 above). National and global scale
Here, I am distinguishing the Internet as an infrastructure, from the consumption o f particular 
Internet services. The Internet as a service is typically represented visually by screenshots of 
particular media interfaces, such as websites ‘in action’ (e.g., e-commerce was often ‘explained’ 
metaphorically by a visual image of Amazon.com’s homepage).
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maps of infrastructure are frequently produced as part of network marketing (see 
chapter six). The level of realism in plotting the routes of lines can be varied and 
in many network maps the routes are logical links between end nodes and bear 
no relation to the physical pathway of the cable on the ground. Increasing the 
degree of topological generalisation of route lines morphs the Internet from 
conventional geographical network mapping into variable scale-distortion 
subway maps and non-geographical circuit diagrams (Figure 4.3).
0
f
Lausanne Beme
Madrid
Figure 4.3: Internet infrastructure explained using the subway maps metaphor. This example was 
produced by Interoute in 2000 to promote its European network. (Source: www.interoute.com.)
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Figure 4.4: Top: A dazzling network of wires provides the central metaphor for a visualisation of 
NSFNET infrastructure produced by Donna Cox and Robert Patterson, National Center for 
Supercomputing Applications, University o f Illinois Urbana-Champaign in 1994. The figure 
itself is a single frame from a short movie of the growth in traffic on the NSFNET backbone 
(source: NCSA 1994). Bottom: The metaphor of ‘arcs across the world’ creates a visually 
arresting image of Internet traffic flows between fifty countries as measured by the NSFNET 
backbone for a two hour period in Februar>' 1993 (source: Cox et al. 1996).
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Attempts have also been made to increase the visual impact of Internet 
infrastructure maps by stringing the 'wires in three dimensions. One of the best 
knovm examples is the NCSA (1994) visualisation of the NSFNET network 
backbone (Figure 4.4 top). The network is imagined glowing white hot with 
pulses of data-light in the inky dark sky, a powerful presence radiating 
connectivity down to the nation. This striking image has been widely circulated 
and reproduced.
The NCSA visualisation is also interesting as it blends together the iconography 
of the engineer’s wiring diagram with the thematic display of statistical mapping. 
The connecting lines from ground to network in the sky are colour coded to 
indicate the volume of traffic flowing from individual sites onto the network. 
“Icons such as this rely on the associations the audience makes between familiar 
forms- the maps of the United States with connecting lines -  and the unfamiliar 
and formless realm of electronic networks” (Kallick-Wakker 1994, 313). 
Showing flows, rather than just the wire routes of a network, opens up many 
possibilities for metaphorical invention. Although, this approach is unusual and 
most network marketing maps are much more convention (see discussion in 
chapter six).
Another visualisation from the mid 1990s illustrates well the potency of visual 
imaginary to capture the essence of the Internet by displaying real flow data in 
three-dimensions (Figure 4.4 bottom). The Arc-Trans map of global traffic flows 
imagines the Internet as a set of fountain-like arcs of light traversing the world. 
The colour, link style and height of the arcs encode statistical information. It is 
important to realise that the arcs are not denoting network links per se but 
symbols plotted between capital cities to represent aggregate statistics on inter­
country traffic flows. The map was produced by the researcher Stephen Eick and 
colleagues at Bell Labs-Lucent Technologies in 1996 as part of a project to 
create compelling 2D and 3D visualisations to understand network data flows. It 
is a screenshot of an interactive visualisation tool they developed called 
SeeNet3D (Cox et al. 1996). Of all the maps and diagrams catalogued in the 
Atlas o f Cyberspaces, the ‘arcs-across-the-world’ metaphor at the heart of this 
image is far and away the most requested one for reproduction. In this manner, a
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few of most the visually impressive and compelling maps begin to define how 
the actual infrastructure of the Internet is perceived. Yet, it is not an innocent 
image. As Harpold (1999, 5) points out, the underlying metaphor draws its 
energy from “visual discourses of identity and negated identity that echo those of 
the European maps of colonized and colonizable space of nearly a century ago.”
I n t e r n e t  W o r l d
A  A  A  A  A
p e a c o c k  m a p s "
Figure 4.5: An effective example of the globe metaphor used to visualise Internet bandwidth 
statistics. It was conceived by Gregoiy Staple and Martin Dodge for a commercial poster in 2001. 
(Source: Peacock Maps, <www.peacockmaps.com>.)
4.3.2.2 Global visions
The earth globe is a dominant visual metaphor in Western contexts. The 
capability to command global vision is intimately associated with modernist 
culture. The globe has symbolic power because “we all assume for ourselves the 
position that most peoples have historically reserved for God. No longer confined 
by the local worlds of our direct experience, the conception of the globe allows 
us to make geography, for us to predict and then to discover new spaces, new 
worlds, new peoples” (Cosgrove 1989, 13). The globe has become integral in the 
imagery of many elements of corporate capitalism (e.g., aviation.
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telecommunications), as well as the key icon for the environmental movement 
(the ‘Whole Earth’ idea) (Cosgrove 1994). Universally displayed, often to the 
point of cliché, it is the iconic symbol of a business or institution with world­
wide operations or aspirations, and potent for representing internationalism in 
political campaigning (cf. Edsall 2007) The global perspective, derived directly 
from the arms-race technical capacities in satellite monitoring, is also bound up 
with the militaristic gaze of command and control.
The globe as a visual metaphor is immediately recognisable^^. It has become a 
staple visual metaphor for the Internet, with network arcs or data flows being 
wrapped around the world (good examples visualising aspects of the Internet 
infrastructure on the globe include: Cox et al. 1996; Lamm et al. 1996; Munzner 
2000). Globes were used as the central motif on a poster called Internet World, 
produced by Peacock Maps in 2001 (Figure 4.5). Three views on the Earth show 
curving lines between capital cities to represent the available international 
Internet bandwidth. The height of the arcs above the surface of the globe is a 
function of distance. This is an imaginary view of the Internet, as if seen from a 
God-like position, with a dense mesh of arcs criss-crossing the USA from coast 
to coast, along with higher, longer transcontinental tunnels curving around the 
globe. The points on the globe without arcs are evident as well.
It is also highly functional in graphic design terms because it can be rendered in myriad forms 
from a naturalistic ‘blue planet’ to a very stylised image conjured forth by a sparse grid of 
curving lines.
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Figure 4.6: A step-by-step machine metaphor using photographs o f hardware linked buildings to 
‘explain’ basic Internet networking concepts (source: author archive).
4.3.2.3 Machine-like visions
In a very different mode to maps and globes, the Internet has also been spatially 
envisioned as a machine with working parts which handle and transport items of 
data. Representing the Internet through such mechanical metaphors can be 
particularly helpful in an educational context (e.g., Gralla 2003). The simplest of 
these approaches use photographs of actual network hardware or iconic images 
of equipment. These visual elements are sometimes presented as a systems model 
showing conceptually how a message is transported - what can be thought of as a 
‘tin cans and string’ diagram (Figure 4.6).
More elaborate machinic metaphors imagine the Internet as a ‘world-in- 
miniature’ inside the infrastructure. For example. Warriors o f the Net, a short 
animated film, shows in a jovial, non-technical way, how the Internet works 
internally by following the journey of data packets through different parts of the 
infrastructure (Elam 1999). Its underlying metaphor shows an industrial
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environment of grimy metal and of noisy machines -  an example of 
‘steampunk’ "^^ imaginary, rather than the slick, clean cyber-infrastructure of 
digital electronics and fibre-optics (Figure 4.7).
y
Figure 4.7: Stills from Warriors o f  the Net film, using a mechanical metaphor to explain the 
inner-workings of the Internet. Empty IP data packets, represented materially as large steel 
trucks, are filled with loads of data in the form of letters (top). They are then carried aloft in a 
freight elevator for entry onto the LAN (bottom). (Source: Elam 1999.)
The visual aesthetic o f ‘steampunk’ (named after the cyberpunk genre of science fiction) 
imagines advanced societies based on machinery (usually steam powered) rather than micro­
electronics (cf. Gibson and Sterling 1992).
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Rather than just imagine infrastructure spaces in mechanical terms, others have 
actually created physical machines to model the Internet’s concept. For example, 
Japanese media artist Kouichirou Eto created ‘a hands-on model of the Internet’ 
that simulates physically the outward appearance of digital bits and data routing. 
As he succinctly notes: “[b]alls roll, and the workings of the Internet are 
revealed.”^^ . Infrastructure is thus made tangible as an analogue model, a real 
spatial metaphor of the Internet that people can see, hear and touch (Figure 4.8).
4 1  # # Éb
Figure 4.8: Kouichirou Eto’s physical model o f the Internet exhibited in National Museum o f  
Emerging Science and Innovation, Tokyo. The control panel in the foreground is used to 
compose short messages by hand using black and white balls to encode letters in binary. Users 
then watch their message move through the machine, accompanied by suitably mechanical 
sounds of clanking metal and clinking of ceramic balls. (Source: 
<http://eto.eom/2001/Physicallntemet>.)
The metaphorical use of the movement of real objects to suggest the invisible 
workings of the Internet is also common. The power and speed of flows of data 
through network has often been visually connoted through images of blurring 
vehicle lights on highways or a soaring flight over a city at night. The feeling of 
physical movement experienced by the viewer captures the idea of flow through 
networks. For example, Goldman et al. (2003, no pagination) highlight a MCI
Source: <http://eto.eom/2001/Physicallntemet/>.
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WorldCom advert using this kind imagery, noting: “Here is the cyber-scape of 
the moment, not simply a symbol of a future that is upon us, but a functional 
conduit, the veins of a network that like a river flows through us, connecting us.” 
Intertwined with the evocative imagery of movement and the power of incredible 
speed is the utopian message of transcendence over the tyranny of place and 
time, commonly used in promotional rhetoric of the ‘New Economy’ (De Cock 
et al 2 0 0 1 ).
4.3.2.4 Abstract visions
The last category of spatial metaphors deployed to envision Internet 
infrastructures connote in a very much more abstract way. These metaphors draw 
on naturalistic iconography of organic structures (the fractal branching of trees 
and leaves, structured lattices of coral and webs of spiders, the fine filigrees 
patterning of brains or veins) and emergent aesthetics redolent of meteorology 
and astronomy (cloud patterns, glowing gas nebulas and star clusters).
198.211.61 22
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Figure 4.9: A montage o f typical representations o f the Internet as a cloud. (Source: various, 
images gathered from the Web through Google image search.)
The simplest and most common genre of abstract visual metaphors is the cloud 
(Figure 4.9). Curiously, cloud diagrams are ubiquitous in the Internet literature as
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a visual shorthand for infrastructure, particularly favoured in technical 
‘explanations’, as they allow the author to signify the Internet as a definite object 
without needing to spell out the detail. As such they are a useful envisioning 
metaphor precisely because they obscure the infrastructure’s heterogeneity and 
topological complexity: “the cloud’s main usefulness lies in its vagueness” 
(Gibson, quoted in Scanlon and Wieners 1999, no pagination). Clouds can be 
quickly sketched and are instantly recognised, and “[a]sk the founders of the Net 
about the cloud, and it quickly becomes apparent that the Net cloud is as old as 
the Net itself’ (Scanlon and Wieners 1999, no pagination).
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Figure 4.10: Connectivity graph to visualise the core of the Internet ‘cloud’ in topological terms. 
The colour coding of nodes is according to the IP address and seeks to highlight zones that share 
common network addresses and, likely, corporate ownership. The striking dark blue cluster 
represents a key hub owned by Cable and Wireless (formerly MCI); Cheswick describes this as 
“the magnetic north o f the Internet”. (Source: Bill Cheswick.)
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Computer scientists and network researchers have produced many other abstract 
visual representations of the Internet that try to show the full complexity of the 
infrastructure rather than hide it inside cartoon clouds. These images, created by 
and for technoscience elites, tend to be amongst the most elaborate and visually 
dramatic representations of the Internet (e.g., chapter three. Figure 3.4). They use 
graph-like network representations to show the topology of connections and are 
distinct from the wiring metaphors using geographical ‘arc-node’ links examined 
above. Even though their construction is avowedly technical, some have 
resonated with wider public constituencies as ‘artistic’ renderings of the Internet.
The outstanding example of this genre emerged from the research of Bill 
Cheswick and Hal Burch^^ (Figure 4.10). Their technoscience visualisation is 
noteworthy in normative aesthetic terms, but also politically, in terms of the 
impact it has had on how the infrastructure has subsequently been imagined. 
Automatic surveying of the topology of thousands of interconnected Internet 
networks provides raw data that is visualised as huge, complex, multi-coloured 
graphs. The layout algorithm uses simple rules, with forces of attraction and 
repulsion jostling the nodes into a stable configuration that looks distinctly 
organic. It is projected within abstract space because as Cheswick notes: “We
don't tr>' to lay out the Internet according to geography The Internet is its own
space, independent of geography”^
Indeed, the power of the metaphor underlying the Cheswick-Burch graphs 
derives directly from this evolved, organic look - this is what people in some 
senses expect the Internet to look like now. Their results have been variously 
described as a peacock’s wing or a coral reef. These graphs have been widely 
circulated, including being sold as large wall posters proclaiming to show the 
‘Whole Internet’, used on book covers and featured in art galleries and as
Begun in 1998 as a research project at Bell Labs - Lucent Technologies and subsequently 
continued as a part o f commercial venture Lumeta, <www.lumeta.com>.
Source: <www.lumeta.com/research/mapping.asp>.
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exhibits in science m useum sT ypically , these types of abstract graphs are 
employed as purely ‘artistic’ images and there are no instructions as to how they 
maybe interpreted, or even that careful interpretation is necessary. The image’s 
main function is as a connotation for the sublime complexity of the Internet and 
as a demonstration of the technical prowess of its creator.
While they have become firmly established, showing the entity with “no 
beginning, no centre, no end (or all beginning, all centre, all end)” (McClellan 
1994, quoted in Kress and von Leeuwen 1996, 8 8 ), the wider implication of these 
graph metaphors is the number of people who assume that they denote the 
endogenous characteristics of the Internet infrastructure itself. In fact, all the 
visual properties of the graphs (geometry of the lines, their spatial arrangement, 
colours, etc) are exogenous to the phenomena being mapped; they are in that 
sense purely technical artefacts. Changing the parameters of the graph layout 
algorithm even slightly can produce a radically different looking Internet. While 
it is possible to make the Internet look like something from nature, there is 
nothing natural about the graph’s appearance.
4.4 Overcoming Internet invisibility via scientific inscription
Instead of being a figment of one’s  Imagination it will becom e a ‘real objective thing’, the 
existence of which is beyond doubt. (Latour and Woolgar 1979, 241)
Using ideas from science and technologies studies (STS) concerning the 
construction of objective authority within technoscience working practices, 
particularly Steven Shapin’s (1984) theory of virtual witnessing, I will now 
consider how infrastructure invisibility is overcome by computer scientists and 
network engineers who are studying the structures and dynamics of the Internet.
See <www.peacockmaps.com>. I worked for Peacock Maps in 2001 and contributed to the 
publication of the 2001 Whole Internet poster. Book covers include: Castells’ Internet Galaxy 
(2001); Mitchell’s ME++: The Cyborg Self and the Networked City (2003).
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According to detailed ethnomethodological studies’^  by STS scholars, the natural 
and biological sciences do not discover Taws of nature’, but socially construct 
knowledge by stabilising particular experimental findings as widely agreed 
‘facts’. Because the phenomena to be experimented upon are usually 
imdetectable directly by human senses, they require measurement techniques and 
graphical inscriptions to make them visually apparent. There is an almost 
obsessive preoccupation by scientists and engineers with such inscription (Lynch 
and Woolgar 1990), producing a bewildering array of “traces, spots, points, 
histograms, recorded numbers, spectra, peaks and so on” (Latour and Woolgar 
1979, 8 8 ). Indeed, Latour (1990, 42) has characterised laboratory work as 
fundamentally a “cascade of inscriptions”. As visual re-presentations of ‘nature’ 
such scientific inscriptions are constructed from direct empirical measurement, 
then cleaned, redrawn, smoothed, transformed, and finally displayed prominently 
in publications to the bolster the of the truth claims made in the text.
The potency of such inscription is due, in large part, to the ocularcentric nature of 
Western scientific practices. Since the Enlightenment, vision has been the 
dominant mode of understanding of the material world: ‘seeing is believing’. 
Reflecting this primacy of vision, most geographical research, for example, was, 
until recently, a matter of ‘looking’ at the landscape as the best way of obtaining 
truthful knowledge (Sui 2000). It has been argued that the Enlightenment 
‘scientific revolution’ itself depended significantly on Renaissance development 
of new ways of seeing, such as linear perspective, which allowed the creation of 
far more mimetic inscriptions of reality (Edgerton 1975). Many ‘technical’ 
approaches in engineering-drawing, which are now taken-for-granted modes of 
inscription, were invented at this time, such as the orthographic projection 
depicting three views of an object, the exploded view to show how complex 
mechanisms were assembled, and the cut-away view to show internal workings. 
Contemporary^ scientific endeavour - partly in response to modem media driven 
agendas -  has also realised the power of inscription for public communication 
and promotion; as Heller (2003, 57) wryly notes: “[sjcientific disciplines with
These seek to understand scientific epistemology by looking at what scientists and technicians 
actually do in their everyday working practices, rather than accept the formally published 
methodology of ‘discoveries’ as sufficient explanation for the production o f knowledge.
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good pictures are rich in resources that keep them ... moving forward.'' This 
equally applies to those scientists seeking research funding to study the dynamics 
of the Internet.
Inscriptions are usually produced by measuring devices, specialised machines or 
an assemblage of apparatus designed purposefully to “transform pieces of matter 
into written documents” (Latour and Woolgar 1979, 51). Inscription devices 
come in all different sizes and work in a myriad of different ways - from a simple 
weighing balance up to an sophisticated radio telescope - but their end result is 
always the same - inscriptive markings written out on paper. The markings are 
invaluable to scientific endeavour because “scientists themselves base their own 
writing on the written output of the [inscription devices]” (Latour and Woolgar 
1979,51).
Yet, the real importance of inscriptions, Latour and Woolgar (1979, 245) argue, 
is “not so much as a method of transferring information but as a material 
operation of creating order.” Inscriptions work to ‘create order’ within the social 
practices in techno scientific settings in several ways. Firstly, they define objects 
of interest. They are seen as having a direct relationship to reality, providing the 
focus of discussion about the properties of the phenomena that are othei*wise 
invisible. The pattern of peaks on the graph is itself analysed as a legitimate 
object of scientific study. Secondly, they are a means for organising collaborative 
effort between scientists and reaching common agreement on ‘what is 
happening’. As such, Roth and McGinn (1998, 217) characterise inscriptions as 
‘conscription devices’, noting how they are of such importance in many 
discussions that “scientists and engineers will stop a meeting to fetch a design 
drawing, produce a more or less faithful facsimile on the whiteboard, or render a 
diagram in a gesture.” Inscriptions are also a most effective means of forging 
unity of effort across different communities of practices, which may well be 
distributed geographically and in time. In this way inscriptions work publicly in 
the production of ‘matters of fact’, that is discrete elements of knowledge that 
have been verified by the scientific community and enjoy widespread assent as 
being true explanations of reality.
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However, a significant problem in the production of such ‘matters of fact’ is the 
limited access to experimental activities and the inner working of inscription 
devices for independent verification. Scientists strive to solve this verification 
problem through what Shapin (1984) describes as a process of ‘virtual 
witnessing’, a way that an experiment can be validly observed via a particular 
kind of publication of results rather than by being physically viewed in the 
laboratory. Assent that an inscription constitutes valid ‘matters of fact’ can, thus, 
be manufactured remotely and infinitely using ‘literary technology’. This is now 
easily recognisable and taken-for-granted as an ‘objective’ style of scientific 
writing, but it had to be invented'®. It comprises a functional, dispassionate form 
of prose, with a puritan form of diagrammatic inscription. The results, Shapin 
and Schaffer (1985, 62) argue, “served to announce, as it were, that ‘this was 
really done’ and that ‘it was done in the way stipulated’; [it] allayed distrust and 
facilitated virtual witnessing.” Objectifying ‘matters of fact’ works by the denial 
of human subjectivity. ‘Facts’ have to appear to have been discovered from 
nature rather than being man-made artefacts.
For this kind of ‘literary technology’ to be successful in virtual witnessing it 
requires that scientists themselves be ‘modest witnesses’ - “the author as a 
disinterested observer and his accounts as unclouded and undistorted mirrors of 
nature” (Shapin 1984, 497). Modest witnesses describe facts objectively for the 
advancement of science, not for personal rewards; and they willingly admit 
weaknesses in their methods and present the results of failed experiments. “Such 
an author gave the signs of a man whose testimony was reliable” (Shapin 1984, 
497). They produce descriptive and systematic work and do not indulge in overly 
theoretical and speculative writing.
Literary technology for virtual witnessing also mandates a very particular style of 
published inscriptions. The now conventional scientific ‘look’ of inscriptions is 
achieved through various semiotic strategies, many of which are also evident in 
the generation of objective authority in modernist cartography (see discussion in
Shapin and Schaffer (1985) argue it came about in relation to the contested emergence of  
experimentalist natural philosophy in the mid seventeenth century. They highlight the 
significance of Robert Boyle’s empirical studies on the nature of vacuum using air-pumps.
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chapter two). Objective authority is, in large part, constructed by how the image- 
marker chooses to position the viewer in relation to the data. Typically, technical 
pictures are authored as the ‘view from nowhere’ that situates the viewer as an 
outside observer. Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) identify several distinct 
viewpoints that convey an ‘objective attitude’ by eliminating the subjective 
distortions associated with linear perspectivism. These disinterested positions 
include the front-on view, the cross-sectional view and, most significant, the top- 
down angle that “contemplates the world from a god-like point of view, puts it at 
your feet, rather than within reach of your hands” (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996, 
149).
Besides employing such objectifying viewpoints, the scientific inscription’s most 
conspicuous semiotic strategy is the strategic use of blank space. Scientific 
diagrams are most recognisable by their lack of decoration or aesthetic 
embellishment. Graphical austerity connotes objective authority. The data are 
always denoted on an bare white canvas to focus attention and to connote that the 
data is sufficient and stand alone for inspection; the existence of issues of 
uncertainty and province in the data are connotatively covered over by the 
blanket of white space. Such emptiness, according to Lynch (1985, 59), “is 
infused with moral significance, inasmuch as it involves the tacit claim of 
scientific integrity, with motives assumed to be beyond reproach, and is offered 
with an unstated presumption that, if anything significant should have been said 
about the operational histoiy  ^of the graphic line, it will have been stated.” This 
kind of semiotic interpretation is applicable to the connotative meanings of 
modernist cartography, with Wright (1942, 527) noting that “[t]he trim, precise, 
and clean-cut appearance that a well drawn map presents lends it an air of 
scientific authenticity that may or may not be deserved .... We tend to assume 
too readily that the depiction of the arrangement of things on the earth’s surface 
on a map is equivalent to a photograph -  which, of course, is by no means the 
case.” We can also draw direct parallels to MacEachren (1995) two internal map 
connotations of veracity and integrity discussed in chapter two. He gives the 
exemplar of official topographic mapping claiming that “[t]he U.S. Geological 
Survey uses highly detailed, unadorned, visually unassuming maps to connote
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accuracy, impartiality, authority -  thereby creating an impression that the U.S. 
Geological Survey maps have no point of view” (MacEachren 1995, 335).
A noteworthy manifestation of the active manufacture of cartography with ‘view 
from nowhere’ in the empty space, as Turchi (2004, 37) says: “a blank on a map 
became a symbol of rigorous standards; the presence of absences lent authority to 
all on the map that was unblank.” The origin of this strategy for a ‘scientific’ 
mode of cartography is often traced to Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d’Anville’s 
1749 map of Africa with its famously blank interior replacing earlier imaginings 
of map-makers. Yet, this map is not only a laying claim to honesty, for as Hiatt 
(2002, 248) points out, “the blank testifies to a lack of possession, since it 
signifies land, rather than territory, earth rather than ownership. Consequently, 
the blank also can be seen to invite exploration, and in a colonial context this is 
the inevitable prelude to acts of demarcation.”
Allied to the strategy of blank space is the normalising power inherent in 
scientific inscriptions. They work as ‘sensible pictures’ according to Lynch 
(1985), to literally refigure the natural world into geomatisied and mathematised 
form. Continuous phenomena are measured into detached units of data, these are 
classified and transformed, then plotted into idealised, abstract graphical space 
that is correctly determined by its labels, axis, scales and legends. (As discussed 
in chapter two this kind of charge is made again official maps by those 
advocating critical cartographic deconstruction. Also, see chapter five in relation 
to the normalising effects of statistical maps). In effect, all data points on a 
scatter graph become exactly similar (except for their position in the grid) and 
‘‘all other circumstantial features of their observation ‘drop out’” (Lynch 1985, 
43).
4.4.1 Virtual witnessing o f Internet infrastructures
Computer network infrastructures have been constructed as objects of ‘scientific’ 
study since the very beginning. The engineers and computer scientists involved 
in designing ARPANET in the 1970s, for example, produced detailed analysis of 
its topology and performance from direct measurement of the network (e.g., 
Frank et al. 1972). Their goal was to discern the underlying ‘facts’ of wide-area
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computer communication by experimental study of the real dynamics of a 
working packet-switching network.
Today, a sizeable interdisciplinary ‘Internet science’ community undertakes 
experimentally-driven studies using positivist scientific approaches. The self­
stated aims of ‘Internet science’ research are primarily pragmatic, being to aid 
future engineering efforts to achieve more optimal design of data routing 
software and equipment through more accurate descriptions of the Internet. A 
key part of this work involves building complex inscription devices in the form 
of large-scale software systems for passively monitoring traffic flows or actively 
scanning instruments to measure the connectivity of the network from multiple 
sample points (see Murray and Claffy 2001; Spring et al. 2004 for reviews). To 
achieve this, most inscriptions devices use the network infrastructure to measure 
itself (Dodge 2000d).
Whilst sharing much of the ethos with other scientists and engineers, ‘Internet 
science’ research centres suffer because they have little or nothing in the way of 
scientific equipment in their labs, so the output of the software-based inscription 
devices becomes all the more critical to witnessing their work. Their inscriptions 
strive to render the Internet ‘factually’, as opposed to most of the more 
‘impressionistic’ envisioning produced through visual metaphors for lay 
audiences, discussed early in this chapter. A range of different inscriptions are 
produced, including schematic diagrams, statistical charts and tables and, most 
especially, complex topological graphs. Another notable feature of their 
inscription practices is the desire to present ever greater data volumes as a kind 
signifier of machismo in modem scientific endeavour.
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Figure 4 .11: A scientific inscription o f Internet connectivity measured in April 2005. It is used as 
a key part of the virtual witnessing of ‘Internet science’ researchers at CAIDA, producing a 
matter of fact of the otherwise unobservable infrastructure.
(Source: <www.caida.org/anaIysis/topology/as_core_network/>.)
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One of the leading ‘Internet science’ centres, combining both academic and 
industrial researchers, is CAIDA^' and they create a range of scientific 
inscriptions to aid the virtual witnessing of ‘matters of fact’ about the Internet 
infrastructure. It was founded in 1997 by KC Claffy^^ and Tracie Monk to “foster 
development of tools and analysis methodologies for promoting the engineering 
and maintenance of a robust, scalable global Internet infrastructure.”^^  It has 
succeeded in securing multi-million dollar grant funding and employs fifteen 
people. It also collaborates extensively with industrial partners and has ties to 
Internet network operators. CAIDA exhibits a fetishistic obsession for 
measurement, generating huge data volumes on different aspects of Internet 
infrastructure performance. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the depth of 
empiricism underlying most engineering practice associated with this approach 
to understanding networking. Here I focus on one example of an inscription that 
is illustrative of the type work that CAIDA produces to make Internet 
infrastructure visible and researchable. The ‘IPv4 Internet Topology Map: 
Autonomous System (AS)-Level Internet Graph’ (Figure 4.II above) was 
created by a team of researchers to visualise the macroscopic structure of the 
Internet for a snapshot in time by showing relationships between networks
An important element in the inscription is the large-scale, automatic 
measurements of the Internet’s topology, using a distributed systems of scanning 
beacons, known as ‘skitter’. This generates large data volumes which are 
aggregated and filtered prior to visualisation. So the 220,000 odd individual 
nodes in the skitter dataset were aggregated by the ISP that they belonged to, 
based on the technical grouping by Autonomous System (AS) number. This 
yielded some 1516 AS nodes which represent the most highly connected ISPs
The Co-operative Association for Internet Data Analysis is based at the San Diego 
Supercomputing Center, the University o f California at San Diego, <www.caida.org>.
Her 1994 PhD thesis topic, in some senses sets the tone o f CAIDA’s research, entitled: 
“Internet traffic characterization: a methodology to support more accurate workload 
characterization in the face o f increasing diversity in Internet traffic types and qualities.”
Source : <www.caida.org/home/staff/kc/kclaffy.xml>.
Source: <www.caida.org/analysis/topology/as_core_network/>. Research team: Brad Huffaker, 
Andre Broido, KC Claffy, Marina Fomenkov, Sean McCreary, David Moore and Oliver 
Jakubiec.
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that form the core of the Internet and carry the bulk of the traffic. These are 
plotted as dots in a calibrated space as ‘matters of facf on the topology of the 
Internet.
Its form is a complex graph displayed using a polar projection, where each AS 
node encodes two data characteristics. First, the distance away from the centre 
shows the relative strength of peering relationships with other networks. Second, 
the angular position around the circumference of the circle shows the 
approximate geographical position of its corporate headquarters^^. The peering 
links between ISPs are shown by the arcs which are colour-coded ‘hot to cold’ 
based on the relative strength of connection (as indicated in the legend). So 
yellow, central nodes are some of the most well connected ISP and the 
scientifically witnessed core of the Internet.
In terms of the geographical data encoded in the inscription, one can think of this 
as somewhat like a map of the Earth, with a projection centred on the North Pole. 
Around the circumference of the graph, longitudes are marked every 10 degrees 
and coloured strips denote different continents. Key cities are also labelled. The 
graph generally divides the nodes into three distinct segments based on the 
continents of North America, Europe and Asia/Oceania related unsurprisingly, to 
the major metropolitan nodes in the world economy.
In normative terms, the IPv4 Internet Topology Map has the ability to identify 
the most powerful ISPs and where on the globe are they are concentrated. It is 
clear that the densest concentration of AS nodes, towards the centre of the graph, 
lies along the longitude of about 70 degrees west, which relates to the eastern 
seaboard of the USA. The headquarters of some of the leading Internet backbone 
operators such as UUnet, PSInet, Qwest, CWUSA are found there. In many ways 
this inscription reinforces what is apparent from many of the other infrastructure 
maps of the global Internet -  that the U.S. is the dominant player in terms of 
infrastructure provision. It has been described as the world’s ‘switching centre’
Obviously there is considerable generalisation as many large ISPs will have their infrastructure 
spread across the globe. As such, one might like to think of this as more of a geopolitical 
location.
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(Singel 2007) in terms of global traffic flows. In fact the top 15 most connected 
AS nodes are in North America (one is in Canada). The IPv4 Internet Topology 
Map also reveals that many of the ISPs based in Europe and Asia-Oceania have 
relatively much fewer connections between them, relying instead on peering with 
U.S. backbones to act as a hub.
Besides the normative reading, this graph clearly is a significant scientific 
inscription for CAIDA. It enjoys prominence in many of their presentations^^ and 
is displayed in pride of place on their Web homepage. Whilst there have been 
some attempts to use it metaphorically as an impressionistic visualisation (for 
example it is available for purchase on wall posters), it is too technical, and it 
lacks the immediate visual punch and instant recognition of a more familiar 
metaphor (for an example of a global image, see Figure 4.4; for world maps, see 
chapter six). It makes use of all three semiotic strategies to achieve the 
dispassionate ‘scientific look’ needed for a successful inscription to use in virtual 
witnessing processes. Firstly, it situates the viewer in a top-down position, 
inspecting the data from a God’s-eye vantage point, apparently offering totalising 
vision ‘over’ the core of the Internet. Secondly, the graph itself is embedded in a 
antiseptic, blank canvass, unadorned except for title and technical scale bar. 
Lastly, the graph is an archetypal ‘sensible picture’ with the connectivity of the 
Internet thoroughly re-figured to fit into calibrated, circular space. The reality of 
the Internet is reduced to an orderly (albeit informationally over-crowded and in 
some area illegible) layout of dots in a graph.
More generally, the way that IPv4 Internet Topology Map is embedded in the 
web page text^^ also demonstrates how this inscription functions as part of 
CAIDA’s virtual witnessing of the Internet’s topology. Firstly, the witnessing 
makes claims to sources of empirical data that are comprehensive and accurate. 
The size of dataset is given precisely, along with exact dates when the 
experimental measurements were run. The description of the data uses various
<^www.caida.org/publications/presentations/>
 ^Source: www.caida.org/analysis/topology/as_core_network/>.
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specialised terms that create an aura technocratic authenticity. The witnessing
also uses other strategies to bolster its objective attitude, such as:
(1) making older versions of the graph available for consultation,
(2) making the raw data available for independent verification,
(3) setting out a detailed list of caveats demonstrating that the authors are 
‘modest witnesses’ willing to admit their weaknesses,
(4) text sets out the ‘insights’ in terms of descriptive, experimentalist 
understanding of Internet topology only and makes no grand theoretical 
claims - again this is a necessary tactic of the ‘modest witness’.
4.5 Conclusions
Ultimately, the choice of how to visually represent the Internet, to overcome 
infrastructure invisibility, is a far from simple question. Over time many 
conceptions have dominated. Implicit in any approach are the underlying power 
geometries of the metaphors used (verbal, visual, numerical) regarding what the 
Internet is, and more importantly, what it could be. None of these conceptions 
can really be said to be ‘incorrect’. The various impressionistic visualisation and 
technical diagrams can be seen as imaginai explorations of what the Internet is 
‘at its essence’. In some respects, this exploration phase has ended, various 
metaphors and diagrams having been tried and rejected, while a few dominant 
ones have been legitimated^^. Certain kinds of cartographic representation remain 
one of the mainstays for overcoming Internet invisibility. Two of the most firmly 
established genres of mapping that are in common use, and are clearly deemed to 
be effective to some degree for this process, are route maps showing network 
structure and thematic maps showing aggregate national statistics. How these 
two genres of mapping work semiotically and politically to make the Internet 
visible and tangible, in particular ways, is the focus of analysis in the next two 
chapters.
Indeed, as Internet as become commonplace, it has itself become a metaphor in its own right, 
for example, used to describe new forms o f decentralised, corporate organisation or supposedly 
new modes o f war fighting.
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In conclusion, spatial metaphors and scientific inscriptions not only make visible 
the invisible infrastructures of the Internet, they work as narrative devices to 
dramatise the dull and banal nature of a network wholly lacking in striking 
physical motifs of soaring airliner or impressive architectural displays. Thus they 
explain visually what the Internet looks like, but they also delude in equal 
measure, as this is never a view of the Internet one could see naturally. This 
applies, for example, to the kinds route map discussed in chapter six which are 
created by commercial operators to market their network and use various design 
strategies to try to demonstrate they have the best available infrastructure. 
Although from empirical evidence, investigated in chapter six, they have varying 
degrees of success at connoting wholly positive impressions because they often 
represent their infrastructure too realistically rather than more metaphorically.
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Statistical Mapping of Internet Globalisation
Jobs, knowledge use and economic growth will gravitate to those societies that are the most 
connected, with the most networks and the broadest amount of bandwidth.
-  Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 1999.
Almost the whole world, it seem s from a casual inspection of this map, has turned Internet- 
coloured. The sun never sets on the Internet; it appears to reach everywhere except som e  
war-torn corners of the world.
-  Mike Holderness, Who are the World’s Information Poor?, 1998.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I consider maps that provide a synoptic picture of the evolving 
geographical structure of the Internet at the global scale using various kinds of 
area-based statistical map designs. The analysis focuses, in part, on the recent 
history of the Internet in the 1990s as the period of mainstream ‘take-off of the 
Internet in most developed nations and subsequent widespread diffusion of 
network connectivity across the world. I consider the ways these differently 
designed maps serve politically to produce particular imaginative geography of 
the Internet, either masking or exposing the extent of ‘digital divides’ across the 
world. These maps are valuable as they highlight the multiple ways that a 
statistical understanding of social phenomena can be represented, particularly 
when seen in contrasting cartographic designs deployed (choropleth, cartogram, 
dasymetric, stepped surface and diagram mapping techniques).
The chapter begins with an outline discussion of the discourses of development 
and digital divides that underpin the use of statistical maps of Internet 
globalisation, and then sets out a fourfold conceptual model of connotative 
meanings based dimensions of difference and complexity that is used to inform 
the empirical analysis. This is followed by a brief contextual history of the
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emergence of statistical mapping as a politically powerful representation before 
moving onto an interpretation of a range of empirical material.
5.2 Connecting the world: Tales of Internet diffusion and digital divides
The Internet grew tremendously during the 1990s. One of the most impressive 
elements in this growth was the speed by which countries across the world 
became connected (Figure 5.1). The first half of the 1990s, in particular, can be 
conceptualised as the ‘globalisation’ of the Internet, starting from a U.S core, 
spreading throughout the reminder of the developed world and then linking to 
poorer, peripheral nations, so that by the end of decade most countries had at least 
some form of connection to Internet. The rapid globalisation of the Internet was 
facilitated by a number of technological developments, as well as wider political 
and economic factors which benefited new forms of low-cost international 
computer networking.
Dec.87 Dec.88 Dec.89 D ec.90 Dec.91 D ec.92#D ec.93 Dec.94 D ec.95
Sou^ce: ftp:/^ic.merit. ^ u/^atistics/nsfnet
Copyright ; 1995 A.M.Rutkowski and Internet Society
Figure 5.1: A typical growth chart demonstrating the rapid pace of Internet expansion from the late 
1980s through the first half of the 1990s as measured by the number of countries connected. The 
de facto meaning of ‘Internet backbone connectivity’ during this period was a direct link to the 
U.S. to reach the National Science Foundation network. (Source: Rutkowski 1995.)
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The most significant technological factor was developments in long-haul fibre- 
optic transmission systems, particularly undersea cables linking continents, made 
in the 1980s. This led to an order of magnitude growth in available bandwidth’ 
and concomitant decline in circuit costs in the 1990s. (See also chapter six for 
more discussion of the boom in fibre-optic infrastructures in relation to network 
marketing maps.) The majority of investment in new undersea cable systems, 
however, was on a select few routes linking together already well-connected 
industrialised regions and major cities (Graham 1999), beneficially reinforcing 
existing transportation routes (Amum and Conti 1998)^.
Demand for this new bandwidth was driven by exponential growth in Internet 
traffic in the early 1990s resulting from many new users, new interfaces to 
navigate online information spaces and wholly new applications (see analysis by 
Coffman and Odlyzko 2000). Web traffic growth in the early 1990s exploded, 
growing at several thousand percent per year and quickly outstripping all other 
Internet applications (Odlyzko 2000). By helping to make it a mass medium, the 
Web was also a critical element in the commercialisation of the Internet. 
Netscape’s Navigator browser was commercially released in 1994 and the 
company’s IPO the following year is now commonly regarded as marking the 
starting point for the ‘dotcom’ boom that propelled the Internet into the public 
consciousness as one of the defining technologies at the fin  de siecle.
The underlying economics and governance structures of the Internet also evolved 
significantly in the early 1990s to facilitate the global spread of the network. At 
the end of the 1980s the Internet largely retained its ‘research & education’ ethos, 
being run in a co-operative, not-for-profit way based on informal consensus
 ^ This growth was reified by technology commentator George Gilder in his ‘law o f telecosm’, 
which states: “The world's total supply of bandwidth will double roughly every four months - or 
more than four times faster than the rate of advances in computer horsepower [Moore’s law].” 
(Rivlin 2002, no pagination). See also ‘Metcalfe’s law’ on connectivity states that the value of a 
telecommunications network is proportional to the square of the number of users on the network 
(cf. Odlyzko and Tilly 2005 for discussion o f the validity o f such ‘laws o f networking’).
 ^The current geographical pattern of submarine cables is mapped in Figure 4.1, chapter four.
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reached by a small cabal of ‘techies’. It was dominated by the quasi-academic^ 
U.S. National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET), which was the largest and 
fastest network and thus formed the effective central ‘backbone’ of the Internet 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 1990s saw the transition of the Internet 
core in the U.S. from a public to a fully privately managed and financed 
infrastructure. In 1991 commercial traffic was allowed and soon the major 
proprietary online services - including AOL, CompuServe and Delphi - provided 
gateways to the Internet to allow exchange of email. An increasing number of 
commercial ISPs emerged, creating an affordable dial-up Internet access market 
for domestic users in several developed countries. In 1995 the Internet backbone 
itself was ‘privatised’, as NSFNET was decommissioned. One noteworthy 
symptom of commercialisation and changing management of the Internet was a 
transformation in online culture, to the chagrin of many long-time users'^.
Beyond the network, so to speak, the world-wide spread of the Internet was 
facilitated by significant broader geopolitical changes at the start of the 1990s, 
announced by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Many states, particularly in Eastern Europe, became more open to external trade, 
economic investment and media flows, often accompanied by marketisation of 
industries. The liberalisation of telecommunications monopolies in many 
developed countries also opened up ‘market space’ for new businesses to start 
providing commercial Internet access services. In complex ways, then, the spread 
of the Internet was greatly aided hy the wider globalisation ‘project’ that many see 
as characterising the 1990s (Dicken 2003). Yet at the same time the Internet was 
itself playing a key part enabling this economic and political globalisation - for 
example, by easing data flows, flattening hierarchies of communication and.
 ^ It was govemment-funded but run by private corporations under an agreement with the National 
Science Foundation. It had an operational charter forbidding transmission of commercial traffic for 
the first five years of its operation.
Feelings about this time are nicely summarised by Guédon’s (2002, no pagination) reminiscence: 
“I remember the dismay of old-time users like myself when the AOL crowd showed up, with no 
manners, no understanding o f the community spirit that had developed quietly in the 80s, no 
comprehension of the sharing and give-and-take quasi-utopia that had grown somewhat 
confidentially in their midst.”
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above all, lowering transaction costs (Caimcross 1997).
Unsurprisingly, interpreting the nature of the Internet’s global growth has been the 
subject of intense and competing analysis through the 1990s, focused in particular 
on the implications for economic and social development likely to flow from 
connectivity (cf. Castells 2001; Drori and Jang 2003; Main 2001; Shade 2003; 
Warf 2001). In binary terms, the debate aroimd the meaning of Internet 
globalisation can be conflated into two viewpoints: what I label here ‘diffusion’ 
and ‘division’ perspectives^. The first discourse sees the world as a relatively 
orderly matrix of countries, which are broadly converging as ICTs, having a 
beneficial impact (bringing about enhanced knowledge and greater opportunity). 
In contrast the alternate ‘divistionisf perspective conceptualises the world as a 
more fragmented set of places and social groups, with disorderly processes of 
change (not solely growth) resulting increasing divergence as ICTs have impacts 
that are often detrimental (bringing about more unequal access and greater scope 
for exploitation).
The broad ‘diffiisionisf coalition of scholars, activists, technology commentators 
and network builders who view the Internet as essentially a progressive tool for 
social empowerment and development. For example, the then U.S. Vice President, 
A1 Gore (1994) in a utopian call to create a global information infrastructure, 
asserted: “I see an new Athenian Age of democracy forged in the fora the Oil 
[Global Information Infrastructure] will create.” (See chapter four for further 
discussion of Gore’s role in promoting the ‘information superhighway’.) Network 
connectivity in the 1990s was seen as a potent tool to diminish of economic 
difference between regions of the world. The rapid diffusion of access, 
particularly of personal email communication, would connect people in the less 
developed regions directly into the core, and the mutual flows of information, 
ideas and knowledge engendered would be beneficial to all, fundamentally 
overturning power differentials. Ultimately development, driven through Internet
 ^ Obviously, this characterisation is a simplification for purposes of the current discussion, but it 
resonates with many other debates about the ‘impact’ o f ICTs which tend to split along broadly 
utopian or dystopian lines (cf. Graham 1998).
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access and ICTs, brings about social and economic convergence at different 
scales.
The alternative, 'divisionisT discourses, focused on the hegemonic power of 
technologies, are deeply sceptical of the progressive potential of networking and 
typically viewed the Internet as simply adding another layer of inequality between 
nations (cf. Jordan 1999; Main 2001). Far from being economically empowering, 
the Internet and ICTs are active in widening divisions, enabling the developed 
regions to exploit the less developed more effectively. In the future, the Internet 
promises, so the argument goes, “the distinction between developed and non­
developed countries will be joined by distinctions between fast countries and slow 
countries, networked nations and isolated ones” (Baranshamaje et al. 1995, quoted 
in Holderness 1998, 37). The winners of world-wide Internet growth - much like 
other dimensions of globalisation in the 1990s - would be those select few 
switching points able to direct the flows and extract surplus value. Besides 
economics, the potential of Internet to level social differentials in power was also 
questioned: “Despite the assertions of the people at Wired^ and other end-of- 
politics theorists, class stratification and oppression have not been eliminated by 
computers or any other technology” (Surman 1995, no pagination). In this way 
development that is delivered through infrastructural intervention, such as 
building Internet access and giving ICT equipment actually brings about social 
and economic divergence at different scales.
Fundamentally then, the ‘diffusionists’ and ‘divisionists’ positions disagree on the 
extent to which the Internet as agent of social and economic development can 
make the world a ‘better’ place. Assessment of the undoubted unevenness of 
Internet penetration is a key element for both sides, with concerns being most 
publicly articulated in ‘digital divides’ discourses. The digital divide emerged as a 
distinct ‘problem’ for academic analysis and political action in the late-1990s with 
major international summits held and the formation of high-profile taskforces to 
measure the scale of inequality and develop acceptable policy solution (such as
 ^ This alluded to the utopian rhetoric espoused by writers in Wired magazine, which was in the 
1990s an influential voice in Internet discourses in the U.S. (Jordan 1999).
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the G8 Dot.Force^). At the global scale, the African continent is often highlighted 
as needing special attention; for example, a New York Times article from this 
period stated: “From the White House and the World Bank to international 
business and academic circles, analysts warn that unless Africa gets online 
quickly, what is already the poorest continent risks greater marginalization” 
(French 1995, 5). For the advocates of the ‘diffusionist’ position, the evidence of 
digital divides was useful for highlighting where extra effort was needed and, 
anyway, these differentials in access were just a temporary ‘blip’ that could be 
relatively quickly ironed out (usually through delivery of better infrastructure to 
the most disconnected places). The same kind of evidence was used in a more 
incriminating fashion in ‘divisionist’ discourses to puncture the utopian hype of 
the ‘diffusionists’ and point up the absurdities of the ‘global information society’ 
rhetoric when large parts of the world still lack basic infrastructure, including 
reliable electrical supply to power computers.
Both sides seek to create particular imaginary geographies of the worldwide 
spread of the Internet to suit their agendas, deploying potent metaphors and tables 
of statistical data, along with specific case studies of successes in ‘wiring’ up 
places or personal stories of continued exclusion from the information age. In 
terms of spatial metaphors deployed, the most prevalent ones seen in the mid- 
1990s drew a direct analogy between computer networks and road networks, with 
the ‘diffusionists’ proclaiming the Internet as the coming ‘information super 
highway’. This was pointedly countered by the ‘divisionists’ camp who said it 
was clear that most of the world would be left to struggle along ‘digital dirt tracks’ 
(see discussion in chapter four). Certain kinds of representations of the nature of 
Internet globalisation are also prevalent and rhetorically significant in the 
competing truth claims of these discourses, as actors seek to gamer support to 
their point of view through the authority incumbent in certain types of images, 
particularly the scientific legitimacy connoted by statistical charts and thematic 
maps. Many official reports, activist documents and scholarly articles tactically
 ^ The Digital Opportunities Task force was instigated by the 0 8  heads o f state at a meeting in 
Okinawa, Japan in July 2000, <www.markle.org/dotforce.html>. It has been criticised for its ‘top- 
down’ model o f development driven by technology which favours the interests o f corporate capital 
above the needs of citizens (Shade 2003).
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deploy bar charts and scattergrams demonstrating obvious statistical trends to aid 
their case by making complex sets of social phenomena into visible and unified 
objects of analysis. As Buck-Morss (1994, 440) says in her work on how graphic 
representations helped to make the ‘economy’ into an object of analysis early in 
the twentieth century: “the map shifts the point of view so that viewers can see the 
whole as if from the outside, in a way that allows them, from a specific position 
inside, to find their bearings.” The potency of scientific looking charts is evident, 
for example, in latest ITU-published ‘information society’ report (WISR 2007), a 
lengthy and well produced policy document, has 40 different statistical charts and 
diagrams in its 147 pages to assist in picturing what actually constitutes the 
‘information society’ as if viewed from an outside ‘objective’ position but clearly 
created from a position inside the discourse.
Given the worldwide scope and inherently geographical nature of the patterns to 
Internet globalisation it is not surprising the valuable role world maps play in 
these discourses, as different kinds of statistical mapping are deployed to show the 
extent to which countries are diverging or converging. The map serves to make 
the abstract statistical measurement into a visual pattern that is tangible and 
perhaps more real and believable than a large table of numbers or scatter chart of 
indistinguishable dots. The map can show the statistics in relation to powerful 
geographical template of continents and the mosaic of nations that is thoroughly 
engrained into people as the proper mental model of the world.
To make sense of the range of statistical mapping deployed by different 
institutions to represent the processes of Internet globalisation, a categorisation 
was developed based on two ‘worldviews’, conceptualised as two linear 
dimensions of ‘difference’ and ‘complexity’. The ‘difference’ dimension is the 
extent of areal uniformity evident (at both the global and continental scale) and 
varies by the how the statistical patterns are denoted in the map, which in turn 
create connotative meanings for readers along a spectrum from universal 
homogeneity to abrupt and widespread inequalities between nations. The 
‘complexity’ dimension is the degree of entropy evident (at various scales from 
local to global) which depends on how statistical patterns are denoted in the map
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by the cartographer and how the explicit representation are interpreted 
connotatively by readers along a spectrum from simplicity and harmony to wholly 
discordant and unmanageable variance between national performance. Using a 
pair of axes, these two dimensions of ‘difference’ and ‘complexity’ create four 
separate quadrants or categories of mapping semiotics (Figure 5.2). Each quadrant 
represents one kind of map worldview, definable approximately by the strength of 
its difference and complexity characteristics. The positioning of a map into a 
particular quadrant depends on the connotative meanings, which in turn depend, in 
part, on the overt graphic design choices and cartographic symbology employed, 
as well as the epistemological element in the data classification and normalisation 
and the units of measurement. Also, less obviously connotations vary depending 
on the underlying ontological schema of what aspect of Internet globalisation is 
deemed to be measurable and worthy of representation.
Difknence
Figure 5.2: A fourfold grid o f connotative meanings to categorise maps o f Internet globalisation.
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The four quadrants of map worldviews are defined as follows:
• Orderly: Maps which fall into this category are typified by the visual 
arrangement of data in a conceptually simple, systematic and logical fashion. 
The overall design aims to be a ‘neat and tidy’ display of the data to suggest a 
world in harmony. Even though nations are likely to be differentiated from 
each other they are presented in strongly regularised array, ranking or 
hierarchy that designates a clear order from worse to best. An orderly 
denotative form also has particular connotations about the underlying 
organisation of the world in terms of obedience to hierarchy (i.e., ‘respectful 
to those who are better’), accepting the ‘natural’ order and the inevitability of 
continual difference in the world. Thus for many a statistical world mapped in 
an orderly manner implies a positive view of the world that is secure and not 
likely to change radically.
• Divergent: This group of maps is characterised by denotation of large 
differences between nations along with high complexity in the display of 
variation often at manifold scales. This is a statistical map without a 
harmonious pattern, exhibiting disunity with many places that deviate from 
the norm in an unpredictable way. There will be obvious and wide inequalities 
between the top and bottom classes, perhaps incomplete coverage, with stark 
contrasts geographically between abundance and barrenness. The connotations 
that may be drawn from a divergent map are of a fractured, and fracturing, 
world without equity and widening injustice. Thus for many a statistical world 
mapped in an divergent manner implies a negative view of the world that is 
insecure, unstable and getting worse.
• Disorderly: Typified by a highly fragmented pattern, yet accompanied with 
low degree of difference between nations. It is denoted by a muddled and 
confused display of data which implies a lack of systematic processes at work. 
Such visual disorganisation connotes a lack of understanding and perhaps 
control over changes, with wild areas that defy conventions on what should be 
done. It is a world without a master narrative and with deep disagreement as to 
the correct solution, and even whether there is a universal solution for uneven
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geographical development. Thus for many a statistical world mapped in an 
disorderly manner implies a negative view of the world that is ungovernable 
and resistant to process of economic and cultural globalisation.
• Convergent: The attributes of a convergent map are denoted by a simple and 
self-evident pattern of low inequities between nations. There are few, if any 
sharp divisions between neighbouring countries and the variation across the 
world is gradual and within manageable proportions. It is a map that shows 
countries are much more alike than they are different, and where relative 
uniformity of development is the norm and within reach for all people. The 
connotative implications arising from convergent maps are the that countries 
of the world are coming together, with a unity of purpose. It is implies 
common causes for the patterns and that universal solutions can be rolled out 
across a largely ‘flat’ world. Thus for many a statistical world mapped in an 
convergent manner implies a positive view of the world that is becoming more 
similar as countries assimilate upwards in terms of social and economic 
development.
The effectiveness of the maps as authoritative evidence in particular discourses, 
one could argue, depends on the extremity of their positioning in the opposite 
quadrants. For ‘diffusionists’ the more deeply located in convergent quadrant the 
better, with its stress on minimal difference between nations and low complexity 
imply a coherent world. For those advancing ‘divisionists’ agenda then an ideal 
map will be positioned in the top-right quadrant because it most advantageously 
connotes complexity and difference, a world of separate nations moving apart.
5.3 The emergence of statistical mapping
Robinson (1982, 16) defines the thematic map essentially as one that “focuses on 
the differences from place to place of one class of feature, that class being the 
subject or ‘theme’ of the map”. The communicative goal of thematic maps is to 
make apparent to the reader the spatial distribution or structure of the theme itself 
and the underlying geographical base map is the backcloth to support this. The
161
Chapter Five: Statistical Mapping o f Internet Globalisation
Spatial description of data revealed by the thematic map can be a useful aid in 
determining underlying causal processes and then demonstrating the plausibility 
of an explanation to others (e.g., spatial diffusion patterns in epidemiological 
studies). An almost infinite range of possible themes can be mapped, using a wide 
range of representational techniques (cf. Dent 1995; Slocum et al. 2005). 
Thematic maps displaying statistical data commonly use choropleth techniques 
which shade areal units of enumeration to represent classified interval data, 
although several other approaches, such as isopleth and proportional symbol 
maps, are also widely deployed.
Thematic maps are one of the most widely-seen forms of cartography, being 
deployed in all manner of discourses and distributed in all media, the ubiquitous 
weather map being the most obvious. Yet, attempts at understanding the nature of 
the human world in terms of the nomothetic mapping of environmental, social and 
economic phenomena came quite late in the history of cartography. Until the late 
seventeenth century, cartography had focused solely on representing idiographic 
knowledge, with maps used predominantly as a topographic reference recording 
the location of unique features in the landscape, for delineating property 
boundaries and as tools for navigation. The development of a distinctive new 
mode of cartographic representation - the thematic map - focused on the 
generalised description of a single aspect of place or human activity came to the 
fore in the beginning of the eighteenth century and became firmly established as 
an outcome of dramatic changes of the Enlightenment era and later industrialised 
modernity (Robinson 1982).
It is now widely acknowledged that the Enlightenment and the shift into a modem 
society gave rise to more systematic means of managing and governing 
populations. People became increasingly viewed as components in larger systems: 
as labour commodities, as problems to be solved (e.g., ill-health, illiteracy), and as 
citizens. The development of ‘population thinking’ by centralised State 
institutions depended, crucially, on generating both a depth and a breadth of new 
statistical knowledge about society as a whole. This period saw the creation of 
systems of universal civil registration, standardised observational methods in
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morbidity, the enactment of large-scale social surveys (on education, poverty and 
other aspects of ‘moral’ status) and, ultimately, the total enumeration of the 
population through censuses. The concern was to gain a uniform understanding of 
the human resources available to the State and also to create “unitary national 
identities via the production of statistical measures that levelled differences, and 
suppressed local and ethnic identities” (Higgs 2004, 20).
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Figure 5.3: A literal mapping of Internet statistics onto place. The actual design o f the data 
presentation means it is hard to make comparisons on how costs o f Internet access varies between 
cities; this failing is tacitly acknowledged by the need to include the ‘highs and lows’ bullet point 
list in addition to the map. (Source: Bures 2006, 53. A larger version is reproduced in appendix 
two, Figure A2.1.)
This wholesale ‘quantification’ of society required new kinds of representation to 
make sense of wholly new classes of economic and demographic data being
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generated. Indeed, Cosgrove (2003, 133) argues that “statistics had their greatest 
social impact through graphic expression - graphs, charts and maps”. A range of 
thematic maps, along with many other chart types, such as Playfair’s pie charts, 
were invented at the start of the nineteenth century in a burst of graphic creativity 
(cf. Friendly and Denis 2003). William Smith produced his geological map of 
England and Wales in 1815 and two years later the pioneering geographer 
Alexander von Humboldt produced the first known isoline map showing 
temperature patterns. The origination of the choropleth map itself has been traced 
back to 1823 and work of the political economist, Charles Dupin, who was 
concerned with mapping the demographic capacity of the French nation 
(Robinson 1982, 156-57). In representational terms, choropleth maps were a 
significant advance in visually communicating complex socio-spatial patterns, as 
they replaced the accepted practice of simply writing numeric values onto the map 
(see Figure 5.3 above for a contemporary example) which aided the interpretation 
of raw data in order to discover and explain otherwise hidden spatial patterns, 
relations and trends.
The emergence of thematic mapping also had political implications (Crampton 
2004). Statistical maps, particular of classified data, in their visual form and 
application tend to dehumanise the spaces they purport to represent. They are 
intimately involved in the production of a particular kind of govemmentality, in 
which their instrumental rationality aggregates unique places and generalises 
individual human experience into easily mappable averages, rates and scores. The 
orderly representation of statistical knowledges offered by thematic maps are 
powerful, I would argue, not because of what they show, but because they can 
mask so well the complex, contingent social reality. The social worlds viewed 
through statistical mapping are thus de-socialised and rendered more easily 
governed by powerful institutions, as the human effects of policy decisions remain 
safely opaque, hidden behind the neat tables of numbers and uniformly shaded 
enumeration areas. (This line of argument is a key element in critical cartography 
paradigm on the power of maps to do work in the world; see chapter two.)
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Copyright © 1991 
Larry Landweber 
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Copyright © 1997 
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Figure 5.4: The first and last maps in the ‘International Connectivity’ series charting national-level 
Internet access. (Source: <ftp://ftp.cs.wisc.edu/connectivity_table>.)
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5.4 Area-based mapping of Internet globalisation
In a way cyberspace’s  spread would becom e Iconized through displays such as the country- 
by-country Internet world connectivity maps which ... adopted the visual language of 
geopolitics in framing cyberspace's spread as national question.
-  Greg Elmer, Critical Perspectives on the Internet, 2002.
In this section I examine in depth two examples of choropleth mapping of 
national-level statistics on Internet globalisation. The first is the ‘Internet 
Connectivity’ maps from the 1990s and the second is a contemporary example 
called the ‘Digital Opportunity 2005/2006’ map published in 2007. The analysis 
considers how the maps work semiotically, utilising the connotative dimensions 
of ‘difference’ and ‘complexity’, and also the wider cultural milieu in which they 
are embedded and the work they do in the world.
5.4.1 'International Connectivity' map series, 1991-97
The world-wide spread of the Internet during the 1990s was tracked by the U.S. 
based computer scientist, Lawrence Landweber, and charted in a series of 
statistical maps. In total, Landweber produced twelve maps over a period of six 
years, providing a visual census of the spread of international connectivity via a 
range of different computer networks, including the Internet (for convenience all 
the maps are reproduced in full pages in appendix two, figures A2.2). The first 
‘International Connectivity’ map produced displayed the diffusion of network 
connectivity in September 1991 and the last one in the series was created in June 
1997 (Figure 5.4). The first ‘International Connectivity’ map produced (which is 
labelled version 2; there is no version 1) is the earliest known published map that 
attempted to represent the worldwide geography of the Internet in a nomothetic 
fashion^.
* A quite similar survey and mapping effort known as the ‘FAQ: International E-Mail 
Accessibility Survey’ was undertaken by Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond 
(<www.nsrc.org/codes/bymap/ntlgy/>), but began in November 1993 and ran through eight 
updates until May 1997. For reference, examples o f Crepin-Leblond’s maps are given in appendix 
two. Figure 2.3, however his project is not examined here because it does not add substantively to 
the arguments made regarding the ‘International Connectivity’ maps.
166
Chapter Five: Statistical Mapping o f Internet Globalisation
By making a simple visual comparison of ‘International Connectivity’ maps 
through time, it becomes clear that a large swathe of the world’s nations appeared 
to have become connected to the Internet in the first half of the 1990s. As such, 
these maps, and the associated data tables (see Figure 5.6 below), became 
established one of the most accessible and well-used sources of longitudinal data 
on Internet globalisation during a crucial period of growth in the middle of the 
1990s.
5.4.1.1 Design of the ‘International Connectivity’ maps
In terms of design semiotics, the ‘International Connectivity’ maps are firmly 
embedded in the conventions of statistical cartography. They use a choropleth 
approach, based on a fourfold nominal classification, to denote network 
connectivity at the national level (Figure 5.4). The first class, ‘No Connectivity’, 
is represented by yellow shading; the two intermediate categories of connectivity - 
‘EMail Only’ and ‘BITNET but not Internet’ - are symbolised by green and red 
shading respectively; and the ‘top’ category of ‘Internet’ connectivity is 
represented by a purple colour. The world base map of countries is wholly 
conventional, taking a familiar Robinson-type projection centred on the prime 
meridian. Countries are rendered as black outlines, easily filled with bright, solid 
colour. No countries, oceans or other features are labelled; there is no geographic 
context shown beyond the country outline acting as a vessel for the statistic. 
Clearly, it is assumed that the readership will know the conventions of world 
maps and be able to interpret the statistic appropriately as showing worldwide 
convergence to complete Internet connectivity.
The classification scheme is set out in the large legend box that dominates the 
centre of the map layout. The legend box also gives the title of the map, 
‘International Connectivity’, along with revision details. The title itself is 
somewhat ambiguous if the maps are read out of context. Connectivity to what? 
The word ‘international’ in the title must also be noted so the reader understands 
what is being shown and what is not shown (see discussion below regarding data 
collection methodology related to the survey on which the maps are based). The 
labels for classes in the legend are also cryptic for readers without prior
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knowledge of computer networking. What, for example, are BITNET and UUCP? 
(Where these maps are employed intertextually the legend text is often simplified 
to aid comprehension.) It is also not explained what the significance is of the 
difference between the classes of connectivity. How is BITNET different from 
Internet? What does it denote for a country to be shaded red rather than green in 
terms of online access for people living there? There is no explanation on the map 
artefacts themselves, although some further details are given in associated data 
tables (Figure 5.5; see discussion below).
Besides the legend box, there are two other textual elements in the map layout. 
These denote background information on the map in terms of authorship and 
distribution. They also work in a connotative sense to grant additional authority to 
the statistics on the map. On the right hand side is a formal sounding copyright 
statement that says of the work: ‘this map is formally published’. De facto  
credibility is also bestowed on the map’s validity by citing the Internet Society 
(ISOC)^. The left hand text ‘opens up’ the map to the world in a sense, by 
proclaiming it to be freely and anonymously available online. This text also subtly 
exudes technocratic power by the statement of the ftp access method and the 
URL; particularly so as the first of the maps were published in 1991-93, pre-Web 
mainstream, when only the cyhQX-cognoscenti would have been able to 
meaningfully decode this text.
Taken as a whole, the textual elements of the map promote the work as a quasi- 
official statement on Internet globalisation. A techno-scientific aesthetic can also 
been seen in the overall map composition: the unadorned, sparse and perfunctory 
style of scientific representation, drawn on ascetic white space. This outward 
‘matter-of-facf simplicity in design results mainly from expediency in 
production. However, the effect - I would argue - is the production of an 
authoritative looking map and one that epitomises the authoritarian imposition of 
the ‘statistical’ vision onto the world, ordering Internet globalisation by country
 ^ This is a significant U.S.-based lobby group working to support the ‘progressive’ development 
agenda for the Internet. In the mid 1990s it enjoyed considerable influence as the ‘voice o f the 
Internet’ in policy debates with the U.S. government and international forums. Today, its influence 
in shaping the structure of the Internet has diminished considerably.
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and by classes. The Tntemational Connectivity’ maps display the prevailing de- 
socialising modus operandi of most thematic mapping.
5.4.1.2 Patterns of Internet globalisation in the Tntemational Connectivity’ maps 
How, then, do Landweber maps denote the geography of global Internet diffusion 
through the 1990s? A casual inspection of the first map from 1991 presents a 
world where pretty much all developed countries were connected to the Internet 
(most had been linked to NSFNET during previous three years), but at the same 
time a large number of the world’s nations were shaded yellow, indicating that 
they had no international network connectivity. In fact, this category included 
about half of the world’s countries, though these were clearly concentrated in the 
less developed regions of Africa and central Asia. The connotation is of a 
complicated and fragmented pattern with significant differences between parts of 
the world, including wide divisions in connectivity between neighbouring 
countries (e.g., the purple shaded India in the highest category bordering the 
yellow coloured Pakistani and Bangladesh in the bottom class of ‘no 
connectivity’).
Jumping forward in time to the final ‘International Connectivity’ map produced 
for June 1997, the vast majority of the nations of the world were shaded purple. 
The Internet, measured according to Landweber's survey methodology and 
classification scheme, was so widespread that by 1997 the exceptions really stand 
out on the map. The connotations are markedly different to the 1991 with a much 
more uniform pattern across the world and much reduced difference evident. The 
1997 map is a representation of convergence and implies that the globalisation of 
the Internet will be imminently complete. It was at this point that tracking 
diffusion at this scale became largely redundant and, hence, this was the last map 
in the series produced by Landweber. (An amended map was created later in 1997 
by activists Mike Jensen, with slightly adapted classification, to show the updated 
networking situation in Africa; map reproduced in appendix two. Figure A2.4.)
By 1997, then, this mapping of Internet globalisation showed a pristine purple- 
coloured world, pockmarked with bright yellow spots. These remaining ‘unwired’
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spots were nations suffering from extreme poverty, war and civil conflicts (such 
as Afghanistan, Bhutan and Somalia) or from geopolitical isolation (e.g., Libya, 
North Korea, Burma, Iraq and Syria). More than ten years after this map was 
produced, many of these yellow ‘No Connectivity’ countries are still marginal to 
the Internet wor ldIndeed ,  in some globalisation discourses they are stigmatised 
as ‘failed’ states, with a number being actively demonised as part of an (illusory) 
‘axis of evil’. These ‘unwired’ places are being shifted, in certain geopolitical 
circles, from a moral problem of underdevelopment to a security threat to 
globalised peace
A particularly pernicious example of such a construction of new threats of the 
‘unwired’ is set out in the ‘Pentagon’s New Maps’, a provocative template of 
twenty-first century U.S. geopolitics produced by defence analyst, Thomas 
Barnett (map is reproduced in appendix two. Figure A2.5). In his mapping, he 
asserts that “disconnectedness defines danger” as the “new security paradigm that 
shapes this age” (Barnett 2003, no pagination). Unsurprisingly, Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraqi regime was cited as the prime example of a nation that was seen as 
“dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world, from its rule sets, its 
norms, and all the ties that bind countries together in mutually assured 
dependence” (Barnett 2003, no pagination). This new security challenge for U.S., 
therefore, justifies pre-emptive action to re-connect the disconnected nations, by 
military means if necessary. As Roberts’ et al. (2003, 895), in their trenchant 
critique of Barnett’s neoliberal re-mapping of the world, argue it justifies 
“intervention in the cause of forcibly removing obstacles to globalisation.”
5.4.1.3 Authorship of the ‘International Connectivity’ maps
Unlike most statistical maps, the ‘International Connectivity’ series has a clearly
identified human author. The maps were solely the work of Lawrence Landweber,
As note above in the discussion of the ‘DOF map, Afghanistan,, Iraq, North Korea and Somalia 
appear to be in a strange category of having no digital opportunity ranking but being denoted 
cartographically.
" Although as pointed out by Vujakovic (notes on thesis draft, October 2006) this is a narrow and 
extreme perspective even in geopolitical circles, yet even with limited support it still has some 
influence on wider development and diplomatic discourses.
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whilst a professor in the computer science department at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, where he worked for over thirty years. Initially, Landweber’s 
research interests lay in theoretical computer science but from the late 1970s he 
become one of the pioneers in the development of academic networking in the 
U.S., being the prime mover in the building of TheoryNet in 1977 and CSNET at 
the start of the 1980s (for details, see Cromer 1983). These networks 
complemented developments then taking place with ARPANET (cf. Abbate 1996; 
Hafiier and Lyon 1996) and were themselves significant milestones along the road 
towards the modem Internet. The success of CSNET, in particular, was an 
important factor in securing government funding for NSFNET (Randall 1997). 
Landweber’s breadth of professional work over two decades clearly demonstrates 
his commitment to spreading the benefits of computer networking as widely as 
possible: “Starting in 1982”, Landweber notes, “we made contact with CS 
[computer science] groups in other countries and held workshops with people 
from around the world who were building national networks. The networking idea 
was awakening everywhere in the world” (quoted in Randall 1997, 120). He was 
involved in founding the Internet Society and he served as the society’s President 
for two years. He was instrumental in founding the society’s Developing Country 
Workshops, beginning in 1993 -  cited as a vital element in Internet 
‘bootstrapping’ (Guédon 2002).
Why did Landweber track and map the global diffusion of network? Given his 
academic background, the desire to inform and educate the wider community of 
interest through the free, timely dissemination of accurate information was 
important; and given his commitment to the ‘diffusionist’ cause, the maps were 
likely not purely academic productions, they were created as tools of persuasion to 
encourage greater efforts to connect up the ‘unwired’ nations. This last motivation 
is articulated in a revealing comment Landweber made in a 1995 New York Times 
article: “Everyone realizes that Africa is lagging .... you look at the map of Africa 
and you see huge gaps all over that will prevent this continent from participating 
in so many aspects of life on this planet as it is developing” (quoted in French 
1995, 5). His efforts in this regard, should be read as altruistic rather than 
commercially-driven promotion for personal gain.
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While the Internet has grown tremendously in the last ten years Africa remains the 
least connected region in the world, and the digital gap between it and the 
developed world is, arguably, widening not narrowing. In illustration of this, 
Landweber was again quote as a authority figure in network developing in a New 
York Times over twelve year later but echoing similar ‘diffusionisf sentiments: “ 
‘Unless you can offer Internet access that is the same as the rest of the world, 
Africa can’t be part of the global economy or academic environment,” said 
Lawrence H. Landweber, professor emeritus of computer science at the University 
of Wisconsin in Madison, who was also part of an early effort to bring the Web to 
Africa in the mid-1990s. “The benefits of the Internet age will bypass the 
continent.” (Nixon 2007, no pagination). Empirical evidence to support the 
widening gap thesis put forward in this news story was provided by two 
choropleth maps of Africa showing national-level per capita penetration of 
Internet and mobile telephones.
5.4.1.4 Methodology of the ‘International Connectivity’ maps 
To understand the ‘International Connectivity’ maps and the perspective on 
Internet globalisation they produce, it is important to have a sense of what they are 
measuring and how the measurement was undertaken. Essentially, Landweber was 
enumerating the availability of computer networks according to two key 
characteristics: that connections were international in nature and that they were 
publicly accessible. ‘International’ chiefly meant connected to the U.S. and 
‘public’ effectively meant that some institutions (most often universities) were 
reachable to general users outside the country. (The degree to which connectivity 
and public reachability in both directions was verified by Landweber is not clear.) 
Landweber was solely concerned with the presence of an international link, with 
no recording of the capacity, cost or reliability of the links (which would have 
clearly been prohibitively time consuming to attempt to gather at worldwide 
scale). Furthermore, measurement did not enumerate the extent of internal 
networking provision and intentionally did not register private networks (such as 
military links or proprietary business networks like the airline reservation system).
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The data was collated and presented in summary form at the country level at 
regular intervals (shown Figure 5.5). Like any survey methodology, Landweber's 
was a compromise; as Press (2000, no pagination) points out: “[kjeeping track of 
only one easily defined variable allowed [Landweber] to maintain a global 
perspective at a reasonable cost, but this system was limited by the fact that 
differences among and within nations were hidden.”
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Figure 5.5: A longitudinal chart o f “worldwide network growth” showing the range o f network 
types covered by the ‘International Connectivity’ survey and the periodicity o f their publication. 
Note, not all surveys were accompanied by a map. (Source: Zakon 2004.)
Details on the changing state of network connectivity in different countries were 
returned to Landweber's ‘centre of calculation’ (Latour 1987) at the University^ of 
Wisconsin-Madison, from a human network of knowledgeable ‘locals' across the 
world. The maps were, therefore, in some senses built by many hands from 
voluntarily submitted data (explicitly acknowledged in the data tables, see Figure 
5.6). Besides collecting data from the field, Landweber was also an ‘insider', with 
intimate knowledge of ongoing networking activities, particularly those related to 
NSFNET's international connection scheme (see Goldstein 1995). He was also 
knowledgeable to be able to exploit technical information and statistics published 
by the consortium that ran the NSFNET backbone. Once the early ‘International 
Connectivity' surveys began to circulate he also received feedback from readers 
(again, this was explicitly encouraged in the header of the data tables, see Figure
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5.6 below). Overall, it is evidently a pragmatic way of assembling such global 
information at a low cost (remembering this project was very much a ‘one man’ 
effort), although others tried direct technical measurement methods, using the 
Internet as measurement tool to scan computer connected to different networks 
(cf. Dodge 1999b, 2000d; Quarterman et al. 1993, 1994).
As noted the actual network data that underlies each ‘International Connectivity’ 
map was also published in tabular form. Figure 5.6 presents an illustrative portion 
of the December 1991 (version 3) table. The table of data is another 
representational form that deliberately exudes orderliness, objectivity and an air of 
authoritative accuracy. The ‘International Connectivity’ survey tables list all 
countries as ‘present and correct’ - the ideological “fiction of the census is that 
everyone is in it, and that everyone has one - and only one - ... place. No 
fractions.” (Anderson 1991, 166). The tables themselves are of direct relevance to 
the discussion here, primarily, because they reveal a more sophisticated 
classification system for connectivity than was represented in the maps 
themselves, as they contain a basic ‘intensity of use’ measure^^. Besides the data 
classification, the table headers also contain some useful information for 
contextualising Landweber’s project, including acknowledgement of sources and 
often succinct remarks on the precision (or otherwise) of the data (e.g., 
‘Information on Slovenia/Croatia/Yugoslavia and former Soviet Republics may be 
incomplete’, from the April 1992 survey table). The admission of potential faults 
in the data (in the mode of a ‘modest witness’, see chapter four) can contrasted 
with the cartographic certainty of denotation by the maps. An orderly visual 
presentation on the choropleth maps does not only reveal, it can most effectively 
hide a multitude of sins in the underlying data^^.
Countries were categorised into the ‘minimal’ use class if  they had fewer than five known sites 
publicly connected and this was indicated with a lower case letter. Countries with more than five 
sites were classed as having ‘widespread’ connectivity and this was denoted by a capital letter.
The capacity to show statistical uncertainty in a useful and meaningful way is a largely 
unresolved area o f cartographic research (cf. Dietrick and Edsall 2008; MacEachren et a l  2005).
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INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIVITY 
Version 3 - December 2 , 1991
Please send corrections, information and/or comments to:
Larry Landweber 
Computer Sciences Dept.
University of Wisconsin - Madison 
1210 W. Dayton St.
Madison, WI 53706 
lhl0cs.wise.edu 
FAX 1-608-265-2635
Include details, e.g., on connections, sites, contacts, protocols, 
etc.
Thanks to the many people from around the world who have provided 
information.
In the following, BITNET is used generically to refer to BITNET 
plus similar networks around the world (e.g., EARN, NETNORTH, 
GULFNET, etc.).
SUMMARY
NUMBER OF ENTITIES WITH INTERNATIONAL NETWORK CONNECTIVITY = 89
BITNET Col. 2 (Entities with international BITNET links.) 
b = minimal < 5 domestic sites = 18
B = widespread >= 5 domestic sites = 28 
X = uncertain = 2 
INTERNET Col. 3 (Entities with international IP links.)
I = operational = 33 
i = soon available = 3 
UUCP Col. 4 (Entities with international UUCP links.) 
u = minimal < 5 domestic sites = 40 
U = widespread >= 5 domestic sites = 38 
FIDONET Col. 5 (Entities with international FIDONET links.) 
f = minimal < 5 domestic sites = 10
F = widespread >= 5 domestic sites = 43
Col 6 New connections expected in near future.
------ AF Afghanistan (Republic of Afghanistan)
------ AL Albania (Republic of Albania)
[.records; deleted ]
------ CK Cook Islands
b-u- CR Costa Rica (Republic of Costa Rica)
- - U - cu Cuba (Republic of Cuba)
b-U- CY Cyprus (Republic of Cyprus)
BiUF CS Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)
BIUF DK Denmark (Kingdom of Denmark)
Figure 5.6: Part of the ‘International Connectivity’ data table produced by Landweber, December 
1991. (Source: <ftp.cs.wisc.edu/connectivity_table>.). Full data table is reproduced in appendix 
two, Figure A2.6.
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5.4.1.5 Distribution of the ‘International Connectivity’ maps 
In the 1990s the ‘International Connectivity’ maps are some of the most widely 
seen geographic maps of the Internet. They are still cited and used several years 
later (see examples below). There are several factors that can be advanced to 
explain why they have enjoyed such wide distribution:
• Easy to get: All of the ‘International Connectivity’ materials were and remain 
publicly accessible online via anonymous ftp (and now through the web) from 
his department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The online location is 
widely disseminated and cited. Further, the address has remained active since 
the project started in 1991.
• Easy to read: The file formats used by Landweber for the maps and data tables 
mean that they are still all readable today on common computing platforms 
without the need for specialised software. The avoidance of proprietary 
formats (e.g., particular spreadsheet formats for the tables or GIS package for 
the maps) has been important for long-term accessibility. The file sizes for the 
materials are also small, making downloading possible for people with slow 
Internet connections (a significant issue for many people when the survey 
began back in 1991).
• Easy to understand: The materials are clearly named and quite straightforward 
to understand in a normative sense. As stated earlier, the choice of choropleth 
mapping provides an ostensibly familiar and comprehensible cartographic 
design. The materials are all labelled with dates and it is easy to work out 
which is the most up-to-date version.
• Free to use: Explicit permission is granted for unlimited reproduction of the 
materials in the copyright statement on the maps and tables. This is a small but 
important factor. By removing the burden in obtaining formal copyright 
release, Landweber was encouraging the widest possible dissemination of his 
maps. Free access and dissemination clearly stems directly from Landweber’s 
academic position, founded as it is on the open publishing model with results 
distributed non-commercially, in marked contrast to other valuable Internet 
statistics and maps, which are available only in expensive reports for the 
corporate market (e.g., those produced by IDC and TeleOeography).
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• Authoritative source: There are several interlocking factors that work to 
promote the trustworthiness of the ‘International Connectivity’ materials, such 
that people are confident in using them as factually accurate representations. 
Firstly, the authorship of the materials is clearly stated and this lends 
considerable weight to their probity. The author, Landweber, is a respected 
professor, well known in the field of research and education networking, and 
affiliated with a major U.S. university. As noted above, the endorsement of the 
Internet Society was also overtly employed.
• ‘Scarcity breeds success’: A last reason for the success of the ‘International 
Connectivity’ maps is that there was little in the way of competition, 
especially in the early 1990s. There were few other maps produced which 
offered as synoptic and simple - and perhaps one might say seductively simple 
- view of the Internet on a single map. Most other maps tended to be more 
technical in nature, showing specific networks or specific countries using link- 
node graphs. Even today, very few ‘high-level’ statistical maps of the ‘whole’ 
Internet are produced to match the effectiveness of the ‘International 
Connectivity’ maps, which are easily accessible and have consistent 
presentation over time^ "^ .
5.4.1.6 Influence of the ‘International Connectivity’ maps
Considered in combination, the semiotics of the images, their authorship and the 
mode of distribution, mean that the ‘International Connectivity’ maps are apposite 
examples of what Latour (1987) called ‘immutable mobiles’. Truthful, scientific 
knowledge on the extent of networking across the globe was constituted at a 
‘centre of calculation’ from various pieces of survey data. This knowledge was 
purposefully inscribed into maps and tables to stabilise the knowledge in fixed, 
conventional forms. The maps and tables are said to be ‘immutable’, remaining 
the same wherever and whenever they are read. The maps and tables as readable 
files, distributed on the Internet, were easily ‘mobile’, freely circulating online 
and in print and being usable in a wide range of contexts, including translation
The maps of the Digital Opportunity Index discussed in section 5.4.2 suffer because o f a change 
of colour ramp from one version to the next making like-for-like comparisons harder.
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into other languages (see Figure 5.8 below). Lastly, the maps were combinable in 
many ways and many discourses.
Regarding the ‘International Connectivity’ maps as ‘immutable mobiles’ is useful 
because it starts to unravel the underlying truth claims they are working to 
establish. As Cosgrove (2003, 136) asserts, maps work because they “permit 
scientific discourse to sustain its claims of empirical warranty and repeatable truth 
in the absence of eye-witness evidence.” Most people have no means of assessing 
first hand the globalising of the Internet. They had to rely on the ‘International 
Connectivity’ maps to establish the truth of the Internet diffusionists’ viewpoint 
by showing that country x was connected. The maps are powerful ‘immutable 
mobiles’ because so many people are willing to accept them as truth, as can be 
seen in the extent to which they have been cited and re-used intertextually. If 
Landweber had failed to secure immutability, then the maps would not be able 
claims to be anything “more than an imaginative picture” (Cosgrove 2003, 137).
The ‘International Connectivity’ maps have been cited and reproduced numerous 
times in newspapers, popular books, academic papers and policy-related reports in 
the last decade, contributing as pictorial evidence to a range of discourses on the 
‘state of the net’. Apparently, they were “displayed triumphantly at the various 
Inets [ISOC conferences] to mark the fact that the Internet was gallantly going 
global; this was exciting!” according to Guédon (2002, no pagination). The data 
tables were widely posted to mailing lists and Usenet newsgroups throughout the 
1990s. Long after the end of Landweber’s updating of the maps (in June 1997), 
they still continue to attract interest^
For example, a search of the Web, as indexed by the Google search engine, in January 2008 
returned 315 pages containing hyperlink citations to the ‘International Connectivity’ maps, quite 
an impressive measure considering the material has not be updated for over ten years now.
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Internet
0  E-mail only (UUCP, Fido Net) 
No connectivity
>
Figure 2.2 International connectivity  
Source: copyright © 1995 Larry Landweber and the Internet Society
Figure 5.7: Intertextual example of the deployment of a simplified ‘International Connectivity’ 
map in a narrative about development in an academic monograph. (Source: author scan fi*om 
Castells 1998, 94.)
In the majority of cases Landweber’s maps and data tables have been 
intertextually deployed as unproblematic and objective evidentiary material, 
which supports the ‘truthfulness’ of rapid Internet diffusion - simple maps of a 
successful Internet, successfully spreading across the world. In terms of more 
scholarly works, the ‘International Connectivity’ materials have been deployed by 
several academic authors as matter of fact evidence (e.g., Choucri 2000; 
Crampton 1999; Grundy 1997; Leiner 1993). A typical example was the use of a 
connectivity map by Manuel Castells in the third book in his ‘network society’ 
trilogy. End o f Millennium (1998). The map was the sole illustration for the 
section titled ‘Africa’s technological apartheid at the dawn of the Information 
Age’ (Figure 5.7). The discourse expounded by Castells’ is a broadly 
‘diffusionist’ one about ‘failing Africa’ and the need to quickly counteract 
technological underdevelopment. The citation to the map in the text follows this 
clear articulation of the infrastructure ‘failure’: “Connection to the Internet is very 
limited because of insufficient international bandwidth, and lack of connectivity
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between African countries. Half of the African countries had no connection to the 
Internet in 1995, and Africa remains, by and large, the switched-off region of the 
world” (Castells 1998, 93). The map itself is presented in landscape orientation, 
filling a whole page; it is reproduced in black and white and has been edited 
(simplified classification into three categorises, removal of copyright notice and 
distribution text). There is no commentary about the map or the statistical patterns 
it displays in the text. The reader is assumed to accept it as ‘truthfuf and to be 
able to decode it sufficiently to support Castells' line of argument. In this way 
Landweber’s map is a ‘factual’ representation, able to demonstrate with the aid of 
cartographic authority, how badly-off Africa is in relation to rest of the world.
Diffusion studies are an enduring topic of interest to academics in a range of 
disciplines, with many focused on explaining the temporal and/or geographic 
waves of innovations in technologies. Unsurprisingly, describing and explaining 
the global spread of the Internet through the 1990s sparked a number of studies
(e.g., Amum and Conti 1998; Batty and Barr 1994; Elie 1998). These studies
commonly used country-level analysis of per capita measures of Internet 
availability in some form of regression modelling to find explanatory 
‘independent’ variables and to fit a growth curve. A number of these studies have 
utilised the ‘International Connectivity’ data as a ‘truthful’ source for the 
dependent variable in their analysis. For example, Hollis (1996) used
Landweber’s data tables from 1991 and 1995 to produce a binary indicator of
network connectivity and chart how this improved over time in relation to the UN 
Human Development Indicator (HDI) groupings of nations. Drori and Jang’s 
(2003) analysis used the ‘International Connectivity’ data to construct an eight- 
level ‘Net Sophistication Score’ with change between 1991 and 1995 compared 
and then explained in a regression model. The ‘International Connectivity’ data 
are used essentially to show that things are getting better, and getting better 
quickly - which in a sense they are. For example, Goodman et a l (1994, 31, 
emphasis added) note: “Landweber maintains an extensive and verified 
‘International Connectivity Table’ ... regularly updated and published in the 
Internet Society News”. However, as explained above, these data are a very 
limited sampling, oply accounting for the presence of connectivity and taking no
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account of the capacity of Internet connections, their availability or how widely 
they are used.
ConectM dad imernacional e  Internet (de 1991 a 1997)
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Figure 5.8: A creative adaptation of two ‘International Connectivity’ maps. The bottom map is 
wrongly labelled as ‘version 2 -  9/91’ when it is actually ‘version 16 -  6/15/97’. (Source: 
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia 2001, 4.)
‘International Connectivity’ maps and data have also been utilised in national and 
international policy documents, particularly in relation to the ‘problem’ of the 
digital divide and development. Illustrative examples include the 1995 UNESCO 
report titled The Right to Communicate - At what Price? which features an 
‘International Connectivity’ map captioned as ‘Research network connectivity as 
of February 1995’, in a section discussing the problems of access for scholars in 
Africa. No interpretation was deemed necessary, again because of its self-evident 
claim to ‘truth’. In another example from a Brazilian ‘information society’ policy 
document two maps are translated and employed in sequence to provide a simple 
narrative of ‘progress’ (Figure 5.8). The maps are redrawn on a much generalised 
country outlines and somewhat modified different colours.
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Figure 5.9: The ‘Digital Opportunity 2005/2006’ map created the International 
Telecommunication Union. (Source: WISR 2007, 150-51.)
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5.4.2 ‘Digital Opportunity 2005/2006’ map
As a comparison to the ‘Internet Connectivity’ maps produced in the 1990s, it is 
worthwhile to consider a contemporary geopolitical mapping of worldwide 
network diffusion. This mapping, based on a self-espoused ‘convergent’ agenda 
of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), uses a multidimensional 
statistic called the ‘Digital Opportunity Index’ (DOI), a ranking of the majority of 
countries according to their capacity to fully participate in the ‘Information 
Society’.
Such composite indicators of technological development and national 
infrastructure capability are fashionable in the last few years, being constructed 
and promulgated by various organisations hoping to capture policy agendas. For 
example, the Network Readiness Index published by the World Economic Forum, 
the Index of Knowledge Societies by the World Bank, the E-Readiness Rankings 
published by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Connectivity Scorecard 
created by London Business School and Nokia-Siemens (see Mahan 2007 for 
review). The DOI is noteworthy amongst this pack of indicators of ‘progress’ for 
several reasons, firstly its ambition to more accurately capture ‘reality’ across all 
nations through comprehensive statistical aggregation. Secondly, it enjoys the 
endorsement of key international institutions as the ‘definitive’ index. Thirdly, the 
commitment of resources to distribute it widely and in a credible form, including 
authoritative presentation of the index using statistical maps.
Two iterations of the DOI ranking, and accompany world and regional maps, have 
been published and widely disseminated online for free and in printed reports^ 
The latest version of the world map using 2005/2006 DOI data was published in 
May 2007 and displays scores for 181 countries (Figure 5.9; the earlier version 
published in 2006 and using a different colour scheme is reproduced in appendix
The map is distributed freely online, in high resolution PDF format. The map is afforded a 
significant visual presence on the main ITU web page promulgating the DOI, serving as a singular 
sign of technocratic authority (‘look we have measured the whole world’)- The map is also 
distributed in various ITU publications, including the DOI executive summary where it is located 
in the middle of the document on double page spread; in the large policy reports the map is 
somewhat hidden away at the end in the statistical annexes (WISR 2007).
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two, Figure A2.9). As is evident, the cartographic design choice for the map is 
wholly conventional choropleth representation.
The construction of the DOI is one of the most sophisticated and well planned 
attempts to rigorously measure the global extent of ICT development, coming 
with high-profile endorsement of authoritative UN bodies and distributed in 
substantial, well produced reports (e.g., WISR 2007). The self-stated goal for the 
DOI, with its clearly implied political stance, is stated as follows: “a valuable tool 
for benchmarking ... that governments, operators, development agencies, 
researchers and others can use to measure the digital divide and compare ICT 
performance within and across countries” (ITU 2008, no pagination); “it provides 
a powerful policy tool for exploring the global and regional trends in 
infrastructure, opportunity and usage that are shaping the Information Society” 
(WISR 2007,35).
In the outline descriptions of the DOI and its potential usefulness as a tool to 
inform policy, the nature of the ‘Information Society’ (always capitalised) is taken 
as given, it is a singular model (‘Society’ not ‘societies’) and one that by 
implication defaults to a Western-centric market model of consumer capitalism 
made, ultra competitive with computers and networks. There is no real definition 
of what constitutes the ‘Information Society’, although again implicitly one 
should take the characteristics of the leading nations in the index as archetypes 
(the role model of South Korea in particular, given the influence of its government 
institutions in the conceptualisation and design of the DOI^^). The ITU 
perspective views the realization of the ‘Information Society’ as an epochal 
change with past socio-economic organisations^^. It is a top-down, technocratic 
view of a particular kind of social relations imagined by elite bureaucrats in their
Highlighted on the ‘DOP map are the logos of Korean Ministry o f Information and 
Communication (MIC) and the Korea Agency for Digital Opportunity Promotion (KADO), see 
Figure 5.9 above.
Some scholars have argued there is actually the emergence o f different types o f networked 
informational societies (e.g., Castells 1996). There are also sceptics who maintain that there is no 
such thing as the information society, and that changes in employment and industrial structures 
cited as prima-facie evidence simply reflect continuity with the past trends (e.g., Webster 1995).
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offices in Geneva and Seoul. Yet, the ‘Information Society’ in the context of the 
ITU, and its view of the world, is accepted as a real achievable goal, that progress 
to this goal is inevitable and that reaching the goal is universally desirable. It is a 
strongly ‘diffusionist’ agenda where all countries are essentially journeying 
towards a single endpoint. The DOI is then a sophisticated statistical ‘navigation’ 
instrument to guide nations along a this linear and one-way path to the 
‘Information Society’.
The DOI is viewed as a particularly useful yardstick for lagging nation, because 
“developing countries are being left behind in the emerging Information Society -  
not just in basic infrastructure, but in their abilities to compete in service 
industries, experience and skilled labour” (ITU 2008, no pagination). The DOI’s 
‘objective’ statistical criteria do not just monitor but can be seen almost as an 
enforcement tool because of the individualised and consumption-orientated 
meanings embedded in very definition of ‘digital opportunity’. According to the 
DOI overview web page (ITU 2008, no pagination) in an “ideal world” digital 
opportunity means:
- the whole population having easy access to ICTs at affordable prices,
- all homes equipped with ICT devices,
- all citizens having mobile ICT devices,
- everyone using broadband.
The agenda implicit in these objectives is clearly focused on neoliberal 
development through of market-based solutions and individualized actions. This 
kind of ‘digital opportunity’ is also clearly desirable and likely to be profitable for 
corporations making equipment and providing services.
5.4.2.1 Design of the ‘Digital Opportunity 2005/2006’ map 
The ‘Digital Opportunity 2005/2006’ map is a world scale choropleth mapping of 
181 countries classified into one of eight categories (Figure 5.9 above). The 
classification of the index values range between 1 and 0  (with 1 being the ‘ideal’ 
country with complete digital opportunity) and uses an equal sized intervals. 
Countries are shaded according to their class with a subdued pink-based colour
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ramp, running from beige to dark pink-purple. There is also a special category for 
‘no data’ that shades countries grey and this seems to apply, noticeably, only to 
Western Sahara (the territories of Northern Cyprus and Puerto Rico are also in this 
category but this is only evident through close-up inspection using the zoom in the 
PDF document). The classification is denoted in a small legend left floating in the 
Pacific. The legend runs horizontally from ‘low’ to ‘high’ rather than the more 
typical vertical alignment. One could speculate whether the vertical arrangement 
was avoided because it denotes a hierarchy from ‘bad’ at the bottom to the ‘best’ 
performers at the top that connotes a value judgement from the institution behind 
the map.
The map is likely in Plate Carrée projection, with the conventional Atlantic 
centred orientation which places Western Europe in the focal point of the 
representation and splits the Pacific Ocean. This projection tends to be ‘default’ 
generated in GIS packages for world maps. (Indeed, Figure 5.9 has, subjectively, 
the feel of a GIS-generated map, being somewhat clinical in execution with overly 
detailed boundaries and distracting smattering of tiny island; it is lacks the 
subtleties and polish of a hand-finished map.) No countries are identified and no 
geographical features are labelled, the cartography is a purely functional graphic 
to display the DOI statistic. (Note, the regional-level DOI maps do label countries, 
see section 5.5.2 below.) The only prominent natural geographical feature evident 
are the large lakes which stand out from the background surround because of their 
silver-blue colouring. There is no overt cartographic paraphernalia such as a scale 
or graticule -  it is a simplified image of the world that that seems to merely denote 
the statistics, it is striving to be as conventional as possible so it artifice and 
constructed nature disappears from view. The bureaucratic origins and supposed 
mundane nature of its viewpoint is subtly reinforced by the literal small print 
running under the map which denotes explicitly in writing that the map does not 
show precisely what it does connote - that of nation state boundaries. The map, 
stamped with the UN logo clearly does signify as a powerful visual ‘endorsement’ 
and ‘acceptance’ of all the boundaries drawn in spite of the disclaimer. As such, 
the caveat is legalise and typical on the documents of such global institutions that 
connote a great deal of meaning but can not denotatively admit to it.
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The map elements themselves are floating on a empty white background and are 
surrounded by supporting graphical material that denote its origins and work 
connotatively to establish its authority as an reliable representation of the state of 
the world. Although this somewhat undermined because the title is rather 
ambiguous in itself -  what does ‘digital opportunity’ mean and what does the split 
date of ‘2005/2006’ indicate? The dual date is explained in the technical notes in 
the accompanying report that the part of the input data for the DOI comes from 
2005 and the other from 2006. Conceptually, this is a somewhat problematic issue 
that makes it hard to place the map at a definite point in time (and different from 
the temporal precision indicated on the ‘International Connectivity’ maps, Figure
5.4 above). Most statistical maps seek to denote their point of reference in time 
exactly so as not to connote uncertainty in the reader. Beside the title, the top of 
the map is stamped with four corporate logos of the institutions involved in the 
production of the index statistics and the map. These are stamps of approval from 
institutions with global credentials and connote integrity on the representation 
below. The logos are also denotative marks the ownership rights over the map 
and, by implication, the world, much like heraldic signs surrounding Renaissance 
maps denoted the patronage of the map and also connoted forcefully their power 
over the territory represented in the map. Given the internationalist agenda of 
these organisation, it is not surprising that they all have a logo premised to some 
degree on the iconicity of globe. The ITU’s logo is a state-less globe formed of 
the graticule alone, the famous UN logo shows the whole continents in unity from 
a polar projection, the MIC (Ministry of Information and Communication, Korea) 
logo has a small globe forming the dot over the ‘i’ and, lastly, KADO (Korea 
Agency for Digital Opportunity Promotion) with the most abstract globe 
symbolism hinted at through the oval swirl.
The bottom third of the whole map page is dominated by an elongated bar chart 
that runs the full width of the world and shows all 181 countries rank according to 
their DOI score. This ranking from high to low creates a very even slope from the 
best to the worst performers. The bars are colour coded to match the classification 
and shading of the map and the subtle colour ramp combined with the smoothness 
of the slope connotes a systematic, almost natural, ordering of the nations of the
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world. It would be interesting to speculate how the bar chart would connote if 
ordered differently (e.g., alphabetical order or by population) and the degree to 
which it would give a discordant impression of the world’s digital opportunity. 
The bar chart acts as a visual support, holding the world aloft (a role often taken 
by a distorted Antarctic continent in this projection) and has utility for the reader 
as a index to aid identification of countries by matching with the colour categories 
on the map. Although, the order of classes in the bar chart runs in the opposite 
direction to the small legend above it which is somewhat poorly thought through 
design. Denotatively the bar chart scale only goes up to 0.9 and not to 1.0. This is 
a somewhat sly design practice that makes the countries seem to be better 
performing that they are, and in particular it connotes positively for the top 
performers making them appear to have achieved near complete digital 
opportunity.
The final component to consider in the overall presentation of map is a text box 
running along the bottom of the page that seeks to explain, and in some senses 
justify and legitimate, the data displayed in the chart and map above. The text 
stresses, in the currently in-vogue language, that it results from an ‘open multi­
stakeholder WSIS^^ partnership’ with a list of organisational types contributing -  
governments, international agencies, corporation and civil society. (Connotatively 
one assumes the order of organisations indicates their signification in the 
partnership.) Denotatively, the tag line is stating this is not the usual ‘top-down’ 
developmentalist^^ attempt to measure the world into orderly existence but rather 
an inclusive and participatory process. However, by feeling the need to state their
WSIS acronym is not explained, it is assumed to be important and well known. It stands for 
‘World Summit on the Information Society’.
Developmentalism is a critical description of the agenda and working practices o f international 
agencies, Western governments, some large NGOs and aid charities that have become a self- 
sustaining industry with a set of top-down models o f modernisation and economic growth that get 
rolled out regardless of local contexts. It is particularly associated with one-size-fits-all structural 
adjustment and marketization policies promulgated from the air-conditioned offices o f institutions 
such as the IMF and World Bank that critics argue work to advantage of Western interests above 
improving the welfare of people in impoverished countries. Easterly (2007, I) argues that 
developmentalism operates ideologically because it “promises a comprehensive final answer to all 
of society’s problems, .... and it tolerates little dissent.”. Statistical indicators, ‘explanatory’ 
scattergrams and simple shaded maps are instrumental tools o f the intelligentsia of  
developmentalism, helping to manage the delivery o f modernisation and inevitable progress out of 
poverty.
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‘openness’ credentials explicitly, arguably, connotes the opposite view and 
making one question quite how inclusive the process actually was. The inclusion 
of the web address at the end of the text box is a denotative aid to locating further 
information, but also work connotatively as a citation for credibility -  by 
willingness to show your sources of the material represented (see also discussion 
of the techniques of virtual witnessing and constructing signs of authority in 
chapter four). Overall, many of the established techniques for connoting integrity 
and veracity of a map supposedly without a point of view are in play in the 
‘Digital Opportunity 2005/2006’ map. It is effective at connoting the impression 
of being imbiased and straightforward presentation of the world that can be 
trusted.
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Figure 5.10: The relationship between national wealth and DOI. Countries above trend line could 
been seen to be performing better than predicted for their GDP, those below the trend line could be 
said to be under performers. (Source: author scan from WISR 2007, 39.)
5.4.2.2 Patterns of Internet globalisation in the DOI map
What does the ‘Digital Opportunity 2005/2006’ map denote about the state of the 
world? The overall geographic pattern of the DOI score represented is quite 
predictable, with no real surprises about the places in world that are classed as the 
‘best’ and the clusters of nations that perform poorly at the opposite end of the
189
Chapter Five; Statistical Mapping o f Internet Globalisation
classification. The distribution is denoted clearly from dark to light shading of 
countries (connotatively from ‘healthy’ and ‘full’ to a ‘pallid and ‘empty’ 
appearance) and follows, broadly, established North -  South global divides, with 
the large Australian landmass standing out in (‘healthy’) pink as the usual odd- 
one-out in uniform pattern across the southern hemisphere nations. The 
predictability of the overall pattern, for anyone who has some sense of global 
socio-economic performance, points to the fact that the DOI is essentially a 
statistical proxy for national wealth. Despite it being a sophisticated index 
measure, combining eleven ICT variables, DOI correlates strongly against GDP 
with an unsurprisingly positive linear relationship (Figure 5.10).
As is the way with such summary statistical plots, most of the interest lies in the 
places located significant off the trend line. Some of the outliers may have 
interesting stories but they corralled into a globally applied composite index, so 
impossible to unpick the local contextual effects from the map. Much of the 
variance on this chart is not discemibly on the DOI map because the choropleth 
classification tends to mask the difference.
Besides the spatial distribution of DOI denoted on the choropleth map, the large 
accompanying bar chart allows one to see the statistical distribution of countries 
in relation to the eight categories in the classification. It is apparent that the 
chosen equal intervals applied to the indicator generates a pleasingly even 
distribution of countries. Unpicking details in the distribution pattern is perhaps 
somewhat less important than seeing the overall regularity to it -  again this has a 
sense of a ‘natural order’ about it. This is particularly so with the anodyne 
classification intervals that do not relate meaningfully to human experience, so 
there is no valuative connotative meanings from that fact that El Salvador, for 
example, is in the ‘higher’ class 0.4-0.5, than Peru, which is adjacent with a near 
identical DOI score but, in a lower class. As with these kinds of world rankings, 
most prurient interest lies in the membership of the top and bottom classes. These 
two privileged categories have slightly fewer countries than the middle classes but 
their membership is as expected. In common with many other country-based 
Internet and technology ranking schemes produced over the last decade or so, the
190
Chapter Five: Statistical Mapping of Internet Globalisation
‘best’ performing nations are always the southeast Asian and Nordic nations, and 
the ‘worst’ are, as ever, the impoverished states in central Africa. The actual 
relative ranking of countries to each other in the top and bottom classes is 
somewhat arbitrary (dependent on the particular vagaries of statistical calculation) 
and only really matters in terms of national pride and regional rivalries (e.g., the 
competition between Japan and Korea for top spot, or the enmity between Hong 
Kong and Singapore as the leading small Asian ‘tiger’ economy). The relatively 
poor performance of the USA, ranked only twentieth in terms of DOI, may 
surprise some readers unfamiliar with technology rankings but it is not out of the 
ordinary and reflects in large part the socio-economic polarisation of the country 
which tends to ‘drag’ it down such lists. There are no countries scoring at the very 
top of the DOI indicator (South Korea is ranked first with 0.80 out of a possible 
1.0 (the top two classes are not denoted on the map legend and the top class is 
missing from bar chart scales). Equally, no country scores zero, although Niger 
comes close.
In terms of the classification of countries according to their DOI score and 
subsequent representation on the map there is an unexplained issue around a 
handful of ‘problem’ nations (derogatorily labelled by commentators as ‘rogue 
states’) of Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea and Somalia. These countries do not 
have a DOI score and are not in the 181 ranked nations on the bar chart, yet from 
inspection of the map it is apparent that they have all been shading according to 
membership of the lowest class (light beige). Interestingly, they are not in the 
special ‘no data’ category but seem to occupy an unidentified position outside of 
the normal parameters of calculation. The lengthy report in which the map is 
published runs to 175 pages, including five pages of technical notes on the DOI 
calculation and data sources, makes no mention of the fate of these four countries 
in calculating DOI rankings. Connotatively, does this mean their scores were so 
low as to be too embarrassing to admit to?
An overall reading of the mapped pattern of digital opportunity in connotative 
terms is one of considerably order and harmony. Most geographically adjacent 
nations are in the same or similar classes. This fact, combined with the well
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chosen colour ramp, connotes a smooth transition from place to place across 
continents, a continuous, almost ‘natural’, spatial gradations in DOI which is 
reminiscent of the subtly changing patterns of vegetation between biomes on 
global landcover maps. (The orderliness of the geographic pattern is also 
reinforced connotatively by the almost perfectly even slope on the bar chart.) The 
‘natural’ harmony amongst nations across the map only breaks dovm slightly with 
the more disorderly patchwork of nations in central/southern Africa and a small 
portion of southeast Asia. But even here there are few sharp divides between next- 
door neighbours (i.e. differences of two classes or more) that would seriously dent 
the convergent impression. Indeed, there are no chasms of difference where 
countries in the top class border directly to nations at the bottom of the ranking, 
unlike the disruptive clashes between top and bottom denoted in the ‘International 
Connectivity’ maps. The one exception to this is the digital opportunity ‘fault 
line’ running along the DMZ on the Korean peninsula, however, this is not 
visually prominent or intrusive to an overall orderly pattern across the rest of the 
mapped world and it can be easily explained away as an aberration from an earlier 
era of geopolitics.
The overall connotative meaning emerging from the ‘Digitial Opportunity 
2005/2006’ map and bar chart is of a convergent world, with nations having much 
more in common than separating them. This notion of the world coming together 
is assisted by the faint, almost porous denotation of boundaries between countries. 
The result is an impression of large continuous blocks of the equal colour (e.g.. 
North America, Western Europe, parts of South America). The connotation is 
different to that created by the ‘International Connectivity’ maps with their 
definite black line-work imply hard boundaries between nations. The choice of 
distinct and boldly differentiated colour to denote the four classes on the 
‘International Connectivity’ map (suggesting marked difference between 
countries) also contrast with the progressive eight class colour ramp for the DOI 
map (suggesting only gradual variation between countries).
Overall, what does the DOI map reveal about the extent of digital opportunity? It 
is already extensively diffused across the world and most places are participating.
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Even though there is some uneven progress to the ideal of the Information 
Society, virtually all nations are safely on route. In terms of the fourfold 
classification of meanings, it can be argued that the DOI map connotes a powerful 
convergent message about the world.
5.4.2.3 Authorship of the ‘Digital Opportunity 2005/2006’ map 
The Digital Opportunity Index (DOI), underlying the map, is primarily a product 
of the International Telecommunication Union. The DOI was launched in May 
2006 and is intended to track progress towards bridging the digital divide and 
implementing the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS), a major UN conference held in two phases in Geneva in December 2003 
and in Tunis in November 2005. Two iterations of DOI have been published so 
far. In authorship terms the DOI was conceived by technocrats and statisticians at 
ITU headquarters in Geneva, with collaboration from the Korea Agency for 
Digital Opportunity and Promotion (KADO) and the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
The ITU is a long established although relatively little know specialised UN 
agency that facilitates global telecommunications through important but behind 
the scenes work in technical standards, setting tariffs and managing the allocation 
of radio spectrum. It has an explicit agenda seeking to promote “peaceful 
relations, international cooperation among people and economic and social 
development by means of efficient telecommunications services.” (source: 
<www.itu.int/about>). It is headquartered in Geneva, one of the favoured world 
cities for such international organisations, and draws its main funding from 
member states and large corporations. As with many such international agencies it 
espouses transparency of operations, budgets and decision-making but remains 
remote from many of the constituencies and people it notionally serves. The ITU 
has also been criticised as being part of the developmentalist industry, in league 
with the interests of large telecommunications companies to sell more equipment 
and gain preferential access to new markets, and not working in the interests of 
consumers (Jordan 1999). In operational ethos it is focused on technical solutions 
with a preponderance for opaque and officious working practices (labyrinthine
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documents, myriad committees and ‘high-leveF meetings) with little delivered 
beyond perpetuating its own existence.
A core element in how ITU the influences industry and government is through 
gathering comprehensive range of data on the worldwide status of 
telecommunications and publishing select statistical analysis from these. Like 
many UN agencies, the ITU’s published statistics enjoy significant legitimacy for 
being reliable and unbiased. They are widely utilised in studies by other 
organisations and academics as the ‘gold standard’ benchmark to measure against. 
They also have a powerful bureaucratic aura of authority because of their 
worldwide scale and year-on-year consistency. As such they are seductive in 
appearance, offering one of few means to quantitatively compare many countries 
across space and through time. Yet, like all large institutions what gets collected 
and published reflect as much the agenda of the organisation as they do the 
underlying social reality purportedly being represented (cf. Comford 1999).
The ethos at the core of ITU agenda is based on the fundamental belief in positive 
interplay between ICTs and social and economic development. This is clearly 
articulated in the following text from November, 2005: “[t]he digital revolution, 
fired by the engines of Information and Communication Technologies, has 
fundamentally changed the way people think, behave, communicate, work and 
earn their livelihood. It has forged new ways to create knowledge, educate people 
and disseminate information. It has restructured the way the world conducts 
economic and business practices, runs governments and engages politically. It has 
provided for the speedy delivery of humanitarian aid and healthcare, and a new 
vision for environmental protection. It has even created new avenues for 
entertainment and leisure” (source: <www.itu.int/wsis/basic/why.html>). Yet, 
through much of the 1980s and 1990s the development of the Internet, at the 
vanguard of the ‘digital revolution’, occurred almost completely outside the orbit 
of the ITU and its standards, statistics and committees. In danger of becoming 
irrelevant in a changing market landscape, over the last few years the ITU has 
made conscious efforts to embrace the Internet ‘revolution’ and move away from 
narrow focus on telecommunications as an industrial sector to be managed. It
194
Chapter Five: Statistical Mapping o f Internet Globalisation
wants to be seen to be representing, and setting agendas, for a much broader 
notion of the ‘Information Society'. The creation and promulgation of the DOI, 
can therefore, be seen as a component in this institutional refocusing exercise, it is 
tool not merely for measuring the information society, but an active instrument 
(including colourful world maps) that proves how seriously and proactively the 
ITU is working to bring about the ‘Information Society’.
5 A 2 A  Methodology of the ‘Digital Opportunity 2005/2006’ map 
The DOI is a complex statistical index created by aggregating eleven separate 
indicators related to measurable aspects of ICT consumption, including cost, 
household access and market penetration. Six of the eleven indicators relate to 
fixed line telecommunications and five are geared to mobile infrastructure. The
DOI documentation stresses that these eleven input indicators can be usefully
categorises into three component parts of ‘digital opportunity’. The average of the 
three components are combined with equal weights into an overall score. The 
indicators for 2006 DOI are as follows.
• Indicators that provide an opportunity for the country’s citizen to use ICTs:
• Percentage of population covered by mobile cellular telephony,
• Internet access tariffs as a percentage of per capita income,
• Mobile cellular tariffs as a percentage of per capita income.
• Indicators that represent the infrastructure needed by any country to use ICTs:
• Proportion of households with a fixed line telephone,
• Proportion of households with a computer,
• Proportion of households with Internet access at home,
• Mobile cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants,
• Mobile Internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants.
• Indicators show the extent of ICTs utilization within the country:
• Proportion of individuals that used the Internet,
• Ratio of fixed broadband subscribers to total Internet subscribers,
• Ratio of mobile broadband subscribers to total mobile subscribers.
The documentation around the DOI also continually stresses that this selection of 
indicators is ‘internationally agreed upon’, arising from consultation and
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deliberation with multiple stakeholders (WISR 2007). However, one might be 
tempted to see it more like a hotchpotch of measures that will often overlap and 
confound each other. Rather than being driven by theory on what constitutes 
‘digital opportunity’ it is arguable that expediency played the major part in what is 
included -  it can only be an indicator if it can be easily measured across the world. 
As with many of these supposedly ‘objective’ and technical rankings of what are 
complex social phenomena, the old accounting adage should be bom in mind, that 
‘they only value what is measurable instead of measuring what is valuable.’
The superficial orderly appearance of the resulting DOI classification with each 
country neatly assigned a single score and put into a class, of course, helps to 
deflect the many questions related to data validity and statistical robustness that 
could be asked of its constmction. Furthermore, each of the eleven indicators 
going into the DOI is itself a complex statistic that requires careful scmtiny, 
particularly in terms of how the multiple base data sources are gathered by 
different countries. In the 2007 World Information Society Report a table sets out 
some of the underlying intricacy of what goes into each indicator; for example for 
the ‘proportion of individuals that used the Internet’ variable: “The base year is 
2005. A growing number of countries have carried out surveys. In the absence of 
survey data, national estimates are used. If these are lacking, then estimates are 
derived from the number of subscribers” (WTSR 2007, 55). There are 181 
countries ranked in the DOI and one wonders how the validity of these variables 
stacks up across that sample size.
Given the potential influence of the DOI to act as universal benchmarking tool, it 
is not surprising that it has come in for methodological criticism, including what it 
chooses to measures and how it is put together, especially the weighting of 
indicators. In terms of the choice of what to measure Pena-Lopez (2007) asks 
‘where are the people?’ in the DOI with its focus on infrastmcture potential above 
digital literacy (the capability to exploit opportunities); 91% of the DOI is 
effectively based on infrastmcture. James (2008, 790-791) has argued that the 
choice of indicator types is ill-considered, meaning that the DOI rankings are 
“deeply flawed and potentially misleading because they confuse ends and means
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or inputs and outputs”; the result he goes onto argue “blurs rather than sharpens 
divergences between means and ends of progress towards the information 
society.”
5.5 Deconstructing area-based mapping of Internet globalisation
The ‘International Connectivity’ maps enjoyed an influential position as 
‘immutable mobiles’, securing particular connotative impressions of the 
geography of Internet globalisation in the 1990s through their superficially simple 
and clear visual narrative. It is apparent that the ITU’s ‘Digital Opportunity Index’ 
maps are quite likely to take on this role over the coming years.
However, in several respects they are both problematic and partial representations 
of world-wide network diffusion. The surface ‘truthfulness’ and authority of this 
kind statistical mapping as comprehensible representations of social phenomena is 
open to question in terms of the efficacy of cartographic design and in terms of 
political critiques of the ways they shape perception in the service of particular 
interests and agendas (cf. Crampton 2003 & 2004; Monmonier 1996). Both the 
technical weaknesses and the ideological concerns in statistical mapping typically 
remain unacknowledged by the institutions publishing them, as such an 
admission, it is feared, would undermine cartography’s authority in representing 
the world. The maps must be presented as ‘matters of fact’ that speak for 
themselves.
Many map readers approach statistical maps assuming them to be straightforward 
and essentially accurate geographical presentations of social reality. Yet, the 
degree of generalisation necessary for successful cartographic design means that 
social reality is inevitably simplified, often to a gross extent, in statistical 
mapping. This simplification is pronounced in the widely-used choropleth 
approach and it is all too easy to draw naive and unsound conclusions as to the 
actual spatial distribution of the phenomena being represented from an orderly- 
looking world map. Therefore, in critiquing the representational effectiveness of
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the ‘International Connectivity’ and DOI maps, I seek to highlight the practical 
and political degrees to which they grant partial views of Internet globalisation.
In this section I discuss the key methodological problems, common to all 
choropleth mapping, and draw out the resulting political implications relevant to 
the ‘International Connectivity’ and DOI maps. These problems concern: the 
choice of scale of presentation and the design of the zones for aggregation; the 
invisibility of small areas and the denial of temporality; the nature of the 
classification scheme applied to the zones, and the resulting issues of ecological 
fallacy and grouping bias.
5.5.1 Zoning scheme design
The size of the zones in choropleth maps has a direct impact on the level of 
generalisation of the social phenomena being mapped. Larger zones average over 
more people to give a much less detailed presentation of the population. The 
definition of the boundaries for areal zones can also have significant impacts on 
the nature of the representation; perhaps most evident in terms of gerrymandering 
possibilities in drawing up electoral constituencies (cf. Johnston 2002; 
Monmonier 2001). Often people producing choropleth maps - using secondary 
data from the census, for example - are constrained to use a predefined set of 
zones in which the data has been published. For many social phenomena this is 
problematic as the zone definitions are arbitrary, not having been drawn up to take 
account of the ‘real’ distribution of the social phenomena; as Crampton (2004, 47) 
puts it: “Where human life is lived continuously, the map (especially the 
choropleth) chops up and divides.” The possible ways the ‘chopping’ can be done 
are manifold - as Openshaw (1984) and others have demonstrated under the rubric 
of modifiable area unit problems (MAUP) - it also ineluctably has political 
ramifications because they alter the denotative visual properties of the map in 
favour of certain interests. In essence, zoning decisions can work connotatively to 
increase the perception of social difference or help to mask the extent of 
inequalities.
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In the case of the ‘International Connectivity’ and DOI maps, the zoning scheme 
is the national state, as defined by the international standard IS03166. Clearly, 
this is the most obvious scheme for world-scale statistical mapping. Indeed, world 
maps using countries as graphical containers for statistical data are so common 
and conventional that they are easily perceived as the ‘natural’ way of seeing the 
world, especially in atlases^ \  Yet, at the world scale, how efficient, let alone 
‘accurate’, is it to aggregate 6.4 billion people into 192 pre-given country units - 
units that have been drawn-up arbitrarily in many cases? Many national borders 
are maliciously arbitrary in relation to the underlying social reality (the infamous 
colonial ‘cartographic’ partitioning of Africa being the archetypal case). The 
result is a set of mapping units with a huge range in terms of land surface and 
population size. Countries as units of analysis and mapping are a highly political 
metageography (Lewis and Wigen 1997). The definition of countries as stable, 
unitary objects, as we see them neatly drawn on world maps, masks contentious 
processes of territorial formation and ongoing maintenance - including some of 
the most bitter, bloody contemporary conflicts (e.g., the Balkans, Israel-Palestine, 
Kashmir). Notwithstanding this, countries as units of analysis are undeniably 
convenient analogues because, firstly, of their engrained familiarity with map 
readers and, secondly, their effectiveness for delineating the distribution of nation­
state power as it currently operates (which remains pivotal for understanding 
many global socio-economic processes). And, of course, cartographic knowledge 
has played, and continues to play, a significant role in the creation of the nation­
states they supposedly only represent (see Anderson 1991; Biggs 1999; Vujakovic 
1995 and 1999b).
The question then, is how effective and appropriate are countries as units of 
analysis for describing Internet globalisation? In many respects it seems illogical 
to create maps that demarcate the Internet into the arbitrary territorial jigsaw 
pieces of nation-states. After all, the network technologies of the Internet are
Although, this dominance is being partially usurped by the growing use o f ‘earth from space’ 
satellite imagery which often do not show nation states. This is exemplified by Google Earth 
which, in its default setting, presents a ‘natural’ looking world free o f geopolitical boundaries.
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creating new online space and virtual groups that, according to some 
commentators, subvert the primacy of nation states and their boundaries. Border 
lines are less meaningful in the era of the ‘death of distance’ (Caimcross 1997), so 
the argument goes^ .^ The use of countries in mapping the Internet is not only 
idiosyncratic; it has the visual effect of granting undue territorial authority over 
the ‘space of flows’. Choropleth mapping ‘chops’ up what should be viewed as a 
continuous network flows linking people together into rhizomatic structures that 
cut across political frontiers. “The tracing of political borders in these maps of 
putatively virtual domains”, Harpold (1999, 15, original emphasis) argues, 
“naturalizes specific relations between nation-state and network identities — and, 
as a result, obscures the global political forms o f the Internet with a mosaic o f  
individual national forms!' These maps, like much of statistical cartography, work 
to constrain the inherent disorderliness of the social worlds and reinforcing 
uniformity of the status quo. As such, their connotations of little difference and 
low complexity mean they are positioned in the convergent quadrant in the 
fourfold conception (Figure 5.2 above)
Despite disputing the ‘end of geography’ thesis, I would nonetheless agree with 
Harpold that there is a need to loosen the metageographical shackles of the nation­
state as a unit of analysis in the Internet and try to show some of the more local, 
contingent forces that affect the patterning of digital access and use by different 
people. Concurring with Harpold (1999, 18), I would argue that progressive 
analysis of the Internet “must look beyond the limited (and limiting) visual 
vocabularies of national-political identity, and base its investigations on new 
schemes for representing the archipelagic landscapes of the emerging political and 
technological world orders”. Some interesting points of exploration in terms of 
cartographic design include the use of dot mapping showing the distribution of 
data at sub-national level, a chorochromatic thematic map which at world scale 
would represented data without boundaries (see Figure 5.19 below for partial
This rhetoric proclaiming the decline of nation state power, in face of technological change, can 
be traced back, at least, to the telegraph era and the utopian hopes spurred by wiring continents 
with undersea cables (cf. Standage 1998).
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example of this), and also flow mapping that represents data as point-to-point 
transfers (as done by Board et al (1970) for South African telecommunications 
flows, see Figure 3.3 in chapter three). The pragmatics of making such alternative 
representations for the whole world are significant, as the necessary data are 
simply not available at this scale.
The counter-argument is that the notion of the fading away of nation-state power 
has been overplayed in much of the globalisation talk on deterritorialisation. The 
transcendence rhetoric surrounding telecommunications and computer 
networking, especially redolent in the ‘dotcom’ boom in the late 1990s, has been 
exposed as essentially hollow. The nation-state has been, and will likely remain, 
crucially important in the determination of people’s actual experience of the 
Internet (setting legal parameters, regulatory structures, taxation, censorship, and 
so on; see Everard 2000; Jordan 1999, for cogent analysis). Most of the Internet, 
in terms of transmission infrastructures as well as content and services, is 
produced by large companies, and as Morgan (2004, 14) tellingly notes: “Contrary 
to fashionable notions of ‘techno-globalism’ and ‘borderless worlds’ the national 
environment remains a highly significant operating milieu for firms, even for so- 
called multinational firms.” Moreover, many global firms are beneficiaries (and 
thus supporters) of current nation state based metageography of consumer 
modernity - for example, exploiting differential regulatory systems in production 
and segmenting markets in profitable ways. Consequently, it can be argued that, in 
many respects, the most appropriate way to analyse and visualise the global 
geography of connectivity is in the form of country-based units, as Landweber did 
through the start of the 1990s and that the ITU continues to do for ‘digital 
opportunity’ today.
In many respects, Landweber’s and ITU’s choice of units of analysis was down to 
map-making expediency; as Vujakovic (1999a) notes, in relation to maps 
produced in the news media, one should be alert to the dangers of looking for 
‘hidden agendas’ for what are in actuality pragmatic decisions made under 
resource and time constraints. Moreover, in terms of the practicability of the 
‘International Connectivity’ and DOI maps, country boundaries are undoubtedly
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convenient for many readers because they render abstract notions of ‘internet’ and 
‘information society’ into easily understandable visual forms (at least for majority 
who are acquainted with the cartographic conventions of thematic maps). This 
factor above all was particularly important at the beginning of the 1990s when the 
prospect of global networking was strange and unfamiliar to most people and, 
arguably, remains so for institutions like the ITU that seek to influence 
mainstream discourses around appropriate development policies that require 
conventional representations.
5.5.2 Hiding small places and silencing temporal variability 
The use of a map projection based on geographic area to represent statistical data 
at the global scale inevitably creates a distortion that visually favours territorially 
large countries and renders small, but populous, nations effectively invisible. 
Much of the ‘data-ink’ on statistical maps is, therefore, wasted in showing land 
where few people live. This technical weakness has obvious political 
repercussions in trying to understand the social processes taking place. This 
problem is a taken-for-granted, largely irresolvable artefact of world scale 
mapping and usually ignored. However, it has been purposefully highlighted by a 
number of socially-conscious cartographers and geographers, leading some to 
advocate counter-mappings based on cartograms (e.g., Dorling 1998; Vujakovic 
1989; see section 5.7 below for further discussion and analysis of several apposite 
examples). On the ‘International Connectivity’ world maps, a number of countries 
are simply not drawn at the given scale and pixel resolution of the image. Many 
islands are indiscernible, including much of the Caribbean. A number of city- 
states, including the Asian technology ‘hotspots’ Hong Kong and Singapore, have 
such small geographic footprints that they do a cartographic ‘disappearing trick’. 
Yet, these places are not unimportant in understanding Internet globalisation - 
several Caribbean nations, for example, have become important nodes in e- 
commerce and online gambling because of their offshore status (see Wilson 
2003). This is ironic, as many of these nations are consciously trying to exploit the 
Internet to project a global image and overcome the inherent limits due to their 
small territorial size (see Brunn and Cottle 1997). The result, then, is a capricious
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map of Internet globalisation that excludes significant countries from 
consideration on the sole criterion of their land surface.
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Figure 5.11: A subset image of the Americas regional DOI 2006 map showing the use of circle 
symbols as artificial graphic enhancement for small nations. (Soiuce: author screenshot from 
original map, W1SR2007, 158.)
The DOI maps perform somewhat better than the ‘International Connectivity’ 
maps in representing nations with small territorial extents. This is achieved, in 
part, technically through the media of map distribution (vector graphics in PDF 
allow readers to zoom to see greater detail) and through the application of design 
device of circle symbols as surrogates for otherwise invisible countries (Figure 
5.11). These circles are relatively effective denotatively but inelegant 
connotatively as it tends to mark out these place as somehow unusual. 
Furthermore, the provision of regional breakdowns (for Africa, Americas, Asia- 
Pacific, Europe) in the WSIS report and on the DOI website allows for larger 
maps that show more detail (these maps are also labelled to highlight countries, as 
can also be seen in Figure 5.11). More radical alternative methods of displaying 
classified data that denote small areas are possible, such as projecting the data into 
three-dimensions (an example of which is examined below, see section 5.6.1) but 
these are often unsatisfactory compromises.
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Statistical maps like the ‘International Connectivity’ and DOI examples also 
necessarily distort dynamic processes by arbitrarily freezing them at a single point 
in time. The processes of Internet globalisation are shown fixed in time - credited 
to the actual day of publication in Landweber’s case - with no way to convey the 
underlying temporal dynamics of the diffusion of connectivity, such as the 
sequencing or rate of change. The denial of temporality in conventional 
cartography is only partially solved by the use of a series of surveys and maps that 
build up over time (an example of this approach is deployed by Batty and Barr 
1994, in their analysis of Internet diffusion where they present readers with a 
Tuff e-style ‘small multiples’ set of five choropleth world maps from 1991-1994; 
reproduced in appendix two. Figure A2.10). However, the periodicity of 
compilation and publishing of statistical maps rarely have any meaningful relation 
to the temporality of the social phenomena being represented (it is commonly just 
a function of administrative convenience, e.g., the decennial cycle of censuses). 
Consequently, the handling of the temporality of events in thematic cartography 
remains a largely unresolved problem^^. Even animation and interactively offered, 
for example, via online mapping toolboxes like GapMinder 
(<www.gapminder.org>) can not overcome the episodic nature of the collection 
and publication of most global scale socio-economic datasets This failure has 
ideological implications, as the inability to represent dynamic phenomena over 
space and through time means much of the subtlety of social life is simply 
unmappable (Dorling 1998).
5.5.3 Implications o f classification
The final - and most significant - methodological problem with statistical maps 
concerns the process of data classification. The selection of the number of classes, 
and their intervals, for grouping data on choropleth maps is crucially important in 
denotative term to the appearance of spatial patterns and, thus, the connotative
Developments in map animation and multimedia, and more recently in geovisualisation 
environments, are opening up interactive avenues for mapping phenomena spatio-temporally (see 
Cartwright et al. 1999; Harrower and Fabrikant 2008; MacEachren and Kraak 2001), but have not 
yet delivered any generally applicable solutions.
204
Chapter Five: Statistical Mapping of Internet Globalisation
impressions that readers receive on the phenomena being represented. Producing 
practicable and meaningful classifications is a real challenge, as a balance must be 
struck each time a choropleth map is made, since, “[r]educing the number of 
classes achieves simplification at the expense of loss of useful detail, especially 
local contrasts” (Evans 1977, 99). In the days of manual cartography, 
cartographers typically used a small number of classes as a matter of convenience 
rather than because of any deeper philosophical or perceptual concerns. In recent 
decades, there has been considerable investigation by cartographic scholars into 
the specification of ‘optimal’ classification schemes from both the statistical point 
of view (e.g., Jenks and Caspall 1971; Evans 1977) and from the perspectives of 
aesthetics and map usability (e.g., MacEachren 1982; Slocum and Egbert 1993). 
Computer mapping and GIS has made it much easier to experiment with different 
classification schemes for a given data set, but have given little help to users in 
choosing a workable one; and Jenks and Caspall’s (1971, 221) perceptive 
comment still holds true: “[w]e are certain, however, that many maps result from 
an almost accidental setting of class limits”. This is significant because the use of 
an inappropriate classification scheme can, at a stroke, render a choropleth map 
unworkable.
However, beyond technical concerns on performance, it is clear that the nature of 
the classification scheme in statistical mapping has political ramifications because 
of the connotations that readers may draw about the underlying social reality 
denotatively being ‘accurately’ represented. The design of the classification, either 
deliberately or unintentionally, serves a purpose in highlighting the ‘right’ spatial 
pattern for the map-maker’s agenda. Active manipulation of classifications, as 
Monmonier (1996) has demonstrated, opens up a rich array of ways to ‘lie with 
maps’.
The level of simplification implied in fourfold classification on the ‘International 
Connectivity’ maps, for example, as it is applied to the complexity of world-wide 
patterns of Internet diffusion, is problematic. The distinction between the four 
classes in the map is important, and corresponds roughly to the increasing 
sophistication of services possible, the persistence of the connection, the
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bandwidth of links, and also the likely cost. Only full internet connectivity 
allowed interactive services, including telnet and ftp, that require persistent 
synchronous links. In a sense, the middle two classes are intermediary levels of 
sophistication in terms of possible services. ‘Bitnet’ and ‘EMail only’ 
connectivity only supported asynchronous interaction and did not provide 
persistent connectivity. ‘Bitnet’ was a formally constituted network, with fulltime 
operational managers and users had to pay for access^'' (cf. Kellerman 1986). In 
contrast, the ‘EMail only’ type networks of Fidonet and UUCP^^ were informal 
(low cost/no cost) networks relying on volunteers to operate nodes for ‘store and 
forward’ email transmission (cf. Bush 1993). (The issue of classificatory collapse 
of reality, is even more problematic on the adapted version of the ‘International 
Connectivity’ map used in Castells’ book (Figure 5.7 above) conflates the middle 
two classes into one.) The bottom class of ‘No Connectivity’ seems quite 
straightforward, although this will also have included ‘no data’ countries - the 
maxim, ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’, always needs to be 
borne in mind when reading statistical maps. (This issue reappears in a similar 
vein with the ambiguous classificatory status of the ‘rogue states’ of Afghanistan, 
Iraq, North Korea and Somalia in the DOI map.)
The DOI is a much more sophisticated measurement of ‘reality’ and has 
categories (and the bar chart under the map allows alert readers to see the 
distribution of countries in the classes). Yet there are deeper conceptual problems 
with the DOI and similar kinds of indexes. One can argue that they are less 
meaningful, in important commonsense terms, than simple measures because their 
classification have no direct, intuitive relation to the real-world they purport to 
represent. (In this sense the four levels of the ‘International Connectivity’, whilst a 
gross simplification, are at least more intuitively meaningful than the DOI.) The 
composite nature of the DOI, made up of eleven different indicators, means that
Bitnet had ‘gateway’ connections to the Internet to enable exchange o f email. However, it was 
distinct from the Internet as it did not use the TCP/IP protocol for data transmission.
For half of the maps - versions 6 to 11 - the ‘E M a i l  O n l y ’ category was expanded to 
encompass OSI networks in addition to UUCP and Fidonet. Reproduced in appendix two, Figure 
A2.2. See Salus 1995 for discussion of significance o f the OSI challenge to TCP/IP in the early 
1990s.
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overall score for each country does not stand for anything specific or tangible, it is 
just a number representing ‘digital opportunity’. Yet no one know what this is, as 
it does not exist -  it is a statistical construct. Furthermore, this DOI construct is 
literally ‘made-up’ and varies from place to place, so a similar DOI score in two 
countries does not mean they have comparable social and technological 
characteristics. This is counter intuitive in many respects. The classification of 
DOI into ten equal classes also has no inherent real-world meaning (what is the 
real difference between a score in the range of 0.4-0.5 and one in 0.5-0.6?). In this 
fashion, the DOI is a statistical ‘black-box’, which readers must take on faith to it 
represents some aspect of reality. However, in important ways, I would argue, the 
map has no relation to the world it represents, it merely reifies the DOI score as a 
reality. Much the same kinds of criticism were levelled at sophisticated factor 
analysis in the 1970s that produced statistical values that were not intuitively 
meaningfully to social experience; and some argue this applies today with 
evermore sophisticated deprivation models and geodemographic profiles (cf. 
Burrows and Gane 2006; Curry 1997).
Additionally, the process of data classification in statistical mapping usually 
implies, either explicitly or implicitly, a ranking of areas. When people are being 
represented on maps, the visual ranking has social meanings, with the map-maker 
exercising disciplinary power to produce an ordering of areas (and thus people) 
from ‘good’ to ‘bad’ or sorting out the ‘successful’ from the ‘failures’, according 
to particular criteria. Depending on the interests served, statistical maps can be 
deployed as instrumental tools of discrimination, operating as elements in larger 
systems of modem govemmentality (Harley 1988a; Crampton 2004); for example 
in much ‘top-down’ analysis of poverty, choropleth type maps are used as a visual 
instmment for identifying areas suffering ‘problems’ - and implicitly the 
‘problem’ people who need help - and enabling the spatial targeting of ‘solutions’ 
(cf. Yapa 1992). The judicious manipulation of data classification means it is 
possible to produce the ‘right’ ranking to identify the desired type of areas (and 
people) to target. The issue of power over people created through social order and 
instmmental targeting is at the heart of ‘Ground Tmth’ critique of GIS and 
geodemographics (Curry 1997; Goss 1995; Pickles 1995).
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In the cases of the ‘International Connectivity’ and DOI maps, the ranking serves 
the purpose of expounding a normative ranking of technological prowess. It has 
an explicit political ordering of countries based on their ‘worth’ to the so-called 
information society. For the ‘International Connectivity’ maps it runs from Good 
(‘Internet’) to Getting there (‘Bitnet but not Internet’) to Unacceptable (‘EMail 
only’) and bottom of the list, are the Failures (‘No Connectivity). This last group 
of excluded nations are ripe for ‘targeting’ with (Western) networking know-how 
to ‘solve’ their problem of underdevelopment. With the DOI map countries 
become progressive more ‘healthier’ coloured, connotatively, the higher you 
climb up the ‘ladder of progress’ to the ideal state 1.0, complete ‘digital 
opportunity’. Most of the rich world is already comfortably (‘naturally’) classed 
atop the ‘International Connectivity’ ranking and ‘in the pink’ with a high DOI 
score, and with each passing map, it is possible to see how well the other 
straggling nations are doing to ‘improve themselves’ and climb their way up the 
list. Such quantifying and ranking approaches can be seen as indicative of 
developmentalist view of inequality that locates the ‘problem’ solely within the 
boundary of the impoverished countries and exhorts them to follow set pathway 
out of poverty. For example, Yapa (1992, 507) in his critique of the pernicious use 
of maps of GNP as unproblematic ‘facts’ about the worldwide distribution of 
poverty notes; “[w]hat do we really communicate when we use this map?: that it 
is reasonable to compare whole nations to each other according to the exchange 
value of commodities; that developed countries are advanced because they have a 
higher GNP per capita; that underdeveloped countries need to expand their GNP 
rapidly if they hope to solve the problems of hunger and poverty, and catch up 
with the rest of the advanced world. But growth in GNP has no necessary relation 
to the eradication of hunger.”
The connotative impact of the ranking of areas is frequently enhanced on 
choropleth mapping through the particular choice of colours and shadings and 
their sequence. Understanding colour perception related to the visual classification 
of areas on choropleth maps combine aspects of psychological comprehension, 
physiological processing and subjective interpretation in complex ways. The
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meanings taken up by readers are unstable and perhaps inconsistent (Dent 1995, 
295). Although Keates (1996, 234) argues that colour in this context works in a 
“fundamentally metaphorical” way, where “fully saturated and dark is equivalent 
to either more of, or more important than; and less saturated and lighter is 
equivalent to either less of, or less important than.” So where the choropleth map 
colours sequence run from dark to light colour, it can be argued, that the dark 
colours and heavy shadings reinforce notions that these are the ‘darkest’ areas, 
with shadowy people and endemic failure - what Cosgrove (2003, 134) calls 
“cartographic gloom” - while light colours give off the impression of progress, 
success and the ‘light of reason’. Charles Booth’s poverty map of London is a 
‘classic’ in this regard. The streets at the bottom of his ranking, ‘lowest class, 
vicious, semi-criminal’, are shaded black, while the top category, the ‘upper- 
middle and upper classes, wealthy’, are coloured a light golden yellow.
It is interesting, however, that on the ‘International Connectivity’ and DOI maps 
the choice of colours are in reverse of this, with the darkest hues, being applied to 
the top category and the lightest colour to lowest category. The eight stage colour 
ramp on the DOI map, in particular, is open to connotative interpretation running 
as it does from light beige up to dark purple. One could argue that the saturated 
purple gives the impression of solidity, surety and, perhaps, superiority of 
Western Europe / North America in ‘digital opportunity’, in marked contrast to 
the pale and anaemic colours used to portray many nations at the bottom end of 
the ranking. Purple has historical connotations with royalty and richness (Dent 
1995, 295). Many of these low scoring (under performing) countries lie in the 
global South, which in the Western imagination are stereotypically seen as 
poverty stricken places that are arid and dun-brown. In some senses, then, the DOI 
map resonates with Vujakovic’s (2002b, 372) observation that the choice of 
colour can often “play on culturally embedded connotations; for instance, maps of 
the British empire were traditionally coloured pale red/pink, with connotations of 
‘health/vigour’.”
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5.5.4 Ecological fallacy and grouping bias
In addition to the issue of ranking, there are two more fundamental problems 
associated with the imposition of a constricting classification scheme on data in 
choropleth mapping. While classification is useful (often vital) to denote complex 
patterns of variability in a clearer fashion, and thus more easily comprehended, it 
also induces the problems of grouping bias and ecological fallacy. These are 
visual-cognitive effects on the map reader which work to diminish the apparent 
difference between areas and overstate the level of homogeneity within areas. 
These problems are not tractable from a map efficiency point of view, but must be 
embraced to begin to comprehend the ideological implications of statistical 
mapping. The later ‘International Connectivity’ maps and DOI map are an 
apposite example of both problems and create convergent connotations by 
reducing the apparent complexity of the pattern of Internet globalisation and the 
extent to which difference between nations is visible.
The ecological fallacy as a general statistical problem occurs when a relationship 
observed at one scale of aggregation is assumed to hold true when looking at a 
more detailed scale, without proof or testing. More specifically, in the case of 
statistical maps of social phenomena, it is the ‘natural’ tendency, in graphical 
connotations, to assume that the residents in an area match the average conditions 
of the area as indicated through the uniform shading on the map. This notion is 
commonly expounded in media reporting on social issues such as crime, health, 
and education (cf. Vujakovic 1998). This is problematic when demeaning social 
stereotyping based on the area’s characteristics come to taint individual lives.
In the case of the ‘International Connectivity’ and DOI maps, each country is 
assigned to one class and wholly shaded accordingly. The result is an easily- 
conferred visual impression that every location within the country has equivalent 
levels of network connectivity or digital opportunity and all citizens enjoy 
comparable access, which is clearly not the case. Uniformity in the shading of 
spaces on the map is all too easily connoted into uniformity of places on the
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ground^^. Therefore, the ideology of ecological fallacy in these maps instinctively 
promotes an artificial sense of homogeneity, masking socially-significant 
variation and inequality within countries. This denial of differences in terms of 
reader connotations, one might argue, serves the interests of diffusionists because 
the results is a more orderly and convergent representation of social reality.
The reality of network access is far from uniform, particularly so in the early 
1990s as many empirical studies have demonstrated (e.g.. Miller and Slater 2000; 
Press 2000; Warf 2001). The effect of the ecological fallacy in the ‘International 
Connectivity’ and DOI maps are most evident, and significant, in the poorest 
places. In many least developed countries (LDCs), international network 
connectivity, especially in the early 1990s when Landweber created his maps, was 
likely to be very restricted, available only at certain elite institutions in primary 
urban centres. As Holdemess (1998, 40) pointedly comments: “[tjhere may be a 
full Internet connection at the university in Ulan Bator, but ten kilometres away 
there are no telephones.” Despite very rapid growth in mobile phone use, 
significant basic access inequality issues remain in many LDCs today, which 
Castells (1998, 82) memorably characterised for Africa as “technological 
apartheid”.
The ecological fallacy also has insidious effects for rich nations, imposing 
unrealistic visual homogeneity. In well-‘wired’ nations, including the U.S. and 
Britain, there were significant variations in take-up at in different regions 
throughout the 1990s^  ^ (e.g., see NTIA 1995; Office of e-Envoy 2002), often the 
focus for ‘digital divide’ policy initiatives. Although these differences in basic 
Internet access have closed markedly since the last ‘International Connectivity’
I would argue this is exacerbated because areal units in choropleth maps are drawn for 
simplicity, using a so-called ‘space-filling’ approach - that is, no part of the territory can be left 
blank as unclassified. This contrasts with dasymetric approaches, described in section 5.6.3 below, 
which fades sparsely populated regions and greys out uninhabited area. Although, it acknowledged 
that the dasymetric is not a panacea for all problems of ecological fallacy; they are still scale 
dependent, so on world maps do not distinguish at the local level (Vujakovic, notes on thesis draft, 
October 2006).
There are, o f course, also inequalities along other important social dimensions such as age, 
gender, class and race (cf. Shade 2003; Warf 2001).
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map was drawn in 1997, socio-spatial differentials in networking capability are 
being replicated, in a quite similar fashion to the early 1990s, with the deployment 
of newer (faster, and more flexible) technologies like fibre-to-the-home and 
municipal public wi-fi coverage (Townsend 2003). So ‘digital opportunities’ are 
not evenly distributed, socially or geographically, with in developed nations but 
the connotation arising from ecological bias is that everywhere is uniformly ‘in 
the pink’.
Due to the nature of the choropleth mapping, with its inherent visual dominance 
by geographically extensive areas, the ecological fallacy also contains an in-built 
rural-urban bias. As the average rate, determined predominantly by densely 
populated urban areas, must be ‘painted’ across the whole country, this can mean 
a significant overestimate of networking potential of rural areas. This is certainly 
the case with the ‘International Connectivity’ maps (extreme cases, in Figure 5.4, 
being Russia, Canada and Australia). Whilst network access has diffused to many 
rural areas over the last decade, the economic reality is that Internet production, 
despite the ‘spaceless’ rhetoric, is to a large extent an urban phenomenon, 
dominated by hubs in a few large cities^^. Is it likely that ‘digital opportunity’ is 
the same across the whole of Brazil or China as it connotes to be or concentrated 
in a few major cities, mostly along the coast.
The second cartographic ‘error’, with political ramifications, caused by 
classification in statistical mapping is grouping bias, which is the prejudicial 
contraction of the differences between units of enumeration. Because of the 
limited number of categories, coupled to the selection of their class limits, it is 
often the case that really quite dissimilar countries end up being assigned, and 
visually labelled, to the same group. In conventional choropleth maps there is no 
scope for ambiguity or fuzziness, each zone must be classified completely - it can 
only exist in a single group. In the case of the ‘International Connectivity’ maps.
According to Zook’s (2005) empirical analysis o f January 2002 data, the top 100 cities across 
the world, with only six percent of the global population, contained fifty percent of the Internet 
domain names.
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all the diverse countries of the world have to fit into just four groups. The lack of 
discrimination in the top Internet class is especially problematic. Only a minority 
of countries shaded Internet purple actually had comparable nation-wide 
infrastructures to support genuinely comprehensive network access, especially so 
in the first ‘International Connectivity’ map from 1991 (Figure 5.4 above). The 
amount of international network connectivity could vary from a single (expensive, 
low bandwidth) satellite link in the capital city along a spectrum of capacity, up to 
countries with dense networks of high-capacity fibre-optic cables linking many 
parts of the country to the Internet. For example, on the 1991 map, the three 
nations that constitute North America are all shaded purple, denoting they are in 
the same group because they all have Internet connectivity, yet it is an 
inappropriate connotation if readers believe that Mexico’s Internet capability was 
in any way equivalent to that in the USA and Canada at that time.
In the final ‘International Connectivity’ map produced by Landweber in June, 
1997, a large proportion of the nations are classified as having full Internet 
connectivity. “Almost the whole world, it seems from a casual inspection of this 
map, has turned Internet-coloured” Holdemess (1998, 39) sardonically 
commented^^. Yet, this connotation of Internet hegemony through graphic 
homogeneity is map fiction. Despite their belonging to the same category, 
Petrazzini and Kibati (1999) demonstrate that the USA, Argentina and Kenya, for 
example, have fundamentally different Internet statuses, noting that end-user 
access costs (adjusted for purchasing power) were nine-times higher in Argentina 
than the U.S., and 413 times more expensive in Kenya. It is not just in the 
consumption of the Internet that inequalities are masked: arguably even wider and 
politically more significant variations are hidden in terms of Internet production 
(again, demonstrated by Zook’s (2005) analysis of the geography of the Internet 
industry). The result, then, for an unwary reader of the ‘International 
Connectivity’ maps, is that countries coloured the same are easily assumed to
Interestingly, he went on to construct his own version o f the ‘International Connectivity’ map, 
which tried to remove some o f the grossest distortions of the ecological fallacy and grouping bias, 
effectively by using dasymetric mapping techniques (discussed in section 5.6.3 below).
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have equivalent levels of connectivity in reality. Reducing the connotations of 
difference between neighbours and across continents is powerfully convergent.
Grouping bias still applies for the DOI map as 181 different countries must be 
grouped into eight classes^^. Although the extent of grouping bias is lessened 
somewhat as there are twice as many categories than in the ‘International 
Connectivity’ maps and the ranking of countries by their DOI score on the bar 
chart under the maps provides useful information on the class distribution and the 
degree of variance in their score. A much more radical representational strategy to 
overcome grouping bias would be classless choropleth techniques (cf. Peterson 
1979; Tobler 1973), where all countries are uniquely shaded. Such mapping is 
now easily produce by mapping software and studies show readers can interpret 
them, but not widely seen as too unconventional and the resultant patterns are too 
complex.
In combination, then, the ecological fallacy and grouping bias result in the 
graphical imposition of homogeneity, diminishing diversity and the erosion of 
difference between places. The deeper question, then, is who benefits from the 
cartographic concealment of true inequality in the distribution of networking 
across the world in the 1990s? Making the situation look much better than the 
underlying social reality supports the ‘diffusionist’ viewpoint.
5.6 Design extensions to area-based mapping of Internet globalisation
There are various design options that can be applied to represent area-based 
statistical data to overcome some the methodological issues with conventional 
choropleth maps. While these can generate different denotative meanings about 
statistics of Internet globalisation, it is not always so easy to change the 
connotative impressions of the mapped world. In this section consideration is 
given to three extensions that have been used to represent Internet globalisation 
differently from standard choropleth mapping: pseudo three-dimensional stepped 
surface mapping, hybrid diagram mapping, and, lastly, dasymetric mapping.
Plus the two special classes for ‘no data’ and for the ‘rogue states’.
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5.6.1 Stepped surface mapping o f Internet globalisation
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Figure 5.12: The ‘Bit Map’, a pseudo three-dimensional stepped surface map representation o f the 
ITU’s Digital Access Index. (Source: Cherry 2004, 54-55.)
Projecting data into the space above the x-y plane of conventional cartography is 
one possible way to display more levels of attribute information in statistical 
maps. The use of the z-dimension for representing density values and trend 
surfaces is relatively common and now quite easily generated with GIS software 
from point sample data. It is also possible to represent area-based data 
volumetrically as a stepped surface map where height above the ground of each 
enumeration unit denotes a statistical aspect of the data. Such stepped surface 
maps have some novelty as ‘alternative’ representations and do offer the potential 
to display more of the variance within data than may be possible with shading of 
the enumeration units according to a limited classification (i.e., z-dimension is
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unclassified). However, they also suffer from problems of visual occlusion when 
presented statically on a flat sheet of paper or display screen, rather than as a fully 
three-dimension model that can be used interactively and visually interrogated 
from different angles.
The ‘Bit Map’ is an example of a pseudo three-dimensional stepped surface map 
representing national-level data related to Internet globalisation (Figure 5.12). It 
was published on a double-page spread in an article entitled, ‘a world divided by a 
common Internet’ in IEEE Spectrum (flagship journal of the U.S. Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers). The accompanying text claims it “show[s] 
who’s bit-rich and who’s bit-poor, and why” (Cherry 2004, 56). The data 
underlying the map was from an ITU calculated ‘digital access index’ created in 
2003, and a statistical forerunner to their DOI national ranking discussed above.
From initial inspection it is a visually intriguing representation of the world, 
however in a lot of ways it is premised on a conventional choropleth approach, 
with five colour-coded classes with unequal intervals. All that is different is the 
countries are extruded vertically according to their index score, in addition to 
being shaded. Indeed, one can seriously question the benefits to legibility in 
employing the stepped surface mapping technique as the scaling factor for the 
extrusion means particularly tall counties mask other parts of the map. The 
vertical bulk of Australia blocks out much of Southeast Asia, for example, and the 
relatively well-wired South Africa obscures a good portion of central Africa. In 
denotative terms it is also difficult to compare reliably the heights of countries 
from different regions (is Brazil higher than South Africa?). Given the viewing 
angle for map, some countries also have an unfamiliar shape to them making 
identification more difficult. The one noticeable benefit of projecting up off the 
surface of the map is that territorially small nations that score highly -  and 
therefore stand tallest -  can be much more easily discerned than on a ‘flat’ 
choropleth map (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore).
Besides the denotative issues with information legibility, the ‘Bit Map’ does, 
however, connote powerfully an overall sense of the patterns of sharp divisions
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across the world. The countries in the global North metaphorically and graphically 
appears to stand over the world and dominate the map. This is enhanced for some 
coimtries because of the viewing angle at which the map is drawn. The overall 
tilting of the map diminishes the apparent size of the nations in the southern 
hemisphere. The bottom scoring - denotatively lower - countries are all found 
across the middle of the continent of Africa. Statistical ‘cliffs’ seem to rear up to 
separate the ‘mountainous’ networked core of Europe from the flat under-wired 
periphery. Inequalities between some neighbouring countries appear to be sheer 
and physically insurmountable because of how they are drawn, quite a different 
connotation in comparison to how disparity between classes in a ‘flat’ choropleth 
map is read. In connotative terms the difference between high and low have clear 
social significance to readers, creating valuative connotations; Harpold (1999, 17) 
observed of such three-dimensional statistical mapping: “[a]cross its peaks and 
valleys emerges an archipelagic, virtual landmass that traverses the conventional 
boundaries of continents and nations. Viewed from on high, the vast, flat surface 
of the network’s digital plains seem far removed, alien and obscure.”
Geographically contiguous nations at the same level of distribution tend to merge 
into one another, supporting the impression of large politically unmarked terrains 
free of significant activity at lower level, and others, politically-differentiated but 
also uniformly towering over the rest of the world. (The towering nations are all 
signalled as important connotatively by the selective denotative labelling.) Yet, it 
is not just about height alone, the use of the z-dimension creates much greater 
visual differences, enhancing the presence of already territorially large countries 
that score well, by granting them voluminous amounts of space on the map 
display (e.g. Australia, the U.S./Canada are not just taller, they appear to be very 
much bigger than other nations). Along with the effect of the bright yellow colour, 
for the countries in the top category, the connotative meaning of their bulk is clear 
- bigger is better.
The selective labelling strategy highlights that this is not a map of the whole 
world as it purports to be, but actually a map of an American viewpoint on parts 
of the world that are deemed to be significant. (The top 10 countries are listed
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against only the bottom 5, for example) Many nations outside the core economies 
are left unmarked; the ‘middle’ ranked countries, of average height, are 
undifferentiated and unnamed. Special treatment is reserved for the bottom five 
countries in central Africa which are purposefully identified by text even though 
they barely register as volumes in space.
The selective labelling, combined with the widely differentiated heights applied 
across the world (rather than classifying the z-values) means that the patterns 
revealed are too complex and disorderly to connote convergence. And despite the 
muted colour ramp that hints at convergence, the connotative effects of such 
uneven heights and variations in volumes between adjacent nations and across 
continents is to imply an excess of difference in the world. As such the ‘Bit Map’ 
is firmly located in the divergent quadrant of the fourfold conceptual model of 
connotative meanings.
The ‘Bit Map’ read semiotically in its totality is also clearly projecting a 
forcefully valuative connotation, it is “intended to aid in preferential selection” 
(MacEachren 1995, 227). A more challenging way to re-map the ‘world divided 
by a common Internet’ would be to reverse the logic of the extrusion so the lower 
the statistical score, the taller the projection of the country. This would, perhaps, 
contest stereotypes by highlighting the divergent of the world seen from the 
perspective of those nations usually at the bottom of worldwide ranking schemes.
5.6.2 Hybrid diagram mapping o f Internet globalisation
Another thematic mapping method to display statistical data is using multiple 
small charts or diagrams drawn within country boundaries. The advantage is that 
the diagrams can display several different statistical values at the same time rather 
than the single value denoted through shading the enumeration unit. The notion is 
that the reader can make comparative inferences between areas according to 
multiple statistical dimensions, giving a more nuanced understand of the spatial 
distribution and the underlying social processes. Although the results are not 
necessarily effective because, as Board and Taylor 1977 31) note, attempts “to
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show both the total volume and proportional sub-divisions of a phenomenon in an 
area by complex symbols such as pie-charts sets up mutual interference or ‘visual 
jamming’ that could be severe enough to reduce the information communicated by 
both sets of information.”
4  , r  il
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Figure 5.13: The ‘Network Society Map’, published by World Link, 1997. Map research and 
conception by Nico Macdonald; cartography by Chapman Bounford. (Source: Spy Graphics, 
<www.spy.co.uk/research/worldlink/>.)
An example of diagram mapping applied to the theme of Internet globalisation is 
the ‘Network Society Map’^ \ published in 1997 by World Link magazine (Figure 
5.13; a larger version is also reproduced in appendix two, Figure A2.11.) The 
‘Network Society Map’ was originally designed to be distributed as a large poster 
(measuring 32" x 54") for “the occasion of the 1997 Annual Meeting of the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland”, according to subtitle. The overt 
business-focus of the map is denoted explicitly in the text in the ‘explanation’ 
box, the being to “show how well prepared 49 of the largest and most dynamic
Another conceptually similar but graphically more complex diagram map entitled ‘Wired 
Countries of the World’ was produced in 2007 by the World Information Access Project. It is not 
analysed here as it does not add anything substantive to the arguments but is reproduced for 
information in appendix two. Figure A2.12. This map suffers severely from what Board and 
Taylor (1977) term ‘visual jamming’.
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economies are to compete in the network society.” The map’s support for global 
capital is reinforced through its visible sponsorship by Hewlett Packard and 
Novell, two major multinational IT companies with the prominent presence of 
their logos in middle of the page. The connotations from these texts and logos 
signals the world as represented in the map is ripe for capitalist exploitation, it is a 
dehumanised view of national markets with differing opportunities for investment 
and profits.
letiwrk eMMCtraitf 
prmcipWly via P  iMenct
Macwork cMMCctiviry
letwarfc ewaeetfwty 
p rrn ci^> fii^m 9
No Mtwork c«M«eTivity
Meraet hosts PC H«etrst»os 
pwlOMoeook
Nomhof stphooehoM porlhOOpeopkper 1001 oespk
Cofltrai rumbef is the sverall ranfcin hsso^ m  * e  mXwofk society M o rs  shem  left
Figure 5.14: A subset image of the ‘Network Society Map’ showing the key showing the 
choropleth shading scheme and doughnut symbol. (Source: author scan from original.)
The map is well constructed cartographically with has production values as 
befitting its target audience; it is rather more aesthetic than purely scientific. For 
example, the design uses a graticule and shaded ocean floor terrain to frame the 
countries which creates a more realistic feel to the background, rather than the 
unadorned white frame more typical of statistical maps. All countries are 
identified and have name labels.
The map visually denotes five different statistical variables (see legend detail in 
Figure 5.14), although it is demanding to make meaningful comparative 
inferences between them and across multiple countries. At the base level, all
220
Chapter Five: Statistical Mapping of Internet Globalisation
counties are assigned into one of four classes and shaded accordingly. This 
classification is actually Landweber’s 1996 ‘International Connectivity’ survey 
(acknowledged in the notes at the bottom of the Connectivity text box). Most of 
the world is in the top class (full Internet connectivity) and shaded a warm pastel 
pink, except for the mosaic of colours across central and southern Africa 
indicating much greater difference. Doughnut-type symbols located within a 
select number of countries denote another four data variables (Figure 5.14). Three 
ICT measures, phone lines, PCs and Internet hosts per capita are denoted by 
colour coded rings and the overall network society ranking is denoted by the 
number at the centre of the doughnut. Much additional ‘technical’ data and detail 
is also presented to readers in four text boxes which work connotatively as 
credible evidence to enhance the credibility of the map itself.
The ‘Network Society Map’ is a discriminatory representation, denotative ranking 
only 49 nations, thus connotatively signally these are the nations that matter most 
in the network society. The prime focus of the map is Europe with its denotative 
enhancement through the enlargement of scale and the graphical highlighting in 
the drop shadow box. (The box connotes, perhaps, as a protective wall around 
‘fortress Europe’.) The Eurocentric connotative meaning is clear - the network 
society is principally enjoyed by markets of European nations^^. The rest of the 
world is relatively sparely covered, except for a slight cluster in Southeast Asia 
economies; large swathes of the world and hundreds of millions of people are, by 
implication, excluded from the network society. The ‘empty’ African continent 
languishes, connotatively, below spatially enhanced and graphically enclosed 
Europe, only receiving doughnut symbols at the top and tail and nothing worthy 
of network society status in between. Indeed, much of the equatorial zone of the 
world seems to be beyond the network society with no doughnut symbols found in 
the Caribbean or Central America. The large expanse of Russia (heading east 
beyond the safe confines of the European citadel) and central Asia is also a
Although even in the European heartland of the network society, there is powerful and 
judgemental selectivity on what nations matter. Many ‘emerging markets’ in the eastern half of 
Europe obviously do not quality for network society status. Russia does get targeted but all its 
former colonial territories are consciously left out.
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denotatively empty and connotatively unimportant void.
Yet as noted earlier, many of these ‘excluded’ economies in Africa, the Caribbean 
and Central America are actively involved in the production and development of 
the information economy, albeit in a different capacity to those in developed 
nations (i.e., as manual labour providing raw materials or manufacturing, low-paid 
back office function rather than high-order information processing).
The connotative power of Europe, at the centre of the network society, is assisted 
denotatively because the territorially compact countries are well filled with the 
large doughnut symbols. For other countries, with larger territorial extents, these 
symbols look much less impressive and a stuck somewhat awkwardly in the 
middle, signify a relatively empty zone of activity, with network society 
concentrated only at this one point (e.g., the USA, Canada, China). Europe also 
gains in status by the denotative North-South division in the map layout by 
placing nearly all text boxes and ancillary material in bottom of the map, 
connotatively in regions that do not matter so much to the network society, which 
is securely located in the region above.
Besides their geographical distribution, the doughnut symbols themselves are 
open to interpretation. At one level they are not effective denotatively for 
statistical comparison between countries and their interpretation is made harder as 
the three colour-coded rings have widely different scales (e.g., why does the USA 
score better than Finland?). Connotatively, they imply complexity and show 
excessive difference, with too many rings empty for countries outside the West. 
Even the emerging BRIC economies barely register any colours on their doughnut 
rings. The extent of bareness is confusing connotatively, how can they be ranked 
in the network society if they denotatively don’t have any PCs or Internet hosts? 
Also, what is the connotative meaning of the doughnut symbol design itself? It 
has a quasi-militaristic appeal of a target on a firing range. Does these signify the 
value of countries as different business ‘targets’, their worth denoted directly by 
the large number in the bull’s-eye for business in the network society. The number 
‘1’ target of USA is worth more than Indonesia at number ‘49’. No target symbol
222
Chapter Five; Statistical Mapping of Internet Globalisation
on a country connotes that it is not worth targeting by corporations.
In conclusions, the ‘Network Society Map’ leaves much of the world unmeasured 
and unmapped. The selection of criteria measured and mapped to denote 
‘preparedness’ of the countries for competition with each other are wholly 
concerned with technological superiority, with no wider social or cultural 
dimensions. A great deal of variation and inequality is evident in the ‘Network 
Society Map’, which in its desire to show technological progress and prowess, 
only targets the best 49 countries with attention. The map is a divergent view of 
the world.
5.6.3 Dasymetric-based mapping o f Internet globalisation
INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIVITY 
Modified for connection density: 1996 
Ï  Internet; D ense / sp a rse  
E  Bitnet but not Internet 
E  Email only (UUCP, FIDOnet)
I  I  No Connectivity 
□  Low population
Copyright © 1996 
Mike Holdemess with Larry Landweber 
and the Internet Society. 
Unlimited permission to copy or use 
is hereby granted subject to 
inclusion of this copyright notice.
Figure 5.15: A hand-drawn dasymetric style map of ‘International Connectivity' produced by 
Mike Holdemess. It is a consciously political ‘adjustment’ of Landweber’s original map that seeks 
to undermine the myth of rapid Internet diffusion. (Source: Holdemess’s website,
<www.poptel.org.uk/nuj/mike/cyberdiv.htm>.)
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The dasymetric technique for cartographic representation seeks to ameliorate the 
gross areal averaging inherent in choropleth maps by explicitly recognising the 
internal spatial distribution of the phenomena being represented to create a new 
set of zones to display the data. The goal is, therefore, to map the statistics, as far 
as possible, to their ‘natural’ zones rather than to arbitrary, prescribed units of 
publication (mostly based on administrative convenience). The primary 
application of the technique has been in mapping social phenomena, particularly 
population distributions. It can be argued that the dasymetric mapping methods 
give a more denotatively ‘accurate’ (i.e., spatially realistic) - and hence a more 
connotatively persuasive - visual representation. The dasymetric method can “help 
us to escape from the spatially bounded conceptions of human life produced by 
the choropleth map” (Crampton 2004, 50). Robinson (1982) traces the lineage of 
the dasymetric approach back to the 1830s, with the Harness population map of 
Ireland cited as the first published example.
Yet dasymetric mapping has been only sporadically deployed, despite its 
potentially significant benefits for mapping area-bases social statistics. This lack 
of use is because it requires considerable amounts of ancillary geospatial data^  ^
and additional cartographic processing to produce them, compared to the standard 
choropleth mapping techniques'"^. Also, like cartograms (discussed in section 5.7 
below), dasymetric maps can suffer from the ‘unfamiliarity’ problem, as new the 
boundaries generated to display the data are more complex and less uniform than 
the administrative units people are used to seeing.
Despite this lack of general use, dasymetric ideas have been applied to the 
mapping of Internet globalisation by journalist and activist, Mike Holdemess
In terms of social mapping, necessarily detailed, small-scale, data on population distributions 
have traditionally been unavailable - although technical developments in urban remote sensing and 
household level geodemographics are changing this, at least in the UK (cf. Longley and Harris 
1999). In many ways, Martin’s (1996) extensive work on surface-based population representations 
from the census provides one of the best routes to generating data needed for dasymetric mapping.
The availability of GIS, enabling greater flexibility in the manipulation and aggregation of 
spatial data, has made it potentially easier to create dasymetric maps (e.g., Mennis’ 2003, work 
using Arc View). However, as far as I am aware, no major GIS package yet provides a ‘point-and- 
click’ function to generate dasymetric maps. Indeed, the help system for the market leader, ESRI’s 
ArcGIS, contains no reference to them.
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(1998). He states he was troubled by the level of abstraction in the ‘International 
Connectivit} ' maps, bow they portrayed an unrealistic viewpoint on the extent of 
world-wide network diffusion, and decided to produce bis own approximate, 
band-drawn reconfiguration as a political counter-map (Figure 5.15; it is also 
reproduced as a full page image in appendix two. Figure A2.13). Although be 
does not recognise it as such, bis map has many elements of dasymetric design.
Holdemess’ adjusted map removes some of the most significant elements of 
distortion from the ‘International Connectivity’ map (be used the second to last 
map from 1996 as bis starting point, reproduced in appendix two, Figure A2.2) by 
fading non-metropolitan regions outside of the OECD core nations to account for 
their likely much lower ‘connection density’ and also greying out the uninhabited 
deserts and arctic tundra. Holdemess has effectively doubled the complexity of 
the classification, so as to make “a first approximation at a realistic map” 
(Holdemess 1998, 40), by introducing the notion of dense and sparsely networked 
regions (in many ways mirroring the more complex division in the original 
‘Intemational Connectivity’ data tables; see Figure 5.6 above). Although the 
representation of dense and sparse areas was acknowledged as cartographic 
guesswork on Holdemess’ part, the result is a view of the world with a very much 
more constricted degree of Intemet globalisation, and with network connectivity 
significantly more spatially concentrated, than implied by the homogenising 
cboropletb display of the last few of the ‘Intemational Connectivity’ maps. (For 
example, Russia, China and Australia seem to be much less completely networked 
in dasymetric form compared to the cboropletb representation in the ‘Intemational 
Connectivity’ map.) The rich, dark purple shading of full Intemet connectivity is 
very much more constrained to the core regions of the developed world in 
Holdemess’ presentation. It is also interesting to see that Holdemess is willing to 
create his zoning scheme by curving the boundaries of different connectivity 
levels across national borders (e.g., between the U.S. and Mexico) which is 
arguably more realistic that the complete cut-off at the frontier implied by the 
solid black lines on the ‘Intemational Connectivity’ map. In this fashion 
Holdemess is by implication breaking down the primacy of the nation state
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metageography, where countries as sovereign units must be denoted as completely 
separate and self-contained on conventional world maps.
In connotative terms Holdemess (1998, 40) says of his map, “it is not dissimilar to 
a map of per capita income - or, for that matter, one of where the white folks are”. 
The global south is clearly rendered connotatively as markedly unequal periphery 
through the use of faded colours, while the distinctive ‘spotty’ appearance 
highlights to the map reader the tight concentration of the best connectivity in 
very few principal cities (e.g., India goes from full purple in the ‘International 
Connectivity’ map to only three dark city spots). And one could argue 
denotatively that many of the spots are actually exaggerated and if drawn to scale 
would actually be dots of connectivity. In many ways then, Holdemess’ 
dasymetric mapping of the Intemet highlights effectively the extent of continuing 
unevenness in network access and the complexity of pattems within countries and 
across regions, countervailing the more harmonious picture painted in the 
‘Intemational Connectivity’ and DOI maps. As such, on the fourfold connotative 
schema for maps of Intemet globalisation, this dasymetric view of the world 
should be placed in the quadrant for map with disorderly meanings.
5.7 Cartogram-based mapping of Internet globalisation
Cartograms are a hybrid of map and diagram in which a scale manipulation of 
distance or area is deliberately employed to highlight the stmcture of the thematic 
data at the expense of geographic accuracy. The most common technique is the 
‘value-by-area’ cartogram where the units of enumeration are drawn scaled 
according the statistical data and not their customary territorial extents.
Even though there is a relatively long history of cartograms production, dating 
back to innovations in the 1860s in statistically representing data for European 
countries (see Tobler 2004 for review), they have not been commonly deployed, 
particularly compared to cboropletb maps. This is due, in part, to the fact that they 
are perceived as being more demanding to produce, and in an era of automated 
cartography, most software packages still do not provide cartogram drawing
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functions^^. When cartograms are deployed, it tends to be for consciously political 
reasons and a case is often made that they offer a more socially progressive way 
of mapping people, particularly at the global scale (Vujakovic 1989). For 
example, the political case for cartograms for radically re-presenting global social 
geography is explicit within the work of the Worldmapper project at Sheffield 
University, as they claim their eye-catching cartogram design “enables a more 
democratic representation of the population of the world, where people are treated 
as equals regardless of where they live” (Barford and Dorling 2008, 68). 
Cartograms are said to be rhetorically powerful because they eliminate the 
“fimdamental distortion of much past thematic cartography in (literally) drawing 
our attention to the pattems in places where the fewest people live” (Dorling 
1994, 85) and thus offer a connotatively ‘fairer’ scheme of visual representation, 
particularly at the world scale (e.g., small, densely populated states can be easily 
seen and sparsely populated territory shrinks). The goal in their use is, therefore, 
to stimulate new ways of thinking about social pattems represented by denoting 
them in a way that goes against convention (e.g., cartograms used in Kidron and 
Segal 1995).
The major disadvantage of cartograms is their unfamiliar denotative appearance to 
readers. Cartogram algorithms, particularly contiguous ones that attempt to 
preserve boundar>  ^ adjacency, can produce very warped country outlines, 
eliminating conventional shapes and shifting well-known landmarks, such that 
people, who have been imprinted from a lifetime’s exposure to the ‘normal’ visual 
geometry of world maps, find them confusing and difficult to read. (The extent of 
distortion to conventional shape is a very evident issue, for example, in the 
Worldmapper cartograms; selected examples shown in appendix two. Figures 
A2.15-A2.18). Such denotative unfamiliarity can, of course, be viewed as a 
connotative benefit as it can spark interest and help to challenge complacent 
viewpoints - “[t]he appeal of cartograms no doubt results from their attention- 
getting attributes” (Dent 1995, 208). However, it can also reduce the effectiveness
Various custom scripts and programs have been developed to create cartograms (e.g., Dykes’ 
(1997) ‘cdv’ system), but the extra effort required is usually not justifiable, compared to the ease 
of producing a choropleth map.
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of the map because people focus their attention more on the mapping technique 
than on the actual data being represented, thereby breaking one of Tufte’s (1983) 
maxims for good information design.
Cartograms are potentially interesting semiotically as a representational technique 
to change the conventional denotation of statistical views of the world that has 
connotative impacts beyond just ‘shocking’ the audience out of complacency -  
they can connote a uncluttered and more lucid world picture. Such a smooth, 
simpler and more straightforward appearance of nations for example, 
unencumbered by the complex twists and turns of borders and coastlines, implies 
a greater clarity of understanding of the statistical trends and highlights 
differences not noticed before. In the context of representing Intemet globalisation 
under examination here, the interesting question is whether the connotative 
meanings in cartograms suggest a more divergent pattern in comparison to the 
tendency of choropleth maps to present a convergent view of the world coming 
together.
A number of cartogram techniques have been applied by several different 
individuals and groups to represent the extent of networking across the world. It 
should be acknowledged that the distribution of most of these cartograms of 
Intemet globalisation has been limited, especially in comparison to the two main 
choropleth-based examples considered above (‘Intemational Connectivity’ and the 
DOI maps) and they should perhaps be viewed as rather experimental 
interventions into the discourses of network development. As such they have 
likely had little impact on reshaping the wider discourses about the worldwide 
extent of Intemet globalisation, but do offer altemative connotations that are 
worth considering, particularly if an organisation with influence, such as the ITU, 
were to decide to deploy cartograms rather than choropleth-based world maps in 
the future.
Distance-based cartograms using a linear scale distortion according to cost, time 
or speed of travel have been employed to show how communications connectivity 
is differentially re-scaling relationships between places, for example Arrowsmith 
and Wilson’s (1998) ‘telecom tectonic’ world maps (example reproduced in
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appendix two, Figure A2.14). Crude aesthetically, their cartograms denote the 
distance between countries in terms of the uneven costs of telecommunications, 
which they claim connote differences between cyberspace and physical, 
highlighting the “location of electronic ghettos ... of the electronic world” 
(Arrowsmith and Wilson 1998, 8) not apparent on conventional choropleth maps.
Value-by-area cartograms have also been used to show Intemet globalisation, 
including the work of the Worldmapper project, using their novel equal area 
diffusion algorithm that attempts to preserve boundary shape and adjacency of 
nations^^. The Worldmapper team are publishing online hundreds of world 
cartograms on a myriad of social, demographic and economic themes using public 
national-level statistics. They have created two cartograms of Intemet users per 
capita, for 1990 and 2002 survey points -  the results denote the northem 
hemisphere nations as greatly enlarged, connoting images of being blown up like 
balloons and the Global South shrivels almost out of existence (reproduced in 
appendix two. Figures A2.15-A2.18). Their goal is to highlight scale of inequality 
by exaggerating the connotation of divergence between regions of the world in the 
hopes of bringing about changed policies (which would ultimately bring about 
changes to the pattems denoted, making the world a more harmonious social 
space). Their 2002 cartogram poster, for example, asserts this agenda through a 
human voice in the following quote: “we strive to achieve a ‘warm-hearted digital 
world’ where everybody ... enjoys ubiquitous access to communications 
technologies for the greater good” (reproduced in appendix two. Figure A2.17). 
The denotative and connotative meanings of their cartograms can, in some senses, 
be correlated to Barford and Dorling’s (2008, 108-09) dual scientific objectives 
expressed in their work: “These cartograms are scientifically (in the natural 
science sense) [and denotatively] interesting as they result from the beauty and 
elegance of solving an algorithmic problem. These cartograms are also 
scientifically (in the social science sense) [and connotatively] interesting because 
they show how we live now -  they deliver a clear message about the current state 
of the world.”
Developed by U.S. academic physicists Michael Gastner and Mark Newman. Further details at 
<www.worldmapper.org>.
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The more easily constructed and thus more commonly drawn cartogram design is 
the non-continuous one and there are several exemplars that map data relevant to 
the theme of Intemet globalisation, including ExploMap Technologies’ cartogram 
using a relatively simple design of scaled square blocks representing the number 
of Intemet users placed directly on top of world map of country boundaries; 
Govcom.org’s ‘digital divide cartogram’ has an interesting twist in that country 
size is drawn inversely proportional to level of Intemet usage, so the nations with 
least become the most visible; and Byte Level Research’s cartogram ignores 
geopolitical boundaries by focusing on the global politics of Intemet domain 
names with nations represented solely by their country codes scaled according to 
the size of population (these three different cartograms are reproduced in appendix 
two. Figures A2.19, A2.20, A2.21)^^. Two further non-continuous cartogram 
examples will be considered in a little more depth because they have a rather more 
sophisticated design perspective and significant political agendas -  the first is 
from a U.S. technology magazine and connotes the ‘wired world’ as a set of 
business opportunities and under-developed markets, the second is a project by an 
Italian artist questioning the unequal growth in the Intemet in relation to 
population geography by exploiting the iconicity of nation-state flags.
Original pdf versions of them are currently available from:
• <w'ww.bytelevel.com/map/ccTLD.html>,
• <http://explomap.free.fr/world_map_intemet_users_2005 .pdf>,
• <www.govcom.org/maps/map_set_wsis/GC0_Maps_set_3.0_digitaldivide_invert.pdf>.
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5.7.1 ‘Wired World Atlas ’ cartogram
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Figure 5.16: The ‘Wired World Atlas’ displays national-level statistics on telephones and 
televisions per capita using a non-contiguous cartogram technique. (Source: author scan from 
Conners-Petersen 1998, 162 and 167.)
In 1998, at the height of the ‘dotcom’ boom and the hype around the 
transformative potential of the Intemet and worries about those people and places 
trapped on the wrong side of the digital divide, Wired magazine featured a large 
non-contiguous value-by-area cartogram, entitled the ‘Wired World Atlas’ in its 
November issue. In the cartogram countries are denoted as rectangular blocks, 
scaled according to telephone lines per capita and shaded by the penetration of 
television (Figure 5.16; a larger version is reproduced in appendix two. Figures 
A2.22 and A2.23). Wired magazine is a U.S. technology lifestyle magazine with a 
strongly libertarian and utopian outlook on the Intemet, and in the mid 1990s was 
considered something of a ‘bible’ for the tme believer in cyberspaces’ potential to 
change the world for the better (Jordan 1999). Their conscious decision to use a 
visually novel cartogram representation rather than a more conventional
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choropleth world map is in keeping with the design pretensions of the magazine 
which often features altemative and colorful info-graphics.
The ‘Wired World Atlas’ cartogram was printed across a double page of the 
magazine as part of a six-page special fold out sect ion^This  feature was 
promoted on the magazine’s cover with the strap line: ‘Globally wired - your 
foldout guide to every nation’s tech wealth’ which overtly construes the agenda of 
the cartogram. It is a technologically centred narrative, viewing computer media 
and telecommunications as actives agent, existing ‘outside’ of society, that are 
capable of directly effecting (positive) changes social behaviour. The text 
accompanying the map also clearly advocates a developmentalist point of view 
that technology can solve problems of uneven development: “This leapfrog 
syndrome, the speed of IT development, the entrenchment of socio-economic 
inequality -  these factors are shaping and animating the media map” (Conners- 
Petersen 1998, 167). The statistics represented on this ‘media map’ are wedded to 
commercially-driven, positivist measures of infrastmcture penetration and 
technological progress, failing to reveal the nuanced role that many developing 
nations play in supplying and supporting the information economy of developed 
nations.
The other four pages feature a large summary chart, entitled ‘The Media Spectrum’, showing 
countries classified by eight different statistics accompanied by short anecdotal portraits o f how 
technology is improving individual lives in different countries.
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Figure 5.17: A subset image of part of the ‘Wired World Atlas’ cartogram. (Source: author scan 
from Conners-Petersen 1998, 167.)
Design wise the cartogram is actually a quite familiar shaped world view, albeit 
with a strongly rectilinear manifestation, with the established cardinal orientation 
of north at the top, America to the left and Australia on the right, and the 
continental groups all in the right places. In denotative terms a major change from 
world scale choropleth maps, such as the ‘International Connectivity’ and DOI 
considered above, is that countries can not be recognised by their familiar outline 
shape so must all be labelled for identification. Many counties do maintain, 
approximately, their correct geographical adjacency to each other. Representing 
nations scaled by the statistical values rather than their territorial extent results, in 
general terms, in the countries in the Global North being denoted as larger and 
lighter coloured, compared to the rather undifferentiated mass of nations in the 
southern hemisphere, which tend to be much smaller and more darkly shaded. The 
most striking visual feature of this cartogram, in connotative terms, is the 
slirunken-looking African continent which seems to be overwhelmed by huge,
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overbearing European countr)' blocks. Although slightly less oppressive, this 
‘squeezing down’ from above connotation also applies to a stunted looking 
Central and South America that seems to capped by the ‘heavy’ golden blocks of 
the U.S. and Canada. Mexico, in particular, seems to have been squashed flat by 
their bulk.
In specific denotative terms the representation performs poorly as it is impossible 
to judge the meaning of the size of countries as no scaling equivalence is given in 
the legend (shown in close-up in Figure 5.17). In fact, the legend and 
accompanying text are vague about the mechanics of the classification and 
denotative meaning of the shading; what is the scale of the saturation meant to 
indicate? (Whether this vagueness is deliberate or merely oversight is not 
discernable.) How are readers to reliably decode the meaning of two variables in 
the cartogram? Perhaps they are not supposed to focus on detail of each country 
but just appreciate the ‘big picture’. Besides size and colour, the actual shape of 
different countries varies from exact squares and elongated rectangles, to some 
with odd blocky protrusions. Again, it is not clear whether this denotes 
information or is simply artistic license by the designer (the shape of Italy would 
suggest shape is used arbitrary for decorative purposes alone.)
Even though the denotative meaning of the size and shape of countries is 
unspecified and therefore uncertain, the potential connotative meanings are 
interesting to speculate about, particularly how to read the meaning of narrow- 
vertical nations (do they appear to be ‘skinny’ and rather ‘puny’?) in comparison 
to the wide-horizontal countries (which seem ‘fatter’). This thin/fat visual 
dichotomy, arguably, creates subconscious perceptions of the differing potency 
and worth of nations -  in this case square-fatter shaped countries appear superior 
visually and thus are judged as being superior places. The variations across 
Western European nations, between wide ones and tall ones, is an interesting case 
in point; connotatively how do France and Belgium compare, or more 
dramatically in terms of visual prominence, Monaco and Switzerland?
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The case of Monaco’s representation in the ‘Wired World Atlas’ also highlights 
another key denotative aspect of the cartogram in that it offers clarity of 
representation in some respects in that many small nations can be seen at the 
global scale. As noted above, on the ‘International Connectivity’ and DOI maps 
many small nations can not be discerned visually, and connotatively they do not 
exist in the mapped world. In Figure 5.16, the tiny principality of Monaco is 
actually the most visible nation at the centre of Europe, with the largest graphical 
extent and a bright yellow shading which makes it stand out from the darker hue 
colour of its neighbours. Connotatively, Monaco is clearly an important nation in 
the wired world, a point reinforced denotatively by the addition of a textual 
citation next to the cartogram informing readers that it may be small in land area 
but is ‘arguably the most wired’. The text goes on to point out the obvious 
explanation for this ‘superpower’ status in the wired world -  “its sheer wealth 
remind us that money begets media.” This hints at the fact that per capita wealth is 
actually the real factor determining denotative visual presence of countries on the 
‘Wired World Atlas’.
As well as highlighting the small and wealthy nations, the cartogram seems to 
give undue denotative attention to a select few island economies which are most 
‘plugged’ into wired world. Such islands are normally mere specks in expansive 
seas and oceans on conventional map projections. The ‘wired’ islands that are 
most apparent are in the Atlantic with Bermuda, the Bahamas and the Antilles, 
typically invisible on world maps, shown are hefty-sized blocks in their own right. 
Indeed, Bermuda seems like some kind of new Atlantis, drawn as large as North 
America and connotatively inviting favourable comparisons between the two 
nations. While in the southern hemisphere, the whole African continent 
(undersized denotatively and connotatively an unwired zone of ‘failure’) is 
visually hemmed in by an enlarged Cape Verde island and a combined island 
block representing Réunion, Seychelles and Mauritius; this bright red block is 
denotatively bigger than the whole of southern Africa (it also receives additional 
attention as a ‘noteworthy place’ via a text citation). The way these islands are 
mapped is also interesting as it provides clear evidence of selective cherry-picking 
as many other island nations -  one suspects the poorer and much less wired one -
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are consciously not represented on the ‘Wired World Atlas'. For example, much 
of the Caribbean seems not to exist.
In terms of visual clarity, the African nations are clearly a denotative design 
‘problem’ on this cartogram. Given their low scores in ‘wired’ rankings they are 
drawn as small and indistinct squares, whereas on conventional territorial 
projection they are easily visible. They are also shaded in dark purple hue that 
connotatively seems to resonate with Cosgrove’s (2003) notion of ‘cartographic 
gloom’ and recreates the dark heart of Africa, reminiscent of European maps of 
the continent from the age of empires. Some of these small and landlocked nation 
‘squares’ do not even get labelled -  signally connotatively that they do not need to 
be named, they are indistinguishable and do not really matter in the wired world.
Another advantageous dimension of cartogram designs in general is that they can 
often be seen as an improvement over conventional choropleth maps in their 
capacity to make readers to think anew and undertake qualitative comparisons 
between places when seen in a different projection. Certainly some of the visual 
juxtapositions on the ‘Wired World Atlas’ prompt reconsiderations of relative 
importance between neighbours and may overturn perceived hierarchies based on 
unequal territorial size alone. For example, which is best in connotative terms 
when comparing the UK and Ireland? It is hard to say, and their representation on 
the cartogram implies near equanimity between what have traditionally been 
viewed as very asymmetrical neighbours (particularly given the colonial legacy^^). 
One might argue that the representation is now more accurately reflecting the 
changing economic balance as the UK economy has declined in comparison to the 
boom enjoyed by the ‘Celtic tiger’ in the last two decades.
Other connotatively intriguing regional power re-configurations include eastern 
Europe versus Russia. Denotatively, Russia is very small scaled on the cartogram, 
connotatively a tiny sliver of a nation unlike its usual connotation of a vast 
territory spanning a third of the world from Europe to the edges of Asia. In the
Interestingly, the denotative simplification o f representation in the cartogram allows the 
territorial ambiguity of Northem Ireland be overlooked.
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‘Wired World Atlas’ its power, accruing from sheer land mass, is lost and it is 
rendered at a scale comparable to former socialist republics of Belarus and 
Georgia and appears connotatively to be somewhat less important than its former 
colonial territories, and now newly vitalised, Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania.
In Asia, there are several potent reversals of normal power relations evident, 
including the two populous superpowers of India and China which are shrunken 
significantly. The diminished size of India and China (which can visually 
dominate population-based cartograms) shows that the geometric calculation of 
power in the ‘Wired World Atlas’ depends not on people per se, but on wealthy 
people. It would be interesting to speculate what this cartogram would look like 
redrawn with 2008 data, and the degree to which the intervening ten years of 
double-digit technology-driven economic growth in China has really changed the 
per capita performance that much. In terms of comparative geopolitical visualities 
in the cartogram, the contrast between Pakistan being drawn as larger (and above) 
India is noteworthy given their bitter national rivalries, along with the 
juxtaposition of Hong Kong drawn much larger and brighter than China proper.
One last theme to consider regarding the meanings given out by this cartogram is 
the degree to which it does connote the whole world, as it denotatively purports to 
be. The legend texts hints at the ambiguity that the cartogram is not actually a 
guide to 'every nation’s tech wealth’ by admitting that no data, means no 
representation (Figure 5.17 above). So territories that do not rank statistically, 
literally do not count - they are made to disappear from the ‘Wired World Atlas’. 
Denotatively the cartogram is made up of a profusion of nation blocks but there is 
not enough of them to connotatively represent the world effectively. The count of 
blocks shows about 140 countries represented on the cartogram, which is about 
forty nations less than mapped by the DOI (which is itself less than 193 sovereign 
states recognised by the UN). What is missing? Its hard to identify countries left 
unmapped but it likely to be places that do not count strategically to U.S. interests 
or do not offer attractive market opportunities (e.g., some small poor Caribbean 
nations). So while the headline text under the cartogram may claim that it
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‘envision[s] the globe’, it is only on a partial viewpoint, and while it might be a 
‘brand-new map’ it exhibits many of the old geopolitical devices of silencing, 
ethnocentrism and visual ordering based on social power found in other world 
maps.
Given these limitations, how does the ‘Wired World Atlas’ score in terms of the 
fourfold categorisation of connotative meanings for representations of Intemet 
globalisation? Some denotative elements of design -  the saturated colour ramp, 
the regular shape to the symbols and the spatially contiguous spatial 
representation of each nation"^ ® - means it is simplified picture which strongly 
implies an orderly world. This connotation of relative orderliness is enhanced 
because the transitions in country block size and shading are, broadly speaking, 
gradual across the continents, with relatively few sharp divides between adjacent 
nations. In many ways then this cartogram suggests an ordered and convergent 
world, however, this is at odds with much of the surrounding text annotations and 
commentary along the bottom of the page which consciously highlight places of 
difference and of concem"^  ^ (e.g., a particularly negative comment is associated 
with Africa by choosing to highlight the Congo as the worst performer in the 
world.) “Rarely will you find clear pattems in the way media penetrate markets 
and influence our lives” notes Conners-Petersen (1998, 162), which does not 
suggest a convergent pattem. (This could be a case of the visuals and the text 
being authored separately and the editor not being fully aware of the clash of 
connotations; cf. Vujakovic 1999a.) Furthermore, differences between continents 
evident in the relative scaling of the blocks, does highlight in an unavoidable 
fashion the degree of inequality in the world; the shmnken African continent in 
contrast to Europe is especially powerful connotation of the gulf of difference in 
the wired world. The extent of order, combined with evident difference exhibited 
in the ‘Wired World Atlas’ mean it should be positioned in the upper left quadrant 
on the fourfold grid of connotative meanings.
Avoiding the visual complexity and disharmony o f nations with split territories, such as the U.S. 
or geographically fragmented nations such as the Philippines.
Note, text is more legible on the larger versions in appendix two, Figures A2.22 and A2.23.
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Figure 5.18: Screenshots of two frames from an animated cartogram visualising the growth of 
Intemet users created by Antonio Scarponi. The top image is from the middle of the animation and 
the bottom image is the last frame. (Source: GlobaLab, <www.globalab.org/eng/>.)
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5.7.2 Internet Users World Map ’ cartogram
Another noteworthy project exploiting the cartogram approach to try to envision 
Intemet globalisation differently is the "Internet Users World Map’ created in 
2002 by Italian architect/artist Antonio Scarponi, as part of a larger critical art 
project he calls ‘Human World’"^  ^ (Figure 5.18). He describes his mapping project 
as “an atlas that propose a representation of the cultural and political information 
of our world displayed on a demographic basis. This project uses Boetti's mapping 
code by flipping the concept of the flag from the territory to its population.
The design aesthetic Scarponi deploys for representing the world are country 
outlines filled with their national flag. Denotative this conflates two of the primary 
visual signifiers of national identity - the territorial outline and the emblem of 
state. Flags and maps often have overlapping emotive connotations, particularly as 
they are interwoven with patriotism and nationalistic politics (Vujakovic 1999a). 
Yet, typically these two icons of the nation are deployed as separate 
representations; Whyte (2007) reports only one national flag (that of the Republic 
of Cypms) features a recognisable country outline, although other flags do make 
symbolic calls to cartographically related theme and geopolitical narratives.
Scarponi acknowledges his deployment of the cartographic design of the world 
doubly ‘politicised’ through national flags is a notion copied directly from the 
work of another Italian artist, Alighiero Boetti (1940-1994). Given this aesthetic 
relation, the work of Boetti is of relevance to the reading of the conceptual 
meanings Scarponi’s cartograms. Boetti was fascinated by the relationship 
between chance and order, systems of classification, and many aspects of culture, 
particularly non-Western traditions and practices. These interests are reflected in 
aspects of his most significant art works, a series of large embroidered maps of the 
world, made in collaboration with Afghani and Pakistani artisans, where the shape 
of each country is filled with its national flag, described as “vividly illustrating
Available online at <www.conceptualdevices.com/ENG/Human%20World/index.html>. The 
other maps use the same country-flag cartogram design but represent different statistics, such as 
national rankings for democracy and the use of the death penalty.
Source: <http://point-view.blogspot.com/2GG7/G4/space-in-picture-is-like-property.htm]>.
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our world of fiercely demarcated individual nation states.""^ In contrast to signs of 
demarcation, others have argued, the interwoven pattem of countries in Boetti’s 
work, resulting denotatively from the embroidery technique in the making of the 
map, symbolises the interdependence of states (Storr 1994). In some senses, 
Boetti’s world maps also connote that national boundaries are not as fixed as they 
can appear in conventional cartography, involved as they are in a constant process 
of flux and negotiation due to geopolitical events (such as the reunification of 
Germany, or the break-up of Yugoslavia)"^ .^ The maps, then, have multiple and 
potentially incompatible connotative readings (just like Scarponi’s cartogram, see 
below). This instability of meaning resonates with Boetti’s own creative practice, 
which he self-effacingly described as follows: “[f]or me, an embroidered map 
couldn’t be more beautiful. I did nothing for this work, chose nothing myself, in 
the sense that the world is shaped as it is, I did not draw it; the flags are what they 
are, I did not design them. In short I created absolutely nothing. When a 
fundamental idea, the concept, emerges, there is no need to decide on anything 
else.”"^  ^ This comment, in its overt naivety that the shape of the world is merely 
‘given’ to him, I think clearly suggests that one needs to think very carefully about 
why the world is shaped way it is on his maps.
Scarponi’s own art work, ‘Internet Users World Map’ is a short animated non­
contiguous value-by-area cartogram (delivered online using Flash) that shows the 
countries scaled according to the number of Intemet users (Figure 5.18 above). To 
achieve the re-scaling, he claims each pixel represents a thousand people, in what 
he describes as a ‘demographic’ projection. The animation of maps mns from 
1993 through to a future projection in 2015 and denotes how the configuration 
and relative scaling of countries changes as differential growth in the Intemet user 
population plays out. In the beginning, the U.S. dominates the field of view, with
Source: <www.tate.org.uk/modem/exhibitions/artepovera/boetti.htm>. A noted example from 
this series, Mappa del Mondo, 1989 (140 x 220 cm) is on view in the permanent collection o f the 
New York Museum of Modem Art. Photographs o f a range of Boetti maps are presented here, 
<http://www.orbit.zkm.de/?q=node/357>.
A point made visually in Scarponi's animation through the merging of European nation into an 
imagined single Euro-land under one flag (discussed below).
4 6 Source : <ww w. orbit, zkm. de/ ?q=node/357>.
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Latin America and the African continents barely visible (except for Brazil and 
South Africa), yet towards the end of the sequence, North America shrinks from 
prominence as the maps become visually dominated by the expansion of India, 
China and the central African states (based on future projected online population 
growth in those countries). Also, some territorially large nations, which tend to 
dominate conventional geographically projected world maps, shrink away because 
of their relatively small online presence -  the most noticeable being Russia, 
Canada and Australia. Separate European nations merge overtime to become a 
single EU super-state in the middle of the world map, the nature of the bright blue 
flag connotes a dominant monolithic expanse (by the end of the animation 
sequence only the Swiss flag exists to disrupt European unity).
Overall the cartogram has many denotative problems around the legibly of the 
information displayed and the difficulties of interpretation for many people with 
limited awareness of the design of national flags and the shape of nation states. As 
a mode of identification the rectangular shaped flag designs are often poor 
choices, particularly when they have had to be tightly cropped to fit irregularly 
shaped countries. This makes recognition a challenge in many parts of the map 
and clearly disadvantages those nations without a strongly iconic flag (or with a 
flag not known to wider readership). Denotatively, then the primary meaning of 
the map is one of cartographic muddle as a jumble of odd sized bits of pattem and 
colour grow and jostle around.
Beyond explicit issues with design effectiveness and denotative legibility, there 
are several important connotative meanings expressed through this cartogram. 
Firstly, many flags are only recognisable when shown on territorially extensive 
countries and consequently small countries cannot be identified and are silenced. 
The outcome is that the citizens in these nations are given no more connotative 
significance than on the conventionally projected choropleth maps of the world. 
As a politically motivated cartogram, it does not address the fundamental 
equalities with territorial delineation. As a result it is very much the same select 
few countries (those that dominant global discourse and are widely represented in 
the media as leading the intemational community) reified in Scarponi’s cartogram.
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The effect of using flags as land cover can have other disconcerting connotative 
results. The dominance of China for example, with its large land area and 
population base is magnified through the simplicity of the Chinese flag design, 
with it assertive singular red colour. The result is a monolithic area which gives 
off menacing connotations of ‘threat from the easf. In comparison, the design of 
India’s flag with its three distinct bands, denotatively splits the nation and this 
connotes as a divided country, with diminished capacity (and threat to Western 
interests) compared to China.
Scarponi’s invocation of the cartogram as a supposed ‘demographic’ projection 
that focuses attention on people, rather than conventional representation 
dominated by territory, is interesting politically but is not delivered with his 
chosen design approach. Its emotive connotation to change understandings of the 
world is undermined precisely because of his choice of the primary semiotic 
vehicles of the territorial power - the country outline and the nation flag. The 
implied claim that flags can speak for  people is problematic at best, they more 
likely signify state space.
Flags are culturally complex visual symbols in their own right, each one having 
layers of meaning and imbued with various historical belongings (Whyte 2007). 
For those outside of a culture, the symbolism embedded in the flags colours and 
pattems is obscure at best and many citizens probably do not know what their flag 
means; how many people can decode the meanings of the British flag? The 
narrative and symbolic meanings of flags are also unstable, varying over time and 
with contexts -  the ‘problematic’ issue of the meaning imparted by displaying the 
Union Jack, for example, with it connotations of a tarnished colonial past and 
more recent associations with racist and fascist groups and the violence of football 
hooligans in the 1980s. This is in marked contrast to the rejuvenated position, for 
some, of the George Cross with positive connotations of English pride. In the 
U.S., the national flag has strong patriotic resonance for many, to the point where 
the protest of burning the flag is criminalized. The flag and map are often 
combined as political icons, particularly in conservative rhetoric. Edsall (2007, 
343) notes the prevalence of ‘flag-filled maps’ in America which “emphasizes the
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difference between what is “ inside” and what is “ outside” the borders but, more 
importantly, implies a unity of spirit, purpose, and resolve. This monotone fill 
suppresses notions of internal variation (e.g., dissent) and connotes uniformity, a 
common mission, solidarity, and national pride.”
Crucially, then, the deployment of national flags is not innocent as each of them 
brings with them all kinds of political connotations. Vujakovic (1999a 11) notes, 
“[f]lags are highly potent symbols of nationhood, and their importance is 
demonstrated by the multitude of ways in which they have been revived and 
incorporated into the iconography of resurgent nationalism in east-central 
Europe.” So the complex profusion of flags in some areas on the cartogram 
(central Africa or the Middle East), one could read connotatively as an emergent 
maze of cultural diversity, political self-determination and the potential rise of 
nationalism as a powerful force reshaping the geography of states. The flag, in this 
sense, is an emotive sign producing “incitive connotations”, which MacEachren 
(1995, 348) says tries to “stimulate action (or at least a desire that someone take 
action).” The profusion of country filled flags are perhaps a call to resist a 
globalising, convergent world of uniformity of media access. Yet, at the same 
point these forces are signified elsewhere on the cartogram by the strength and 
stability of the flags of powerful nations (the EU, the US and China), which are 
visually dominant and most legible in denotative terms.
Overall, then Scarponi’s cartogram approach is a conscious attempt to visually 
restructure the readers understanding of Intemet globalisation through a map that 
focuses on population and not territory but is flawed in many respect because it is 
fundamentally still premised on nation-state geopolitics and not people as social 
actors. It is founded on the nation as the basic units of measure and representation 
(reified, of course, by the iconography of national flags). Despite its intentions it 
is connotatively analogous to the ‘Intemational Connectivity’ and DOI maps in 
many respects, with the emphasis on the power of nation-states to visualise and 
explain the impact of the Intemet.
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In terms of the fourfold grid of connotative meanings, it is apparent that 
Scarponi's cartogram defies clear classification into a single quadrant. 
Semiotically it speaks to global consolidation and growth, but also invokes 
countervailing notions of nationalism and splintering of world into many separate 
spaces. It is a picture of a converging world in the sense that countries seem 
visually to be getting closer, stemming in part from the denotative use of a 
growing cartogram, and also in the sense that growing Intemet use is all about 
convergent media practices, but it also connotes diverging world because it 
highlights trends that are locally variable and, in part, nationally regulated, hence 
the flags.
5.8 Discussion
Given the many issues with how the above maps connote divergent or convergent 
pattems, is it possible to conceive of more progressive, although not necessarily 
more 'accurate', approaches to the analysis of Intemet globalisation? Maps that 
overcome the culture of ranking, which tends to encourage competition rather 
than cooperation, pitting countiy against country, rather than highlighting 
common causes of difference. In a neoliberal socio-economic contexts 
benchmarking tools such as the DOI are seen as beneficial as both a measure of, 
and also means to encourage, competitive behaviour between economies. Policies 
are enacted with an eye to the rankings and to improve the score (e.g., Japan and 
Korea vying for top spot; rivalry between Hong Kong and Singapore as most 
efficient Asian hub). Focus is on score not necessarily what it means for changing 
and improving the lived experience of people (as a very different scale, rankings 
of the world's top universities can be seen to perform in the same way).
Getting beyond the ranking culture may means more than ‘tinkering' with 
altemative representational forms and indicator choices, to think about different 
conceptions of measurement and, indeed, very different types of questions about 
the nature of the Intemet and so-called information society. In addition to 
measuring Intemet availability and activity, some have argued for an empirical 
assessment of the Intemet focused on utility in terms of peoples' capacity to
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exploit For example, Gurstein (2003, no pagination), using ideas from 
community informatics, has called for the analysis of digital divides to look at 
'effective use' of the Intemet in local settings that focus on the ability to actively 
participate in the production as well as consumption of the networks. In relation to 
the Asian Tsunami and supposed 'failure’ of communications in the region, 
Gurstein (2005, no pagination) notes:
"From what I can gather most if not all of the communities impacted [by the 
tsunami] had Intemet 'access’ in one form or another. What they (and here I 
would include those with the knowledge who couldn't use it as well as those 
without knowledge) lacked rather, was the social, organizational, 
informational, and applications infrastmcture which could have tumed 
Intemet access into an 'effectively usable’ early waming system.”
Conceptualising Intemet measurement in terms of the ability for individuals and 
communities to take effective action online is also interesting conceptually 
because it moves the focus from 'top-down’ measurement of infrastmcture 
availability^ towards a more 'bottom-up’ rights-based agenda for understanding 
Intemet globalisation. Some commentators argue that the most socially relevant 
way to measure Intemet globalisation now is as the 'freedom to access’. For 
example, Guédon (2002, no pagination), noting the ‘completion’ of the access 
project charted by the ‘Intemational Connectivity’ maps through the 1990s, 
argued in a statement on the future role of the Intemet Society that: “I believe a 
new kind of map ought to be issued each year by ISOC. and it would graphically 
display how the rights of access of cyber-citizens are respected or flouted, as the 
case may be’', a consciously political mapping, meaning that 'ISOC would raise a 
moral voice in the world, a voice that would say: not only do we guarantee the 
existence of our cyber-citizens, but we also defend their cyber-rights.” There have 
been a number of ‘moral mapping' projects with this kind of human rights agenda 
recently (e.g., mapping of Darfur crisis, cf. Parks 2008).
 ^ The DOI has one indicator, out o f eleven components, that comes part way to capturing some 
notion o f use but it tends to be lost in crowd o f other infrastructure capacity indicators (cf. Pena- 
Lopez 2007).
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Figure 5.19: An overtly propagandist mapping o f Internet globalisation in terms o f online freedom, 
produced by campaigning NGO Reporters without Borders. (Source: <www.rsf.org>.)
In terms of Intemet globalisation, Wired magazine produced a world map in 1997 
entitled ‘Freedom to Connect’ (Conners 1997; reproduced in appendix two, 
Figure A2.31) denoting the extent of government censorship in five classes. 
Harpold (1999, 14), however, critiques the map’s chosen way to measure 
‘freedom’ saying “[t]he crudeness of the map's visual scale - distinguishing free 
from unfree connections in only five steps that must represent differences across 
all political-legal, economic, and technological contexts - begs the question: how 
meaningful is it to compare the ‘freedom to connect’ in Mexico City, Paris, 
Brisbane, and Algiers, and come up with the same result?” More recently in-depth 
annual studies have been produced by the NGO, Reporters without Borders 
comprehensively auditing inequalities in online access caused by governmental 
surveillance and censorship. The results are informative in that they show the 
highly fragmented nature of Intemet globalisation, even in many OCED countries.
As part of a campaign to highlight the extent of surveillance to attendees at the
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2005 World Summit on the Information Society in Tunis they published an 
striking and simplistic map of a binary world highlighting almost universal 
‘freedom’ except for the 'black holes’ (Figure 5.19; reproduced as a larger image 
in appendix two, Figure A2.32). Despite its stress on difference, it is also a 
convergence with the definite potential to eliminate the ‘black holes’, if only 
enough political pressure could be brought to bear. Of course the map deliberately 
hides much of the complexity of online surveillance to make a political point. 
Online freedoms are, arguably, in reverse - and not just from more intensive 
government wiretapping spurred by the ‘war on terror’. The right to explore 
cyberspace anonymously and communicate freely is being undermined by media 
corporations in their attempts to channel consumers and combat file sharing, along 
with criminals who are polluting virtual commons with offensive spam, phishing 
and malicious viruses.
Unsurprisingly, there is tendency in the quantitative analysis of global Intemet to 
focus on technical and economic statistics - seen as solid, knowable data and 
relatively easily gathered, rather than ‘fuzzy’ human experience. (This has been 
highlighted by Comford (1999) as a general problem in the statistical assessment 
of impacts of ICTs.) The basic epistemological problem in all the above 
approaches seeking generalisable mappings is that they explain little about 
people’s real experience. Statistical world maps in this regard have an implicit 
tendency to dehumanise the world because they work best as simple stories of 
national averages, per capita scores and the rollout of governmental schemes. To 
broaden the understanding of the peopling of the global Intemet, one must try to 
assess the rich, individual experiences of networking practices best gained through 
ethnographic case studies.
The work of anthropologists Miller and Slater (2000), examining how the Intemet 
is variously adopted and adapted into everyday life of people in Trinidad, provides 
an authoritative exemplar of the benefits of exploring the local contingency of 
networking practice. Accordingly, they claim, “[sjocial thought has gained little 
by attempting to generalize about ‘cyberspace’, ‘the Intemet’, and ‘virtuality’. It 
can gain hugely by producing material that will allow us to understand the very
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different universes of social and technical possibility that have developed around 
the Intemet in, say, Trinidad versus Indonesia, or Britain versus India" (Miller and 
Slater 2000. 1).
In particular, most existing statistical approaches and mappings completely fail in 
their representation of the African experience of the Intemet. The result, at 
present, leaves Africa largely as a blank, the ‘dark continent' of old. The 
blankness on Westem-centric Top-down' statistical maps of the network society 
masks the fascinating richness and diversit}- of the Intemet's percolation through 
Africa (e.g., see Barlow 1998; Hall 1998 for diverse examinations of the situation 
'on the ground'). The need is for analysis not to demarcate the spaces of diffusion 
but to give voice to the places of adoption.
Given this sophistication is pretty much impossible to capture in conventional 
cartographic genres, in what ways are the statistical maps of Intemet globalisation 
useful and how should they be interpreted politically? They seem to provide a 
conceptually simple - one might say simplistic - picture of the global geography 
of the Intemet. Taken together they create a various cartographic stories of the 
extent of the diffusion of connectivity and access measured at the national scale. 
The maps, through the use of the most ‘obvious' geoplitical form of nation state, 
make it is easy to assume that they provide a clear and straightforward geographic 
presentation of the data. This is certainly how they have been used (for example 
deployment of DOI map by the ITU). Yet, one must also recognise "that these 
depictions of network activity are embedded in unacknowledged and pemicious 
metageographies — sign systems that organize geographical knowledge into visual 
schemes that seem straightforward, ... but which depend on historically - and 
politically - inflected misrepresentation of underlying material conditions.'* 
Harpold (1999, 5). A critical reading of them as actually revealing something of 
this metageography, that they actually 'tmthfuT maps of contemporary global 
power relations. As world maps and thematic maps from Victorian era can now be 
read as representations of Britain's imperial vision, so these maps can show the 
nature of contemporary economic neo-imperialism driven in part by the Intemet.
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5.9 Conclusion
This chapter has examined a range of different statistical maps of Internet 
globalisation in some detail and in conclusion I want to think about how they 
work in terms of positioning them into the four quadrant model of connotations 
outline in section 5.2. The conception uses to two linear dimensions of meaning 
(‘difference' and 'complexity') to create a simple fourfold grid of possible 
categorises which best summarise the map, allowing for the fact that the nature of 
connotative meanings is partial, contextual and imstable so that any placement 
will always be approximate (Figure 5.20).
W red (cartogram)
Oderly
Diflference
International Connectivity 
1907 (choropletti)
Convsrgent
DO! (choropleth)
Bit Map (stepped 3D)
International Connectivity 
1991 (choropleth)
Network Society 
(diagram map)
DKergerl
ConfJexify
Holdemess (dasymetric)
Disorder^
Figure 5.20: Positioning the sample statistical maps analysed in the fourfold grid o f connotative 
meanings.
Despite having varying degree of denotative effectiveness, in the technical sense 
of intelligibly conveying patterns of variability between nations and difference 
within nations, it is important to remember that all these maps have important 
connotative meanings, and they are all products of particular people and 
institutions who are embedded in particular socio-political milieus and espouse 
their own agendas. It is also worth reiterating that it not possible politically to 
produce an unbiased map - they all remain selective and socially-produced 
representations. In many ways, their connotative messages are ambiguous and
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open to multiple readings, in that some highlight more strenuously the divisions in 
some respects, but, at the same time, also speak to the potential for convergence as 
well.
Given these limits, it is apparent that the eight different statistical maps examined 
occupy a range of positions in the fourfold grid, with slight majority tending 
towards convergent meanings in how they represented Internet globalisation. 
Considering each of the maps in turn, it seems useful to start with Antonio 
Scarponi's "Internet Users World Map’, which is represented by the box 'Flags 
(cartogram)’ in Figure 5.20 and has been placed precariously balanced across the 
confluence of the two axis as it exhibits in a dichotomous fashion connotative 
meanings of both convergence and divergence in roughly equal measure. While 
the meanings of the flags are complex to interpret, the evident growth in the 
cartogram and the emergence of dominant national and supranational blocks 
suggests a consolidation of power, yet other elements are, at the same time, 
divergent in meaning with the multitude of different flags connoting a 
counterv ailing force of cultural diversity and potentially nationalist separatism.
The 'Digital Opportunity' 2005/2006’ map produced by the ITU is, arguably the 
most convergent in terms of connotations of difference and complexity. Overall, it 
projects a view of Internet globalisation that is strongly harmonious with 
commonalities between nations rather than wide differences. The degree of 
variance across the world is made to appear as gradual, almost natural, phases of 
change and there are no sharp breaks or unsettling complexity.
The "Wired World Atlas’ is a rectilinear cartogram which has been positioned 
high in the orderly quadrant because it presents a compelling vision of Internet 
globalisation that is at once simple in appearance but also highlights the 
differences between continents. The connotations of simplicity stem from the 
block shapes and the even transitions of colours but there is also a very unequal 
connotation created by the scale differences in block sizes across the world as a 
whole.
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The 'Bit Map', with its distinctive pseudo three-dimensional stepped 
representation of the world, is similar in some respects to the connotative 
meanings of the 'Wired World Atlas’ as it emphasises, using height and volume, 
the differences between regions of the world. The extent of divergence across the 
world can not be counteracted by the classification and colour scheme that work 
to reduce the perception of inequality. The overall feel of the pattern is much more 
intricate and disorganized than the Wired presentation, hence the placement of the 
'Bit Map’ in the divergent quadrant, scoring highly on both dimensions of 
difference and complexity.
Two versions of the 'International Connectivit}’ maps, one from near the 
beginning of Internet globalisation (1991) and then another from the height of the 
Internet boom (1997) were examined. The first map from 1991 suggests a fairly 
divergent and somewhat disorderly world, with some areas of high difference 
evident (adjacent countries in polar opposite categorises and obviously wide 
differences between continents). The sharp inequalities are emphasised by the 
discordant choice of colours that can not suggest anything but divergence. There 
is little symmetry to the patterns of highs and lows across the world and the 
extensive inequalities mean this map, in connotative, terms is located inside the 
divergent quadrant. At the end of the 'International Connectivity’ series, the 
eleventh map produced by Landweber in 1997, arguably, connotes a quite 
different view of Internet globalisation. This map suggests a much more 
convergent world due to changes in the underlying data as so many countries 
reached the top class (full Internet connections), rather than modifications in the 
design and classification (which remain constant). Given these changes in 
underlying data mean most of the world is a uniform colour leaving only 
constrained pockets of ‘failure’, the map scores much lower on difference and 
complexity dimensions and is positioned firmly in the convergent quadrant. The 
arrow between the 1991 and 1997 ‘International Connectivity’ maps boxes in 
Figure 5.20 illustrate the reasoning behind the significant switch in connotations.
The next map is the dasymetric reconfiguration of the 1996 'International 
Connectivity ’ map undertaken by Holdemess to take account of variance in
252
Chapter Five: Statistical Mapping o f Internet Globalisation
connection density 'within countries, particularly in the developing world. The 
changed design, in terms of doubling the number of classes displayed on the map 
and the willingness to represent subnational variation in the data, means that it is a 
much more complex and less certain view of Internet globalisation. The 
impression is of a world much more divided, with only spots of high connectivity 
in many parts of the Global South. Given these characteristics this map should be 
placed connotatively in the opposite quadrant to its originator because it is 
fundamentally a disorderly representation of the world. The arrow between the 
two maps in Figure 5.20 illustrates that they map essentially the same data but the 
impact of classification and design changes has altered the connotative meanings.
The final map to classify into the fourfold grid is the 1997 'Network Society Map' 
hybrid diagram map, which has a clearly Eurocentric bias and visually emphasises 
the very partial distribution of ‘network societ} ' status across the world. The use 
of the diagrammatic targets plotted onto countries added to the complexity of 
patterns displayed and suggested multiple processes at work and little coherence 
in the narrative of network society diffusion. The design of the target graphics 
themselves also emphasises the incompleteness of the network society ‘project' 
for most countries outside the core rather than demonstrating positive fullness. 
The many empty targets speaks to failure rather than success. Given these 
characteristics the dominant connotative meaning for the ‘Network Society Map' 
is one of divergent world.
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Marketing Maps of Internet Networks
The advertiser generally u ses the map both to enlighten and to persuade and only rarely to distort. 
The map is often the quickest, clearest, and most neatly organised method of conveying a 
geographical idea in advertising.
-  Douglas K. Fleming and Richard Roth, Place in Advertising, 1991.
6.1 Introduction
The focus of analysis in this chapter arc marketing maps used in the commercial 
promotion of Internet infrastructure, particularly during the phase of rapid growth in 
the second half of the 1990s through a case study of WorldCom. A large number of 
maps of Internet infrastructures have been produced by commercial network operators 
for the purposes of marketing services and as an element in their corporate branding 
strategies. As such, they are the latest incarnation of a long lineage of marketing maps 
used to promote communications networks, including railways, highways and the 
airways. This genre of mapping is interesting theoretically as it drops the ethic of 
cartographic independence by serving an overt commercial purpose, namely to attract 
prospective customers and investors in what are often highly competitive business 
environments. The maps created seek to communicate persuasively to potential 
customers and investors the benefits of using the network operators' ser\dces above 
another company by highlighting key aspects of their infrastructure, including its 
geographic extent, the range of important places connected and its capacity.
The analysis in this chapter is structured in four distinct parts: it begins by discussing 
the nature of marketing maps in general terms, considering how cartographic rhetoric 
can be employed in commercial promotion strategies for a variety of networks. The 
second part of the chapter is an overview analysis of the extent of marketing map 
usage to promote Internet infrastructure based on data from a content study of the 
websites of the fifty most important network providers. In the third part a framework 
of cartographic design strategies is developed to analyse the rhetorical power of the 
network marketing maps. This framework is then applied to examine in the detail 
global scale network marketing maps deployed by five of the largest
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telecommunications corporations. The forth and final part of the chapter analyses a 
time series of network marketing maps produced by WorldCom, a corporation that 
dominated Internet infrastructure provision through much of the late 1990s before 
going bankrupt in 2002. The analysis uses the same framework of cartographic design 
strategies as in the previous section, along with other contextual business data and 
interview material from the manager responsible for map production, to understand 
how the marketing maps of one corporation evolved over time, considering the extent 
to which design modification improved the rhetorical capacity of the maps to match 
WorldCom’s global ambitions. The concluding discussion considers the role of 
network marketing maps in the promulgation of unrealistic views of Internet growth, 
which in the late 1990s fuelled a disastrous speculative bubble of investment in 
infrastructure that lost shareholders billions when many networking companies went 
bankrupt in 2 0 0 2 .
6.2 Maps for marketing
Given the ways that maps can be made to Tie’, it is perhaps not surprising that they 
are a commonly used visual trope in consumer advertising, corporate marketing and 
place promotion. As has been well noted, all maps are selective in what they show 
because they take a particular viewing position, in that they are essentially selling a 
viewpoint on space that serves certain interests. And like advertising, the best maps 
work when the viewers do not really feel they are being sold a selective view.
In scholarly discussion of the forms and purposes of Western cartography it is 
frequently asserted that a distinct genre of propaganda mapping can be usefully 
discerned. Such maps are categorised separately from 'normal’ cartography on the 
basis that their goal is consciously political and their design is deliberately and 
maliciously manipulated to present views of space that advance one particular 
message above all others. Fundamentally, maps are propagandist in nature when they 
wilfully deceive people to change their behaviour. Yet, attempting to draw a sharp and 
practicable distinction between propaganda maps and other supposedly 'objective’ 
cartography is obviously a problematic task. As Pickles (2004a, 39) points out, 
"notions of propaganda are ... centred on an unexamined boundary between 'truth’ 
and 'falsity’, an unstable boundary at best.” In fact all maps have persuasive and
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deceptive qualities -  and a part of the practice of ‘scientific' cartography is to police 
the norms on acceptable deception (through, for example, the recommendations given 
in textbooks and best practice guides, along with the criticism and gate-keeping work 
of journal editors and reviewers.)
The most evident propaganda cartography is the mapping used by the state in 
asserting claims for the territorial naturalness of the nation, for the geographic right of 
territorial expansion or to exaggerate foreign threats (cf. Biggs 1999; Burnett 1985; 
Herb 1997). Propaganda maps produced for mass consumption in times of war offer 
particularly egregious examples of cartographic artifice, often overlaid with crude 
racist symbolism, to generate fear of the enemy and engender greater efforts from 
citizens (see Monmonier 1996, chapter seven; Tyner 1982). More subtle and insidious 
ethnocentric propaganda is said to pervade the world maps of many national atlases 
(cf. Fremlin and Sebert 1972; Kent 1986). The devices of cartographic centring and 
biased size distortions, fostered through projection choice, are used to create an 
advantageous sense of national superiority that seems to be geographically ordained 
(Henrikson 1994). Overtly propagandist mappings are not the sole preserve of 
government, of course, and in recent decades non-state actors have created 
consciously political cartographies in counter-hegemonic discourses opposing, for 
example, nuclear weapons (cf. Burnett 1985). While commercial marketing maps, as a 
form of propaganda in support of capitalist accumulation, carefully use the 
pretensions of objectivity in selling a respectable representation space.
Clearly, decoding the propagandist connotations given off by maps depends to a great 
degree on the discourses in which they are used. When the discourse moves away 
from informing to influencing the reader, the map is evoked as an intentional means to 
change behaviour in one particular direction, resulting in what Tyner (1982) usefully 
terms persuasive cartography. It is evident that the growth in persuasive cartography 
in the twentieth century has seen a shift in emphasis from politically-motivated 
propaganda mapping to profit-driven promotional cartography. The shift is evident in 
the use of maps in consumer adverts that seek to channel customers to the benefit of 
private capital rather than national interests. “Whereas maps were once used to 
expand nation building they now build commercial empires that, in a very real sense, 
are eclipsing the nation-state in importance" (Francaviglia 2005, 11). Yet, the
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effectiveness of maps in the service of commercial promotion has been, surprisingly, 
little examined in the cartographic literature, with only sporadic coverage since the 
Second World War (e.g., Harrison 1953; McDermott 1969; Monmonier 1996; 
Schulten 2001). Growth in the commercial use of maps has been significant, 
particularly as new means of cartographic production enabled a much wider range of 
more attractive graphic representations (e.g., Richard Edes Harrison's celebrated 
hemispheric map views), some of which were the direct result of new technologies 
created in the Second World War and subsequent Cold War arms race (cf. Cloud 
2002).
6.2.1 Advertising visual rhetoric
At one level, advertising works semiotically through iconic images that show what the 
product or service looks like and indexical images that show how it can be used - car 
advertisements being a good exemplar, with close-up views of the form of the vehicle 
and then seductive shots of it being driven. Obviously, maps can serve indexically as 
a good way to show a complex, space-extensive product such as a transportation 
network to potential customers, the archetypal case being the airline route map found 
in nearly ever}' in-flight magazine (discussed below).
However, much modem advertising rhetoric is about creating a brand identit}' rather 
than demonstrating specific products and how they are used. Marketing is about 
generating a desirable image - the brand - that consumers will aspire to be part of. 
People desire goods and services from the brand in the hope that the positive cache 
associated with brand is transferred onto them. Consequently, rhetorical messages in 
branding tend to be more subtle than 'straight' product advertising, (for example 
lifestyle imagery used in establishing the brand values of car manufacturers and their 
models - young and fast, luxury and business, families and flexibility, and so on). 
Even though there is resistance and cynicism from many consumers to these lifestyle 
marketing efforts, powerful brands, particularly those with global appeal, are 
recognised as hugely valuable assets. For some businesses, the building of the brand is 
arguably their primary activity as the products by themselves are largely 
indistinguishable (e.g., the drinks industry). Many multinational companies spend 
hundreds of millions developing a brand identity and marketing it through numerous 
media channels. The most successful have become global icons recognisable virtually
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ever>^here. Indeed, these branding strategies themselves have come to be seen as a 
defining element in contemporary' globalisation and threatening in terms of cultural 
homogenisation (Klein 2000).
The production of brand imagery in a marketing campaign relies much more heavily 
on symbolic representations, rather than iconic or indexical semiotic forms. 
Commonly the product or service is not shown at all - it does not really need to be. 
Instead, the goal is to conjure up the right mood using symbolic visual forms that 
resonate with readers through base human instinct, ingrained cultural conventions or 
positive associations (e.g., celebrity endorsement or sporting sponsorship). Maps, 
when used adeptly, can have powerful symbolic qualities, able to exude a multiplicity 
of connoting moods required for effective brand marketing. At one level, a familiar 
map can symbolise a sense of pride in territory, taping into national identities and 
reassuring feelings of hearth and home, but they can also be used to connote messages 
of adventure, exploration and the exoticism of distant lands. Antiquarian-looking 
maps, on the other hand, can be used to suggest endurance, authenticity and 
traditional wisdom; while sweeping satellite views overlaid with glowing grids radiate 
a modernist sense of techno-power and transcendence over nature.
In corporate brand advertising of 'hi-tech' firms, maps are a common visual trope 
used purposefully to tap into the cartographic fetish of expansionism and the pseudo­
militarist aura of command and control over territory (see Goldman et al. 2003). 
Corporate marketing designs mesh with business desires to ''wrap the world in 
complexes of arrows, networks and cages to represent their own 'global' presence" 
(De Cock et al. 2001, 217). World maps, map-like overhead satellite views and Earth 
globes are now so thoroughly ingrained visually in globalist business discourses that 
their use can easily tip into cliché. The image of the Earth, in particular, is an 
enormously powerful symbol that can connote myriad different meanings and has 
been exploited by a wide range of interests (cf. Cosgrove 1994; Edsall 2007; also 
chapter four).
Besides globes, a panoply of other geographic imagery is used for its symbolic power. 
These can include expansive landscape views of the countryside displayed on the 
threshold between map and picture, dramatic panoramic cit}scapes, typically
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represented at night-time as vistas of lights, and increasingly popular use of high- 
resolution aerial photography. Cartograms and map-like pictorial graphics are also 
common in marketing, often employing elements of fantasy or whimsical humour to 
produce a positive rhetorical effect (see Edsall 2007; Holmes 1991; McDermott 1969 
for examples). Spatial rhetoric can even be conveyed simply from territorial outlines, 
as they are proven to be ‘‘a highly recognizable shape that cannot be confused with 
anything else" (Francaviglia 2005, 5).
6.2.2 Marketing maps for transportation networks
The use of marketing maps in the establishment of the brand identity of commercial 
transportation networks has a long lineage and one of direct relevance to 
understanding the commercial promotion of Internet infrastructure. As Fleming and 
Roth (1991, 288-289) note, "[rjelative locations, distances, types of itineraries, transit 
times, and costs of transit are factors of significance in the advertising of railroad, 
ocean, and airline services." All these factors can usefully and persuasively be 
visualised in cartographic form \ Showing the geographic structure of routes offered is 
an especially powerful selling point and one that can best be conveyed semiotically 
through network maps and diagrams. This is well demonstrated in nineteenth century 
railroad cartography, for example.
The growth in railroads in the United States from the 1850s, especially during the 
speculative building boom following generous land grants from the government, led 
to fierce competition between companies on routes between major metropolitan 
centres. High quality network maps were a significant element in competitive 
marketing strategies (cf. Modelski 1984; Musich 2006). Initially derived from 
construction surveys and engineering plans, the output became ever more 
presentational in design and persuasive in purpose, such that “manipulating scale, 
area, and paths of railroads became common practice in advertising maps of the 1870s 
and early 1880s and in railroad timetable maps’* (Modelski 1984, 4). Besides long­
distance railways, the growth of mass transit subways, trams and buses at the end of 
the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century in large cites required a new
' For typical examples, see the collection o f  transportation and communication maps from the 
nineteenth century provided by the maps division o f the U.S. Library o f Congress, 
<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/tmshome.html>.
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mapping idiom to inform passengers, and also to promote new ridership. The 
development of complex metropolitan networks and the need to forge a public 
identity for an integrated system gave rise to one of the celebrated maps of the 
twentieth century, the London Underground ‘diagram’ (Garland 1994).
Harry Beck’s supremely successful Tube map not only made a chaotic mass of lines 
under London into a legible system, it also created a powerful visual-cognitive 
template of the spatial layout of London in the minds of many visitors and residents. 
The cartographic design, drawing on ideas from electrical wiring diagrams, pioneered 
a new genre of schematic subway maps, which sacrificed locational accuracy for 
topological clarity and has been widely copied across the world (cf. Avelar and Humi 
2006; Ovenden 2003). The Tube map also established itself as marketing symbol par 
excellence for the Underground, and now enjoys symbolic power world-wide as a 
marque of London and quirky Englishness.
In promoting the network in the way it did, the Tube map also played an important 
part in promoting the actual form of London’s urban growth (Hadlaw 2003). 
Extending the simplification and generalisation of cartographic practice to the 
extreme. Beck completely denied the twists and turns of topography by straightening 
route lines; stations became uniformly spaced, and - most (in)famously - differential 
distance scales were applied across the map to expand the crowded centre and greatly 
shrink the periphery. The result was to sell a selective spatial layout of London, a 
layout that is cartographically marketing a much more compact, orderly and 
accessible city than really exists. The remote suburbs, in particular, only look to be a 
short distance from the centre of town in Beck’s vision of London, when in fact they 
are a rather long ride away.
Another noteworthy example of persuasive network cartography was the role of route 
maps in selling the desirability of automobile travel in the U.S. in the 1930s. Detailed 
analysis by Ristow (1964) and Akerman (1993, 2002) has ably decoded the marketing 
rhetoric in the production of these widely used route maps, directed and subsidised by 
oil companies and motoring clubs^. The free ‘gas map,’ Akerman (2002, 187)
“ The Petrol Maps website curated by Ian Byrne provides a comprehensive catalogue o f examples for 
Britain, <www.ianbyme.free-online.co.uk>.
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observes, "promoted specific brands by associating them with positive social aspects 
of automobile travel and good customer service”. Most state governments also 
produced official highway maps as a potent form of tourist promotion, with selected 
historic and scenic places of interest prominently marked. The manipulative 
techniques in service to marketing included “representing highways in thick, clean 
lines emphasizing connected populated places and cross-routes” (Akerman 1993, 16) 
along with clear route identification through numbering schemes. Importantly, the 
promotional elements did not in themselves diminish the need for clear, reliable route 
information to facilitate navigation - although “railroads ... were generally omitted” 
(Akerman 1993, 16), which conveniently worked to ‘silence’ the competition to the 
automobile. Similar techniques continue to be used to help drivers and sell road travel 
in the latest, advertising-supported, interactive route planning services available on 
the Web. Today, the extent to which car culture dominates in most developed 
countries means that the persuasive road rhetoric underlying general reference 
mapping is masked and rendered unquestionable (see Wood 1992, chapter four).
In addition to rail and road, the most obvious application of the marketing maps is the 
promotional cartography of the airlines^. Virtually all glossy in-flight magazines 
contain a route map that informs and above all persuades passengers of the space- 
transcending power of the airline. The map’s “rationale seems to be to create an 
impression of the airlines entangling, even appropriating, the world in their own webs 
of commercial influence” (Thurlow and Jaworski 2003, 586-588). The route maps 
have been around since the start of commercial aviation as an obvious - and from a 
marketing perspective, absolutely intrinsic - way to make intangible schedules of 
flight times and lists of destinations into a coherent, believable and real network, 
capable of carrying people quickly, reliably and safely. An interesting feature of 
airline route mapping over the years has been its willingness to experiment design- 
wise, particularly with unconventional projections as a means to get the optimal 
promotional look for the map. Cartographic manipulation has been put to the service 
of corporate centricism, necessary to position the airline’s hub of operations at the 
central point of the map view, and to connote a convincing visual appearance of the
The Airchive curated by Chris Sloan presents an impressive array o f route maps, 
<www.airchive.org>.
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desirability of its routes by making them look to be the shortest or most direct 
(Fleming 1984). In the last decade, the printed route maps in in-flight magazines have 
also been significantly augmented by the airshow moving map provided as one of the 
entertainment television channels on many long-haul flights. This map dynamically 
updates the position of the plane to inform passengers of the progress of the flight, but 
it is also subtly promotes a particular sense of the air travel experience through a 
privileging, God's-eye, view of the world for passengers.
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Figure 6.1: Network marketing map from the telegraph era. (Source: Bill Bums, <www .atlantic- 
cable.com/Maps index.htm>.)
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Figure 6.2: An attractive azimuthal projection map o f  the world produced to market the globe spanning 
Cable & Wireless telecommunications net\\ork in 1945. (Source: Cable & Wireless Archives, 
Porthcumo, Cornwall, <www.porthcumo.org.uk/>.)
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6.2.3 Marketing maps for telecommunications netw orks
Transportation marketing maps in their profit-driven agenda and cartographic 
strategies have much in common with examples produced by telecommunications 
companies to promote the extent of their networks to prospective customers and 
investors. Going back to the telegraph era in the mid nineteenth century, a number of 
competing companies used maps in their advertising to demonstrate the extensiveness 
of their network infrastructure by plotting the geographic pathways of cables and 
emphasising the cities connected"^. The beginnings of intercontinental telegraph 
services from the 1860s resulted in a range of promotional cartography, both to attract 
investors and to celebrate the success of new cable connections^. A typical example is 
the map from the Anglo-American Telegraph Company (Figure 6.1 above). In many 
cases, these ambitious and expensive engineering schemes were initially intimately 
bound to the needs of imperial communications. Servicing the telecommunications 
needs of the British Empire, for example, was the responsibilitv of the Cable & 
Wireless company linking the territorv on the ‘red routes' and becoming one of the 
largest operators of networks across the world by the middle of the tw entieth centurv' 
(cf. Bartv-King 1979). The company commissioned designer MacDonald Gill to 
produce the ‘Great Circle Map' (Figure 6.2 above), a particularly refined example of 
telecommunications marketing genre, with its promotional cartouches showing scenes 
of building the network infrastructure and how it operated. The map also provides a 
seminal example of projecting the company (and in an imperial sense, the British 
nation) at the centre of the map. w ith cable route lines radiating outwards from Britain 
to connect distant lands.
The task of network mapping for telecommunications companies is in some respects 
harder than for transportation, but at the same time more important for marketing. As 
discussed in chapter four, the invisibility and intangibilitv of the infrastructures for 
telecommunication, as opposed to those for physical movement, mean there is little 
for people to see and feel. The telegraph, the telephone and the Internet lack the iconic
A range o f  examples for North America can be found online in the David Rumsey map collection 
<\\vvvv.davidrumsey.com> and the U.S. Libraiy o f Congress's collection 
<http: lcweb2.loc.gov ammem gmdhtml/tmshome.html>.
■ Examples maps and memorabilia associated with these engineering feats are available on Bill Bum s’ 
'Histoiy o f the Atlantic Cable & Submarine Telegraphy" website, <http://atlantic-cable.com>.
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architectures of railway viaducts, wide highways carving through the landscape and 
monumental modernist airport terminals that can be exploited for advertising imagery . 
(The prominence of BT Tower in central London is an exception to the rule and only 
reinforces the great extent of the invisibility of telecommunications infrastructure). 
Furthermore, the most conspicuous visible element in telecommunications networks, 
the telephone handset, has none of the dramatic visuality of fast cars, thundering trains 
and soaring jetliners.
Besides the invisibility' of infrastructure, telecommunications networks are also 
intangible from the consumer experience perspective (see also chapter four). In 
transportation, the friction of distance can be readily turned into fictions of experience 
by the marketers. Passengers and drivers have innate, physical knowledge of 
transportation networks through the journey. Positive elements of this physicality - the 
smoothness of the ride of the new car. the relaxing comfort of wider seats on planes 
and so on - is commonly exploited in promotional narrative that attempt to positively 
connect customers to brands^. Telecommunications, in their inherent virtuality. are 
completely lacking such experiential customer knowledge. The lack of human 
kinaesthetic involvement defines r^/e-communications. Telephones and the Internet 
provide customers with mere interfaces to the network, through physical devices like 
the phone handset and computer screens, not experience of the network itself. No 
knowledge of the network structure and physical construction is gained from 
brow sing the Web. for example - it gives off little physical sensation, except perhaps 
the sense of delay when waiting to connect or the odd bout of frustration when it fails 
temporarily.
Marketing telecommunications, therefore, tend to construct its own symbolic imagery 
in the form of route maps, in part to compensate for the lack of other iconography and 
direct customer experience that can be more easily exploited (see the discussion in 
chapter four of major types of spatial metaphors used to represent Internet 
infrastructure). Route maps of telecommunication networks, while of no practical 
value for navigation, construct a sense of tangibility , a kind of second-hand
 ^ O f course, the all too common mismatch between customer experience and the projected images o f  
marketers is the basis for much contemporaiy cynicism about corporations.
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experience of the network to compensate for the lack of directly observable activity. 
This was particularly so when the technologies were new and customers and investors 
needed evidence of what they looked like and how they worked. This has been 
repeated with the development of the Internet from 1990s onwards when maps 
became a useful tool for making a novel, unusual and unproven technology seem real.
6.3 Internet marketing maps
In many respects promotional Internet network maps as a genre can be traced back to 
those produced to document the growing extent of ARPANET from the early 1970s 
through to the late 1980s. In terms of their cartographic design there is little to choose 
between the maps produced by BBN^ to virtually witness the logical structure of links 
and hubs of ARPANET and the contemporaiy- Internet marketing maps detailed in the 
following section.
ARPA NETWORK, GEOGRAPHIC MAP 
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Figure 6.3; ARPANET network map created by Bob Brooks and the BBN graphic design department to 
promoted the growth o f the infrastructure. (Source: scanned from Heart eï al. 1978.)
 ^The private company contracted by the U.S. government to design, build and maintain the network.
266
Chapter Six: Marketing Maps
ARPANET pioneered wide-area computer networking in the U.S. and laid much of 
the foundations of the Internet in terms of both the technical infrastructure and social 
practices of internetworking (cf. Abbate 1999; Hafner and Lyon 1996). A series maps 
of ARPANET were created at regular intervals throughout its operation to document 
its network structure (e.g.. Figure 6.3). (Many maps have survived in published 
records, reports and scholarly articles, e.g., CCR (1990) and Heart et a l (1978)). It is 
important to note that these maps show the ARPANET at the level of data linkages 
(termed "level 2 ' in terms of the hierarchical layer model of communications 
protocols). They do not plot the actual geographic routes of the cables (so called Tevel 
r  facilities). \Miile the nodes are relatively accurately positioned, the paths are 
merely relational, designating a link between sites. Hence the acceptability of 
generalising transmission paths between nodes to straight lines in the maps. It is also 
apparent from the maps that ARPANET was. tentatively at least, international in 
scope, with sites overseas connected via satellite links, represented by the two wa\w 
lines projecting out beyond the continental coastline. Interestingly, the these links 
went towards the east and the west, rather than perhaps more obvious north or south 
direction to the United States' immediate continental neighbours. One satellite link 
towards the west, crossed the Pacific to connect with the network research group at 
the Uni\ ersit) of Hawaii. The link east crossed the Atlantic, to London and then onto 
an ARPA-funded seismic monitoring facilit) near Oslo. Norway (called NORSAR).
In terms of cartographic design, these maps are quite crude, being simple black and 
white line drawings using the functional form of arc-node representations (Figure 
6.3). They employed magnifying circles as a graphic device to enhance legibility in 
the four core ARPANET regions in northern and southern California, and the Boston 
and Washington DC. This scale distortion makes the maps look fuller than they are. In 
realit) . many sites were clustered geographically (e.g.. the sites in the Washington DC 
area w ere all w ithin a few miles of each other).
The presentation of the territorial base itself in these marketing maps of ARPANET as 
an empt) canvas is also noteworthy. The U.S. is represented by a simple border line 
which has the effect of creating an inert container, an archetypal terra nullius, ready 
to be filled with infrastructure and remade into a modem networked space. Indeed, for
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the engineers involved, the abilitv to draw the network on a blank map parallels the 
unencumbered construction of the infrastructure itself: "the ARPANET did not have 
to interconnect with other existing and/or decrepit communications systems; it was 
possible to establish ... standards de novo, in the best ways that could be devised” 
(Heart et a l 1978, III-l l l ) .  Fitting into the U.S. tradition of Manifest Destiny, 
ARPANET could literally be mapped out over a blank landscape.
The JANET Bacicbone
Figure 6,4: An example o f  a contemporary network map produced to promote a non-commercial 
research and education network. Shown is the geographic topology o f  the core o f the SuperJanet3 
network in Britain, circa 2000 (source: <wwA\.ja.net>).
The maps were significant in the virtual witnessing of ARPANET, supporting the 
‘matter o f fact’ of novel packet-switching computer networking technology^.
* One element o f  this was to win over traditional telecommimications engineering, which is based on 
the circuit-switching concept. This debate continued for next two decades. Today packet-switching has 
won out. as voice telephony is being rapidly being absorbed to become just another service running on 
IP networks.
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ARPANET maps worked as a credible form of visual proof of, firstly, the material 
existence of a network that was beyond the limits of human vision and, secondly, the 
superiorit) of the engineering by showing a network that was dominant in size and 
spanning the nation. This kind of information dissemination and promotional ‘pride' 
role for technical network maps, established as a distinct genre of cartographic 
discourse by ARPANET, continues today with contemporary research and education 
networks across the world producing backbone maps that provide virtual witness to 
their engineering prowess. For example, maps of the Joint-Academic Network, known 
as J.ANET. in Britain are frequently deployed in its publications for the technical user 
community- (Figure 6.4).
The contemporaiy role of the ARPANET network marketing maps is really an 
archaeological one. as they ser\ e as evidence of a past infrastructure that no long 
exists and also as emblematic visual symbols of pioneering engineering. The maps are 
now percei\ed as historical artefacts and they have became easily packaged into 
narratives of the Internet's development (e.g.. Abbate 1999; Hafner and Lyon 1996; 
Salus 1995). This symbolic role is aided graphically because they easily connote as 
‘old' maps with their crude line-drawing design.
6.3.1 Survey o f  the prevalence o f  Internet marketing maps
To compete for new customers and investors, and differentiate themselves from 
competitors. Internet infrastructure companies use a range of marketing techniques. 
This extends well beyond conventional advertising, and includes the overall ‘look and 
feel' of the company's public image, its pricing strategies, special offers and 
discounts, along with the response of sales representatives and customer service staff. 
Network maps are deployed as a component of this marketing mix of activities.
To gauge the prevalence and significance of network maps in the marketing of 
Internet infrastructure, a website surv ey of the fifty most important corporations^ was 
conducted in August 2007. A subsidiary aim of the survey was to evaluate the
° Ranking o f  corporation by importance used to select the sample for the survey was based their 
capacit} to route traffic across the Internet. This was determined by a measure o f degrees o f  
connectivity (given in column two in Table 6.1) to other corporations in an adjacency matrix calculated 
b> active surveying o f Internet topology undertaken by the Cooperative Association for Internet Data 
Analysis. Further details and the full ranking data available from <http://as-rank.caida.org/'>.
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appearance of any network marketing maps present in terms of their geographic scale 
and user functionality . The survey methodology involved the identification of the 
main corporate website used to promote networking services and then a thorough 
manual search was conducted to determine the presence of any network maps; results 
were recorded in a spreadsheet and a digital copy all maps located was taken (where 
interactive and d\mamic maps were present representative screenshots were taken and 
stored).
The tabulated results for the fifty corporate websites surveyed, summarised in Table 
6 .1 . showed that seventy-six percent had some form of network marketing map 
present. (A comprehensive set of the different marketing maps discovered from the 
survey is provided in appendix three.) In some regards, it seems that having a 
infrastructure map available is seen as necessary in itself irrespective of what the map 
shows. For marketing bra\ ado, it is the abilit) to produce such maps that symbolises 
the company as a "serious" player in the Internet infrastructure industry. A useful 
parallel can be dra\&n here to the airline industry, where Thurlow and Jaworski (2003, 
586. original emphasis) note in their study of promotional in-flight magazines: *'it is 
not so much what is in the magazines which is important, as the fact that the airlines 
have a magazine clearly identified by its ascription to a range of generic "in-flight
magazine* features  it appears that the in-flight magazine is a textual practice
which marks an international airline as an "international airline' - evidenced most 
obviously by its ubiquity ."
Note, this was not always the primaiy consumer-facing website. For example, BT has a dedicated 
website for its network infrastructure (www.btglobalservices.com) that is quite separate from its for 
domestic customers (www.bt.com).
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Table 6.1: Use of network marketing maps on the websites o f the top fifty Internet infrastructure operators, August 2007. (Source: Author survey. Ranked list o f corporations 
provided by Cooperative Association for Internet Data and Analysis, <www.caida.org>.)
Map Scales Map Functionality
Rank Degree
3,008
2,079
Corporation (headquarter location)
Verizon Business (USA)
AT&T WorldNet (USA)
Website surveyed
■oc(TJ
8
0  O 
(A  C  0) 0
ro o
www.verizonbusiness.com
www.att.com
0c
.9
S’
0co
0
E
8
jx.
I
0
A .
■o
.9
E
0
C
Û
2
8TJ
Ç
1Q
E
2O)
.9■o
I
â
_3_
4
6_
7_
8_
1 0_
11
11
11
11
.11
16
1,689
1,660
1,436
1,260
967
934
680
564
528
521
499
482
466
Sprint (USA) www.sprint.net
Cogent Communications (USA) www.cogentco.com
Level 3 Communications (USA) www.level3.com
Qwest (USA) www.qwest.com
Global Crossing (USA) www.globalcrossing.com
Time Warner Telecom (USA) www.twtelecom.com
Hurricane Electric (USA) www.he.net
Abovenet Communications (USA) www.above.net
Verio (USA) www.verio.com
XO Communications (USA) 
Savvis (USA)___________
www.xo.com
www.savvis.net
Telia Sonera (SE) www.teliasoneraic.com
COLT Telecommunications (NL) www.colt.net
17
19
20_
23.
2^
2^
28_
31
40_
i l
i 2_
43
464
432
406
VSNL International (CA)
LambdaNet (PE) www.lambdanet.net
www.vsnlinternational.com
Deutsche Telekom (PE) www.deutschetelekom.com
394 Swisscom (CH) www.swisscom.com
392
341
324
323
315
306
Tiscali International Network (DE) www.tiscali.net
WV Fiber (USA) www.wvfiber.com
KPN (NL) wyyw.kpn.com
LG DACOM (KR) www.lgdacom.net *
Interoute Communications (UK) www.interoute.com
Korea Telecom (KR) vyww.kt.co.kr *
304
298
291
248
239
227
216
216
Bell Canada (CA) www.bell.ca
PCCW (USA) www.pccwglobal.com
KDDI Corporation (JP) www.kddi.com
TransTeleCom (RU) www.transtk.ru
Cable & Wireless (UK) wvyw.cw.com
Net Access Corporation (USA) www.nac.net
IIJ Internet Initiative Japan (JP) www.iij.ad.jp
Asia Netcom (CN) www.asianetcom.com
205
195
Golden Telecom (RU) yyww.goldentelecom.ru *
British Telecommunications (UK) www.btglobalservices.com
194 REACH (HK) www.reach.com
193 Port80 (SE) www.rixport80.se *
191
185
PIPEX (UK) wvyw.pipex.net
Internap Network Services (USA) www.internap.com
183 Yipes Communications (USA) www.yipes.com
M.
45
49.
5^
54
178
178
175
174
167
162
161
156
153
143
New Edge Networks (USA)
Romania Data Systems (RO)
RTComm (RU)
Cablevision (USA)
France Telecom (FR)
Cox Communications (USA)
GTS Energie (PL)
Flag Telecom (UK)
SingTel (SG)
Integra Telecom (USA)
www.newedgenetworks.com
www.rdsnet.ro *
www.rtcomm.ru
www.cablevision.com
www.francetelecom.com
www.cox.com
www.gtsc9.com
www.flagtelecom.com
www.singtel.com
www.integratelecom.com
* Indicates non-English language website
Note: The following entries from the CAIDA list were 
excluded because the corporation no longer exists:
9 SBC Internet Services (USA)
22 Broadwing Communications (USA)
36 WilTel Communications (USA)
48 Adelphia Business Solutions (USA)
Legend
= Network maps featured prominently on homepage 
= Network maps featured prominently on product pages 
= Network maps can be found by browsing around 
= Network maps are hidden, found by keyword search 
= No network maps evident on corporate website
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6 .3.1.1 Website sample
The fifty corporations surveyed provide a cross-section of commercial providers 
of Internet infrastructure services. Some of these are well-known 
telecommunications companies which offer consumer phone services (such as 
AT&T and British Telecom), whereas others specialise in Internet infrastructure 
services (e.g., Interoute Communications). Even though this is the top fifty ranked 
corporations, it should be noted they do vary in the size and scale of their 
operations, ranging from global scale corporation with transcontinental 
infrastructures, millions of customers and many billions in revenues (e.g., Verizon 
and Deutsche Telekom), down to smaller, niche operators serving particular 
regional or national markets (e.g., GTS Energis in central Europe). The degree 
column in Figure 6.1 indicates the scale range of connectivity across the sample. 
From the original rank list it was found during the survey process that four 
corporations no longer existed as distinct businesses^ \  It was decided to exclude 
these four corporations and to substitute the next four highest ranked corporations 
to maintain a consistent sample size. As a consequence of this, the numbering in 
the rank column in Table 6.1 goes down to fifty-four and has gaps at nine, twenty- 
two. thirty-six and forty-eight indicating the excluded records. Another caveat 
with five of the corporations in the sample was the unavailability of their 
corporate website in English which hindered an in-depth search (these are 
indicated in Table 6.1. column 4).
Geographically, the sample is weighted to U.S.-based corporations (twenty-two 
out fifty surveyed): of the other twenty-eight corporations, the majority were 
headquartered in Europe (nineteen) and southeast Asia (seven). There were no 
corporations headquartered in Africa, Oceania or South America in the survey. 
This distribution is unsurprising and reflects the uneven geography of global 
telecommunications and the political economy of Internet infrastructure which is 
dominated by U.S. based corporations.
' ' These were: SBC Internet Services (ranked 9th), Broadwing Communications (ranked 22nd), 
WilTel Communications (ranked 36th), Adelphia Business Solutions (ranked 48th). They were all 
U.S. based and have either merged with or been taken over by corporations.
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6.3.1.2 Website survey results: map prevalence and prominence 
The survey found network maps present on thirty-eight out of fift>^  corporate 
websites examined (seventy-six percent). This basic count of presence 
demonstrates that maps are widely employed and clearly deemed worthwhile to 
produce and display for marketing purposes. Looking at the results for presence of 
maps in more detail (see Table 6.1, column five), it is apparent that the higher 
ranked corporations are more likely to have marketing maps. The top quartile of 
most important corporations, in terms of degree of Internet connectivity, all had 
some form of network marketing map deployed on their websites. In the bottom 
quartile, over a third (thirty-eight percent) of corporations had no network maps 
visible on their websites.
Beyond simple presence/absence, the website survey assessed the prominence of 
network maps on the websites and by implication the weight attached to them in 
marketing terms. Prominence was quantified through how easy they were to find 
and how highly positioned they were in the website page hierarchy. Corporation's 
use of maps was then coded into a five-level categorisation (represented by 
different hatching styles in Table 6.1, column five):
1. Network maps prominent, featured on or directly linked from the 
homepage.
2. Network maps featured prominently on secondarv^ product pages.
3. Network maps can be found by browsing around subsidiary pages,
4. Network maps are hidden away, found by keyword searching,
5. No network maps evident on corporate website.
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Figure 6.5: Evidence o f  the high regard o f  network maps for infrastructure marketing by Cogent 
Communications. Left image is the homepage o f the corporate website, right image is the network 
map page. (Source: <www.cogentco.com>, August 2007.)
The most prominent and visible category - featuring network maps on the 
homepage - provides a strong indicator that these corporations see maps as a 
highly effective tool to promote their infrastructure to potential customers and 
investors. Remembering there can only be one homepage for the corporate 
website, screen ‘real-estate’ on this page is, consequently, at a premium and only 
the most significant items can command space. The survey results showed that of 
the thirty-eight corporations with some kind of marketing map, twenty -nine 
percent gave them high prominence by featuring them on the homepage. One of 
the best examples o f this is on the homepage of Cogent Communications, that is 
ranked as the fourth most important corporation in terms of degree of Internet 
connectivity , which gives over a significant portion of available display space to a 
thumbnail maps of the USA and Europe (Figure 6.5), accompanied by a 
somewhat clichéd sales pitch: ‘How our network translates into big savings for 
you’. This invites people to see more about the company’s infrastructure and 
clicking on the map panel provides a direct hyperlink to a dedicated ‘Network 
Map’ web page displaying a large network infrastructure map and descriptive text 
highlighting technical capabilities (Figure 6.5, right-hand image).
The eleven corporations with the most prominent use of network marketing maps 
on their homepages tended to be the more important ones. Seven of them were
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located in the top twenty-five corporations surveyed according to their degree of 
Internet connectivity. While the bottom quartile had only one corporation, GTS 
Energis, featuring network maps directly on its homepage (Figure 6 .6 ). As in the 
case of Cogent, clicking on the map on the GTS Energis homepage takes users to 
a dedicated network map web page.
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Figure 6.6: The homepage o f  GTS Energis features maps prominently for marketing its 
infrastructure. (Source: <www.gtsce.com>, August 2007.)
The second category of prominence - maps readily displayed on subsidiary 
product or ‘about us’ web pages - accounted for over forty percent of corporations 
with some kind of infrastructure marketing maps (sixteen out of thirty-eight 
websites surveyed). In these cases, network maps are deemed to be effective for 
infrastructure marketing, but are perhaps not sufficiently important in the overall 
corporate strategy to command valuable screen space on the homepage.
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Figure 6.7: Example o f  the high quality network marketing maps available on the Qwest website. 
(Source: Author screenshot from interactive Flash-delivered map from <www.qwest.com>, 
August 2007.)
The third category encompassed corporate websites where infrastructure maps 
were present, but were not prominently displayed (i.e. the manual search required 
several minutes of browsing around and potentially clicking down through 
multiple layers in the website’s information hierarchy). Eighteen percent of 
corporations were found in this class (seven from thirty-eight), which included 
well known U.S.-based companies, such as AT&T and Qwest. Both these 
corporation produce high quality network maps and make them available (e.g., 
Qwest’s map shown in Figure 6.7; AT&T maps are analysed in section 6.4 
below), but their lack of visibility in the website indicates they are not at the 
centre of marketing strategy at the time of the survey.
The bottom category are the corporate websites that literally hide their maps away 
and these could only be located by specific key word searching (for the phrase 
network map’). This applied to only four out of thirty-eight websites with some 
kind of marketing maps present. 'WTiile a small minority, it rather surprisingly did 
include Sprint the third most important corporation in the survey according to its 
ranking on degree of Internet connectivity. So in a minority of cases mapping is 
not regarded as a particularly effective tools for marketing network infrastructure.
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6 .3.1.2 Website survey results: map scale and functionality
The survey of fift) corporate websites also considered other relevant contextual 
information about the nature of the marketing maps deployed. Four aspects were 
recorded: scale of maps; availability of interactive functionality to users; the 
presence of currency flag for the map; and the presence of topological (i.e. non­
geographic) diagrams. These results are also summarised in Table 6.1 above by a 
binar}  ^display (filled = presence/ blank = absence).
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Figure 6.8: Small scale map presented on the Asia Netcom corporate website to promote its 
infrastructure. (Source: <www.asianetcom.com>, August 2007.)
The scale of maps deployed was recorded in four classes: small scale world maps, 
regional scale, national scale and large scale metropolitan maps. Twenty-four 
from the thirty-eight corporations presented world scale network maps of their 
infrastructure. (It should be noted that this partly reflects that these are typically 
large corporations with international operations.) A typical example from the 
corporate website of Asia Netcom (Figure 6 .8 ) shows a highly generalised 
network representation of routes and hubs drawn on a generic world map. (Other 
examples can be consulted in appendix three and in section 6.4 below.) The map 
is centred on the Pacific to focus attention on the company’s core operating 
territory, encompassed by the prominent blue lines of their backbone network. 
The design is conspicuously diagrammatic with angular routes reminiscent of the
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Tube map, and without easily identifiable countries, the visual focus is given to 
the few named cities in which Asia Netcom has infrastructure. There are no 
details on the capacity of the network links. The currency of the data displayed is 
not specifically indicated but the image is copyright 2005, so already dated at the 
time of the website survey.
A greater percentage of corporations with some kind of network marketing maps 
deployed regional scale maps (twenty-nine out of thirty-eight websites). Fewer 
provided maps at the national scale (twenty-one out of thirt)-eight) reflecting, in 
part, that the survey focused on larger networking corporations rather than more 
local oriented corporations, but also the additional time and effort required to 
produce individual maps for each country  ^ in which a multinational company has 
infrastructure. There is similar in design approach used in many regional and 
national maps, taking what might be termed the default airline route map style of 
smoothing cuiwing network links between prominent city nodes (e.g.. Figure 6.9; 
see other examples in appendix three).
Figure 6.9: The network marketing map deployed by the RTCOMM corporation showing its 
infrastructure spanning the Russian Federation. (Source: <www.rtcomm.ru>, August 2007.)
The map is produced by RTCOMM providing Internet network services in the 
Russian Federation, and is prominently featured on its website. The map is
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dominated visually by the curving network link shown in red. What appear to be 
secondary hubs and links are shown in grey and fade into the background. The 
size and elongated shape of the country creates a challenge for representing the 
whole network infrastructure legibly on a single map; the international link to 
London is rather fudged and the weight of information is very unbalanced around 
Russian heartland leaving Siberian expanse as virtual blank.
The most detailed mapping showing infrastructure on a large scale in relation to 
metropolitan geography is relatively uncommon from the survey. Barely ten 
percent of websites with maps displayed metropolitan level mapping and these 
were almost all highly ranked corporations. This scale of mapping is not widely 
deployed for several reason, including the cost of production, 
security/confidentiality concerns, and because they are seen as having limited 
effectiveness for marketing. Yet the mapping provided by two companies, Colt 
and AboveNet, belies this trend by providing a surprisingly wide range of ver\' 
legible and detailed street-level infrastructure mapping. Colt sells its networking 
seiwices across western Europe and provides, on its corporate website, street-level 
maps of network routes for thirty-four different cities in sixteen countries, 
including London, Birmingham and Manchester (e.g.. Figure 6.10 top). The way 
the red line, representing the network route jinks around, suggests the actual route 
of the fibre-optic cable in the ground, including branches and stubs, has been used 
as the source for these maps. Equally impressive coverage is provided on the 
AboveNet website, with thirty-five detailed maps for fifteen different 
metropolitan areas in the U.S., including for example routes through Boston's 
CBD (Figure 6.10 bottom). The AboveNet maps have the Took-and-feef of 
engineering schematics with neat-boxes, scale bar and revision numbers common 
on these types of representation rather than a more abstract and anodyne 
presentation found in small scale marketing maps.
281
Chapter Six: Marketing Maps
7  TV
— COLTNetMKti
Data Voce Managed Services
BOSTON. MA -  CBD Network
SUMMER
CONGRESS ST
a
t
tansmtt^ Wkan
EMcrmnBiGissijeecrTOxMBeECRsan»
Figure 6.10: Metropolitan scale network marketing maps from the corporate websites o f COLT 
(top) and AboveNet (bottom). Infrastructure represented as cable routes along streets. (Source: 
<www .colt.net> and <www .above.net>, August 2007.)
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The second contextual aspect of the network marketing maps audited by the 
survey was the use of interactive functionality. The focus was on whether the 
potential of the web as a media is being exploited by the corporations to extend 
the usabilit)' of their maps beyond inert representations (delivered as a raster 
image).
A fourfold classification of functionality was applied:
1 . scaleable zoom and panning.
2 . selection control over layers displayed,
3. interactive queiydng of features and/or keyword search.
4. d\Tiamically generated maps features from iiv e ’ data feeds.
In some senses this categorisation represents increasingly sophisticated 
functionalit) that requires more programming effort on the part of the 
cartographers / web designers. The final categor>' of dynamic map generation, in 
particular, also requires significant behind-the-scenes software engineering to 
produce the actual graphics delivered to the users.
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Figure 6.11: A screenshot of the interactive network mapping application provided by Intemap. 
(Source: author screenshot o f interactive application, <www.intemap.com>, August 2007.)
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Overall, forty-two percent of websites with some kind of network marketing maps 
utilised at least one of the four interactive features in displaying their maps. 
Unsurprisingly, the most widely deployed was the pan/zoom facility. Nearly all 
interactive maps were in packaged and delivered Flash applet, a popular web 
technology for authoring and delivery complex package of graphics. (Flash has 
been quite widely utilised for online cartography, cf. Taylor and Caquard 2006). 
One of the advantages of Flash over raster images is that it can deliver high- 
quality scaleable vector graphics, allowing pan and zoom by default. Given the 
greater costs to produce it is not unexpected that they are more prevalent in the 
larger, more important corporations in the survey; ten out of sixteen of the 
websites with some level of interactivity in their marketing maps were found in 
the top half of the ranked corporations. Although, interestingly the only 
corporation in the survey to provide a map offering all four interactive features, 
including dynamically generated data, was Intemap Network Services, ranked at 
number forty-lwo out of fifty (Figure 6 .11).
Satellite Hybrid
Extremely Slow Traffic
From Atlanta To Plac, Poland 
Latency of 179m s above optimum w as m easured  
On the <5BLX network at 10.44 OMT
Figure 6.12: Detail o f the Intemap mapping system showing the result o f an interactive user query 
on a data point on the map. (Source: author screenshot, <www.intemap.com>, August 2007.)
The interactive mapping application is called ‘Eye on the Net’ and ingeniously 
seeks to promote Intemap’s own infrastmcture and services by highlighting poor 
network performance being experienced by other commercial network providers. 
The underlying cartographic ‘engine’ in the application is Google Maps, currently
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dominating online mapping with its seamless global map and imagery layers, and 
offering smooth zoom down to street level and high-resolution aerial photography 
backdrops in many metropolitan areas.
Intemap’s ‘Eye on the Net’ mapping application allows users to select which data 
layers are displayed and also toggle on/off different classes 'within each layer. 
Points of data traffic congestion (in terms of latency and volatility) are measured 
by Intemap’s ‘observation points’ (shown as blue triangles) and displayed 
dynamically as red and yellow dots. Indicator links fi*om the observation points to 
the points of congestion can also be drawn, although its not indicated if the 
colouring of lines encodes any meaning. The user can also interactively query the 
congestion dots to obtain summary details on the time, location and nature of the 
performance problem, displayed in a small pop-up window (Figure 6.12).
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Figure 6.13: The interactive mapping application provide by TeliaSonera to market its network 
infrastructure. (Source: author screenshot, <www.teliasoneraic.com>, August 2007.)
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Another noteworthy example of a well designed interactive marketing map is that 
provided by TeliaSonera (Figure 6.13). The company serves the Scandinavian and 
Baltic regions, and features the map prominently on its homepage. Although, it 
does not offer dynamic data generation of the Intemap system, its link mapping is 
both aesthetically pleasing and more functional as it is classified by bandwidth. 
The symbolisation of bandwidth is achieved by colour coding link lines as well as 
using multiplier icons for routes with several links of a given capacity. The map is 
delivered in a simple-to-use Flash application that offers visitors the capacity to 
zoom and pan, to make layer selections and to interactively query nodes. The 
panel along the bottom of the display provides intuitive controls for the pan and 
zoom functionalit} . The ‘map selection' menu allows users to choose one of three 
possible data layers (IP backbone, capacity backbone, voice backbone). The hubs 
in its network infrastmcture (called ‘TSIC PoP locations') can be interactively 
queried to give the street address and details on the particular services available 
through this location (in Figure 6.13 details for the Budapest hub are displayed in 
the bottom-right hand panel).
A further aspects noted during the survey was the presence of a date of production 
on the network marketing maps. Given the high profile role of these maps in the 
public communication for many corporation it was surprising that only a fifth 
(eight from thirty-eight) had some form of currency indicator to show how up-to- 
date the map data was. Why are so few maps given a date? It could simply be 
oversight in some cases, but one might also suspect that in many other cases it is 
consciously done to mask the fact the maps are not updated regularly and only 
partially reflect the dynamic state of the corporation's infrastmcture. (Indeed, a 
few include a ‘small print' caveat to this effect; e.g., Verizon's map says: 
“Network routes and speeds are subject to change'.) The lack of dates on the map 
is a small but significant design feature that perhaps marks out marketing map 
from other independent cartographic products for information purposes. It is 
perhaps not surprising given that many of the maps are designed to give ‘an 
impression' of the infrastmcture rather than ‘be precise' mirrors of reality, 
however this can be problematic when people choose to interpret them as 
representing being mirrors and not impressions (see also section 6.5.1 below).
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This impressionistic aspect is made explicit by the legal sounding disclaimer 
made in small print on the Cable&Wireless maps: “This image is representative 
only and. to the extent permitted by law. Cable & Wireless pic makes no 
representation or warranty of any kind, whether express or implied, that the 
information contained in this image is accurate, complete or current. All liability 
for any loss or damage that may result from the use of this information as a 
consequence of any inaccuracies in. or any omissions from, the information, is 
expressly disclaimed." (see Figure 6.17 below).
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Figure 6.14: One o f only two examples o f topology diagrams employed to represent network 
infrastructure in the fifty websites surveyed. (Source: <www .nac.net>, August 2007.)
The final element noted in the website survey was the deployment of topology 
diagrams to market the corporation’s network infrastructure. As discussed in 
chapter four, the use of topology visualization rather than cartography is a 
common trope for representing the structure of Internet infrastructure in different 
contexts. However, from the auditing the fifty websites it is clear that non­
geographic representation are hardly ever used for network marketing. Topology
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diagrams were only found on two corporate websites; in one case, Net Access 
Corporation, only had a ‘network topography’ diagram and no geographic maps 
(Figure 6.14). The Net Access diagram has a quirky, rather unattractive, design 
common of topology diagrams. While it does give valuable detail (including 
bandwidth of links) it is apparent that this type of approach to representation is 
little used because it is ineffective for marketing. Topological diagrams and 
network graphs lack necessaiy visual rhetoric and do not matching peoples’ 
expectations in wanting to see where the corporation’s infrastructure is physically 
located in relation to a familiar geographical frame. These alternate kinds of 
diagram fail for marketing because they cannot 'ground’ the intangible nature of 
the Internet.
6.4 Design strategies in network marketing maps
Advertising says to people, ‘Here's what we've got. Here's what it will do for you. Here's how
to get it.’
-  Leo Burnett, advertising guru.
The study of transportation and telecommunication marketing maps reveals a 
number of consistent cartographic design strategies used for cartographic 
persuasive representation of network infrastructures. These strategies - of 
selectivit). simplification and amplification - are really no different from the 
practices of 'objective' cartographies and their desire to produce representations 
that are as clear and unambiguous as possible. Importantly, I would concur with 
Fleming and Roth (1991: 290) that ”[t]he advertiser generally uses the map both 
to enlighten and to persuade and only rarely to distort.’’; there is no evidence of 
outright cartographic lies in such infrastructure marketing maps - there is no need. 
The job of selling the network can be achieved more subtly through visual 
emphasis and suppression of map features.
Through a detailed interpretation of many network maps, including those audited 
in the website survey discussed above, a range possible representational choices - 
exploiting the full range of graphic variables for map features, along with textual 
elements (titles, labels, legends, etc.), projection and the overall layout -  can be 
identified. These choices can be grouped into eight distinct design strategies:
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range, reach, directness, centrality, abundance, capacity, silencing competition 
and exclusivity. (Usually, some combination of these strategies are employed; 
some strategies are easily combined, others are incompatible.) To establish how 
these strategies work it is useful analytically to distinguish between denotative 
signs (i.e. explicit information representation) in the map and the more 
connotative messages that are inferred from these by readers of the map. 
Cartographers may seek to connote positive messages to promote the 
corporation's infrastructure and services, but these may not necessarily be 
interpreted correctly, if at all (cf. Vujakovic 2002b). I briefly describe each 
strategy, noting the primary connotative meanings they seek generate:
• Range: 'our routes are the longest'
Fundamentally, the marketing goal of the map is to demonstrate, in compelling 
visual ways, the extensiveness of the network coverage offered by the company. 
Extensive range is best denoted cartographically by long route lines shown criss­
crossing the whole map extent (or as much of the extent as is plausible without 
fraud). Line length is paramount as it draws the reader along the route, connoting 
a network with a powerful capacity to traverse distances and to transcend space. If 
the company is positioning itself as the premier national network, the map must 
tr\ to show all of the country to be well covered with long route lines. Likewise, if 
the company is pursuing a globalist strategy, the map should demonstrate a fully 
world-wide range of routes, stretching across continents and effortlessly spanning 
oceans.
• Reach: ‘our routes connect to all the right places'
Closely allied to impressions of extensive route coverage, is the need to 
demonstrate the reach of the network on the map. The reach of a network is 
assessed by how well it connects to important places. Importance, here, is 
determined by the target market for the network.
• Directness: 'our routes run straight and true'
The network should not only connect to all the important places, it should also 
denote as clearly as possible that it provides uninterrupted, point-to-point, links 
between these places). Networks with lots of interchanges connotes slower
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transmission - remembering that in Internet terms delays of a few hundred 
milliseconds can be significant to customers.
• Centrality, ‘our routes are at the heart of the action'
The combination of a wide ranging network, directly reaching all the right places, 
should also connote the impression of a network offering all the advantages of 
centrality to customers, a network naturally positioned at the heart of things.
• Abundance: 'we have many routes'
'*[N]umerousness indicates success, and success indicates a superior product" 
(Monmonier 1996, 6 8 ). Effective promotional network cartography, should not 
only show how much of the terrain is spanned or which places are connected, it 
must also powerfully demonstrate the sheer abundance of routes offered by the 
company. In prosaic terms, the company which is best able to show many routes, 
projects in connotative terms an image of strength through abundance, a sense of 
security through numerousness.
• Capacity", 'our routes can cope with demand'
Well proportioned lines denote lots of capacity and connote a strong, healthy 
network easily capable of meeting all demands without the risk of clogging or 
congestion. Conversely, 'skinny'-looking links can connote insufficient capacity 
to cany bulky loads and imply a risk of an under-strength network. Solidit)' of 
lines, through their graphic weight on the map, can also be useful in connotative 
terms as it implies the network is well engineered, it is secure and. above all, it 
can be trusted.
• Silence Competitors: ‘show only our routes'
The silencing of competitors is the key characteristic differentiating informational 
cartography (serving the interests of consumers by mapping all available options) 
and promotional cartography (serving the interests of one company). 
Unsurprisingly, commercial network operators resist comparative mapping, 
particularly when their infrastructure, in terms of range, reach, abundance and 
capacity, does not stand up well against competitors.
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• Exclusivity: ‘privilege our routes above all else'
The role of a marketing map is to focus squarely on demonstrating the 
impressiveness of the network and it should not be cluttered with any extraneous 
contextual details that could distract readers. A degree of selectivity is, of course, 
inherent in cartography; however, in persuasive mapping, selectivity goes further 
to exclusivit}' - producing privileged views of world to service the needs of 
network marketing and the interests of capital.
6.4.1 Decoding the design strategies in five network marketing maps 
The eight fold schema of cartographic design tactics proposed in the previous 
section is now applied to the network infrastructure deployed by five large 
telecommunications corporations that serve international markets and espouse 
globalist rhetoric. Summary details on the size five corporations examined is 
given in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Details on the size o f five sample corporations, 2005. (Source: OECD, 2007, table 1.1.)
Corporation Revenues (USD millions) Employees Access lines (millions)
1 AT&T 43.862 190.000 86.9
2 British Telecom (BT) 35.480 104.000 36.5
3 Cable&Wireless 5,873 8.150 4.6
4 France Telecom 50.048 203,000 145.2
5 Verizon 75,112 250.000 105.0
These corporations publish high quality maps, at various scales, for marketing 
purposes. Four are delivered on their websites as interactive maps (using Flash 
applets), whereas Cable&Wireless also provides then as high-quality JPEG 
images for download (analysed here due to access problems). An example of the 
world maps offered by each corporation, displaying the maximum available data 
on their Internet infrastructure, was obtained for analysis in December 2007; these 
are reproduced as Figures 6.15 -  6.19 below. (Appendix three also provides a 
number of examples at different scales for these five corporations.) Superficially 
there is much in common between all five in terms of cartographic design for 
representing network infrastructure. They are all based on conventional layouts 
for world maps with North orientation and Atlantic centred projections.
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All five corporations publish marketing maps at a range of different scales and 
offering readers various data layers. None of the five maps in the sample has 
specific authorship information displayed they are all, except BT's, adorned 
prominently with corporate names and logos. AT&T and BT's maps gave explicit 
date of issue/revision; AT&T, Cable&Wireless and Verizon provide some form of 
disclaimer as to the validit}' of the information shown on the map (as noted above 
the Cable&Wireless disclaimer, written literally in small print, is particularly 
fulsome).
The maps also had varying levels of significance in the marketing strategies of the 
five corporations analysed. According to the fivefold schema of map prominence 
in the website hierarchy set out in section 6.3.1 above, three corporations, BT, 
Cable&Wireless and Verizon, deployed their marketing maps at the second level 
('network maps featured prominently on product pages’), AT&T had their 
marketing maps at level three (not especially prominent use of maps but can be 
found by browsing around), while France Telecom ‘hide’ their maps away from 
readers to some degree and they were only located by keyword search. Given that 
none of the five featured marketing maps on their homepages one could conclude 
that they were not essential to promotional agenda of the corporations.
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Figure 6.15: Global scale network marketing map for AT&T. (Source: author screenshot, 
<www.corp.att.com/globalnetworking/media/network_map.swT>, December 2007.)
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Figure 6.17: Global scale network marketing map for Cable&Wireless. (Source: 
<http://portal.cw.eom/wps/wcm/resources/file/eb34020c09dfbe0/All_Cables.zip>, December 
2007.)
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Figure 6.18; Global scale network marketing map for France Telecom. (Source: author screenshot, 
<www.francetelecom.com/en/our solutions/wholesalesolutions/about us/>, December 2007.)
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6.4.1.1 The long range of network infrastructure
All five of the corporation’s marketing maps deploy range as a necessaiy design 
strategy in an attempt to demonstrate the extensive, globe-spanning, network 
services they provide. The most effective in this regard are the long curving routes 
on the AT&T and Verizon maps which sweep across several continents and 
oceans (Figures 6.15 and 6.19). Both map designs also chose red lines as a strong 
visual statement to represent their routes. The Verizon map is especially 
noteworthy for the raft of arrow straight route lines driven across the Pacific and, 
in the centre of the map, the extended routes arcing out from the east coast of the 
U.S. across the south Atlantic to connect to cities in South Africa. The 
effectiveness of range on the Verizon map is somewhat weaker on the crucial 
north Atlantic zone where the cartographer has bunched the company’s route lines 
together reducing the denotation of range. In this area of the world the AT&T 
map, arguably, is better able to tap into range visually with three long smoothly 
curving lines from Europe over the Atlantic to the U.S. northeast cities (Figure 
6.20). The AT&T map also benefits in terms of demonstrating range by several 
veiy long lines stretching out from western Europe to southeast Asian cities that 
run right across the Middle East and Indian subcontinent. However, there are the 
Canadian and Russian northern territories as vast blank spaces literally out of 
range of the company’s network.
PORTUGAL
Figure 6.20: Effective demonstration o f  network range through long route line across the north 
Atlantic. A subset image taken from the AT&T map. (Source: author screenshot.)
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Turning to the other three corporations, it is apparent that the maps deployed by 
BT. Cable&Wireless and France Telecom (Figures 6.16 -  6.18) are significantly 
weaker at demonstrating the powerful range of their infrastructure. The design of 
the Cable&Wireless and France Telecom maps consciously focuses on following 
the approximate geographical routes of submarine cables rather than tracing out 
notional point-to-point paths in the style of airline marketing maps. Submarine 
cables tend to hug the continental coastlines and consequently do no produce long 
route lines which are most effective for connoting range. France Telecom’s map, 
in particular, is also lacking in visual impact in terms of range because it has no 
elongated routes crossing landmasses in many parts of the world, as such it 
appears that its infrastructure is not able to get beyond the shoreline. 
Cable&Wireless is marginally better in this regard with several long route lines on 
land, most notably those snaking across the vast expanse of the Russian 
Federation and northern China (also shown in inset Figure 6.24 below).
The somewhat different cartographic design of style of BT’s map for representing 
network links results in shorter, straight and much more angular routes rather than 
continuous curves that appear to be longer. Such short lines are problematic for 
confirming the range of BT’s infrastructure. Furthermore, like Cable&Wireless 
and France Telecom, BT utilises submarine cable routes that tend to follow the 
shoreline (e.g., through the Mediterranean) and thus cannot conjure up a sense of 
long range connections. BT’s map also suffers from the lack of any long routes 
travelling across the Pacific, which the vast expanse of central Asia and Siberia 
are uncrossed as well - connoting these spaces as out of range. Overall, the BT 
map has failing in many areas in making the range of its network infrastructure 
manifest to potential customers and investors.
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EUROPE
Figure 6.21: Europe is lost under a mass o f nodes making it impossible to determine whether the 
network reaches the right places. A subset image taken from the BT map. (Source: author 
screenshot.)
6.4.1.2 The wide reach of network infrastructure
It is important in marketing terms that maps can prove the network has wide reach 
to connect to the most important places across the world. Arguably, none of the 
five maps examined perform particularly well at denoting reach. While both 
AT&T and BT (Figures 6.15 and 6.16) display a great many nodes across the 
world, none of the points are identifiable as specific and important cities, and the 
majorit>' of these places are not visibly linked by the company’s routes. Indeed, 
one could argue this lack of visual connections breaks the intuitive narrative of 
these marketing maps that the lines represent real cables carrying data to and from 
actual places. The message connoted from these maps is that a node without a link 
is disconnected, completely at odds with needs to convey network reach. In a few 
areas the sheer number of nodes are over-plotted and merge into an 
undifferentiated mass that again is unhelpful in expressing where specifically in 
world the network reaches, for example BT’s mapping of its infrastructure in 
Europe (Figure 6.21).
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The Cable&Wireless map (Figure 6.17) is better in some respects in that it tries to 
show how the network reaches key cities in Europe and Asia. Hubs are explicitly 
named and prominently drawn with red target symbols. However, there is simply 
not enough of them for Cable&Wireless to convincingly portrait itself as offering 
customers real global reach (the dearth of hubs across North America is 
particularly problematic).
France Telecom’s map (Figure 6.18), with its focus on submarine cable routes, 
manages to display a good distribution of coastal nodes, drawn prominently as 
black points, but it is all too apparent that its network does not reach major cities 
within the interior of continents. In some respects then the map produced by 
Verizon of the sample in demonstrating reach, with a fairly even distribution of 
nodes across the world (except in Russia and China). All Verizon’s hub cities are 
clearly displayed and definitely connected by a network link. Unfortunately none 
of them are named so as to unambiguously identify them as key cities, however 
zooming the map into a regional scale allows users to interactively query nodes to 
find out the city name and also its network connectivity (an example is shown in 
Figure 6.22)'l
AFRICA IP NETWORK 
Selebi Phikwe, Botswana
Gaborone, Botswana -128 Kbps
h'2
Figure 6.22: Querying a hub city on Verizon’s network. A subset image o f a zoomed 
the Verizon world map. (Source: author screenshot.)
version o f
This example illustrates well the added value that interactive maps have over static images.
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6.4,1.3 Direct network connections are indispensable
Besides reaching the right places, the most effective network marketing maps 
need to be able demonstrate how directly connections are made. Regarding the 
directness of network infrastructure, the Verizon map again scores best out of the 
sample analysed (Figure 6.19). There are a plethora of route lines projecting out 
from Verizon’s core U.S. hubs to provide uninterrupted connections to multiple 
destinations in Europe, Asia and South America. Miami, for example, has seven 
direct routes to cities in Central and South America, along with connections 
across the Atlantic to Cape Town and Johannesburg (Figure 6.23). Such a quantity 
of direct city-to-cit) links denotes strongly that a network able to deliver data 
swiftly and reliably as there are no unnecessary detours or diversions. AT&T’s 
map (Figure 6.15) is also fairly effective in this regard, displaying direct routes 
from its U.S. core to peripheral markets in Central and South America.
Figure 6.23: Example o f direct connections from Verizon’s Miami hub to multiple cities in Central 
and South America. A subset image taken from the Verizon world map. (Source: author 
screenshot.)
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The representation of networked infrastructure mapped by BT, Cable&Wireless 
and France Telecom (Figures 6 .16-6 .18) appear much weaker at denoting direct 
routes to key cities. Indeed, France Telecom’s map offers few unbroken 
connections, and the visual impression connoted from bow the routes are 
represented is that the journey of data from the European core out to Asia 
promises to be circuitous and slow one, bopping between numerous cable landing 
points. One could argue the cartographer has produced a too realistic a 
representation full of wiggles and meanders taken by the actual cables. 
Cable&Wireless’ route mapping also connotes of being sinuously languid, 
suggesting prolonged journey times as data must navigate all those curves -  the 
overland route from the UK to China across the Russia Steppes is a particularly 
problematic case (Figure 6.24). The route line on the AT&T map, in comparison, 
just ‘flies’ from Europe to Hong Kong and looks considerably shorter and more 
direct.
R U S S I A N
Figure 6.24: These routes from Europe to China do not suggest direct connectivity . A subset image 
taken from the Cable&Wireless map. (Source: author screenshot.)
6.4.1.4 The centrality of network infrastructure
Another key aspect of promoting the Internet for global scale corporations is to 
prove their network infrastructure is able to serve the core regions of the world 
economy. It is helpful if these regions are suitably displayed at the centre of the 
map as well. In a conventional reading, the core regions needing good 
infrastructure coverage would be North America, Western Europe and Southeast 
Asia, although this is expanding with the growing economic power of the so-
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called BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and also the powerful 
petrodollar economies in the Middle East. None of the maps in the sample cover 
all regions with equal effectiveness, reflecting the partial infrastructure provision 
of even the largest global telecommimications corporation and also the political 
economy of infrastructure ownership that still favours state monopoly providers 
(or privatised monopoly corporations) in many countries.
BT's map demonstrates good centrality, with it strong coverage of Europe with 
dense mass of hubs and a busy array of short angular network links (Figure 6.16). 
This impression is enhanced as this region is positioned in the middle of the map 
and at the focus of reader's visual attention. BT also exhibits reasonable coverage 
in North America and South Asia, visually important to any claim to centrality. In 
terms of the BRIC economies, BT appears from its marketing map to have a 
relatively good amount of infrastructure in Brazil and India and some nodes in 
Chinese coastal cities. However, BT is much weaker in covering Russia, which is 
largely a blank landmass. The petrodollar economies in terms of the mapped 
infrastructure appear to partially served, with network routes running down the 
Red Sea and out into the Gulf of Aden.
Verizon exhibits very good centralit}' in terms of North America and Europe is 
fairly well covered, but has rather sparse network links to the BRIC nations 
(Figure 6,19). For the crucial Middle East region, Verizon is also limited with 
only one access hub in Kuwait Cit) with direct network connections to London 
and Amsterdam. The infrastructure in the other established core region of 
southeast Asia is also surprisingly restricted for Verizon, despite the large number 
of direct network links the corporation has heading into this region from the U.S. 
west coast.
In contrast, Cable&Wireless has a surfeit of cabling running throughout southeast 
Asia and Japan along with the appearance of adequate network coverage in 
northern Europe, but fails in asserting the centrality of its infrastructure because 
the key North American market appears under-served as there are no internal links 
or nodes (Figure 6.25). Surprisingly, the same serious failing applies to AT&T
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which falls down in demonstrating centrality on its world map because it display 
no network links covering its U.S. heartland (Figure 6.15). This contrasts with 
Europe which AT&T covers well. The reason for the failure to display network 
links is a pragmatic design one, explained in part by the caveat under the date - 
‘Not all in-country network circuits are represented’ -  but in terms of 
coimotations of centrality given to readers this is problematic.
U N I T E D  S T A T E S
OF A M E R I C A
Figure 6.25: Blank North America region is a serious weakness in demonstrating centrality of 
network provision. A subset image taken from the Cable&Wireless map. (Source: author 
screenshot.)
6 .4.1.5 An abimdance of network infrastructure
In combination with centrality, the ability to demonstrate an abundance of 
infrastructure connotes trouble-free service availability as well denoting a sense of 
strength and reliability through redundancy. Again. BT does well with significant 
parts of its world map literally filled to overflowing with infrastructure nodes and 
links (Figure 6.16). Europe is completely covered, which for demonstrating 
abundance is very good, but as noted above, it is problematic for the specificity 
needed to illustrate the network reaches key places (Figure 6.21 above). However, 
the good work done with abundant European infrastructure coverage is 
immediately undone by the connectivity hole at the centre of BT’s map -  the stark 
emptiness of Africa (Figure 6.26). The almost complete lack of coverage stands
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out visually with the bright beige-coloured continental outline resting below 
Europe almost completely unconnected apart from a couple of routes that pass 
over the top of most of the population to link to South Africa and a submarine 
cable skirting conspicuously around the outside without making landfall. 
Greenland is also visually prominent in the middle of the map but devoid of any 
BT infrastructure whatsoever, as is the vast Russian landmass.
J
é
Figure 6.26: The emptiness o f Africa in terms o f infrastructure is antithesis o f abundance. A subset 
image taken from the BT map. (Source; author screenshot.)
Both the U.S. based corporation AT&T and Verizon score relatively well on 
abundance, but only in restricted regions (Figure 6.15 and 6.19). Their maps 
utilise robust-looking red route lines crossing land masses and have many nodes 
shown prominently as black symbols that standout against the white country 
outlines. As with BT, however, both corporations suffer when considered in the 
whole because of the unconnected northern lands in Canada, Greenland and 
Russia seriously undermine the connotation of global infrastructure abundance.
France Telecom’s marketing map is significantly weaker than these three because
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of its focus on undersea cable routes gives the appearance that it has no coverage 
across the continental landmasses of Africa, Asia, Australia or South American. 
Apart from some infrastructure sited in Western Europe and a skeletal network 
across the U.S., France Telecom's map fails to convince that the corporation has 
an abundant network able to meet demands of customers (Figure 6.18). 
Cable&Wireless is arguably the weakest of the sample as its map design has node 
symbols that lack visual bulk to make an impact and the line style used to 
represent network routes is too slight to suggest abundance in most regions 
(Figure 6.17). The only exception, and slight bright spot on the Cable&Wireless 
map, is the crowding of submarine cables in a narrow strip in the East and South 
China Seas region resulting in an over layering of lines to connotes abundance. 
The scale of the un-networked world, presented to prospective customers or 
investors trying to interpret Cable&Wireless's map, is exacerbated by the curious 
design decision to include the Antarctic continent which, because of the 
projection, looms as a vast empty landmass across the whole bottom portion of the 
image. It is apparent that Cable&Wireless designers chose the most 
geographically complete and detailed world base map but this is not necessary the 
most effective for denoting focused marketing narratives. All the other marketing 
maps in the sample exclude Antarctica and three of them (AT&T, France Telecom 
and Verizon) cut-off a portion of higher northern latitudes in an attempt to reduce 
extraneous territoiy- that is largely unpopulated and, therefore, unconnected (see 
Figures 6.15, 6.18 and 6.19 above).
6.4.1.6 Confirming network capacity
Are routes suggestive of capacity to cope with growing global traffic in the 
marketing maps of these five telecommunications corporation? In most cases the 
answer is no, as the line styles employed lack the visual weight necessary to 
connote large carrying capacity. Furthermore, none of the five maps use the 
conventional design device of varying line symbology (either width, style or 
colour) to explicitly denote differential bandwidth capacity.
As in the case of the abundance strategy, the Cable&Wireless map is notably 
weaker than the others with its especially delicate looking network links between
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continents not connoting high capacity. While the lines are differentiated through 
colours this simply indicates the transmission protocol employed and not 
bandwidth capacity.
The marketing maps offered by BT and France Telecom are slightly better at 
connoting high capacity with somewhat stronger line styles and colours for the 
representation of submarine cables (Figures 6.16 and 6.18). While AT&T and 
Verizon’s map make a markedly stronger visual claim to capacity with their 
routes drawn in a solid and readable red (Figures 6.15 and 6.19). However, neither 
take the opportunily to maximise the impact of capacity for marketing their 
infrastructure by proportionally increasing the line weight to show greater 
bandwidth on important routes. So on the Verizon map, for example, the high 
capacity transatlantic routes are denoted in the same way as the links in southern 
Africa which are an order of magnitude smaller in bandwidth. (Note, users of the 
Verizon map can determine bandwidth on different routes when zoomed into a 
region by an interactive queiy on city nodes; see example in Figure 6.22 above for 
Selebi Phikwe, in Botswana which has a connection of 128kbps, less than a 
typical domestic broadband connection in the UK.)
6.4.1.7 The silencing of alternatives
AT&T, Cable&Wireless and Verizon enact the silence prerogative completely in 
the design of their marketing maps by not admitting, in the slightest degree, the 
existence of Internet infrastructure that is not their own (Figures 6.15, 6.17 and 
6.19). BT’s map appears initially be silent of competitors and alternative 
networks, but on closer inspection the descriptions of infrastructure types in the 
legend tacitly admits that submarine landing points and certain undersea cables 
are not exclusively owned or operated by the corporation (Figure 6.16). Finally, 
France Telecom’s map more seriously undermines the logic of the silencing 
through the highly visual labelling of every submarine cable system as different 
(Figure 6.27). This conscious naming invites speculation that France Telecom 
does not own or control these vital infrastructures and connotes that its network 
service merely piggy-backs across other systems. This is overly honest, one could 
argue, on the part of France Telecom as other corporations certainly buy 
transmission capacity on many of the same cable systems, but do not admit in
308
Chapter Six: Marketing Maps
their marketing maps to this dissolution of primary' control over infrastructure. 
Such an admission in the map weakens the position of France Telecom to offer 
customers the total solution to their needs and to guarantee security of data 
deliver).
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Figure 6.27: Silence is broken in the labelling o f submarine cable systems. A subset image taken 
from the France Telecom map. (Source: author screenshot.)
6.4.1.8 The exclusive exhibition of the network
All the marketing maps have a strict focus on representing just the network 
infrastructure and avoid extraneous details in their overall designs. None of the 
five examples includes the technical paraphernalia common on many other world 
maps, such as a graticule or scale. They all use blank, and one might say ‘default’, 
Eurocentric outline maps showing just the shape and position of continents and 
nothing more. They are in some senses quite bland, lacking embellishment and 
having consciously excluded all topographic contexts (e.g., relief or vegetation), 
all thematic information (e.g., population distribution or economic activity), and 
all other modes of transportation. No natural features are named as these are 
irrelevant to marketing the Internet, a network existing apart from nature. This
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then is a primitive world of landmasses and unnamed oceans, a terra nullius onto 
which corporation can parade their wares.
Figure 6.28: Differential levels o f  cartographic generalisation. Simpler cartography focuses 
attention exclusively on the networic infrastructure. Subset images from the Cable&Wireless (left) 
and BT (right) maps. (Source: author screenshots.)
In evaluating the employment of exclusivity as a cartographic design tactic it is 
apparent that all the maps score well. BT and Verizon are the most effective of the 
five. BT’s map, for example, even assuages country boundaries, plotting its 
network on top of stylised continental outlines, each of which is distinctively 
coloured (Figure 6.16). The shape of the continents themselves has also been 
significantly generalised which aids clarity of display and connotes them as mere 
containers for the corporations infrastructure (Figure 6.28). BT’s map also has 
very little text on it, adorned with only five regional labels -  nothing else it 
deemed important enough to name.
Verizon’s map also exhibits a strongly exclusive focus and does not allow much 
else to distract readers from the core marketing narrative of demonstrating 
network geography (Figure 6.19). The continents are coloured virginal white, with 
only faint country boundaries. No countries, cities or other geographical features
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are named. The corporation's infrastructure itself is represented in a simple, yet 
visually strong, pallet of colours and symbols that envelopes an otherwise empty 
world.
The other corporation's maps are slightly weaker than the paired down 
minimalism of BT and Verizon. Cable&Wireless’s map in particular is quite a bit 
busier in design terms one might argue (Figure 6.17). Their designer/cartographer 
has employed an unnecessarily detailed backdrop (probably bought as a generic 
vector world map outline 'of-the-shelf ). The continents are dravm with joyously 
fractal coastlines and true multitude of tiny islands (Figure 6.28). Such geographic 
detail distracts from the exclusive display o f the network structure. The 
infrastructure itself is also represented in a more complex fashion than on the 
other maps in the sample, with multiple coloured links and several different kinds 
of nodes symbolised. There are small satellite receiving station icons that appear 
to be scattered across the globe, including some on near invisible islands in the 
middle of the ocean; arguably this appears as somewhat of a visual oddity and is a 
distraction perhaps from reading the network routes themselves.
6.4.1.9 Summaiy-
UTiile it is hard to give a quantified summary of the performance of the five maps 
analysed, it is apparent that their utilisation of the eight cartographic design 
strategies (range, reach, directness, centrality capacity, abundance, silence, 
exclusivity) was variable and, consequently, that they had varying degrees of 
success at connotatively generating positive impressions of the corporations’ 
global network infrastructure coverage and capability to potential customers and 
investors. There is no clear winner as to the most potent marketing map in the 
sample, although it is noticeable that in a number of denotative areas the maps of 
AT&T and Verizon had superior performance over their competitors in the 
sample. Equally apparent was the relatively weaker performance of the France 
Telecom map at connoting positive messages needed for marketing. The 
somewhat curious design decisions made by the Cable&Wireless cartographer 
means its maps are also problematic at connoting a powerful and reliable network 
infrastructure that potential customers could trust.
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6.5 WorldCom case study - backbone boom and the doubling myth
There is no way to give us an understanding of any society, including our own, except through 
the stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources. Mythology, in its original 
sense, is at the heart of things.
-  MacIntyre, 1985, quoted in De Cock et al. (2001, 209).
Companies operating dedicated Internet backbones emerged in the late 1980s in 
the U.S., offering connectivity to businesses who were not able to use the 
academic networks, such as the NSFNET backbone. Many of these were small 
start-up companies, rather than established telecommunications carriers, and some 
grew out of regional consortia set up to connect local universities together (e.g., 
PSINET from NYSERNET in New York). One of the earliest commercial Internet 
network providers was UUNET, founded in 1987. Initially, UUNET was selling 
access to Usenet and grew to become a dominant U.S. Internet backbone operator 
by the mid 1990s, eventually being bought by WorldCom in 1996.
Table 6.3: Growth in potential bandwidth on U.S. domestic inter-city routes, 1999-2002.
(Source: TeleOeography 2002, 9.)
Rank Route 1999 (Gbps) 2002 (Gbps) Multiple Increase
1 New York -  Washington DC 7.5 137.4 18
2 Los Angeles - San Francisco 5.1 129.9 25
3 Sacramento - San Francisco NA 124.9 NA
4 Atlanta - Washington DC 4.2 111.1 27
5 Chicago - New York 4.0 110.3 28
6 Dallas Fort Worth - Los Angeles 3.8 72.9 19
7 Philadelphia - Washington DC 0.7 68.9 94
8 San Francisco - Seattle 3.9 68.3 17
9 Dallas/Fort Worth - Houston 5.3 67.9 13
10 Portland - Seattle 0.7 64.9 88
(Gbps = gigabits per second)
The provision of fibre-optic network infrastructure in general, and Internet 
backbones in particular, experienced enormous growth in the 1990s, with the 
second half of the decade seeing an especially frenzied pace of new building in 
the United States and also in Europe. In what can now be seen as a classic 
example of bubble economics, billions of dollars were speculatively invested in 
laying thousands of miles of new cables, creating gigabytes of additional 
bandwidth. On many routes, available capacity doubled again and again in the
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Space of a couple of years (Table 6.3), and several companies built wholly new 
national networks in the United States (e.g., Qwest, LevelS Communications) with 
the hope of capturing the lion's share of Internet traffic and positioning 
themselves as the dominant player in the so called ‘New E co n o m y 'T ech n ica l 
advances in fibre-optic systems were important enablers of this infrastructure 
growth (see Hecht 1999), but the major driving force, at least to start with, was the 
undoubted ‘bandwidth crunch' in the mid 1990s. Traffic on the Internet grew 
extraordinarily quickly in the period 1995-96, when many millions of new users 
came online in a ver>' short space of time (Odlyzko 2 0 0 0 ), and there were worries 
of a shortage of available capacity on key routes. Predicting ongoing traffic 
growth of this scale held out the inviting promise of rich financial rewards for 
those quick enough to meet burgeoning demand. Subsequently, the rapid growth 
in backbone building, paralleling the ‘irrational exuberance’ in the e-commerce 
sector, became a self-sustaining rush as companies sought to position themselves 
favourably, and investors hastened to avoid missing the opportunity. 
Unsurprisingly, there were many new entrants into the backbone market with 
ambitious plans, but little experience of running network infrastructure, who 
nonetheless attracted sizeable investments (Brody and Dunstan 2003).
Much of the new building was duplicative, covering the same routes and 
interconnecting much the same matrix of hub cities (Greenstein 2003). In a time 
of boom few seemed worried about problems of oversupply - this was time when 
'New Economy* talk was rife and almost evangelical belief in never-ending 
exponential growth was prevalent. The key question about who exactly would use 
(and pay for) all this new capacity was never seriously asked. “[I]t was assumed 
that demand for the basic commodity, bandwidth, was unlimited, the recipe 
appeared to be ‘can't miss!" (Brody and Dunstan 2003, 127). The hype-fiielled 
myopia from within the bubble, clouded judgement and the simple and convenient
Besides new networks in the U.S., major investments were also made in intercontinental 
bandwidth with many ambitious new submarine cables systems. Billions more were spent on 
constellations o f  low-earth orbit satellites to provide data network services (such as Teledesic).
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rationale of 'i f  we build it, they will come' was sufficient to lure many eager 
investors’"^.
The problem was that the peak in Internet traffic growth in 1995-96 turned out to 
be a short-lived aberration. Customer demand thereafter, while still growing 
quickly at about 1 0 0% per year, was nowhere near rampant enough to absorb all 
the available new bandwidth being built (Odlyzko 2003). It is estimated that less 
than four percent of the fibre optic cable that was laid during the boom in the late 
1990s was activated (Brody and Dunstan 2003, 146). The predictable outcome 
was a glut of bandwidth, resulting in falling prices and steep decline in revenues 
for network operating corporations. By 2001 many new entrants into the backbone 
market were in financial trouble, unable to service their large debts. The high- 
profile crashes of many dot-com companies in 2001 announced that the 'New 
Economy' was not so different from the 'old' economy after all, repeating much 
the same patterns as earlier cycles of speculative technological boom and bust 
(e.g., railways in the 1840s and broadcast radio in the 1920s). Yet, the sheer scale 
of the telecoms crash in 2 0 0 2  was unprecedented, encompassing many of the best- 
backed companies (for example, the bankruptcy of Global Crossing cost 
shareholders $25.5 billion). The widespread bankruptcies of backbone providers 
also impacted on the large telecommunications equipment manufacturers such as 
Lucent, Nortel, and Marconi. In all, the bandwidth bust has been estimated to 
have cost investors around one trillion dollars (Brody and Dunstan 2003). The 
indignation of over eager investors at the poor judgement of company executives 
would be inflamed further by subsequent revelations of serious corporate 
deception and wholesale fraud in the backbone sector.
6.5.1 Deficient data on the Internet traffic growth
A  serious problem for those planning and investing in Internet infrastructure in the 
1990s was the lack of network knowledge on which considered calculations could 
be made. "It's not like transportation engineers putting down hard numbers for
The ‘luring’ was also aided by some dubious practices and bad advice given by an unscrupulous 
minority o f the bankers, technology analysts and commentators involved (Brody and Dunstan 
2003). With hindsight, the ‘independence’ o f the advice given is in doubt as some o f  the advisers 
stood to benefit directly, through consulting fees and stock holdings, from the companies they 
were recommending to clients.
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expanding the interstate highway system.” (Behr 2000, HOI). The dearth of useful 
and credible Internet traffic statistics, in particular, encouraged an over reliance on 
what turned out to be poor data.
The Internet is poorly understood statistically and economically, especially 
compared to other utility and transportation systems, because of the lack of 
representative published statistics on network size and traffic utilization. There are 
a number of reasons for this, including the newness of the system, the pace of its 
growth, its distributed scale of operation, and its heterogeneous ownership 
structures. Further, network owners have few, if any, incentives to publish 
representative traffic statistics - particularly as these may aid competitors. An 
alternative approach is instrumental measurement of the Internet by independent 
researchers but these attempts are usually flawed by unrepresentative distribution 
of sample points (cf. Murray and Claffy 2001). In terms of assessing backbone 
networks, as built, a number of statistics such as route miles, fibre miles, number 
of hubs have been published, for example in reports from TeleOeography (2002) 
and OECD (2002). Maleckf s (2004) analysis of investment in fibre optic network 
in the U.S. for example relied, primarily, on unverified bandwidth aggregates 
between cities derived from Boardwatch Directory maps and provider marketing 
maps. Bandwidth is a useful but ultimately unsatisfactory variable (it is like 
developing road policy based on the width of tarmac between cities with no 
knowledge of the number of moving cars).
A characteristic of most of the available published statistics is that they show the 
Internet is expanding quickly and in the boom of the late 1990s the best of these 
statistics, and those that got the most attention, were the ones showing the greatest 
degree of expansion. Yet, too often these grow1:h statistics were of dubious quality 
based on unscientific methods and unrepresentative samples. While some were 
well-meaning guestimates and others merely speculative, a few were fabricated - 
numbers literally plucked out of the air to feed to technology journalists and to be 
disseminated out to the financial markets receptive for the latest statistics 
supporting the boom mentality. Such statistical ‘evidence’ encouraged people to 
believe growth was happening everywhere and knew no bounds. It directly fed the
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dot-com hype and the hype, in turn, fed back to those generating evermore 
extravagant numbers (Jordan 2001).
The lack of representative data on data traffic growth opened the way for the 
biggest - and some claim the most fraudulent - piece of statistical evidence to 
circulate, that traffic Internet was doubling in size every 100 days or so. This 
corresponds to annual growth rates in excess of 1,000%. Importantly, the origin of 
this evidence is specific to traffic data at one time point and for one network, but 
it became accepted as universal truth. As with other technology myths, such as 
nuclear-war survivability of the early Internet (cf. Abbate 1999), once the 
statement circulates it gains credibility through retelling, particularly when the 
retelling is in high profile outlets, including in government reports, and by 
credible industry insiders (see Odlyzko 2003 for full discussion). For example, the 
doubling myth was stated as fact in a widely circulated 1998 U.S. Department of 
Commerce report’ ,^ while the former chairman of the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission, Reed Hundt, recited it in his book on 
telecommunications reform. You Say You Want A Revolution (2000). The power 
of such myths is, of course, that they tell people what they want to hear and in the 
late 1990s many people wanted to believe that the Internet was growing so fast 
that it was rewriting the laws of economics and would revolutionise society. And 
that the growth in traffic and infrastructure demands would continue to justify 
extravagant claims in business plans.
The origins of the 'traffic doubling every 100 days' myth have been traced, 
through forensic bibliographic analysis by Andrew Odlyzko (2003), back to 
comments made by UUNET chief scientist Mike O'Dell in 1996. It was 
subsequently repeated in a February 1997 WorldCom press release and further 
reiterated several times during the late 1990s by senior executives in WorldCom, 
including CEO Bemie Ebbers. Even as late as September 2000 it was the mantra 
of the company, with Kevin Boyne chief operating officer of WorldCom's
'■ The Emerging Digital Economy report (April, 1998) stated in its introduction: “Traffic on the 
Internet has been doubling every 100 days" (page 5). On page 11, the report also stated: “UUNET, 
one o f the largest Internet backbone providers, estimates that Internet traffic doubles every 100 
days’* (see <www.technology.gov/digeconomy/EmergingDig.pdf>).
316
Chapter Six: Marketing Maps
Internet division UUNET quoted in a Washington Post article saying 
unequivocally: “[o]ver the past five years, Internet usage has doubled every three 
months" (Behr 2000, HOI). In promulgating the myth so widely it is clear that it 
was useful to WorldCom's business strategies and as such they must share 
responsibilit}' for hype of the bandwidth boom (Economist 2002).
The roots of the myth of Traffic doubling ever}' 100 days’ are situated in the 
unprecedented growth spurt for the Internet in 1995-96 when it might well have 
been true, at least for a time for UUNET’s own network. However, detailed 
analysis by Odlyzko (2003) of a range of traffic data from different networks 
shows that over the period as a whole growth was only doubling annually. Yet, 
the "doubling ever} 100  days’ myth continued to be touted as truth for the rest of 
the decade and its simplicity and promise of potential revenues meant that it came 
to underlay the backbone boom (Dreazen 2002; Economist 2002). In this way, the 
m}th was dangerously misleading and damaged the whole industr}'. ‘'WorldCom’s 
phantom growth caused once-mighty telecommunications companies like AT&T 
to cut prices and slash costs in the crippling race to keep up, from which they 
never fully recovered’* (Belson 2005, no pagination).
6.5.2 WorldCom's rise to the World-Con ' bust
WorldCom’s relatively short corporate history began in 1985 with the arrival of 
Bemie Ebbers, then a small-time entrepreneur in Mississippi, as owner of a small 
telephone company called LDDS. Through numerous take-overs and aggressive 
business manoeuvres, Ebbers quickly grew LDDS into a multibillion dollar 
operation providing a full range of telecommunications services. In 1995 LDDS 
re-branded itself as WorldCom, a name befitting it globalist business ambitions. 
At its height, WorldCom was second only to AT&T in the U.S. long-distance 
telephone market and the dominant global player in the Internet backbone 
business. Importantly, this achievement was facilitated by neoliberal structural 
and regulatory changes that reconfigured the U.S. telecommunications landscape 
during this period. A key part of these changes was a lessening of government 
oversight of corporations’ financial practices.
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Figure 6.29: The fluctuating share price o f WorldCom in relation to its corporate history. (Source: 
graphic accompanying Belson 2005.)
Table 6.4: Principal WorldCom acquisitions, 1995-2001. (Sources: Jeter 2003; Sidak 2003, 241; 
corporate press releases.) *
Date Target Price (USD billions) Core business focus
Mar. 1995 WilTel Networks $2.5 Facilities-based CLEC
Aug. 1996 MFS, UUNET $12.5 IP network provider
Jan. 1997 Brooks Fiber $2.4 Facilities-based CLEC
Jan. 1998 CompuServe $1.3 ISP
Jan. 1998 ANS Communications $0.5 ISP
Aug. 1998 Embratel $2.3 Brazilian long-distance provider
Sept. 1998 MCI $40.0 Long-distance provider
[Oct. 1999 Sprint* $129.0 Long-distance provider ]
Oct. 1999 SkyTel $1.7 Paging service
July 2001 Digex $5.8 Hosting services
* This merger was effectively blocked by government regulators in the U.S. and EU.
WorldCom was a major contributor to the Internet backbone bubble in the second 
half of the 1990s, engineering corporate expansion on a monumental scale with a 
string of billion dollar acquisitions and mergers (Table 6.4). Key in these were the 
1996 take-over of MFS Communications (which included UUNET, then the
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biggest Internet backbone operator), swiftly followed by the acquisition of MCI 
for $42 billion, at the time the largest corporate merger in history. (This was an 
audacious move as MCI was over three times the size of WorldCom’s 
capitalization at the time). The stock value of WorldCom peaked in 1999 at 
$64.50 a share, representing a return of more than 7,000 times the initial 
investment (Figure 6.29). Ebbers was widely feted as a leader in the new breed of 
'bandwidth barons’ and in 1999 was named by Forbes magazine as one of the 
richest Americans with net worth of $1.4 billion, based largely on value of his 
WorldCom stockholding (Jeter 2003). Hindsight also shows that 1999 turned out 
to be nadir of the boom for WorldCom^^ and to some extent the wider 
telecommunications sector.
WorldCom’s tremendous fifteen year growth spurt really began to unravel in 2001 
when revenues fell sharply and the stock price plunged (Figure 6.29), and in the 
spring of 2002 the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission began investigating 
the corporation’s accounts. Soon after WorldCom’s reputation was brought 
crashing to earth with the public exposure of huge accounting irregularities of 
$3.8 billion'^, confirmed in a June 25 2002 company press release. The stock 
price plunged to 2 0  cents and many thousands of employees were laid off 
overnight. On July 21 2002 WorldCom was forced to file the largest bankruptcy 
in the world, amidst allegation of criminally fraudulent practices on the part of the 
senior executives. The media quickly re-branded the company as 'World-Con’.
WorldCom's fraud, along with the collapse of ENRON in December 2001 and the 
associated failure of the global accountancy firm, Arthur Anderson, represented a 
significant blow to confidence in the financial probity of U.S. business and 
prompted calls for new legislation on corporate governance. There were other 
repercussions; "[a]s people from all walks of life watched as WorldCom’s 
betrayal devastated their investments and retirement nest eggs; they wanted to 
know what went wrong -  when, why, and how?” (Jeter 2003, xxi). WorldCom’s
Note, at the end o f 1999 WorldCom planned a massive merger with Sprint a deal that would 
have been worth a staggering $129 billion. The merger was blocked by threatened monopolies 
investigation from U.S. and EU regulators.
' The total fraud was eventually tallied to $11 billion (Belson 2005).
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fall was also part of an industry-wide collapse in the market for network services 
in what has been called the ‘great telecoms swindle’ (Brody and Dunstan 2003). 
In the ensuing fallout, some commentators have focused blame on WorldCom for 
deliberately exaggerating the extent of Internet growth (e.g., Dreazen 2002; 
Economist 2002) and Sidak’s (2003) detailed analysis of failures in regulatory 
oversight of the telecommunications market, uses the ‘traffic doubling’ myth as a 
key element in his legal arguments on the potential liabilities of WorldCom. He 
argues that WorldCom’s market power brought a duty to report honestly: “In 
retrospect, it appears that WorldCom used this asymmetry of information to 
exaggerate the value of its stock by overstating the growth in Internet traffic 
volumes” (Sidak 2003, 230).
The proceeding stor>^  of backbone boom, deficient data and traffic growth myths 
is significant context in which to examine the representational politics of Internet 
infrastructure map. The marketing maps that WorldCom produced to promote 
their businesses played an important part in shaping the geographic imaginary of 
the Internet as a whole, and furthermore, some of this cartography was also 
complicit in highlighting the boom and denying deceit underlying it.
6.5.3 Decoding the design strategies in WorldCom's marketing maps
The network maps are a critical sales tool for us - throughout the world.
-  Henry Ritson, global marketing manager, UUNET - An MCI WorldCom Company, 
2000 .
The cartographic design strategies of the marketing maps used to sell network 
infrastructures will now be considered in detail in relation to one specific Internet 
backbone company, WorldCom. The focus of the analysis is on a sequence of 
different global scale marketing maps published online by the corporation 1997 to 
2001. The comparison of maps over time reveals the evolution of the design 
strategies to best promote the corporation’s growing network infrastructure. 
WorldCom*s maps are also noteworthy because they cover a significant period in 
the Internet’s development and represent an economically significant sample of 
the whole backbone industry' in the late 1990s.
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A sample of seven different maps are analysed here using the framework outlined 
in section 6.4.1 above (Figures 6.31 - 6.36 below). In addition to the cartographic 
materials gathered periodically from WorldCom's public corporate websites, an 
email interview was conducted in April 2000 with Henry Ritson, then global 
marketing manager at UUNET, who had responsibility for the production of the 
maps for much of this period (more detail published in Dodge 2000c).
Our Network
MCl's e x ten siv e  global n e tw o rk  is a  key a d v an tag e  to r b u s in e s s  c u s to m ers  of all s iz e s .
MCI®' o w n s ,  o f ^ a t e s ,  m onitors a n d  m aintains o n e  of th e  la rg e s t com m unications n e tw o rk s  in th e  w orld . Our ne tw ork  
facHities a re  th roughou t North A m erica, Latin A m erica, Europe, A frica, a n d  th e  A sia-Pacific reg ion , in m ore th a n  140 
co u n trie s  and  o v er 2 ,800  cities.
Our 98,0(Ki-miie fiber optic ne tw ork  is d e s ig n e d  to  sup p o rt th e  la rg e st a rray  of d a ta  com m unications a n d  voice 
p ro d u c ts  in th e  w orld .
MCI o w n s  th e  w o rld 's  fa r th e s t reach in g  global n e tw o rk  (b a s e d  on co m p an y -o w n ed  PO Ps), an d  s p a n s  m ore th a n  
4,500 Points of P re s e n c e  (PO Ps) th ro u g h o u t th e  w orld , w th  2.2 million global dial m odem s a n d  h igh-capacity  
co n n ec tio n s  to  m ore th a n  102 ,000  active  bu ild ings. The global IP n e tw o rk  c a n  circle th e  globe m ore th a n  four t im e s . 
AdcSionally, MCI rem ains th e  m ost c o n n e c te d  Internet b a ck b o n e  provider w ith th e  g re a te s t num ber of A utonom ous 
S y stem  n e tw o rk  co n n ec tio n s . The co m p an y 's  e x p an s iv e  IP footprint, coup led  w ith its direct in te rco n n ec tio n s, e x c e e d s  
all o ther comipetitor n e tw o rk s  an d  e n ab le s  its b u s in e s s  c u sto m e rs  a n d  ISPs to  re a c h  m ore destin a tio n s  directly th rough  
MCl's global IP b ack b o n e  th a n  an y  o ther carrie r.
MCI o ffe rs  th e  f a s te s t  s p e e d s  available over IP to d a y . W e w e re  th e  first to  rou te  a n d  sw itch  O C-192 IP ne tw ork  
tra ffic , MCI a lso  h a s  tlie  m ost sca lab le  IP n e tw o rk  available, offering  s p e e d s  from dial to  OC-48.
MCl's IP d a ta  so lu tions a re  directly built into a  w ho lly -ow ned  global ne tw o rk , for direct, s a f e ,  s e c u re  a c c e s s .
Skilled te c h n ic ia n s  in N etw ork O pera tions  C en te rs  a round  th e  w orld  monitor th e  ne tw ork  for optimal e ffic iency  24 
h o u rs  a  d ay , 365 d a y s  a  s ^ a r .
Figure 6.30: Promotional description o f M Cl’s network infrastructure. The style and content is 
emblematic o f the form o f marketing rhetoric promulgated by WorldCom throughout the 1990s 
bandwidth boom. (Source: MCI website, March 2005.)
6.5.3.1 WorldCom's network marketing rhetoric
Before examining a sample of the marketing maps produced by WorldCom, it is 
instructive to first consider the kinder promotional context in which they were 
typically embedded. This is best achieved by looking at the structure and content 
of the corporate website describing the network and how this frames the maps
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themselves. The March 2005 MCI^^ corporate website presentation is used as a 
representative exemplar.
The textual marketing narratives, unsurprisingly, describe the network in an 
emphatic fashion, stressing its capacity and extensive geographic reach (Figure
6.30). The tone of language used - dynamic verbs, fact-laden statements, 'punchy’ 
phrasing - is textbook marketing speak. However, one can also see that this is 
carefully crafted language, for example with the conscious insertion of caveats 
and subtle qualifiers where necessary to avoid making factually false statements. 
The text is also peppered with engineering jargon, a direct call to scientific 
authorit}\ signifying this as a technical sales pitch rather than a consumer one.
The narrative’s primary aim is articulating that MCTs network as the best 
available, tapping into obvious rhetoric on size, scope, speed and so on (Figure
6.30). Archetypal claims include: *‘[t]he company’s expansive IP footprint, 
coupled with its direct interconnections, exceeds all other competitor networks”, 
"MCI offers the fastest speeds available over IP today.” Other common marketing 
practices deployed by MCI in this narrative, include the claims that the company 
was the ‘first* and is thus at the forefront of Internet development; that the 
company owns and controls the whole network; connoting that the company can 
meet all customer’s needs -  ‘the complete solution’. Additionally, several 
statements directly outline the benefits to prospective customers, stressing not 
only ‘biggest is best’ but also security, reliability, and safety; for example, the 
closing assertion of the text highlights the fact that the network is monitored by 
skilled technicians to ensure "optimal efficiency 24 hours a day, 365 day a year.” 
This kind of statement chimes particularly well in the current risk-averse climate 
of the so-called ‘fear economy’.
Beside what the marketers choose to emphasise in the text, branding messages 
also work through what is left out. The most striking omission in this marketing 
statement is any mention of pricing. By not referring to low costs, the company is
WorldCom re-branded itself as MCI in July 2002 following the bankruptcy.
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positioning itself as a premium ser\dce that does not have to attempt to compete 
on cheapness. Also, omitted are customer testimonials.
Another core rhetorical strand underpinning the text is the stress on the global 
credentials of the company (thereby revealing clearly it's globalist business 
strategy). The word 'global' is used seven times and 'world' five times; emphasis 
is also given to the company's presence across the world with network facilities 
"in more than 140 countries and over 2,800 cities" (Figure 6.30). The 
corporation's marketing is clearly attempting to project an image of itself as being 
'in the world' and positioned to dominate global telecommunications. The 
'worldliness' of the rhetoric also implicitly offers the cachet of globalism to 
prospective customers and investors. The global rhetoric as a promotional device 
is very common in corporate brand marketing, particularly in IT, 
telecommunications and airline sectors (cf. De Cock et al. 2001; Goldman et a l 
2003; Thurlow and Jaworski 2003). Indeed, being seen to be 'global' is often used 
as a key selling point to domestic buyers and investors. Clearly, if a company does 
not lay claim to be a global player in the age of globalisation one might question 
their corporate virility.
The network maps themselves were embedded on the 'Global Presence' Web 
page (Figure 6.31). The page directly spells out corporation's network sale pitch 
(what marketers call the 'unique selling proposition') to customers and, 
especially, investors, starting with the forceful opening tag line: ''For reach, 
reliabilit}, speed, and security, our global network is unparalleled.'' In just one 
line, the author tries to encompass pretty much all of the key product advantages. 
A hierarchy of maps from global to regional to national is then presented to the 
reader. The maps are directly cited in a process of 'virtual witnessing' (see chapter 
four) and "[f]or the experienced technical customer, they act as 'hard facts' to 
back up our marketing claims" (Ritson interview 2000). Essentially the invitation 
to the reader says: 'go on, look at the maps and see for yourself just how great our 
network really is'. This is the classic appeal to unimpeachable cartographic 
authority to justify the 'unique selling proposition' for the network. The evidential 
authority of the map is, itself, backed up by indexical 'facts' listed in the seven 
bullet points (Figure 6.31), that detail the 'strengths' in terms of some 'honest'
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engineering numbers. Overall, then the marketing materials are designed to 
convey a sense 'hard-headed' seriousness and technological competence, and to 
achieve this connotation they draw directly on the authoritative visual and 
narrative rhetoric of engineering, cartography and statistics.
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6.53.2 WorldCom's network marketing maps
The map artefacts are produced ‘by hand' in Adobe Illustrator using spreadsheets 
of data of network connections provided by the engineering department; '‘this 
takes several days per map'' (Ritson interview 2000). A quarterly update cycle is 
used as ‘'an appropriate cost/benefit balance between keeping the maps up-to-date 
and the resource implications of getting maps drawn to print quality" (Ritson 
interview 2 0 0 0 ).
A critical point to note is that the maps show inter-city routes and installed 
capacit}^ only. They do not show how much of the capacity is active, or how much 
data traffic is actually flowing across the network routes. The routes between hubs 
are represented as logical links and not geographic cable pathways. Given the 
speed of change in ‘Internet time', the temporal accuracy with static maps is 
always problematic, as Mike O'Dell then Chief Scientist at UUNET notes: ‘'the 
engineering data change constantly, so there is a challenge to ‘smooth' some of 
detail so the [maps] stay relatively accurate while at the same time don't violate 
external statements of 'over <mumble> locations' where people literally count 
dots on drawings to check-up on such statements" (pers. communications, March 
2000). A balance must also be struck between accuracy and artistic licence. The 
maps are published on the corporate website and identified by text and logos as 
officially sanctioned public statements of the corporation. Therefore, they have to 
tread a fine line between portraying the infrastructure in the most favourable way 
and wilful deception. Outright lying on the map could too easily be exposed and 
open the corporation to adverse publicity, potential accusation of deliberately 
fraudulent statements and criminal deception of investors/customers.
The first map in the sample is the “UUNET Global Network", dated first quarter 
1997 (Figure 6.32). Although clearly identified through the UUNET logo, the 
network was a subsidiar}' of the WorldCom corporation by this point (see Table
6.4 above). In graphic design terms this is the simplest marketing map of the 
WorldCom set, being a muted black and white line art composition. It has a 
distinct engineering feeling about it and has many stylistic commonalties with 
ARPANET network maps (see Figure 6.3 above).
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Figure 6.32: A WorldCom global scale marketing map showing the newly acquired UUNET 
backbone from spring 1997. (Source: Originally published on corporate website. No longer 
available.)
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The title clearly proclaims this to be a global network, but in terms of the range of 
infrastructure mapped this is clearly a problematic claim to sustain. While the 
U.S. territory is well covered, everywhere else looks sparsely connected. There is 
a rather tenuous feel to the links to Europe: just two thin lines terminating in 
London. Asia-Pacific looks better in some regards, with several long network 
lines carving straight across the Pacific ocean, but there is no actual mesh of 
networking within the region. The map is thus somewhat unhelpful because it 
shows too well that vast swathes of the world are far outside the range of 
WorldCom’s networking. To try to counter this and to increase the perception of 
network range, the cartographer has shrunk the extents of the map - cropping off 
the top and bottom of the world and removing a large slice through the middle of 
the Eurasian continent, including the whole of India.
However, the reach of the network looks rather more positive than the range, with 
many of the major hubs (Tokyo, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York and London) 
of globalisation interconnected by UUNET / WorldCom. The map focuses 
effectively on identifying the cities connected, rather than the countries. Other 
well known ‘important’ places for global business activities are also connected 
and consciously identified - Singapore, Hong Kong, Paris, Frankfurt and Zurich.
WorldCom’s global network is projected consciously to create an image of 
corporate centrality. The hub of operations in the Northeast of America is visually 
privileged by its positioning in the middle of the map view. The map is a textbook 
example of ethnocentricism, with North orientated at the top, and the U.S. centred 
and complete. Centrality for the U.S. and for WorldCom is doubly reinforced 
because there are no links out to the periphery of globalisation (South America 
and Africa are wholly bypassed) and all links lead back to the North American 
heartland^^. However, other core regions of the world economy are not connected 
by WorldCom’s infrastructure.
Except for a somewhat curious link between Monaco and Singapore, that does the 
uncomfortable cartographic trick o f disappearing at one edge and then reappearing on the opposite 
side of the world.
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In terms of the next two cartographic design strategies for promotional 
cartography, abundance and capacity, the performance of the 1997 map is mixed. 
The North American heartland appears at first glance to have an abundance of 
network routes criss-crossing it. However, on closer inspection it is apparent that 
many U.S. states do not have a hub and the lines cross over them without 
connecting. Outside North America, the network fares even worse - just four hubs 
in Asia-Pacific and only eight to cover Europe. The impression is not one of an 
abundant network throughout the world from this map, but one of a largely 
unconnected globe. The capacity of the network again looks relatively healthy for 
North America, with some well proportioned black lines representing what were 
at the time high-bandwidth DS-3 routes (45 Mbps) and fairly large circular hubs, 
but the international routes run at a much lower capacity (1 Mbps) and are 
mapped by rather spindly looking lines and dot-sized hub symbols that connotes a 
rather frail network overall.
Figure 6.33: Global scale backbone marketing maps produced by WorldCom’s UUNET backbone. 
May 1998. (Source: Originally published on corporate websites. No longer available.)
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The next map in the sequence moves forward about a year, showing UUNET’s 
‘Global Backbone Network’ in May 1998 (Figure 6.33). This map is clearly the 
product of the same design approach as the 1997, however, the coloured version is 
arguably actually less effective than the black and white version it updates. The 
legend is somewhat simplified and the technical language is toned-down 
compared to the 1997 map.
Little has changed in terms of range of the network in that year. If anything, there 
actually seem to be fewer long links, particularly in Asia-Pacific (the dropping of 
links between Tokyo-San Francisco and Tokyo-Sydney being obvious). There are 
several more links across the North Atlantic but they are tightly clustered 
together. The lack of network range in the northern latitudes now also seems 
problematic, with the empty’ extents of Greenland and the Canadian Northern 
Territories drawn large (and exaggerated by the map projection). The corporate 
centrality of WorldCom in this Mercator view of the world remains potent and if 
anything is somewhat enhanced by the imposition of the three-class colour-coding 
of nations. The golden-coloured corporate heartland of North America and parts 
of Northern Europe comes to the fore on the map, followed by a select few beige 
nations deemed privileged enough to have a UUNET hub. The rest of the world 
literally shrinks into the background of the map by the application of the light 
‘natural’ green wash. This signifies unidentified, unimportant, unprofitable 
territoiy’ outside the sphere of WorldCom’s corporate concerns. Yet, as a network 
marketing map, the presentation remains quite ineffectual in terms of denoting 
abundance and especially capacity.
The next map shows a dramatic shift in design, presenting ‘UUNET’s Global 
Internet Backbone’ draped over a stylised ‘marshmallow’ world, from the summer 
of 1999 (Figure 6.34). The map has lost all its clunky engineering legacies, likely 
a function of ‘proper’ marketing people taking over the design of the network 
maps, under the direction of Henry Ritson, at UUNET’s office in Cambridge, UK 
(interview 2000). The design styling would develop over the next three years, but 
remain quite consistent in terms of colours, key symbology and fonts (see Figures 
6.35 and 6.36 below).
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In terms of demonstrating network range, the 1999 map is quite an improvement 
over the previous two examples. The somewhat unusual choice of projection 
means that many long orange-coloured route lines sweep from the west coast of 
the U.S. across the entire width of the map to reach the Asia-Pacific cities. These 
routes are represented by smooth curves which draw the eye along their full 
length from U.S. origin points to distant destination in the Orient. The lines are 
also spread apart, aiding range identification and increasing the perception of an 
abundance of routes. However, one must question the validity of this presentation 
of routes. Obviously, all route lines are generalised to some degree on marketing 
maps but they should probably be shown actually going in the right direction 
around the world! Additionally, showing routes in this way also unintentionally 
punctures further the globalist claims of the corporation, as the lines can be seen 
to pass over all of South America, Africa and India.
UUNETs Global Internet Backbone
for mors inhrmsdom *Wl «mrai.iiii.net U U N E T
Figure 6.34: Global scale backbone marketing maps produced by WorldCom’s UUNET backbone, 
June 1999. (Source: Originally published on corporate websites. No longer available.)
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Unlike the two previous examples, the 1999 map shows the whole extent of the 
world (the dissected Indian landmass is restored). The projection is a ‘one-ocean' 
viewpoint focused on the Atlantic, with the Pacific Ocean effectively disappearing 
at the margins of the map. This, in combination with the unification of the 
Eurasian landmass, creates clear problems for the persuasive presentation of a 
supposedly global network. The whole left-hand side of the map, stretching east 
from Stockholm to the Bering Straits, becomes an eye-catching vast white void, 
entirely un-penetrated by WorldCom.
These problems with map extents and the display of route range also impact on 
the sense of centralit}' in the overall presentation. The graphic centre of the map is 
now occupied by Western Europe. In a design sense, the overall map looks 
unbalanced - the dense left side appears to outweigh the empty void on the right. 
This ‘off-centred’ presentation in relation of corporate power was quickly 
corrected in the next version of the network map (see Figure 6.35).
The reach of the network is still well-defined with the maps focusing on cities that 
are connected. Unlike the previous map, two different sizes of hubs are 
distinguished by the size of the symbol and label font. Indeed, the strength of the 
clusters of hub symbols tends to dominate the map. rather than the route lines 
between them. The primacy of cities is further enhanced by the greater degree of 
exclusivity on this map compared to the previous ones. The background is 
represented by expansive empt>  ^ continents. This is a conscious de-politicised 
rendering of the globe, a neoliberal terra nullius for globalising capital.
The density of city hubs and interlinks in the two core regions of North America 
and Western Europe scores well in terms of the cartographic design strategy for 
abundance. Yet, the super-abundance in these parts of the map also makes the rest 
of the world look more starkly empty. Pragmatically coping with such a large 
contrast is difficult; “You try and show a map of the world’s Internet and you 
can’t ever find a scale or legend which will cope with the differences in line 
density between Northeast of the USA and more ‘Internet remote’ areas” (Ritson 
interview 2000). The capacity of the network is better demonstrated in this map, 
with the use of thicker lines and inclusion of colour coding of routes by
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bandwidth. One can speculate as to whether the ambiguity in the representation of 
capacity has positive connotative impacts. Of course, the use of data classification 
to group diverse features together into a small number of categories is a common 
approach in statistical cartography (as noted in chapter five with regard to 
choropleth maps in particular). While classification is useful for simplification it 
also works to mask variability in the data. This masking could have useful 
benefits in marketing by maximising the impression of capacity because, without 
knowledge of the underlying data distribution, the map reader cannot tell how 
many of those bright orange-coloured lines are 45Mbps bandwidth and how many 
are really at 1.5Mbps - this is a not an insignificant difference in capacity, after 
all.
Moving forward in time by another year, we come to the marketing map of 
‘UUNET’s Global Internet network’ for June 2000 (Figure 6.35). The corporate 
fortunes of WorldCom were beginning to slide by this point, as the growth in 
capitalisation through the second half of the 1990s began to slow (see Figure 6.29 
above). In overall design style, there is clearly a lot of common heritage with the 
previous map. However, some of the more radical elements in the 1999 design 
have been toned down. Most obviously, the centring of the map is changed to give 
North America back its ‘rightfuF (in terms of corporate power) privileged 
position. Also, the unusual bubble shaped rendering of the continental outlines in 
the 1999 map has been dropped in favour of more conventional geographic 
shapes.
In the same fashion as the 1997 and 1998 maps, the unified world is split and the 
Tndian cut’ is again made to shrink the extents of the Eurasian continent. There 
are a whole lot of long route lines, rendered in bright colours, across the pale blue 
North Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Most run arrow-straight and have been 
consciously spread apart to improve their legibility and also their potency in 
connoting range. The parallel track-like routes to Europe in particular seem to 
cover the whole ocean. The extra long route line from Seattle across the Pacific 
and down through the whole of China to reach Singapore is also demonstrative of 
extreme range. Linked to the overall impression of network range, UUNET’s 
infrastructure now also appears to offer many more direct routes than in previous
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maps, especially connecting into European cities. All the improvements in the 
presentation of the range of the network in the June 2000 map are, however, more 
than offset by the complete failure to demonstrate the reach of UUNET’s network.
The slightly larger scale of mapping employed and the growing density of 
network route lines and hubs means that the cartographer chose not to identify the 
cities. The simple removal of labels to improve legibility is actually problematic 
for persuasive communication, as readers cannot tell which ‘right places’ the 
network reaches. If one knows something of the geography of world cities, it is 
possible to make plausible guesses, but prospective customers and investors can 
not tell for certain which cities are connected. To the untrained eye, the scattering 
of red squares of the UUNET hub on the map now appear to be a random 
collection of points. Additionally, I would argue that without citing cities by name 
(and country borders as well) the visual-cognitive link between infrastructure and 
territory is broken on this map; the result seems like a disengaged network 
floating above the world, the network is rendered so exclusively that it does not 
actually connect with the world. This impacts directly and significantly on the 
power of map to conjure up the required sense of tangibility in reader’s minds. 
The logical network in this map looks too virtual to be really real.
In terms of demonstrating abundance and capacity, this map also achieves mixed 
results. The underlying network has expanded greatly over the 1999 extents and 
there is an appearance of a denser meshing of links in the North American 
heartland and also in Europe. Indeed, the overwhelming abundance of mapped 
infrastructure, at this scale, completely smothers the Northeast U.S. and the San 
Francisco Bay area; as such it is counterproductive to cartographic legibility. The 
broader based growth of the route links in Japan, across Australia and branching 
down to Puerto Rico in the Caribbean are, however, useful additions for evoking 
an abundant, successful network. There are now so many links on most routes that 
the cartographer has chosen not to try to show them all, instead the overlapping 
presence of multiple links is indicated by placing small numbers (‘x2’, ‘x3’) 
embedded in the middle of the line. Whilst an acceptable pragmatic technical 
solution to convey information factually, it does nothing in terms of design 
strategies for marketing maps to evoke in readers the power of network
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infrastructure being built by UUNET. The result is that while the number of routes 
is many times greater than the year before, it does not look like it from the map.
g:
9
Figure 6.35: Global scale backbone marketing map o f WorldCom’s UUNET network, June 2000. 
(Source: Originally published on corporate website. No longer available.)
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The display of route capacity is partially improved by using six different 
coloured-coded line categories instead of the three classes in the 1999 map. 
However, the choice of colours seems rather random and does not suggest a 
building intensit)' through hue; although line weight is sensibly employed to 
suggest increasing capacity and the overly thick style of the 1999 is avoided. 
Looking at the key, it is also worth noting how much the topmost network 
capacity has increased. In the one year between, the highest bandwidth links 
(shown by dark green route lines on Figure 6.35 above) have grown fourfold from 
2.45Gbps to lO.OGbps. However, these routes in the Northeast U.S. (in a ring 
linking NYC-DC-Chicago) are, however, hard to spot being heavily over-plotted 
with other lines.
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The last map available from this era of WorldCom’s dominance of Internet 
backbone infrastructure comes from January 2001 (Figure 6.36). The company 
was experiencing business difficulties at this point with falling revenues, large 
debts and a steeply declining stock price (Figure 6.29). The projection and extents 
of the underlying base map remain unchanged, along with the problematic lack of 
city label needed to identify the network bubs. The demonstration of network 
range has been improved on trans-Pacific routes with the links being stretched 
into long swooping curves that seem to be pulling Asia towards the North 
American heartland. The network infrastructure has also expanded, finally, into 
the 'global south’ with a notable series of route lines dangling down from U.S. to 
Brazil. This positive display of range is somewhat undone, however, by the 
removal of lines across the Atlantic, with the tremendous track-lines of the 2000 
map replaced by two rather understated gold-coloured routes into London. The 
demonstration of abundance has intensified in this map, with even more over­
plotting of link lines to create an impossible tangle in the core networked regions. 
The capacity encoding remains unchanged, apart from the somewhat strange 
addition of one new category^ at the bottom. This new low bandwidth level of just 
64 Kbps looks embarrassingly small compared to the rest and has been seemingly 
added to accommodate a single new route in Latin America, likely to be between 
Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires (although one cannot be sure of this reach, due to the 
lack of city labels).
The discussion of WorldCom’s global marketing maps is concluded by examining 
the last version presented on the MCI^^ corporate website, as of March 2005 
(Figure 6.37). The map was a very different design origin to the Ritson produced 
ones. It was delivered as an interactive Flash application and served partially as an 
index map to access more detailed regional scale maps. The overall projection 
used is a ‘standard’ geographic world map centred interestingly on Europe, rather 
than the U.S. Harking back to the map from 1997, country boundaries are added 
back in. Indeed, of all the cartographic attempts to justify the claims of offer a 
global network, this map presents some of the most plausible evidence, with the
This was the name WorldCom’s post-bankruptcy corporate entity. The company disappeared as 
an independent entity having been purchased by Verizon in January 2006.
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links into several countries in South America, to India and into Africa (admittedly 
only to two cities in South Africa).
Figure 6.37: Global scale backbone marketing maps o f the MCI network in March 2005. (Source: 
Originally published on corporate websites. 2001 map is no longer available.)
The map has a veiy much simplified symbology compared to earlier examples and 
there is no legend, logo, date, contact information or other corporate 
identification. In terms of identifying network reach, no effort is made at all, as no 
hub locations are indicated. Only two classes of network links are distinguished 
(green ones and orange-coloured ones), but it is not clear what their capacity is. 
Only in terms of demonstrating network range does the 2005 map score 
reasonably well; the links running down through the South Atlantic to South 
Africa are especially effective. The impression of range, however, is diminished 
because the Atlantic-centred projection necessarily splits the Pacific, so breaking 
the routes here in half. In this case utilising a world map with an equal area 
projection to denote their network would serve the company’s marketing better.
6.6 The map and the myth
In conclusion, I want to consider the relationship between cartographic 
imagination displayed in the network marketing maps and the hype of Internet
339
Chapter Six: Marketing Maps
growth, particularly the 1990s myth that it was doubling in size every 100 days in 
terms of traffic flows. Cartography has long been created and consciously 
deployed to serve the exclusive and exclusionary interests of private capital. The 
emergence of the marketing map genre over the last century has been one of the 
most conspicuous developments in cartography (although surprisingly little 
analysed, in comparison to scholarly preoccupations with territorial and thematic 
mapping of nation-states). Maps are deployed to differentiate one network from 
another. As Henry Ritson, UUNET global marketing manager put it:
''What we have to illustrate is that, since the Internet is ‘many networks 
connected' you get better, faster, more reliable service if the network you 
connect into first is able to take you most of the way to your destination ‘on 
an uncongested motorway' rather than hitch-hiking across a variety of 
crowded lanes. Our network maps basically show the area of the Internet that 
we have the ability to manage directly - and if we are managing it we can 
maintain high quality  ^of service ..." (interview, 2000).
Internet infrastructure marketing maps are also as much about impressing 
investors as luring customers from competing networks. By analysing network 
maps, such as sequence published online by WorldCom, it was demonstrated that 
marketing maps attempt to denote the strengths of a infrastructure to investors and 
differentiating it from competitors through eight distinct cartographic design 
strategies: range, reach, directness, centrality, abundance, capacity, silencing and 
exclusivity. However, it was also apparent that they had mixed success in tapping 
into these eight strategies in a connotative sense. As such, the analysis present 
here demonstrates the real difficulties in effectively mapping Internet 
infrastructure even when the interest being served is dedicated exclusively to 
commercial persuasion without the need for objectivity. The most significant 
failing in the maps overall was the all too obvious mismatch between the claims 
of corporations to offer a global network service and the mapped reality of their 
infrastructure that barely covers a third of the world in terms of area (although 
they do probably connect the majority of the significant population from the 
business perspective). The overall connotation is that much of the world remains 
out of their reach.
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Despite the design failings in the maps, they are produced frequently by 
corporations and often prominently displayed on the website, and are obviously an 
integral part of the company's marketing message (as shown by the analysis of 
fifty corporate websites; see Table 6.1). The maps' primary goal is to justify bold 
marketing claims by providing attractive and authoritative visual proof of the 
extent of the company's network. The maps draw on the reserves of cartographic 
gravitas - people tend to believe what they see on the map as real, particularly 
when it is shown using familiar framework of a Euro- centric world projection. At 
least three distinct truth claims can be discerned from the use of cartography in 
service of Internet infrastructure marketing;
(1) 'Biggest is best' : The maps can prove, better than other rhetoric devices, that 
the network is as large as is claimed. One can see it really does connected 
continents, link all those important cities, span oceans. The expansive scale of the 
network as demonstrated beyond doubt on the map implies a successful company.
(2) The network is made tangible through the map. The rendering of invisible, 
unknowable, virtual network links into real lines inscribed onto a familiar 
landscape connects customers instinctively to the infrastructure (as discussed in 
chapter four). As Ritson commented: “The Internet is such an intangible concept 
for people that it is easy for them to assume that whichever Internet provider they 
choose, they will still connect to the 'same Internet*.... The network maps show 
what the infrastructure really is" (interview 2000). Of course, the map can show 
this with particular emphasis to make it look rather more than it is.
(3) The third and most important truth claim is that of trust. The network, when 
mapped must look permanent, safe and trustworthy. The backbone marketing map 
connotes: 'we are here to stay. Look at all the infrastructure we've built. You can 
trust us with your precious data.'
In relation to WorldCom case study it is now apparent that faith in this 
corporation generated by cartographic trust was misplaced. Events happening o ff  
the map fatally damaged the truth claims made on the maps. Despite having the 
biggest Internet backbone, WorldCom went bankrupt in July 2002. More widely.
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the crash of the telecoms sector in 2002 exposed the hollowness of the hype that 
underlay all those marketing maps. The maps were bom out of the myth of 
internet Traffic doubling ever}' 100 days' and they were also an element in 
promulgating this mythical narrative. They were visual, irrefutable, cartographic 
prove of the growth happening and the need for more and more bandwidth. Ritson 
himself repeated this mantra in relation to WorldCom:
“the network has been growing at 1000% per year for several years now. The 
map can go significantly out of date in a week. It is a terrifying moving 
target. Tm not even sure if anyone has ever had to map anything that grows 
this fast before." (interview 2000).
Of course, the maps in the late 1990s may have been connoting great traffic 
growth but they were not actually denoting that. They were showing the 
speculative building of infrastructure. They denoted more and more bandwidth, 
but investors could not see (and some probably did not want to see) that all those 
thick gigabit route lines were only half full, a quarter full, had only a trickle of 
data on them or were actually empty. It was easy to believe that maps were 
showing growth in demand - after all, why would a commercial company be 
building links between cities if they did not have the traffic to fill it? Airlines do 
not fly with empty planes, why would backbones networks be running empty 
pipes - and then spending billions building yet more pipes?
Basically, WorldCom were claiming to be installing much more infrastructure 
than they actually needed to hide losses and artificially boost revenues. They gave 
the impression of canying much more traffic than they actually were. 
“[WorldCom] routinely counted fiber-optic capacity as traffic, rendering the 
statistic essentially worthless as a barometer of the Internet's growth’' (Dreazen 
2002, no pagination). WorldCom's backbone maps were complicit in this 
deception, they were compliant in mis-selling the nature of the demand.
Although, accusing the maps per se of misleading is disingenuous at another level. 
The maps were doing what they were supposed to be doing. They were marketing 
maps, not independently-produced, informational maps, and made no pretence at 
denoting traffic. Indeed, within their own parameters and agenda of marketing
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they were accurate and in some senses honest. It was just that there was no other 
source of information - so people believed the claims of doubling growth every 
three months and took the maps that were available (and pushed out by 
companies) as credible and cartographically trustworthy evidence^ \
Wliat of the Internet infrastructure business now the dust from the 2002 crash has 
settled? Well it is still there - the Internet as a whole did not miss a beat and still 
continues to grow at a healthy rate. WorldCom, however, has vanished as rapidly 
as it appeared. The tainted name itself was erased when the corporation emerged 
from bankruptcy in April 2004 as MCI. At the start of 2006, MCI was to be 
acquired by Verizon, a major U.S. telephone company, for a mere $5.3 billion. 
Meanwhile, Bemie Ebbers, the former chief executive of WorldCom was found 
guilty' in federal court of orchestrating the fraud and in July 2005 received as 25 
year jail sentence.
■’ Indeed, the marketing maps from ISPs in this period have been exploited as credible evidence in 
a good number o f academic studies on Internet topology and growth (e.g., Malecki 2002, 2004; 
Townsend 2001) and for policy analysis (e.g., OECD 2002).
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Conclusions: 
The Cartographic Imagination of Cyberspace
fHhe domains that explorers chart, and the maps they produce, open up territories to 
interests that view them differently ... be they gold deposits or stands of timber or 
dispensable human cultures. The maps serve as the groundplan, the blueprint, the graphic 
agenda for subsequent exploitation.
-  Stephen S. Hall, Mapping the Next Millennium, 1992.
How many maps, in the descriptive or geographical sense, might be needed to deal 
exhaustively with a given space, to code and decode all its meanings and content?
-  Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 1991.
7.1 Introduction
In conclusion, I would argue that this thesis, along with the wider research into 
cybergeography I have undertaken, has made three contributions to 
understanding the evolving forms and functions of cartography in terms of: (1) 
showing how cyberspace cartographies are new, significant politically in the 
work they do, and as such are worthy of examination; (2) applying a semiotic 
reading of meanings and critical cartographic deconstruction of a range of novel 
empirical case studies; and (3) revealing valuable information about how 
cyberspace has developed and its varied spatial characteristics as seen through 
the cartographic imagination created to make it visible and tangible to different 
audiences.
7.1.1 m iy do cyberspace cartographies matter?
I have argued that cyberspace cartographies are important because they chart 
new virtual spaces of human interaction and economic transaction, and they are 
deployed in service to powerful interests that seek to shape what these spaces 
will be like in the future. They are active components in many wider-ranging 
cyberspace discourses, in large part because they create potent imaginable 
geographies for virtual media and hidden infrastructures that are otherwise
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intangible and hard to comprehend. (The two major discourses analysed in 
chapter five and six were role of the Internet in development as represented in 
statistical maps and the commercial promotion of Internet infrastructure 
performed through marketing maps.) As explained in chapter four, the impact of 
spatial metaphors and geographic representations on the perception of what 
cyberspace looks like, how it works and what it can do, can be quite profound 
precisely because it is essentially an invisible infrastructure. Their production 
and consumption occurs in various settings, for example, many cyberspace 
cartographies are used operationally to document network structure, as 
inscriptions to virtually witness online experiments and measurement, or as 
means of the legitimising results of policy analysis. Many more maps of 
cyberspace are used strategically by business interests, as the ‘blueprints' and 
‘groundplan' for commercial exploitation, to use Stephen Hall's phraseology 
from the quote above. Most significantly, like all maps, cyberspace 
cartographies, regardless of their declared purpose, have an impact in shaping 
how people perceive cyberspace, and as such need to be subjected to academic 
analysis, considering both how they work semiotically and also what power they 
have in the wider world in terms of effecting change.
Furthermore, cyberspace cartographies are increasingly prevalent and should be 
seen as a distinctive aspect of contemporary mapping practice and part of wider 
visual cultures. Yet, it is also important to recognize that the maps of cyberspace 
have multiple and sometimes unstable meanings which makes academic 
interpretation and deconstruction challenging. In the main case study chapters, 
the analysis focused on the semiotic strategies adopted by the mapmakers in 
discourses of development and marketing, drawing a distinction between the 
denotative and connotative uses of cartographic symbolisation to effect particular 
kinds of meanings. Such an analytical route can be profitable, but as Vujakovic 
(1999a, 4, original emphasis) tellingly notes from his work how the news media 
exploits cartography: “[cjare has to be taken to not read too much, or too little, 
into cartographic images. Any apparent contradictions between a map and the 
discourse in which it is embedded may reflect the limitations of cartography as a
representational medium, ........  rather than a hidden agenda or internal tensions
within the discourse itself. We may, however, be equally tempted to treat the
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medium as too limited (especially if restricting analysis to linguistic approaches) 
and ignore the (visual) subtleties of the form.”
Furthermore, another reason why cyberspace cartographies merit scrutiny by 
cartographic scholars is because, by and large, they are produced outside the 
mainstream map-making industry. In some senses, then, they are a challenge to 
established knowledge and practices but also, I would argue, an opportunity for 
cartographers to gain insights and novel ideas on map ontology and mapping 
epistemologies. As discussed in chapter three there are many new groups and 
individuals becoming active as map-makers to meet their needs to represent and 
understand cyberspace. (Although, the authorship of the most significant 
elements in the cartographic imaginary of the cyberspace originates from the 
United States predominantly.) Cyberspace cartographies, I feel, are a key part of 
a larger contemporary reinvigoration of creative mapping practices, as well as 
popularising new map uses. They also open up new scope for resistance to 
established representations of space as more people are empowered by 
fashioning their o \^Ti maps rather than consuming predetermined cartographic 
products (cf. Sui 2008 for discussion of the implication of the new 'wikT ethos 
of user-generated content to the GIS industry).
WTiilst in some respects the shifting power of authorship is creative and 
empowering, there are also serious questions about the effectiveness of many of 
results in normative terms of design quality, intelligibility, accuracy and more 
general appreciate of aesthetics. Given the unstable meanings, it is also important 
to keep in mind when interrogating the maps that the mapmaker, or the mapping 
institution, themselves may well not be cognisant of the implications of particular 
design decisions made. In some cases denotative choice in design and symbology 
produce connotative meanings that are not at all what the mapmaker would have 
intended. This is evident in projection selection for many of the world maps used 
to display network infrastructure for marketing purposes that diminish the 
connotative sense of the corporations coverage of the globe (chapter six). 
Acknowledging such unconscious failings in mapmakers and their unintended 
impacts is not new of course (cf. Wright 1942), but poor projection selection 
persists even with people who, one might think, would know better, geographers
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writing undergraduate textbooks (Vujakovic 2002b). So the mismatch between 
denotative intentions and connotative outcomes in cyberspace cartography 
should not been seen as necessarily implying a ‘hidden agenda' to deceive, yet it 
can still have serious implications for how readers (mis)interpret the mapped 
world.
Besides questions of effectiveness and imperfect understanding of connotative 
meanings by authors, it should also be acknowledged that the drawing of maps of 
cyberspace - even empowering, counter-hegemonic ones - are also acts of 
boundary-making, which inevitably contribute to the commodification of virtual 
spaces in the service of some particular interest or set of interlocking interests. 
Once cyberspace is mapped, it is changed. The nature of space becomes known, 
exposed for others, made available as territory that can be exploited, often in 
ways not anticipated or welcomed by user communities. New forms of mapping 
can all too easily open up cyberspace to a new kind of surveillance, revealing 
interactions that were previously hidden in unused log files and databases. The 
act of mapping itself may constitute an invasion of privacy of individuals and 
impinge on communit)' rights. If the appeal of some virtual spaces is their 
anonymity^ then users may object to it being placed under wider scrutiny, even if 
individuals are unidentifiable. In some senses, these maps may work to shift the 
spaces they map from what their users consider semi-private spaces to public 
spaces, and thus the maps may actually change the nature of cyberspace itself. As 
Smith (1999. 211-212) points out, reflecting on his own research ethics in 
mapping online discussion space: “[t]he bright light of social science research 
can create an unpleasant glare for participants drawn to a dimly lit online space." 
Thus, it is important to consider the ways, and the extent to which, cyberspace 
cartographies are 'responsible artefacts’, which do not destroy what they seek to 
represent or enhance.
A desire for totalising knowledge of a territory (real or virtual), with mapping as 
a logical, necessary process is long standing characteristic of capitalist political- 
economy. as Stephen Hall’s quote at the beginning of the chapter nicely 
encapsulates. Many of the most effective examples of cyberspace cartographies 
can be critiqued for their active role in expansionist rhetoric and technological
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hyperbole, a naïve faith in the inherent beneficial nature of economic growth and 
capital accumulation flowing from opening up online space. For example, 
driving an unsustainable building bubble in network infrastructure in the 1990s 
exploited maps to show where the investment was going, to make the 
construction programs tangible, to make the dreams of growing market share and 
future profits seem much more likely to come true. The infrastructure marketing 
maps in of that time were part of the proof that the Internet ‘doubling every 100 
days', yet such exponential network traffic growth turned out to be a myth and 
the predicted fortunes from selling bandwidth were millennial hubris (see chapter 
six for further discussion).
While visions that represent an alternative to the development of the ‘virtual 
frontier', based on communitarian values rather than capitalist imperatives, are 
manifest in some cyberspace cartographies, these have a much lower profile. 
Moreover, these tend towards the utopian, being underwritten by ‘one network - 
one world' idealism that all too often naively denies the importance of place 
relations. The reality is much more contested and contestable, with evidence 
strongly indicating that cyberspace is yet another technological layer which 
replicates and reinforces existing inequalities and power structures within 
societies and bet^^een different regions and nations. The crucial issue to bear in 
mind here, is that the maps do not just represent capital accumulation or social 
difference, but are active in their ongoing reproduction, including in cyberspace. 
This is one of the core themes that have resonated throughout the discussion in 
the case studies, in the analysis of marketing maps of commercial networks 
(chapter six) and the statistical mapping of Internet globalisation (chapter five).
7.1.2 Critical theorisation o f cyberspace cartographies
I have defined cyberspace cartographies in three distinct modes, following 
Edney's (1993) non-progressive theorisation of map history. The modes are: 
maps of cyberspace, which are maps that describe cyberspace as a phenomenon 
from an external perspective, maps cyberspace, which are interactive maps 
and spatialization for navigation within virtual spaces, and lastly maps in 
cyberspace, which are conventional (terrestrial) cartographic representations that
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have been transmuted through online presentation. The focus of the thesis was 
primarily on the first mode, particularly in the case study chapters.
The analysis of maps of cyberspace concentrated on in-depth case studies of 
Internet infrastructure mapping. This was situated conceptually within 
contemporary cultural analyses of representational practices, employing a 
hermeneutic epistemology that sought, both, to understand the semiological 
nature of the map designs, and also expose the power of the maps as texts. As 
discussed in chapter two, I interpreted these maps of Internet infrastructure as 
sets of signs with complex denotative and connotative meanings and as 
expressions of power/knowledge of new infrastructure spaces. As such the act of 
envisioning Internet infrastructure can never be unbiased and objective, it is 
always a social construction that connotes multiple meanings and that serves the 
interests of some groups. Maps are thus the products of privileged and formalised 
knowledge and they also produce knowledge about the world. Map construction, 
dissemination and use, therefore, must also be read within political-economic 
milieu. As Harpold (1999, 5, original emphasis) argues: “[t]he lines of force 
defining information flow in the networked and unnetworked spheres are not 
merely geographical or technological; they are also -  irreducibly -po liticar.
As discussed in chapter two, such critical theoretical approaches to cartographic 
texts as expression of power have been well developed over the last ten to fifteen 
years, but have most often been applied in historical contexts to untangle the 
power that infuses old maps. Virtually all empirical work by Edney, Pickles, 
Crampton, Harley, et al. deconstructs by looking backwards, which in some 
senses presents easier targets and with less at stake in relation to contemporary 
political relationships. The present thesis is innovative in the application of the 
theories in a forward looking way, a productive act of map deconstruction to 
reveal the 'power' of cyberspace mapping, unveiling its purposes, the interests 
served and social implications of this new mode of mapping.
Yet, there has been very little socially-informed analysis of cyberspace 
cartographies. And as was noted in chapter three, most analysis focuses on 
technical aspects and design performance rather than interpreting semiotic
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meanings and political ideologies. This thesis, along with my other publications 
on cyberspace cartographies (see appendix one), has played a role in building 
understanding of the social effects of these new maps and spatializations. At 
another level, this thesis has sought to move beyond thinking epistemologically 
(the techniques for mapping the Internet), to focus ontologically on what aspects 
of the Internet infrastructure are chosen to be mapped, which are ignored and 
which are deemed un-mappable. As the Lefebvre (1991) quote above suggests, 
an almost infinite number of possible maps would be needed to fully encode and 
decode meanings of a given space, yet only a small percentage of possible maps 
are eveiy  ^actualised and an even smaller number enjoy wide circulation and have 
the power to effect change in the world. It is important to realise that much else 
is unmapped and that this has political implications, not just pragmatic 
limitations. The discussion in chapter five on how people have tried to measure 
and map Internet globalisation highlighted this. The choice of what to map can 
reveal as much about the cartographer as how they actually seek to represent it 
(allowing for the instability of connotative meanings and the uncertainty of the 
intentions lying behind design decisions discussed above).
7.1.3 What is revealed about cyberspace?
Through critical interpretation, focused on connotative meanings and social 
power, 1 revealed new details on the nature of Internet infrastructure and the 
spatial nature of cyberspace more generally. At the same time, the analysis 
provided insights into the worldviews and agendas of the map-makers 
themselves and the institutions they work for. As chapter four discussed, maps of 
infrastructures shape perceptions of the reality of the Internet by making its 
invisible routes and flows visible and aiding the analysis of its uneven 
geographic structures across different scales and seeing the spatial effects on 
interaction and mobilities.
Internet infrastructure maps do important, and sometimes counter-intuitive, work 
puncturing the spaceless rhetoric of cyberspace. In their denotative representation 
of 'what is where’, they connotatively counteract the deterministic ‘death of 
distance’ notions by demonstrating that place matters in the so-called Network 
Society (Castells 1996). Despite the virtualised rhetoric, the socio-technical
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assemblage of the Internet remains embedded in real places and maps are 
effective at denoting the intersections between cyberspace and geographic space. 
Even maps in the services of Internet promotion, show the discontinuity in 
infrastructure provision as much as the coverage, particularly in the ongoing 
inequalities between core and periphery at the global scale (chapter six). 
Location remains crucial in terms of political and cultural contexts -  for example 
territorially defined freedom of expression and privacy rights - and the 
geopolitical power of the nation-state still holds sway in much cyberspatial 
interaction. This is very evident in the ways institutions and individuals have 
mapped statistics on the worldwide growth and diffusion of the Internet into a 
framework of countries rather than flows of traffic between places and through 
borders. Although this is not unusual, because Vujakovic (1999a, 4) notes, 
“[cjartography is an excellent medium through which to represent spatially 
distinct areas (legally defined territories), and lines (national borders), but less 
good when it comes to fuzzy ' boundaries (culture regions), or intersecting and 
overlapping 'classes' of information (dialect groups, religious affiliations, etc.)." 
It is also apparent that the intersections and overlaps of aspects of cyberspace 
make it hard to represent cartographically.
7.2 Infrastructure mapping and the importance of the technical
This thesis has taken the object of the infrastructure map as the prime vehicle for 
the wider political interpretation of the Internet and, simultaneously, as a notable 
signifier of the new era of the Network Society (Castells 1996). Seeing the 
possibilities and the partialities of map representations of infrastructures of the 
Internet can assist people, I think, in the realisation that the technical is not 
natural or pre-given. Breaking through the cultural naturalisation of everyday 
technologies to see that the technical is a political project is vital for a more 
nuanced understanding of the socio-spatial effects of the Internet. This kind of 
approach can be categorised as materialist media studies, which, Thacker (2004, 
xii) argues: "shows how the question 'how does it work?’ is also the question 
'whom does it work for?’. In short, the technical specifications matter, 
ontologically and politically.’’ Within this notion of 'technical specifications’ one 
should include all manner of infrastructure maps. Interrogating the coimotative
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meanings created by maps of infrastructure, therefore, does not merely show 
‘how the Internet works’ but begins to disclose ‘whom does the Internet work 
for’. This is an important and worthwhile project, given the degree to which the 
Internet is fast seeping into everyday life and is already slipping into the cultural 
background in developed countries.
In addition, while the topic of Internet infrastructure might seem narrowly drawn, 
it actually raises many substantive questions in the creation of effective and 
legible cartography. Understanding infrastructure is a conceptual and 
representational challenge, in large part because of its invisibility and lack of 
definite metaphors. I described several dimension to this in chapter four - 
materially hidden and unseen activities, taken-for-granted background services 
and institutional obscurity. Infrastructure is something you notice more by its 
absence than its presence, it is a kind of 'second nature’ according to Thrift 
(2004, 584), ‘'the surface on which life floats.”
The potency of cartographic imagination was examined in terms of how it works 
to make the invisible Internet infrastructures visible, but in certain ways, with 
certain kinds of connotative meaning. Firstly, for general audiences, the power of 
verbal and visual geographic metaphors was considered. Part of the capacit>- to 
influence enjoyed by some of these metaphors (for example, organic form of 
abstract network graphs; Figure 4.10) comes from the way they conform to what 
people expect the Internet to look like. Visual metaphors are typically chosen 
deliberately to reinforce existing preconceptions, thus it is easy to understand 
how people willingly accept certain kinds of maps and diagrams as ‘natural’ 
pictures of the actual Internet, rather than entirely contrived images.
Secondly, for the research-engineering audiences, the significant role of 
scientific inscriptions in constructing ‘matters of fact’ about the Internet’s 
structure and operations was demonstrated. The theory of virtual witnessing was 
used here to understand the mechanism for creating credible connotations using 
particular kinds of denotative strategies. Many Internet infrastructure maps are 
part of the lineage of ‘scientific illustrations’, which includes architectural plans, 
engineering blueprints, anatomical drawings and statistical graphics. The value
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of infrastructure maps produced by scientists is not in what they show, so much 
as in how they show it, to make the Internet a plausible, a known, a measured 
artefact. They are able to convince others ‘at a distance' of the matter of the 
factual reality of the infrastructure.
As Latour and Woolgar (1979, 243, original emphasis) note from their laboratory 
ethnography: “Scientific activity is not ‘about nature', it is a fierce fight to 
construct reality." The infrastructure maps construct the Internet scientifically, 
they construct it literally as a visible reality. (This also applies to the cases of 
worldwide Internet globalisation and network marketing which are made real 
through the representational acts.) Yet these messy (social) processes of 
construction should themselves be invisible to maintain the impression of 
scientific objectivity. The result is an authoritative illusion that the Internet is a 
natural phenomenon from which scientifically measurable objects are simply 
‘discovered', rather than manufactured: what the science and technology studies 
literature calls the ‘ship in the bottle' conceit, which then presents complete 
Internet ‘facts' as if found fully formed.
7.3 Case studies in infrastructure mapping
The empirical core of this thesis has comprised two case studies in cartographic 
imagination of Internet infrastructure. These unpacked distinctive visions of what 
the Internet looks like and what various interests want it to become. The case 
studies were not designed to give synoptic coverage of cyberspace 
cartographies % but sought to provide in-depth portraits, highlighting the 
connotative meanings and the power of maps for imagining particular aspects of 
Internet infrastructures.
The case studies analysed maps that purposely work as ‘representations of 
spaces' (Lefebvre 1991, 233). They are formalised works of planners, 
statisticians, engineers/technocrats and marketers that attempt to structure 
everyday social life through rationalised, organised, and commodified
' The range o f my publications, as part o f the larger cybergeography project, does provides 
comprehensive coverage; discussed in appendix one.
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(re)productions of spaces. In terms of visual form they were recognisably 
cartographic - they were static, planar maps based on a geographic framework 
generally using established design conventions.
A key part of a hermeneutic approach to cartographic analysis is to break down 
the superficial anonymit) of viewing map artefacts as a distanced audience, and 
to begin to understand the context and power relations involved in their 
authorship. In terms of authorship, the cartographic imaginary of Internet 
infrastructure examined in the case studies arose from a distinctive set of 
institutional contexts. Significantly, none were produced by trained cartographers 
working within recognised cartographic institutions, such as a national mapping 
agency or a commercial mapping company - reflecting that much of the 
authorship of maps of cyberspace is happening in new contexts. Chapter five's 
statistical maps were produced by academics, artists, activists, and also 
technocrats working for international agencies and designers employed by U.S. 
magazines. Chapter six's promotional maps were produced in the marketing 
departments of major Internet infrastructure corporations, typically by unnamed 
graphic designers and illustrators. It is apparent that the cultural-linguistic setting 
of these cartographic visions of the Internet is Euro-American because of the 
domination by these institutional contexts (academic, corporate and 
governmental).
All the maps examined in case studies were disseminated free of charge and were 
publicly available. In terms of the mechanism of publication as graphic artefacts, 
some of the statistical maps in chapter five were published conventionally in 
print (magazines, official reports and academic articles) and others were 
designed to be solely delivered online. The marketing maps analysed in chapter 
six were all published wholly through the web (although some have no doubt 
also been physically printed in various outlets to meet particular needs, e.g., 
promotional brochures). The media of presentation for the statistical maps were 
digital files (colour raster graphics and postscript), the marketing maps were all 
digital files primarily in PDF format and also Flash animation.
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7.3.1 The statistical cartographic imaginary
The first case study explored how statistical maps of Internet work semiotically 
and politically to produce a particularly kinds of imaginary of the worldwide 
Internet globalisation. The analysis examined eight different maps in detail. 
While they all premised upon the dominant geopolitical framework of nation­
state as their units of measurement and representation, they produced a range of 
viewpoints onto the world. In many respects their reliance on this nation-state 
metageography is both a conceptual and design shortcoming, however, in other 
respects these maps are successful in creating a compelling cartographic 
imaginary of the worldwide status of the Internet because they play to these 
established conventions. In addition there are still relatively few other kinds of 
maps produced which offer a competing synoptic - and one might say 
seductively simple -  a view of the Internet on a single page. Most other maps and 
visualisation tended to be more technical in nature, showing specific company’s 
infrastructures denoted as link-node graphs (as in chapter five).
There are few statistical maps of the ‘whole’ Internet, so the ones that exist are 
powerful. The empirical examples included maps, such the ‘International 
Connectivit)’ and DOI maps, which are some of the most widely seen 
geographic maps of Internet infrastructure and enjoy an influential position as 
‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour 1987), securing a particular imaginative geography 
of Internet globalisation through their denotatively conventional and clear visual 
narrative design. They employed a range of different area-based thematic map 
designs, but they nearly all exuded a recognisable techno-scientific aesthetic, as 
they sought objective authority through an unadorned, sparse and perfunctory 
style of representation. (Scarponi’s flag-based cartogram was the one noticeably 
different case.) The maps are typically presented intertextually as a ‘matter of 
fact’ envisioning the Internet using semiotic strategies of scientific inscription. 
Of course, this denotative ‘simplicity’ in their design was in part due to 
expediency in production but it had political consequences in how people 
perceive Internet globalisation.
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To make sense of the sample statistical maps of Internet globalisation, in 
semiotic terms, a simple fourfold classificatory model was used to characterise 
them according to their overall connotative meaning. The classification was 
formed by two dimensions of meaning, 'difference' between nations (evident in 
denotative signs) and the 'complexity' of the patterns (denoted at scales from 
local to global). In diagrammatic form these two dimensions were drawn as axis 
running from low-to-high, forming a grid of four quadrants. These quadrants are 
connotative meanings for four separate classes of map; orderly representations 
(lower 'complexity' with higher 'difference'), divergent representations (higher 
'complexity' and higher 'difference'), disorderly representations (higher 
'complexity' with lower 'difference') and, lastly, convergent representation 
(lower 'complexity' and lower 'difference').
The case was also made in chapter five that there are two broad, and competing, 
discourses that seek to 'explain' the relation between the Internet and ICTs and 
the prospects for fostering economic and social development across the world. 
These were termed 'diffusionists' for organisations and individuals who see 
basically positive relations, with the Internet being empowering and able to foster 
progressive development, and the 'divisionist' institutions and activists who are 
sceptical and highlight the negative consequences flowing from a developmental 
model premised on the Internet and ICTs. In terms of the fourfold model, the 
maps classified, according to their overall connotations, as orderly or convergent 
are arguably likely to envision the world statistically in ways that are supportive 
of the 'diffrisionist' agenda. In opposition, the divergent and disorderly map 
categorises are more likely to have connotations that would be advantageous to 
the 'divisionist' perspective on Internet globalisation. From the eight maps 
analysed connotatively, three were assigned to classes supportive of the 
'diffusionists' and four were categorised as 'divisionist' representations of the 
world. One map, Scarponi's flags cartogram, could not be assigned neatly into 
one or other camp because it displays ambivalent connotations that are both 
divergent and convergent.
The three 'diffrisionist' categorised maps were created primarily for the cause of 
securing wider network connectivity^ in poorer parts of the world. They are
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working tools of techno-missionary efforts to connect up the ‘unwired' nations 
by Internet pioneers and development bureaucrats. Enhanced Internet capacity 
will also be beneficial for capital in securing access to new markets and 
emerging economies.
The final ‘International Connectivity' map created by Landweber in 1997 and 
ITU's DOI map were both classified as strongly convergent connoting gradual 
and limited degrees of inequality between countries (low on difference 
dimension) and overall consistent pattern across the world (low on the 
complexit}' dimension). It was also demonstrated how they are a problematic 
representation of Internet globalisation, demonstrating many common problems 
with choropleth maps, in terms of zone selection, the occlusion of geographically 
small areas, ecological fallacy and grouping bias. The connotative effect is the 
production of authoritative looking images, ones that epitomises the imposition 
of the normalising ‘statistical' vision onto the world, ordering rhizomatic 
processes of Internet globalisation into country-based units and a rigid hierarchy 
of classes. The outcome, I would argue, is that these convergent statistical 
mapping of Internet infrastructure work to ‘lockdown' the complex, multi-vocal 
processes of diffusion into a systematic cartographic form favouring hegemonic 
narratives about the ‘naturalness' of technological expansion. They connotatively 
reduce the perception of difference in the world and advance the case that ICTs 
and the Internet are a beneficent driver of economic development and social 
integration. As such they could be seen to be replicating colonial representation 
of old. a kind of neo-colonial cartography for the so-called information society, 
providing an authoritative view from centre and conscripting the rest of the world 
into economically productive digital relations.
Several of the maps analysed presented a different imaginative geography of 
Internet globalisation with more confused and complex narratives, in semiotic 
terms, about the state of the world. These maps were seen to be likely to work in 
favour of the ‘divisionist' line of argument that sees a generally negative 
relationship between the Internet and the prospects of inclusive and progressive 
development. Three maps had overall connotative meanings of a divergent world 
that emphasises the large inequalities between countries at a local scale and also
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wide differences between regions of the world. The statistical patterns were also 
read as disharmonious which suggested undue complexity and the lack of 
systematic development process at work. The first ‘International Connectivity’ 
map from 1991 was classified as divergent in meaning between of the high 
degree of difference starkly evident between nations. The other two divergent 
maps were the three-dimensional stepped surface ‘Bit Map’ with its cliff-like 
digital divides between regions and the ‘Network Society  ^Map’ that selectively 
targeted only nations that matter while excluding large parts of the rest of the 
world. The other ‘divisionist’ map was the dasymetric reconfiguration of the 
‘International Connectivity’ data, produced by activist Mike Holdemess, that 
connotatively emphasises a much complex and fragmented vision of Internet 
globalisation so was classified as an essentially disorderly representation.
I concluded the chapter by looking beyond the critique of cartographic 
imagination of Internet globalisation, considering other kinds of statistical vision 
that are not based on infrastructure capacit}' but its capacity to effect social 
change. This was about assessing the value of Internet infrastructure and I 
discussed work trying to get at a more subtle analysis of the digital divides and 
infrastructure diffusion, using local ethnographic studies of individual and 
communal use of network technologies to achieve everyday tasks and also 
advancing a rights based agenda. Such a 'view fi-om the ground’, so to speak, 
contrasts starkly with the synoptic vision offered by 'God’s-eye’ global statistical 
maps that actually hide much more than they reveal about the real state of the 
Internet infrastructure across the world.
7. S. 2 The promotional cartographic imaginary
The second case study interrogated marketing maps produced to promote the 
networks of the Internet and the work they do in selling a positive geographical 
imagination of Internet infrastructure as reliable and trusted to potential 
customers and investors.
To begin it was shown how Internet network marketing maps could be situated 
within an established lineage of cartography used to promote commercial 
networks for transportation and communication. This genre of mapping practice
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is also interesting theoretically because the facade of ‘objectivity' is negated by 
its serving an overt, singular commercial purpose: namely to attract prospective 
customers and investors from competing firms and maximise profits. Yet, for this 
commercially-biased mapping to work well it still seeks the cloak of objective 
cartographic authority in its presentation of deceptively selective data. However, 
the maps also silence competitors by not admitting the existence of alternative 
routes owned by others. This is a key differentiator of promotional cartography, 
that servies solely the interests of one company, from informational cartography, 
which serves the broader interests of consumers by mapping all available 
network routes.
To understand the prevalence of network maps in the marketing narratives of 
Internet infrastructure, a survey of the top fifty networking companies was 
undertaken. It revealed that over two-thirds of their corporate websites deployed 
network marketing maps and of these nearly thirty percent featured them 
prominently on the home page. Nearly all the maps denoted infrastructure using 
arc-node symbology on a geographic base map. Such arc-node representations 
are the conventional and culturally ‘obvious" format for representing physical 
transportation infrastructures and this clearly translates meaningfully for virtual 
networks.
Network marketing maps work as a tangible form of proof of, firstly, the material 
existence of a large scale network that is beyond the limits of human vision and, 
secondly, the superiority of its design and engineering by showing a network that 
is dominant in size and fully able to span the globe. Yet, further interpretation of 
many of the maps showed that the network infrastructure was not world-wide at 
all, connecting only a small number of cities.
To consider in more depth how network marketing maps work semiotically their 
denotative designs were interrogated using an eight point framework of ideal 
connotative meanings that effective promotional cartography should produce. 
The framework was applied to a sample of maps from five global 
telecommunications corporations. Their world scale maps of their infrastructure 
were examined in terms of how well they were able to connote positive
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impressions on the range of the network links across the whole globe, the ability 
of the network to reach key cities, to provide direct connections to these cities, 
and to signal abundance coverage of continents, the network should also ideally 
appear to be centrally positioned to serve key markets, to offer ample capacity to 
meet customer demands, display their network exclusively and, lastly, to silence 
competitors. The analysis showed a mixed performance overall, with none of the 
five maps interrogated achieving all eight connotations, of an ideal network, 
consistently and strongly. Out of the sample, the maps of two corporations, 
AT&T and Verizon, performed markedly above the others. This was due partly 
to their simpler design and more abstract symbology that gave superior 
impressions of range of the network, direct connections and exclusivity . The 
France Telecom marketing map suffered significantly weaker connotations than 
its competitors, which was, in part, because it denoted the company’s 
infrastructure too realistically and honestly. The result, in connotative terms, 
made the network appear to have quite limited geographic coverage o f the world, 
unable to reach many of the important cities or to offer directness of routes 
necessary for rapid flows of data.
The second part of the chapter six analysed the evolving marketing of network 
infrastructure of one company. Worldcom through a series of maps produced 
over an eight year period from 1997. Again, it is evident that the maps sought to 
communicate persuasively and with authority, to potential customers and 
investors, the benefits of using Worldcom’s services above those of another 
company by highlighting several key aspects of their infrastructure. Analysis 
showed the most important of these were; visually demonstrating its geographic 
range, the routes to reach important places and its capacity to meet customer 
demands. In serving these promotional goals, the semiotic analysis showed, 
however. Worldcom’s marketing maps were only partially successful. The most 
significant failing in the maps was the all too obvious mismatch between the bold 
claims of WorldCom to offer a global network service and the mapped reality of 
its infrastructure that barely connected a third of countries in the world. The 
analysis demonstrated the real difficulties in effectively mapping Internet 
infrastructure of a single organisation, even for commercial persuasion.
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Despite these semiotic failings, current marketing maps are enrolled in the 
discourses sustaining demand for new network infrastructure construction. They 
do critical work proving cartographically where the investors' money is going. 
They do this by conjuring up a sense of tangibility, a kind of second-hand 
experience of the network to compensate for the lack of visibility in the 
environment or physicalhy of experience. People tend to believe what they see 
on the map as real, particularly when it is shown using the familiar metaphors of 
geographic world maps.
7.4 The true vision of Internet infrastructure
A critical interpretative approach was applied to understand the ways that the 
Internet as a material infrastructure has been cartographically portrayed and 
proselytised by different interests over the last decade. As the analysis highlights, 
it is impossible to imagine a single ‘true', objective map of the Internet. As such, 
there will always be a range of maps produced, for a range of purposes. I have 
shown how reading beyond the surface messages as intended, to interrogate the 
'second text' of infrastructure can be productive for understanding the new 
modes of mapping that are coming into existence to chart cyberspace.
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Appendix one
Building the Atlas of Cyberspaces
at-las n., pi. at-las-es. 1. a bound collection of maps. 2. a bound volume of charts, plates, or 
tables illustrating any subject.
This appendix outlines my personal role in the developing notion of cyberspace 
cartographies and is focused on the contribution of my research to scholarly 
knowledge in relation to building and maintaining the Atlas of Cyberspaces web 
catalogue for ten years \
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Figure A 1.1: The front page of the Atlas of Cyberspaces web catalogue. The links on the left- 
hand side represent the high-level taxonomy of cyberspace cartographies presented on the site. 
(Source: <www.cybergeography.org/atlas>.)
' See <www.cybergeography.org/atlas>.
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The significant part of my academic research time between 1995 and 2005 was 
focused on the understanding the geographies of cyberspace, what I have termed 
cybergeography^. The primary areas of concern in this research has been on 
analysing the spatial forms of the Internet and its supporting material 
infrastructures. The epistemological and philosophical approach I have taken is 
centred around the map as a process of knowledge construction and as social- 
material site for critique. The major methodological approach to achieve this has 
been the Atlas o f Cyberspaces (Figure ATI), a comprehensive web catalogue of 
the most significant published cyberspace maps. Examples in the Atlas are drawn 
from both the ‘maps of cyberspace' and the ‘maps fm cyberspace' modes; the 
'maps in cyberspace' mode is not covered. The Atlas began largely as a simple 
set of visual bookmarks to guide my research, but subsequently grew into a 
widely used and well known public resource that has helped to define the scope 
of cyberspace cartographies. Over the first six months of 2005, for example, it 
was receiving an average of eleven thousand visitors a week and according to the 
Google database it has 532 incoming web hyperlinks (equivalent to citations)^.
The Atlas web catalogue remain freely available online and was continuously 
maintained and update for over tens years' .^ It was publicly announced in spring 
1997 (via messages to various newsgroups and mailing lists; Figure A1.2) and 
expanded in scope as many new sections were added to index the diversity of 
maps and spatialization discovered. It comprises seventeen thematic sections, 
cataloguing 251 different cyberspace cartography examples^ Each item in the
■ I began investigating this field in 1995 while a research assistant at Cardiff University and the 
research flourished, subsequently, at the Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis, Universit>' 
College London with the support and encouragement of Professor Mike Batty.
" These figures exclude mirror sites and foreign language translations for which usage statistics 
were not obtainable.
The primary URL for the site is <www.cybergeography.org/atlas>, with mirror sites provided 
by the Department o f Geography, UCL <www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/casa/martin/atlas/atlas.html> and 
for the Australian / Asia-Pacific region at <http://cybergeography.planetmirror.com/>.
 ^ The thematic categories are as follows: conceptual maps and diagrams, artistic representations, 
geographic visualisations, cables and satellites maps, traceroutes mapping tools, census maps, 
topology visualisations, information maps; information landscapes, information spaces, ISP 
maps, weather maps, wireless visualisations, web site maps, surf maps, muds and virtual worlds, 
historical maps. This classification mixes form and function, and reveals the evolutionary nature 
of the Atlas as a research tool.
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Atlas contains representative visual image(s) of the map, a short descriptive text 
and hyperlinks to further reading/relevant Web pages. The whole resource has 
been translated by volunteers into French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese^. In 
2001 a 270-page long ‘coffee-table’ book version of the Atlas was published, co­
authored with Rob Kitchin; whilst it drew heavily from the Web Atlas, it had 
many fewer examples and a simplified taxonomy.
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Figure A 1.2; Original public announcement of the At/as o f  Cyberspaces web catalogue, posted to 
the comp.infosystems.gis newsgroup in March 1997. (Source: <www.google.com/groups>.)
 ^ The French language mirror site was maintained by Nicolas Guillard, <www.cybergeography- 
ff.org/atlas/atIas.html>.
Italian language mirror was initially created by Paolo Cavallotti and then maintained by Giuliano 
Gaia and Stefania Bojano, <www.mappedellarete.net/>.
Rodrigo Nobrega maintained the Portuguese language mirror site, 
<http://cibergeografia.org/atlas/atlas.html>.
Emiliano Rodriguez Niiesch translated the Spanish language version, 
<www.cybergeography.org/spanish/atlas.html>.
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My contribution to the analysis of cyberspace cartographies through the Atlas 
web catalogue has been primarily as a curator, surveying the diversity of 
examples, classifying and interpreting them and then assembling a selection into 
a structured typology for public display. The resulting Atlas presentation was the 
most comprehensive one produced by 2 0 0 2  and has significantly greater value as 
a curated whole than the simply the sum of its parts (given as an unedited 
bibliography or set of bookmarks). As well as curating the Atlas on the web, I 
have described, interpreted and critiqued a wide range of cyberspace 
cartographies using various theoretical approaches. The results of these 
interpretative analyses have been disseminated to diverse audiences in a range of 
publications and presentations.
Collecting the cartographies of cyberspace materials required extensive 
fieldwork given the diversity of authorship in these two modes and the fact that 
no other catalogues or classifications existed when the project began in the mid 
1990s. To a large degree this was 'virtual fieldwork’ comprising many, many 
hours spent in front of the screen exploring cyberspace itself, trawling through 
search engines results, monitoring new corporate websites and homepages of 
individual researchers, as well as numerous other online resources. In addition, 
conventional library research and literature reviews were undertaken, along with 
a more limited amoimt of archival research of primary historical materials at the 
British Telecom corporate archives in Holbom and in the British Library map 
collection. In total over four hundred different maps (or interactive mapping 
projects / software systems) were researched under the criteria of ‘maps of 
cyberspace’ or ‘map for cyberspace’ modes^. The majorit)' of these are archived 
and not displayed in the Atlas. Besides archiving copies of the cyberspace maps 
themselves, relevant supporting papers, descriptive Web pages, and biographic 
details on the creators were also kept. As part of the fieldwork process I also built 
a significant professional knowledge network, making personal contact with
 ^ I have been limited to collecting published maps, i.e. those that are available in the public 
domain. It is certain that there are many more maps o f cyberspace created by individuals, 
corporations and governments never released into the public domain, either because o f  reasons o f  
confidentially and security, lack o f resources or interest, or a belief that the maps are too 
technical and will, therefore, be of no practical use to the wider public. In addition, my researches 
have been largely restricted to English-language materials.
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many of the map-makers and other interested parties through email, mailing list 
discussions and individual interviews. Twenty-two map-makers were 
interviewed via email by myself between 1999 - 2003 and the findings written up 
and published as 'map of the month’ articles^. In totality, this collection of 
materials arising from the fieldwork represents a valuable contribution to the 
history  ^of cartography.
As an information resource, the Atlas has had an impact within human 
geography discourses, for example it was highlighted by AAG president Duane 
Nellis in the AAG Newsletter (November 2002, 3) as a prime example of 
innovative new research which "documents the worldwide info sphere fostered by 
the internet that will surely be of growing importance as the millennials further 
transform the ways we interact within geography”. While cartography theorist 
John Pickles (2004a, 194) in his book 'A Histor>  ^of Spaces’ cites the Atlas in the 
conclusion arguing that it reveals the "conceptual flexibilities and political 
possibilities” of new cartographies that have "de-ontologized whatever we ever 
meant by modem cartography in ways that we are perhaps only beginning to 
recognize.” Further, Pickles (2004b, 184) notes the Atlas "is rich and varied, and 
the maps illustrate well the geographically uneven nature of access, connectivity 
and interaction in this new 'world in the wires’”. More importantly, the website 
has proven to be a productive medium to disseminate my research beyond the 
confines of geography, becoming visible in many other disciplines and outside 
academia. The website is also used as a teaching resource for many courses, 
across disciplines. The Atlas has also been cited frequently in the press (e.g.. The 
New York Times, see chapter three. Figure 3.8). Lastly, it has acted as a catalyst 
in informing different groups about each others work, cross linking ideas and 
maps between information science, media studies, network engineering, artists, 
and designer, as well geography/cartography of course.
* These majority o f these articles were published in Mappa.Mundi Magazine and usually involved 
a detailed examination o f a specific example map that best represents a particular genre o f  
cyberspace cartography, and, where possible, an interview with the mapmaker to determine their 
aims and intentions. All the articles are accessible fi-om <www.cybergeography.org/>.
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In addition to the Web catalogue, I have actively disseminated ideas about 
cyberspace cartographies to a diverse range of audiences through invitations to 
give talks at conferences, in departmental seminar series and to industry. For 
example, in 2001 I spoke in the Department of Architecture, Princeton 
University; in April 2000 I participated in a symposium at the Department of 
Design and Media Arts, UCLA; and more recently at the end of 2004 I gave a 
keynote presentation for a workshop on ‘e-social science’ at the School of Social 
Sciences at the Australian National University and an invited talk the Ordnance 
Survey in Southampton. Key published output also included two books, both co­
authored with Rob Kitchin. These have been well received and cited; the first, 
Mapping Cyberspace (Routledge, 2000), currently has 81 citations according to 
ISI Web of Science. I have also written a number of other articles and book 
chapters considering different aspects of cyberspace cartographies, in which I 
have tried to meld together a technical understanding of their formal properties 
with some consideration of their wider social implications and cultural meanings 
(see Dodge 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002; Dodge and Kitchin 2000b). I have also 
fostered a network of researchers, scholars and practitioners from across the 
world and across multiple disciplines interested in cyberspace cartographies by 
publishing a regular email bulletin^ and as the moderator of the mapping- 
cyberspace listserv^®.
In conclusion, the Atlas of Cyberspaces web catalogue acted as one of the key 
international knowledge hubs for cyberspace cartographies and virtual 
geographies. My researches as a whole have helped to define cyberspace 
cartographies as a coherent and legitimate field of academic enquiry.
 ^Located at <www.cybergeography.org/register.html>. It has been running since June 1997 to 
February 2004 and had 6,100 subscribers by the end.
Located at <www.cybergeography.org/discussion.html>. It currently has over 500 subscribers.
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Statistical Maps of Internet Globalisation
2006.Figure A2.1; The cost of staying connected, published in Wired magazine 
(Source: scanned version from <www.flickr.com/photos/24657869@N00/156209557>.)
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Appendix Two
Figure A2.3: Two example maps from the ‘FAQ; International E-Mail 
Accessibility’ survey produced by Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond; maps legend also 
provided. (Source: <www.nsrc.org/codes/bymap/ntlgy/>.)
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Figure A2.4: Updated version of the 1997 International Connectivity map 
produced by Mike Jensen. (Source: <www3.wn.apc.org/africa/afstat.htm>, no 
longer available online.)
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Figure A2.5: The ‘Pentagon’s New Map’, published by Esquire magazine to 
illustrate a story about Thomas Barnett’s work, March 2003 (Source: 
<www.thomaspmbamett.com/images/books/pentagons_new_map_small.jpg>.)
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Figure A2.6: Data table of the International Connectivity survey, December 
1991. (Source: <ftp.cs.wisc.edu/connectivity_table/>.)
NTERNATIONAL CONNECTIVITY 
Version 3 - December 2, 1991
Please send corrections, information and/or comments to:
Larry Landweber 
Computer Sciences Dept.
University of Wisconsin - Madison 
1210 W. Dayton St.
Madison, WI 53706 
lhl0cs.wise.edu 
FAX 1-608-265-2635
Include details, e.g., on connections, sites, contacts, 
protocols, etc.
Thanks to the many people from around the world who have provided 
information.
In the following, BITNET is used generically to refer to BITNET 
plus similar networks around the world (e.g., EARN, NETNORTH, 
GULFNET, etc.).
SUMMARY
NUMBER OF ENTITIES WITH INTERNATIONAL NETWORK CONNECTIVITY = 8 9
BITNET Col. 2 (Entities with international BITNET links.) 
b = minimal < 5 domestic sites = 18
B = widespread >= 5 domestic sites = 28 
X = uncertain = 2 
INTERNET Col. 3 (Entities with international IP links.)
I = operational = 33 
i = soon available = 3 
UUCP Col. 4 (Entities with international UUCP links.) 
u = minimal < 5 domestic sites = 40 
U = widespread >= 5 domestic sites = 38 
FIDONET Col. 5 (Entities with international FIDONET links.) 
f = minimal < 5 domestic sites = 10
F = widespread >= 5 domestic sites = 43
= New connections expected in near future.
Afghanistan (Republic of Afghanistan)
Albania (Republic of Albania)
Algeria (People's Democratic Republic of Algeria) 
American Samoa
Andorra (Principality of Andorra)
Angola (People's Republic of Angola)
Anguilla 
Antarctica 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina (Argentine Republic)
Aruba 
Australia
Austria (Republic of Austria)
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---- AL
---- DZ
---- AS
---- AD
---- AO
---- AI
----* AO
---- AG
BIUF AR
---- AW
-lUF AU
BIUF AT
Appendix Two
----- BS
----- BH
----- BD
----- BB
BIUF BE
----- BZ
----- BJ
----- BM
----- BT
- - U - BO
---f BW
----- BV
BIUF BR
----- BN
—  UF BG
- - U - BE
----- BI
--uf BY
Republ ic)
CM
BIUF CA
----- CV
----- KY
----- CF
----- TD
----- 1 0
BlUf CL
- - U - CN
----- cx
----- Cl
----- cc
b-u- CO
----- KM
----- * CG
----- CK
b-u- CR
- - U - cu
b-U- CY
BiUF cs
BIUF DK
----- DJ
----- DM
- - U - DO
----- TP
b-u- EC
b-u- EG
----- SV
----- GO
—  UF EW
ET
----- FK
----- FO
- - U - FJ
BIUF FI
BIUF FR
- - U - GF
PF
----- TF
----- GA
----- GM
BIUF DE
Bahamas (Commonwealth of the Bahamas)
Bahrain (State of Bahrain)
Bangladesh (People's Republic of Bangladesh) 
Barbados
Belgium (Kingdom of Belgium)
Beli ze
Benin (Republic of Benin)
Bermuda
Bhutan (Kingdom of Bhutan)
Bolivia (Republic of Bolivia)
Botswana (Republic of Botswana)
Bouvet Island
Brazil (Federative Republic of Brazil)
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria (Republic of Bulgaria)
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta)
Burundi (Republic of Burundi)
Byelorussian SSR (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Cameroon (Republic of Cameroon)
Canada
Cape Verde (Republic of Cape Verde)
Cayman Islands
Central African Republic
Chad (Republic of Chad)
Chagos Islands (Indian Ocean)
Chile (Republic of Chile)
China (People's Republic of China)
Christmas Island (Indian Ocean)
Cote d'Ivoire (Republic of Cote d'Ivoire)
Cocos Keeling Islands)
Colombia (Republic of Colombia)
Comoros (Islamic Federal Republic of rhe Comoros) 
Congo (People's Republic of the Congo)
Cook Islands
Costa Rica (Republic of Costa Rica)
Cuba (Republic of Cuba)
Cyprus (Republic of Cyprus)
Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) 
Denmark (Kingdom of Denmark)
Djibouti (Republic of Djibouti)
Dominica (Commonwealth of Dominica)
Dominican Republic 
East Timor
Ecuador (Republic of Ecuador)
Egypt (Arab Republic of Egypt)
El Salvador (Republic of El Salvador)
Equatorial Guinea (Republic of Equatorial Guinea)
Estonia
Ethiopia
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
Faroe Islands
Fiji (Republic of Fiji)
Finland (Republic of Finland)
France (French Republic)
French Guiana (Department of Guiana)
French Polynesia
French Southern Territories
Gabon (Gabonese Republic)
Gambia (Republic of the Gambia)
Germany (Federal Republic of Germany)
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---- GH
---- GI
BIUF GR
---f GL
---- GD
- - U - GP
---- GU
--------U ” GT
---- GN
---- GW
---- GY
---- HT
---- HM
---- HN
B--F HK
biUF HU
-lUf IS
blU- IN
- - U - ID
---- IR
---- IQ
BIUF IE
BIuF IL
BIUF IT
---- JM
BIUF JP
---- JO
---- KH
KE
---- KI
---- KP
BlUf KR
b--- KW
---- LA
—  UF LV
---- LB
----* LS
---- LR
---- LY
Arab Jamah
---- LI
--uF LT
b-uF LU
---F MO
---- MG
---- MW
b-uF MY
---- MV
— u— ML
---- MT
---- MH
- - U - MQ
---- MR
---- MU
Bluf MX
---- FM
---- MC
---- MN
---- MS
---- MA
---- 'k MZ
Ghana (Republic of Ghana)
Gibraltar
Greece (Hellenic Republic)
Greenland
Grenada
Guadeloupe (French Department of Guadeloupe)
Guam
Guatemala (Republic of Guatemiala)
Guinea (Republic of Guinea)
Guinea-Bissau (Republic of Guinea-Bissau)
Guyana (Republic of Guyana)
Haiti (Republic of Haiti)
Heard and McDonald Islands 
Honduras (Republic of Honduras)
Hong Kong (Hisiangkang, Xianggang)
Hungary (Republic of Hungary)
Iceland (Republic of Iceland)
India (Republic of India)
Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia)
Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)
Iraq (Republic of Iraq)
Ireland
Israel (State of Israel)
Italy (Italian Republic)
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan (Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan)
Kampuchea, Democratic (formerly Cambodia)
Kenya (Republic of Kenya)
Kiribati (Republic of Kiribati)
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, Republic of Korea 
Kuwait (State of Kuwait)
Lao People's Democratic Republic 
Latvia
Lebanon (Lebanese Republic)
Lesotho (Kingdom of Lesotho)
Liberia (Republic of Liberia)
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Socialist Peoples's Libyan 
riya)
Liechtenstein (Principality of Liechtenstein) 
Lithuania
Luxembourg (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg)
Macau (Ao-me'n)
Madagascar (Democratic Republic of Madagascar) 
Malawi (Republic of Malawi)
Malaysia
Maldives (Republic of Maldives)
Mali (Republic of Mali)
Malta (Republic of Malta)
Marshall Islands (Republic of the Marshall Islands) 
Martinique (French Department of Martinique) 
Mauritania (Islamic Republic of Mauritania) 
Mauritius
Mexico (United Mexican States)
Micronesia (Federated States of Micronesia)
Monaco (Principality of Monaco)
Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic)
Montserrat
Morocco (Kingdom of Morocco)
Mozambique (Republic of Mozambique)
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  MM Myanmar (Union of Myanmar)
--U- NA Namibia (Republic of Namibia)
  NR Nauru (Republic of Nauru)
  NP Nepal (Kingdom of Nepal)
BIUF NL Netherlands (Kingdom of the Netherlands)
  AN Netherlands Antilles
  NT Neutral Zone (between Saudi Arabia and Iraq)
--U- NC New Caledonia
-luF NZ New Zealand
--U- NI Nicaragua (Republic of Nicaragua)
--U- NE Niger (Republic of the Niger)
  NG Nigeria (Federal Republic of Nigeria)
  NU Niue
  NF Norfolk Island
  MR Northern Mariana Islands (Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands)
BIUF NO Norway (Kingdom of Norway)
  CM Oman (Sultanate of Oman)
  PK Pakistan (Islamic Republic of Pakistan)
  PW Palau (Republic of Palau)
  PA Panama (Republic of Panama)
--U- PG Papua New Guinea
--U- PY Paraguay (Republic of Paraguay)
x-u- PE Peru (Republic of Peru)
--uF PH Philippines (Republic of the Philippines)
  PN Pitcairn Island
biUF PL Poland (Republic of Poland)
blUF PT Portugal (Portuguese Republic)
BIUF PR Puerto Rico
  QA Qatar (State of Qatar)
 * RE Re'union (French Department of Re 'union)
 * RO Romania
  RW Rwanda (Rwandese Republic)
  SH Saint Helena
  KN Saint Kitts and Nevis
  LC Saint Lucia
  PM Saint Pierre and Miquelon (French Department of Saint
Pierre and Miquelon)
  VC Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
  SM San Marino (Republic of San Marino)
  ST Sao Tome and Principe (Democratic Republic of Sao
Tome and Principe)
B  SA Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
--U- SN Senegal (Republic of Senegal)
--U- SC Seychelles (Republic of Seychelles)
-- - SL Sierra Leone (Republic of Sierra Leone)
bluF SG Singapore (Republic of Singapore)
  SB Solomion Islands
  SO Somalia (Som.ali Democratic Republic)
-lUF ZA South Africa (Republic of South Africa)
BIUF ES Spain (Kingdom of Spain)
--U- LK Sri Lanka (Demiocratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka)
  SD Sudan (Republic of the Sudan)
  SR Surinamie (Republic of Suriname)
  SJ Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands
  SZ Swaziland (Kingdom of Swaziland)
BIUF SE Sweden (Kingdom of Sweden)
BIUF CH Switzerland (Swiss Confederation)
  SY Syria (Syrian Arab Republic)
B-uF TW Taiwan
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------- TZ
--uF TH
------- U “ TG
------- TK
------- TO
------- TT
b l  — TN
B--- TR
------- TC
------- TV
b-UE SU
------- UG
—  UF UA
------- AF
blUF GB
Northern :
BIUF US
------- UM
x-uf UY
VU
------- VA
- - U - VF
------- VN
------- VG
------- VI
States ;)
------- WF
------- FH
------- WS
------ YF
Yemen)
YD
B-U- YU
------- ZR
------- * ZM
ZW
Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania)
Thailand (Kingdom of Thailand)
Togo (Togolese Republic)
Tokelau
Tonga (Kingdom of Tonga)
Trinidad and Tobago (Republic of Trinidad and Tobago] 
Tunisia
Turkey (Republic of Turkey)
Turks and Caicos Islands 
Tuvalu
USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Uganda (Republic of Uganda)
Ukrainian SSR (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) 
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom (United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
:reland)
United States (United States of America)
United States Minor Outlying Islands 
Uruguay (Eastern Repuplic of Uruguay)
Vanuatu (Republic of Vanuatu, formerly New Hebrides)
Vatican City State
Venezuela (Republic of Venezuela)
Vietnam (Socialist Republic of Vietnam)
Virgin Islands, British
Virgin Islands, U.S. (Virgin Islands of the United
Wallis and Futuna Islands 
Western Sahara
Western Samoa (Independent State of Western Samoa) 
Yemen (Republic of Yemen)
Yemen, Democratic (People's Democratic Republic of
Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic 
Zaire (Republic of Zaire)
Zambia (Republic of Zambia)
Zimibabwe (Republic of Zimbabwe)
of Yugoslavia
Copyright 1991 Lawrence H. Landweber and the Internet Society 
Unlimited permission to copy is hereby granted subject to 
inclusion of this copyright notice.
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Figure 2 .2  International connectivity 
Source; copyright © 1995 Larry Landweber and the Internet Society
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Appendix Two
Figure A2.8: Modified versions of two International Connectivity maps used as 
an illustrations in a policy document by the Brazilian government. (Source: 
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia, 2001, 4.)
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D  Sin conectividad
Fuente; http://www.cs.wisc.edu/- Ihl/lhI.html
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Figure A2.9: Digital Opportunity Index Worldwide, 2005, produced by the 
International Telecommunication Union. (Source:
<www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/worldinformationsociety/2006/World.pdf>.)
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Figure A2.10: The growth of Internet hosts mapped at regular intervals through 
1991-1994. Countries only appear on the map only once they had an Internet 
connection. (Source: author scan from Batty and Barr 1994, 707-708.)
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Figure A2.11: The ‘Network Society Map’, 1997. Map research and conception 
by Nico Macdonald; cartography by Chapman Bounford; published by World 
Link. (Source: <www.spy.co.uk/research/worldlink/>.)
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Figure A2.12: ‘Wired Countries of the World' produced by World Information 
Access Project 2007. (Source; <http://wiareport.org>.)
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Figures 3 and 4: Non-contiguous cartogram o f  electronic sp a ce  for the African continent as seen  from Japan 
using a scale factor o f  0.2 (Figure 3) and  W  (Figure 4). Notice the radial distribution o f  all 
countries, with centroids p laced  on an arc centred  in japan.
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Internet Use 1990
-îîtRKwil»<fc5îîSt4~ww«.
f'iwKrti’hi l>,' 3ASI ^ irovi) iVhJ Mi)rk Newvttun
In 1990 the Internet had existed for 
only 7 years; just 3 million people had 
access to  it w orldw ide. 73% o f these  
p eople w ere living in th e  United 
States, 15% w ere in Western Europe.
Internet users in 1990 w ere recorded  
in just a few  other territories. Outside 
Western Europe and the United States, 
most users lived in Canada, fo llow ed  
by Australia, then Japan, the Republic 
of Korea and Israel. In 1990 there was 
practically no access elsew here.
Switzerland is hom e to  the European 
Organisation for Nuclear Research 
(CERN) w here th e  World W ide Web 
was developed . In 1990, 5.8 peop le  
per thousand in Switzerland used the 
Internet.
Territory size show s the proportion of worldwide Internet 
users w ho  lived there  in 1990.
INTERNET USE IN 1990: ALL TERRITORIES REPORTING RATES
R an k  T errito ry V alue
l a n r i  ,v p ^
IbchnlcAl not©*
•  Oafii .ire f iw n  IN; U n ited  N,di;xw. fTftvekmnieniPiwyamntë's 200A I luman DPV©kjpiTt»nî
•  *Only 19 lerfitofWî.'i nK ïirded  In ip rne i in
1990 . B elgium  r©pod©d tw  krwivvn rmte. b u t  a 
lowv Icw l T errporfcs w ith  e s tim a te d  d a ta  ne t 
s trew n  in tf ie  wbW. W W e  Intw rrvt a cc«si I» 
Kn«)wn lo  exist b u t  n o  d rtia  w e re  refKjrt^rJ. 
vsbm abM  wet© m ade .
•  intwncK uMKshav© a a ttM  to  on<I us© Ih© in tw nm .
•  S w  wvfjsjt© fix fu r th e r  In fo inW ktn .
,3 A u s tra lia  5 .9
17  Israel
1» wwrn""
2 0  , U n ite d  K iirtid o tn  ,
2 Z  fr -a n c e  ____
30 Republic o f Korea
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INTERNET USERS IN 1990
‘‘I  sit down coinfortably in the university ""s modern computer lab and take advantage o f the technology available 
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Appendix Two
Figure A2.16: Full size view of Internet users per capita 1990 cartogram, 
produced by the Worldmapper project, 2006. (Source: 
<www.worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=335>.)
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Internet Users 2002 M ri'rt ü ’vvrhiiirnc Tnist
I
X
H
S
u>w
.m tm
MOST AND FEWEST INTERNET USERS
Rank Territory
3 Republic of Korea 552
Va m e Rank
191
Territory V alue
1.5Sana adenh
193 
196
1 9 'j  M y a n m a r 
199 la jik lilan
Niuer
OmWMr Sin.
9  S in g a p o r t
10 V., NQNrÊV f:
t-y Tl»* N f w iv tn  ^Miï N*j«r>i
During the 12 years from 1990 to  2002, 
peop le using th e  Internet increased  
in number by 224 times. By 2002 there 
w ere 631 million Internet users 
w orldw ide.
The distribution o f Internet users 
w orldw ide has changed remarkably 
over just a dozen  years. In 1990 
Internet users w ere mainly found in 
th e United States, W estern Europe, 
Australia, Japan and Taiwan. By 2002 
people living in Asia Pacific, Southern 
Asia, South America, China and 
Eastern Europe w ere notable Internet 
users. A not insignificant number of 
Internet users are also show n to  be 
in Northern Africa, Southeastern  
Africa and the M iddle East.
Terrifoiy size show s the  proportion of worldwide Internet 
users w h o  lived th e re  In 2002.
INTERNET USERS IN 2002
iarid
Ti*chnk«l not#*
•  D tita frt**Ti ÜW U nited  Motiun*; DtrvelopnieiH
PtoqtamiiHi's 2 0 0 4  Htwnan [««w lopm ent Report.
•  I n w iw  u s m  Af.(.*ss to  *nd  tin# tfw  In ternet
•  S ee  w pbsrte  fo r  In torm atlcm
Internet users fter WOO people in 2002
“We [strive] to achieve a ^warm-hearted digital world^ where everybody, including the elderly, the young, men 
and women, enjoys ubiquitous access to communications technologies for the greater good  Yeon Gi Son, 2006
WWW.Worldniapper.org C  C rw rtf lh l ?0(W  SASI ( x o u p  ( U n iw tw y  o f s tio m rh ll nrnf M u »  N M w n.ir (U nhnrrrty  o f M k h lg ,in | Map 336
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Appendix Two
Figure A2.18: Full size view of Internet users per capita 2002 cartogram, 
produced by the Worldmapper project, 2006. (Source: 
<www\worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=336>.)
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Appendix Two
Figure A2.19: Internet users 2005 cartogram produced by ExploMap 
Technologies, 2007. (Source:
<http://explomap.free.fr/world_map_intemet_users_2005.pdT>
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Appendix Two
Figure A2.20: Digital divide cartogram produced by Govcom.org, April 2005. 
Country size is inversely proportional to level of Internet usage. (Source: 
<www.govcom.org/maps/map_set_wsis/GC0_Maps_set_3.0_digitaldivide_inver 
t.pdf>.)
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Appendix Two
Figure A2.21: Country codes of the world cartogram produced by Byte Level 
Research. Countries represented by their two letter Internet domain names and 
sized proportionally to their population. (Source: 
<ww\wbytelevel.com/map/ccTLD.html>.)
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Appendix Two
Figure A2.22: First page o f ‘The Wired World Atlas’ produced by Wired 
magazine. (Source: author scan from original Conners-Petersen 1988, 162.)
T H E  W I R E D
'rw ir are iw M  w in  *. sw s 
■ns »  Siw » ioB  wrtCartS!,' 
sifs nm Srt» or !ht WwniâwÉ
lrtKW»««3afiOOU!WEl 
Eaw »Hala(>Bn and no moRîhiï 
pa«««x MarSfcwe and Sàtto  
are <w»p! W» Ti» tsosWrt*»! 
giws See frendi wnsnes Sib 
»»« iw piantt t e  BOf fcrTV 
n«wo(b Pjnsan piime tMW.
Moaacs & !»r MX*fs «tiMd 
«M ita nanon Stei ttw '1 Mjuare 
!»»*). te »gii^  dre (90S «wd 
Its ZSOC tefi nwBB. « h  »sb 
(*»(!HBdT¥.a<!d its sis«
«tread #s tel sBWif
CDEMSGMTIC 
REMBUG e r  S8NSS
Congo bas lire bwaaKdewiT; 
ia a» wotld ««h ow pbone Imo 
r» U S  poodk diodaxnde.ow 
«0fniSoîî)was«i»Ws-65 
OMte-donottereaKk 
sixnrewdw
ENVISION THE GLOBE ICCOBDING TO THE BENSITY OF TRADITIONAL MEOIA -  TVS AND
Af you «»»tcti CNN into î«9 ud9 ai|Ni’t *tr- pott kwingo or witness a granddad grectmg 
arrivals with his cell phone still to his ear, you 
mi(^t think the spread of global media is near 
completion, life is a chcus of image M«d sound 
bite, seemingly synchronized and playing non-
Oi St O NOVIMStS fSSS
st<^ around the world. But once you’re past the 
duty-free shop, you see little uniformity tai the 
use of communications technologies.
Take a look at where TV is pervasive or Net 
hosts are sparse, udtcre satellite dishes abound 
or PCs don't, and you find a pteset that's wHtfly
diverse. Cable use per capita in Dominica is 
six times greater than in France. In Cambodia, 
71 percent of aB phone users are ceU phone 
users. Rarely will you find dear patterns in fire 
ways media penetrate nsarkets and influence 
our lives. .
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Figure A2.23: Second page o f ‘The Wired World Atlas’ produced by Wired 
magazine. (Source: author scan from original, Conners-Petersen 1988, 167.)
W O R L D  R T L A S
Paiwd SwM \
Bfbtus’' âeora»
&SNIM
Ti» Asta-Paificregion his the 
g re ite t poKntial fci tekcom 
giowtti, accmdtng to British Tek 
communications, hi ■%, a third of 
new phone lines worldwide were 
laid m CWra «riiere more ceS ijsws 
were added than in any natron 
except the US. Tne waiting giant is 
now the ihifd largest cSi marteL
K u a iu ta n
to rkm em ktan
U itw k ita f l
Country site and color are deter­
mined by the relative degree of 
penetration of TVs and phone 
lines. Countries for which no data 
was available are not included. 
Highest saturation-É ii im in H
Lowest saturation
in Hong Kong, 2S percent of ail 
phone users are oél phone users 
-  this despite a plethora of 
iandhnes.As in Israel, ceil phones 
here are used to supplemerit,. not 
replace, traditional telephones.
vÎ ;  CYPRUS
The 366,400 phone ikies m this 
develop'hg economy make uni­
versal service a reality A iine is 
available for every two people, as 
compared with one for every four 
in neiÿibciing Turkey.
222^ 3
TELEPHONES -  AND YOU GET A BRAND-NEW MAP.
Moreover, with technologies moving from 
earth to air -  and in the case of cable TV vice 
versa -  media use is even less predictable. In 
Bangladesh, the wait time for a new iandline 
phone exceeds six years, but you can score 
your own cell phone overnight. This leapfrog
syndrome, the speed of fT development, the 
entrenchment of socioeconomic inequity -  
these factors are shaping and animating the 
media map. In an effort to reckon with the 
world’s differences. Wired took a tour of the 
action. -  Leila Conners Petersen
D E B W I R E D  N O V E M B E R  1 9 9 8
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Figure A2.24: Freedom to Connect, produced by Wired magazine, August 1997. 
(Source: scanned version from Harpold 1999, no pagination.)
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Appendix Two
Figure A2.25: Internet’s ‘black holes’ produced by Reporters without Borders as 
part of a campaign against online surveillance and censorship. (Source: 
<ww^wrsf.org>.)
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Appendix Three
Network Marketing Maps from Website Survey', 
August 2007
1. Verizon Business (USA), <www.verizonbusiness.com>
Source: <www.verizonbusiness.com/us/about/network/?link=topnav>
V e r iT O n ougness Our gkAW IP network ha» IP swhche« in 128 dtlaa.► Global Networts " IP Network
view Full Map
Select a region from left
North America
Asia Pacific
Africa
O Access Hub C#y 
@ D sa  Center Services AvaSsbie 
— Metro CWewl
Network routes and speeds ere subject to c
VOriTOnbusmess * Global Network -IP  Network Our global IP network has IP switches in 128 cities.
View Fiji Map
city to view network speeds
North America
Asia Pacific
S outh  Africa
South Africa - 8 Mbps 
, South Africa - 30 Mbps
O Access Hub Otv 
Data Center Services 
Metro Cireuit
Network routes and speeds are subtect to change
 ^ Note, web addresses were correct at the time o f the survey. Where multiple maps were 
available, for example for different regions or countries, only a representative example is shown 
here.
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2. AT&T WorldNet (USA), <www'.att.com>
S ource : <www%corp. att.com/globalnetworking/media/network map. swf>
AT&T
Global N etw ork Map
To navigate the  AT&T Global Network Map, 
scroll over a region and click on it to  view in 
m ore detail. at&t
J
h
* hie« erf*»*
AT&T
Global Service Map
To view the  different AT&T services 
click on the buttons below.
IP-Enabled FR/ATM
UM tiNtoW* toh* 3666
Giotei/
Maneged (P-Enabled 
FR-'ATW
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AT&T
Global N etw ork Map
To view city nodes, scroll over a country and 
click on it to view in more detail-
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3. Sprint (USA), <www.sprint.net>
Source: <www.sprintworldwide.com/engiish/maps/index.htnil>
Global Network IP
 ^ A-
#  Spnrt»>P«rt»r
3 Gkbaf NetiX^rk
122T 5ÿrw #  ng^ .-esened Sprintai
Canada
North America 
Global IP
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United
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Mount
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Mexico
San kNeCat»#'
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C 20S7 Sprsx Wixfe* /aser«^tf
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4. Cogent Communications (USA), <www.cogentco.com>
Source: <www.cogentco.com/htdocs/map.php>
c o g e n t  I
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5. Level 3 Communications (USA), <www.level3.com>
Source: <www.level3.com/about us/aboutlevel3network/index.html>
Level 3Level 3 International Connectivity
# WmmMlfiilwiflgiaBU
0 tecmfot 
"  Tlgwmnir abie
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k»l weroM W» *e »<«W!6 baliea. w iaefceed 
#efc6dr»e*ble e tiitt fs tk  h«ei »  Usf k 2056
me wiBiiu r PMWti ilillabJMWWIiüHi
The Level 3 Network Levels
• Om4IMIW*tWilMBArWMA
*  e#kre2N,ARwK
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6 . Qwest (USA), <www.qwest.com>
Source: <www.qwest.com/about/qwest/network/ ; http://stat.qwest.net/>
Qwest® Network Maps Owose fn*n U* mebwnrk types Wow and Wggle map qplkms
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✓ENAL 
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y  Major Cities
Contact Qwest*
Qwest® Network Maps Choose from the network types Imlow and toggle map options
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Qtsa IP , Q
R-anm Rel:^. ATM C 3 
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JSN#totte Circuit Délimitions
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BBBEBS
o c - m
oc-iz
jytejnPOP 
✓ Acceos POP 
✓Major Citiee □
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7. Global Crossing (USA), <www.globalcrossing.com>
Source: <www.globalcrossing.com/network/network_interactive_map.aspx>
^  Global Crossing H o m e  1 S i te  M a p  | S i te  S e a r c h  
S a t u r d a y  9 - 2 9 - 2 0 0 7
To view th e  in te rac tive  m ap click h e re .
Top ol Page J
2006-2007  Global Crossing, All Rights Reserved ( Terms of Use ] Privacy
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8 . Time Warner Telecom (USA), <www.twtelecom.com> 
Source: <www.twtelecom.com/about us/networks.html>
Appendix Three
TIME WARNER^TELECOM
CWNECTtNG VOUR BUSINESS TO MORE BUSiNESS'
 ^ Ctiek any location to sao 
g' sales contact information
—  -O TmtrnmK TwMxtmatMH
10. Hurricane Electric (USA), <www.he.net> 
Source: <www.he.net/about network.html>
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11. Abovenet Communications (USA), <www.above.net>
Source : <www.above.net/products/maps.html>
mW
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12. Verio (USA), <www.verio.com>
Source: <www.verio.com/about/network/gin.cfin>
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13. XO Communications (USA), <www.xo.com>
Source: <www.xo.com/about/network/maps.html>
IP Network Assets : XO Communications
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14. Sawis (USA), <www.sawis.net>
Source: <www.sawis.net/Products+Services/Network/InfrastructureMaps.htm>
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15. TeliaSonera (SE), <www.teliasoneraic.com>
Source:
<www.teliasoneraic.com/files/Teliasonera%20Intemational%20Carrier/Articles/
Flash%20map/IP_backbone.html?LinkType=Static%20File>
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^  switch between m<?5EB Ewibpe
B us
B  Asia •Use the map controls izoom, arrows. minl-Tnap'tto
zoom and move tt% maç=.
•Print the current view
Transferring data from www.teWasoneraic.com. 2s*erq;i m
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16. COLT Telecommunications (NL), <www.colt.net> 
Source: <www.colt.net/uk/en/about colt>
7  TV
7  7 7
Q  GCX?<cnnecwd(*y # Opirattom! n»»«Drk oT»r»e«»
(O Q)
Data Voie© MarggeO Services
jzoteroreTransfwrtig dat4 from «iw<.coll.nel...
Appendix Three: 14
Appendix Three
17. LambdaNet (DE), <www.lambdanet.net>
Source: <www.lambdanet.net/userfiles/netzgrafiken/lambdanet-netzwerk-e.pdf>
The LambdaNet fibre network
-6,500 km optical fibre 
-40 cities, 11 countries
- 24 data centres (X-Net-ColoCenter)
-13 internet peering points
- 5 metro networks (MAN)
L a m h d a w jS N e t:###
: DMkMr
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18. VSNL International (CA), <www.vsnlintemational.com> 
Source: <www.vsnlintemational.com/map/>
Appendix Three
+
t-
^
'v  Ottobrunn
Madrid
Lisbon
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19. Deutsche Telekom (DE), <www.deutschetelekom.com>
Source: <www.deutschetelekom.com/dtag/cms/content/ICSS/en/216802>
T ICSS Interactive Network Map
’i  L . ^3»?
: S : fWKCn «*C<8nS»-
T-SSr ICSS Interactive Network Map
I----- ^
Bratislava
Black b-‘-^
0
?5GIS|S-H5(ai«.«Gta »®»K
Pom tof Presence (POP)
^  PoP: Pam;l2SrnSP<f
QM»«.SDKW Address; ! IS nrrP ew ew  prsX iJPxis
ï.t>!4»îv? ST:t
20. Swisscom (CH), <www.swisscom.com> 
No maps found.
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21. Tiscali International Network (DE), <www.tiscali.net>
Source: <www.tiscali.net/index.php?a=b&id=l01 &p=network_map>
tiscali.
TimcWi WwnaAon.l Networii
jietwork .iwt woiK hm|>
pop list
austria
belgium
china
Czech republic
denm ark
fran ce
germany
greece
Italy
norway
P o lan d
siovaida
spam
Sw eden
Switzerland
the netheriands
uk & Ireland
usa
man map
amstertiam
london
p an s
m adrld
bruxelles
Network Map
Do you want our mapîCBck here
GET A QUOTE
Our offers are tailored 
to your needs. Get In 
touch with us cBck 
lie ie  »
%
IkNTBmaoM 1 r
4
%
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23. WV Fiber (USA), <www.wvfiber.com>
Source: <www.wvfiber.com/netmapus.htm>
Potfrts of Presence
^  Public Peking Exchange
lOGorOCIda
;
0 ^  Data Center
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24. KPN (NL), <www.kpn.com>
Source : <www.kpn.com/kpn/sho w/id= 1228594>
Appendix Three
KPN Global Network
v> iSc ccuntrwe yw KM4 nMwcxk 
an« SmfT< Tcltfcmwi ft other unim
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t^jpk Rniwd. hw tt. W 'M ». hB ïç^
iwMi, )«pv\ Luaembcnns Hoftog. PowgK 
SfltgapcR S*fl«lû4!p».Sw<*e^S*twlJKkfe^. 
IMullàii90cm.U£4.
Orne Swp Shewing )em(t 
i5 OMmw. emofl^^nch Aussiiih lem rv  kmgena 
CWkCraee*. E$#. Itoo» hme Karam 
tauw B, fim nb. «uhu.. South Mnw
£te^ S«b*afwCe<»r*»
#(N. Anm»Â ONWi Wnt. OCS. 
CehMbukft MÜ, aHL«St aaci £SÏIK*I»-ÏT
RAC Eera*94 m *. Wtf OS. mPL MEDJAIV 
SWi SfljAWBÇÎhaSMWl WTU
Mdn B* mAtttnnc caMcw MUbi* I90n r««m: 
sate^ftunngMom
•—Sübiwrecip»ni» S£o««w«mhir»ow»nrifWrad^ ÛMitnowtfiKPNbiijMr3t*gfe«»?»fftl.»K QmCooNiage
%  kpn
-» Home
-* C ustom er n e e d s  & 
so lu tion s  
■* Network se r v ic e s  
*  In ternational
- t  E u rop ean  Network 
G lobal Network 
■t Network fa c ts  ft
-t N ew s & p ress
-» Partners 
■» C ontact 
-» About KPN 
In ternational 
•*  O eutsch
European Network
Further KP\ \etwork map
Global N etw ork | N etw ork f e e t  ft f ig u r
j -
DWDM, SDH an d  MPLS te c h n o lo g y
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25. LG DACOM (KR), <www.lgdacom.net>
No maps found.
26. Interoute Communications (UK), <www.interoute.com> 
Source: <www.interoute.com/network_map/index.html>
in terou te
Interactive network map
Brmm 
WTOJt -
tsatm mm»
 ^ mm# cmagRmmw xswm 
mm» mmm siaown:
Prin te r friendly  p a g e  [F i  em ail p a g e
Network map help
Dr$g th e  map to 
m ove around
Click on a country to
Interactive network map
Network map help
D rag th e  m ap  to  
m ove around
C lick on a MAN to  
s e e  m etro  netw ork
Click on a node to  
s e e  lo ca tio n  m ap
C lick anyw here  e ls e  
to  zoom  b ac k  ou t
m
v^nætro network
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27. Korea Telecom (KR), <www.kt.co.kr> 
No maps found.
28. Bell Canada (CA), <www.bell.ca> 
No maps found.
29. PCCW (USA), <ww\\\pccwglobal.com>
Source: <www'.pccwglobal.com/network-technology/ip-coverage.php>
\  I '-
[8
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30. KDDI Corporation (JP), <www.kddi.com>
Source: <www.kddi.com/english/business/oversea/index.htmI>
Appendix Three
KPÙ! Global Hefwork Map KDDi
mt.MM OLSSki Htrtrow. of OVS»£At CBfTR*
rzar œaa
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31. Transi eleCom (RU), <www.transtk.ru>
Source: <www.transtk.ru/www/nsf/esite.nsfi'docs/dwdm.html>
Kmf» :: NBSIRÎ " DWDM Network
The DWDM Network of TromTdeCotn
n »  DWDM tedmotogy
TroKTeleCof» began to  «îptetnent the CWCM tetfwctogy in dl the  main h e *  of the brKkbor*. Jn h e  near futme, the  cap aü y  of the  netwmkwK^ow, oofwiderébty fût the  in o a  p tfoiat
tekcsmmimaUtirtroute*, whichwilalow f r a n e T e t e C o m t o li - i :  ,rl c ir  t-„
» «  coTBtKxtmn of the DVWJW naCwcrk tc fiss ts  of ts»»e phases:
  M ia tc lw a s h n s h s d m  the eatV  2 0 »  w<h the CwOM system hRsSsd on the 8700-k»Jonç tout» thnajîhicamennogorsfc. S a t t  Petersburg, Moscow, Eiaterk-burg. Novosfctrsk, frfiut*,
attd2abatebk .
  P h a s e  2  was finshoj on the July 1st, 2005. ti-ansleteCoir, so r te d  cmnmoroal E tptetshon o f th e ln e  between Katsennoaorsk (lem nçyad*^ region) and Karyiasky (C tita tegon),
camptetKn of this stage rx i eased the DWCM network length up to  12 7D0 I n  and ptorlded redundancy fen the most important routes.
—  P h a se  3  was finished on the M oremberlSth, 2005. fh s s ta g e e o s ire d  th e  hJiedundancy  of Che DWDM netwoA, its  t o t a i t e t ^  reached l8 0 2 S in .
TransTeleCom conbtuoush' develops the DWDM network
In Pehruayy 2005, the If»  between MosoQw-Kusk-yt»or»s)-Rostov.na-Oonu>voS9C igiad-Saratov‘ Syiran* Samara, so called‘Scuthwa-,'', was p tth to w o tfc . The lenGth of the  new 
DWIW Ine teaches 3600fra.
TransTeleCom started w orionoot: the prthect tom otease networkcapaotyin the Par East legtxii to am strua the2200km kxx iD W D M Ine . ’ > sn? . ,
Reagona
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32. Cable & Wireless (UK), <www.cw.com>
Source: <http://portal.cw.com/wps/portal/intemet/UK/GlobalView>
CableéWiretess
q 9 q
UNITED
KINGDOM
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33. Net Access Corporation (USA), <www.nac.net>
Source; <www .nac.net/enterprise/dedicated.asp?page=NetMap>
net ccess NetworkC O R F   ^ O R A T I O N  
www.nac.net 800-NET-ME-36 MW
# !
NYIIX
A D o v e N e t
165 rt»lsey 
r.e Ji iwMwk. m li BtseawjvV b rt- m
i ECUimx Z j "
Hurricane
E le c t r i c
' Microsoft
NYCX
I /Cogent a'ls
i<Km3nK Cabevisio-tCsdar W k
Savvis
gcjg SE Qct2 o g  fe
2486 loeo €22 135 100
34. IIJ Internet Initiative Japan (JP), <www.iij.ad.jp> 
Source: <www.iij .ad.jp/en/network/backbone/index.html>
3T3Dhina
IIJ s Backbone Network
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35. Asia Netcom (CN), <www.asianetcom.com>
Source: <www.asianetcom.com/inter/index.asp?pg=network_infrastructure>
Asia Netcom IP Service Coverage
■* A N C P P o P
#  Provider
g  PuU c intern^ Exchange Point
♦  Private Peering Point 
O -  ANC DiA Partner
* - ANC DIA Partner Coverage Cofertani ©Ai<» N*e»m200S
37. Golden Telecom (RU), <www.goldentelecom.ru> 
No maps found.
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38. British Telecommunications (UK), <www.btglobalservices.com>
Source:
<www.btglobalservices.com/business/global/en/about_us/global_connectivity/>
Global
BT Presence
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* Subsea cables
► VSAT
RESET EXTRACT Ver 1.30.21
NORTHRMEWCA
ASiAPAàFîC
SOUTH AMERICA
•  B T M PlSPoP , ' aiM PLSNcl-K At BT M « S  ptonned P e f  •  »T ATKTR EoP /  B T A T W /fR tW nw rk
•  ST fUgton •  ST PaP attnwed #  Swbw# L aw m # Pm*w S w b m  CaWe*
#  Voice SwriKh 
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• Voice Switches
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Germany
BT Presence 
► NctweHk
•  _
• BT ATMfR H«wori(
• Region PeP)
Region Networtt
■ Subseo cables
RESET EXTRACT VwIJIt.A
UiMfhd i^ Otl.'Awc >**a
VLfl jw
T«ur
ToiWWmiK 
♦ lE T H B I U R t»  ,
ef y _
mawM . i
T< BicWmx
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39. REACH (HK), <www.reach.com> 
No maps found.
40. PoitSO (SE), <www.rixport80.se> 
No maps found.
41. PIPEX (UK), <www.pipex.net> 
No maps found.
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42. Intemap Network Services (USA), <www .intemap.com > 
Source: <http://event-portal.intemap.com>
^btMTERMAP
CAREERS I INVESTOR SER'/ICES I SITEMAP
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43. Yipes Communications (USA), <www.yipes.com>
Source: <www.yipes.com/technology/tech_network.shtml>
Ncjrtii
Europe
4 ^ ,Mm
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?
m SAM Ff*rwas«:o tfe(c»go
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1 #  i m
'• # 'Dp o«™i 
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St to w t
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^ 2 )  S«Dit^st¥ POP Lotnlion 
Ctweragie Area
O- , Yo«*Uiflrton Phliatteifriiia
I»  W a s ^ n g ttM i DC
OAllât*» /
Miami
44. New Edge Networks (USA), <ww)\%newedgenetworks.com> 
Source: <vAvw.newedgenetworks.com/about_us/coverage/>
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45. Romania Data Systems (RO), <www .rdsnet.ro> 
No maps found.
Appendix Three
46. RTComm (RU), <www.rtcomm.ru> 
Source: <www.rtcomm.ru/en/geo/net/>
47. Cablevision (USA), <www.cablevision.com> 
No maps found.
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49. France Telecom (PR), <www.francetelecom.com>
Source:
<www.francetelecom.com/en/our solutions/wholesalesolutions/about us/>
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AmefKa / .
International Network
SAT>WASC SAFE
M
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► Global view
r o i B l i B B a i  _ 
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System in sw w e 
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*  P o in t o f p re s e n c e /U n d in g  s ta tion
*  P oint o f  p re te n c e  w ith  H ew ing
* Cities
A legend
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50. Cox Communications (USA), <www.cox.com>
No maps found.
51. GTS Energis (PL), <www.gtsce.com> 
Source: <www.gtsce.com/maps/index.php>
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52. Flag Telecom (UK), <www\flagtelecom.com> 
Source: <www.flagtelecom.com/index.cfm?page=4024>
Appendix Three
 ZV • i  WM
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53. SingTel (SG), <www.singtel.com> 
No maps found.
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54. Integra Telecom (USA), <w^^'.integrateIecom.com>
Source: <www\integratelecom.com/about/network_and_facilities.asp>
Integra
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